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# The Edinburgh Review

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JULY, 1917 —————— OCTOBER, 1917

To be continued Quarterly

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# The Edinburgh Review

JULY, 1917 No. 461


## NATIONAL FEDERATIONS AND WORLD FEDERATION

1. **Bodies Politic and their Governments.** By BASIL EDWARD HAMMOND. Cambridge University Press. 1915.
2. **Recueil de Rapports sur les différents points du Programme-minimum.** Published for the Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. 1916.
3. **The Morality of Nations.** By C. DELISLE BURNS. London University Press. 1915.
4. **Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty.** By HAROLD J. LASKI. Yale University Press. 1917.

WHEN President Wilson called upon Congress to declare a state of war with Germany, he justified his action to his countrymen and to the world by the lofty disinterestedness of its motive. This was 'to vindicate the principles of 'peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish 'and autocratic power, and to set up among the really free 'and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of 'purpose and action as will henceforth ensure the observance 'of those principles.' The conditions on which alone the United States would become a party to such a concert he had already defined in his Address to the Senate of the 22nd of January—a statement of his ideal aims to which enormous

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weight has undoubtedly been added by the entry of the United States into the war. There seems, indeed, to be a tendency to look upon this epoch-making event as throwing upon us and our Allies an entirely new obligation. Whatever the objects for which we have hitherto been fighting, it is argued that the supreme aim of the Allies must henceforth be the realisation of the ideal of an international commonwealth, based on the principles of pure democracy and sanctioned by the 'organised force of humanity.' It appears to be assumed by many people that what was, after all, but the expression of the President's personal views is the settled policy of the United States, and that we should in some sort be untrue to the new union of purpose between the two great branches of the English-speaking race were we to refuse to commit ourselves to it. This attitude, as might be expected, is most pronounced in quarters most out of touch with patriotic sentiment. The 'Nation,' for instance, outstripping all other competitors in somewhat fulsome adulation of the American people and government, is eager to subordinate purely British interests, and hopes to see, as the outcome of the future Peace Congress, the establishment of some 'real 'Society of Nations,' which would only be possible, it implies, 'under the leadership of the United States.' *

This outburst of sentiment is perhaps natural in view of the deep gratification, which all of us feel, at the bridging of the chasm which has so long divided us from the American people, with whom we have always been conscious of being united by innumerable ties of interest and sympathy. The fact remains, however, that the ideal of a League of Nations must be judged by us upon its merits; nor is there in the circumstances under which America entered the war anything which throws upon us a fresh obligation in this matter. It is true that an ideal motive lay behind the action of America in taking up arms, just as it did behind that of Great Britain. It is untrue to say that, in either case, the immediate impulse to action was anything but the vividly realised necessity of safeguarding the national honour and interests. Great Britain declared war, and persists in the war, not only because she was bound in honour to protect the rights of Belgium, but

* War and Peace, Supplement for May 1917, p. 5.

because the German policy of expansion by conquest threatened her vital interests. America equally declared war because her honour and her vital interests left her no other alternative. This the President himself has explained in quite unequivocal language.

'I have again and again stated the very serious and long-continued wrongs which the Imperial German Government has perpetrated against the rights of commerce of the citizens of the United States. The list is long and overwhelming. No nation that respected itself or the rights of humanity could have borne those wrongs any longer.'—The Times, 24th of May 1917.

Nor is this all. For some time past there has been a growing realisation among thoughtful Americans that it has been to British sea-power alone that the United States has owed her long immunity from attack; and the moral has been enforced by Mr. Gerard who, speaking with all the authority of a former American ambassador at Berlin, has publicly declared that, had Germany succeeded in destroying this power, she would certainly have directed her next attack against the United States. Thus, although it may be true that America had nothing to gain by entering the war, she had much to lose by remaining out of it. We have welcomed her participation for many reasons, of which reasons of sentiment are not the least; but there is no obligation upon us, because of this sentiment, to commit ourselves blindfold to the carrying out of the ideal programme put forward by the President as the ultimate justification of his action in the eyes of humanity.

This programme was made by me the subject of some criticism in the last number of this Review. I there ventured to challenge President Wilson's claim that the tradition of the American people gives them a 'peculiar right' to appear as the pacific nation *par excellence*; I pointed out the dangers to the British Empire and to the nations at large involved in the acceptance of the conditions laid down by the President as essential to the participation of the United States in a world-union; and I drew attention to the significant omission from his programme of any reference to the principle of universal freedom of trade and intercourse, which to many is the absolute *sine quâ non* of a peaceful co-operation between nations. But no attempt was made, either in the President's

address or in my own criticism of it, to deal with the fundamental practical problems involved in the organisation of a League of Nations. The object of the present article is to contribute to the discussion of these problems, mainly by drawing attention to the lessons to be derived from a study of the essential character and the practical working of those actual inter-State systems which have been put forward, at one time or another, as models for a general international federation.

It may be noted, by way of preface, that a number of very able political writers have of late years been busy clearing the ground for a world-system by a lively attack on the whole traditional theory of sovereignty and independence. Both Mr. Delisle Burns and Mr. Harold Laski argue that the State is but one among many groups in which men are associated for common purposes, and that as such it is entitled to no special pre-eminence. It follows that the sovereignty, i.e. the right and power to enforce its will (a right and power actually limited by consent), which is predicated of the State in its relation with the groups—churches, trade unions, and the like—within it, is equally illusory when conceived as 'independence' of other state-groups. Sovereign States, Mr. Delisle Burns insists, are not in fact independent, but interdependent, and increasingly so with every advance of modern civilisation. If this fact has not hitherto been recognised—and the war proves how far it is from recognition ! —this is because the morality of nations has lagged behind that of the people who compose them. A general levelling up of international morality is, he concludes, the *sine quâ non* of the establishment of an efficient international system. There are not wanting signs of the growth of an uneasy feeling that this lack of international morality is due to the excessive exaltation of the principle of nationality during the last hundred years, the disastrous results of which have been most conspicuous in the case of Germany.

Into the vast questions opened up by these speculations it is not proposed to enter here. The new world which will be formed out of the ruins of the old is even now being rough-hewn by the elemental passions unchained by the war, and it may be doubted whether it will be the providence of the philosophers that will shape its ends. It may be that the

inherited passions and prejudices which we associate with nationalism, as they have grown up among the decay and violent ruin of an old and outworn order, will die down under the influence of a more broadly humane culture. But he would indeed be sanguine who should assert that this change of heart will come about as the immediate outcome of the war, or could safely be assumed as the basis of the settlement to follow. Men may change, but human nature is unchanging ; and in human nature the passion of hate is apt to be more constant than the passion of love. 'Men's natures,' wrote Lord Burleigh, 'are apt to strive not only against the present 'smart, but to revenge by-past injury, though they be never 'so well contented thereafter.' There can be no doubt that this war will leave behind it a terrible legacy of hate between many of the nations engaged in it, and it is not upon a basis of hate that an international commonwealth can be built up. The problem of international relations after the war will, in fact, remain very much what it was before the war—namely, that of adjusting the relations between intensely self-conscious and mutually antagonistic national groups, of very varying size and power, in such a way as to preserve the peace between them. This adjustment has for more than two centuries past been the task of diplomacy, which may be defined as the regulated intercourse between sovereign States by means of their accredited agents. The principles and practice of diplomacy have been exposed, especially since the outbreak of the war, to attacks which seem to me to be exaggerated ; for the debt which the world owes to organised diplomacy, at least during the last hundred years, is greater than many people are willing to allow. The immediate question, however, is not whether diplomacy has failed, but whether the system which it is proposed to substitute for it—namely, a federal or quasi-federal world-union involving a certain sacrifice of the traditional notions of sovereignty and independence—would succeed any better in providing a firm guarantee of peace.

The programme which has found the most general acceptance is that of the American League to Enforce Peace, of which the provisions are as follows :

'First : All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations

of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

'Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

'Third: The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted, as provided in the foregoing.'

It will be noted that this programme carefully avoids the assertion of any principles, such as those laid down by President Wilson, on which there is a fundamental difference of opinion *ab initio*; and it is for this reason that it has been so widely accepted. It represents, in fact, no very radical breach with the traditional procedure in international relations. The task of settling disputes between nations is still in the first instance to be left to diplomacy. The obligation of submitting justiciable disputes to an arbitral tribunal is not carried beyond that which has already been defined in many treaties between the Powers. The suggested Council of Conciliation is, in effect, but a device for bringing collective diplomacy to bear on questions in dispute, with a view to the avoidance of war, as has happened often enough in the past, e.g. in the case of the Berlin Conference of 1886 which demarcated the respective spheres of influence of the Powers in Africa. The sole important innovation is the obligation laid on the members of the League by the terms of the third article; but, though they must submit their cases, there is no obligation, other than moral, upon them to accept the decisions arrived at. Finally, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the right of any State to secede from the union is maintained. In short, the League to Enforce Peace, thus conceived, would not constitute a federal union, but would at most be a somewhat more elaborately organised concert or alliance of sovereign Powers.

Other programmes, backed by a less weight of expert authority, but put forward by groups widely and influentially supported, carry the process much further in the direction of international federalism. Of these, two of the most recent may serve as generally typical. First the 'Proposal of a British

Group,' published in the 'Manchester Guardian' of 12th April, and second the programme of the League of Nations Society. The first of these is in the main but an elaboration of the programme of the League to Enforce Peace, e.g. in defining the competence and functions of the Council of Conciliation. But it introduces two new principles of the most vital importance. In the case of justiciable disputes the obligation to submit them to an arbitral tribunal is made absolute, the 'limitations 'of treaties' being done away with, including the reservation of cases affecting 'honour and vital interests.' The 20th article provides for the eventual coercion by the League of any Power which 'shall fail to accept and give effect to the recommenda- 'tions contained in any report of the Council or in the award 'of the Arbitral Tribunal.'

The language of the programme of the League of Nations Society is more obscure, but it seems to uphold the same principle. There is an obligation on the signatory Powers not only to submit all justiciable disputes to the Hague Court of Arbitration or some other Judicial Tribunal, but also to accept their decisions as final and to carry them into effect. The third article provides 'that the States who are members of the League 'shall unite in any action necessary for ensuring that every 'member shall abide by the terms of the Treaty.' This should mean not only that the obligation to submit justiciable disputes to arbitration is to be enforced, but that the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal are to be backed by the collective power of the League. Unlike the programme of the 'British Group,' on the other hand, enforcement of the recommendations of the Council of Conciliation does not seem to be contemplated.

Other programmes go yet further, and in order to make the sanction of force effective propose the establishment of an international Executive and a standing international police force. These, according to Sir Frederick Pollock, are essential 'if a league to enforce peace is to be in a position to exercise 'timely and effective force at need and to nip offences in the 'bud.'* He dismisses the contention that such a central organisation would merely be a revival of the Holy Alliance in

* 'The American Plan for Enforcing Peace,' Atlantic Monthly, May 1917, p. 653.

another form, but without giving any reasons why the process of nipping offences in the bud should be less dangerous to national liberties now than it was a hundred years ago. Clearly, it will remain a matter of opinion where the seeds of offences lie and at what particular stage of germination they are to be nipped. Sir Frederick Pollock does not shrink from the infringement on national sovereignty which the logical development of an international system would imply; and, certain premisses being granted, he is doubtless right. The main premiss he lays down with characteristic clearness in discussing the formation of an international general staff. 'Obviously,' he says, 'there are plenty of difficulties in this operation; but 'it seems no less obvious that they are of a kind that can be 'overcome if there is a general will to overcome them; and if 'there is not such a general will there cannot be any league 'at all.'

Here at last we come to the root of the whole matter. The groups into which men form themselves are effective only in so far as they grow out of a common need and are directed by a common will. This is as true of States as of trade unions, and of federations as of States. Moreover, when a body politic, whether State or federation of States, is made up of many groups, it is essential to its stability and permanence that the interests of its constituent groups should be subordinated, in all matters affecting the commonwealth, to those of the whole. There must, in brief, be a general will exercising in the last resort that absolute dominion which, as Sir William Temple pointed out long ago,* is of the very essence even of democratic government. Without this the body politic will simply break up into its elements—a truth made disquietingly clear by the developments of the Russian revolution. In view of the efforts, to which allusion has been made, to depose the State from its pre-eminence, this is a truth that needs re-statement. And if it be true of the State, it is true also of federations of States, and will be true of the 'universal union' if and when it comes into existence. The 'organised major force of mankind' is either an empty phrase, or it implies the effective supremacy or sovereignty of a general will over the wills of all the national and other groups within the world league.

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* Essay upon the Origin and Nature of Government, 1672.

This is a consummation which from the point of view of people with an 'international mind' is devoutly to be wished. The 'Nation,' which in England is perhaps the most distinguished representative of this mind, sees, or affects to see, the main obstacle to a world-federation in 'the clamour of some 'special interests for preferential treatment in Africa or Asia, 'or some misunderstanding of a phrase, like Freedom of the 'Seas.' But the obstacles to any organised international system, as even Mr. Bertrand Russell clearly sees and admits, lie very much deeper than any mere clamour of particular economic interests of individual persons or groups of persons within the nations. They lie in the fact of the existence of the nations themselves as they have developed during the last hundred years—that is to say, as intensely self-conscious groups bound together not only by carefully cultivated separate traditions, customs, and habits of life, but by jealously guarded economic interests. We may deplore this segregation, the fruits of which are only too visible in the present war; but it exists, and though the war may do much in the way of regrouping and of modifying the sentiments and relations of certain nations to each other in the direction of amity and co-operation, it will still more certainly intensify old antagonisms between the nations now opposed to each other. This is admitted by Mr. Bertrand Russell, who does not share the illusion of his brother pacifists that a system of international government can be presented ready-made to the peace congress with any hope that it will be effective, even if it be accepted. 'We have 'still,' he says, 'a very long road to travel before we arrive at 'the establishment of an international authority'; and the very first step in this long road is that people must rid themselves of their 'group morality'—that is to say, of that loyalty to their own nation which, for 'nine citizens out of ten,' carries a higher obligation than any considerations of abstract justice or the good of humanity.* The cosmopolitan ideal is thus conceived as the logical culmination of the long process by which the groups formed by men for certain common ends are again grouped in larger sovereign aggregations until, with the final realisation that the ties uniting human interests as a whole

* 'National Independence and Internationalism,' Atlantic Monthly, May 1917.

are far more numerous than those which divide them, one group is made supreme over all.

The ideal that underlies this conception—that of the world as it ought to be, and perhaps might be but for 'the fault and 'corruption of the nature of every man'—must appeal to all people of good will. But it has very little to do with a League of Nations considered as an expedient of practical politics. The amount of mutual understanding, and of a general will to maintain peace, which Mr. Russell predicates as necessary for his 'international authority' would, in fact, make such an authority unnecessary. All that would be needed would be a purified diplomacy to conduct the necessary friendly business between harmonious groups inspired by community of sentiment and interests. The immediate question is, rather, how to preserve the peace in a world of narrow sympathies and conflicting interests, of slow or violent economic and social shrinkages and expansions, of racial, cultural, and religious antipathies—in short, of the world as it is and is likely yet to be. Would in such a world a League of Nations, with a central executive and an international police force, be a guarantee of peace? Would it indeed—to quote Mr. Asquith—mean 'the 'substitution for the reign of force, for the clash of competing 'ambition, and the groupings and alliances of a precarious 'equipoise, of a real European partnership?' To think so is to suppose that it will be possible to establish an international system in which the harmony of the general will is more pronounced than it is even in national States; for in these, too, it is force that in the last resort gives dominion; in these, too, there is a clash of competing ambitions; in these, too, there are groupings and alliances of organised interests and parties, and an equipoise which, so long as there is liberty and movement, must always be precarious.

Nor, if we descend from the regions of abstract speculation to the real world of politics, is it by any means clear that the formation of a general union would be the logical culmination of the processes that have led to the grouping of men in communities and junctions of communities. As Mr. Hammond has shown, the almost universal process in such groupings has been that of war and conquest. He gives, indeed, five examples of 'voluntary junctions of equal communities'—namely, in ancient Achaia, medieval Switzerland, the Dutch Netherlands,

North America, and Switzerland in 1848. But even of these he notes that 'in all cases before their junction they had been 'precluded by their position from conquering one another, i.e. 'either by geographical obstacles or, in the case of America 'and the Netherlands, by subjection to powerful foreign rulers 'who effectually prevented them from contending with one 'another.' *

Moreover, whatever causes may have brought about the formation of particular federal groups, their cohesion, in so far as it has been due to a common will, has always been the result of a sense of particular interests as opposed to those of other groups, and of the pressure exercised by these other groups. The league of the Swiss Cantons was originally formed against the oppressions and aggressions of German feudal neighbours; it was enlarged and cemented by successful resistance to the Imperial ambitions of the House of Austria. Defence against Spain, and later against France, was a sufficient bond of union in the loosely-knit confederation of the United Netherlands. The thirteen original States of the American Union began by quarrelling among themselves to the point of war; and if, fourteen years after the Declaration of Independence, the Federal Constitution of the United States was at last ratified by all of them, this was because 'the interest 'of every State demanded that the central government should 'be strong enough to ensure the federated States against 'foreign enemies.' † Instances might be multiplied; but these will suffice to show that bodies politic, whether States or confederations of States, whatever the original sympathies which drew them together, are essentially combinations for the assertion and defence of their common interests against other competing groups outside.

There are examples enough in history to show that when this competition ceases to be keenly felt the group tends to lose its sense of community, freer play being given to the centrifugal forces of the conflicting interests within it. This is conspicuously true, of course, of that loosest of all forms of political group—the international alliance; and it is true in varying degrees of all others. In the days when Great Britain held the undisputed mastery of the seas, and some-

* Bodies Politic, p. 469. † Ibid. p. 487.

thing like a monopoly of the world's trade, the British Empire was all but allowed to fall to pieces ; it has needed the challenge of Germany to draw it together in a strong group-consciousness. So long as the threat of French domination on the North American continent continued, the English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard were well content to form part of the British Empire. It was not until after the conquest of Canada that they became conscious of their separate rights and interests as against the Mother Country and, striking for independence, threw off its protecting aegis. The splendid isolation of the United States beyond the ocean brought its dangers in turn ; the interests of the States and groups of States within the Union, never very firmly cemented, drew apart in the absence of external pressure, until the great Federation was all but shattered by the war between North and South. The tendency of federations, or of other more or less loosely compacted political groups, has in short been to break up in the absence of any need for common defence against external enemies. Can we suppose that a world federation, of which the very *raison d'être* is to remove the apprehension of war, will prove more stable ?

Those federations which have survived have done so because, as in the case of the United States, they have developed a common sentiment far stronger than any which may divide their constituent States, based on the consciousness of interests, traditions, and ideals distinguishing them from other political groups. They have survived, in short, because they have become nations. Looking upon the world as it is, it is difficult to believe that any such powerful cement of sentiment could be found to bind together even the civilised peoples, not to mention the half-civilised and the uncivilised. In the absence of such a sentiment any international organisation which might be devised would depend for such stability as it might possess on a system of checks and balances, which in the long run would prove no more effective in keeping the peace between nations than the expedients of the old diplomacy.

It will be objected to this that it is mere assertion : at best the expression of an opinion based upon historical precedents which may, and probably will, have no application to the changed circumstances of the future. This is perhaps true. Yet the light of experience, or of reason applied to experience,

is the only light that it is safe for us to follow among the snares and pitfalls of a tenebrous world. This truth has always, indeed, received at least partial recognition from the champions of a European confederation, or of a world union, as the case might be. From the first they have pointed to existing groups of federated sovereign States as giving a foundation of fact to ideals which might otherwise be recognised as unsubstantial, and they have been careful to frame their plans on existing models. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the most obvious model for a league of nations was the Holy Roman Empire, which was still in theory regarded as the world's 'centre of political unity'; and upon this all the various projects of peace, from that of Émeric Crucé to those of the Abbé de St. Pierre and his successors, were more or less closely based. In 1806 the Empire came to an end; and in 1815 the Congress of Vienna refused to restore it, in spite of the clamour of the lesser German princes and the protests of the Papacy. But meanwhile a new model had been set up beyond the ocean in the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, which was destined by reason of its vast territorial expansion, as well as of its general effectiveness within the wide limits of its jurisdiction, to impress the imagination of men as perhaps the nearest approximation as yet attained to the ideal of an inter-State union. Finally, the close of the Napoleonic wars saw not only the attempt of the Great Powers to govern Europe in concert in the interests of peace, but the establishment in the German Confederation of an international organisation which, in the eyes of certain contemporary enthusiasts, was destined to become 'the centre of the States-system' and to develop into a Confederation of Europe.

So far, then, as the mere substructures of their systems are concerned, the various projects of peace have a basis in experience. But little or no attempt has been made to bring the light of experience to bear on the vital question of how far these substructures can be trusted to carry the immensely greater weight which it is proposed to place upon them. Yet surely it is but a counsel of prudence to inquire, before committing the world to the building of an international 'sky-scraper' on the American model, what lessons are to be derived from the record of less pretentious edifices erected on similar

foundations. This inquiry cannot, of course, be made exhaustive within the limits of the present article ; but enough evidence may be adduced at least to excuse, if not to justify, the doubts expressed as to the practicability and desirability of establishing an organised international government. In order to keep the subject within reasonable limits, illustrations will be drawn only from the history of the Holy Roman Empire, the German Confederation, and the United States of America.

In spite of the great changes in the world's order since the Holy Empire ceased to exist, even in name, there is a good deal in the history of the last centuries of its existence that bears on our inquiry. The reorganisation of the Imperial Government by the Emperor Maximilian I. in certain respects actually anticipated some of the features now suggested for an international system. At the Diet of Augsburg, in August 1485, private war was forbidden, and jurisdiction over breaches of the public peace (*Landesfrieden*) was given to the new Imperial Chamber (*Reichskammergericht*), composed of trained jurists, who represented not the Emperor but the Empire, and were appointed by and responsible to the Diet. The decisions of the Chamber were in the last resort to be enforced by the Imperial army, to which contingents were to be contributed by each of the circles into which the Empire was divided ; it was to be set in motion, after the ban of the Empire had been proclaimed against the recalcitrant State, by the Emperor with the consent of the Diet. The Empire had long since lost the character of a unitary State : it had in effect become a confederation of princes, great and small, secular and religious, and of city republics. This character, accentuated after the abdication of the Emperor Charles V. in 1556, was confirmed after the Thirty Years' War by the terms of the Peace of Westphalia, which, while preserving the semblance of Imperial authority and the central organs of the Empire, really erected the 'estates' of the Empire into sovereign States. The Imperial Diet lost all semblance of a parliament in our sense, and from 1663 onwards assumed definitely the character of a permanent congress of envoys.

It was by an unhappy process of decay and disruption that the Empire had thus acquired the character of an international federation, and it certainly required a large faith to

see in it the model or the nucleus of a world-union. Yet Leibnitz not only approved the conception of the Abbé de St. Pierre in basing his league to enforce peace on this model, but had himself many years earlier set forth a similar project, differing only in the proposal that the Empire itself was to become the effective 'temporal head of Christendom,' and as such 'to pursue the common good and, without striking 'a blow, to keep the swords in their scabbards.' * Leibnitz was not only a philosopher: he was also a practical man of affairs. The splendid vision of a reformed and strengthened Empire united with a reformed and strengthened Papacy to keep the peace in the universal Christian Republic was doubtless to him an attractive theme for abstract political speculation. But in 1670 the pressing need of the moment was to protect Germany and Europe against the ambitious designs of Louis XIV., and for this practical purpose Leibnitz recognised that the Empire was useless. The plan he proposed is interesting as anticipating, in somewhat similar circumstances, that of the League to Enforce Peace. This was the formation of a new Alliance, with a central Directory in permanent session at Frankfurt, to which the Powers of the Triple Alliance—England, Holland, and Sweden—should be invited to adhere. Its point was directed against France, but Leibnitz contemplated the perfecting of the league by her ultimate inclusion.† The project, however, was still-born, and before the treatise was even finished the French invasion of Lorraine had relegated its arguments to the world of dreams.

It is germane to our purpose to note the reasons given by Leibnitz for the impotence of the Empire. It lacked a permanent executive council, a common treasury, a standing army—in short, the effective organs of a centralised State. In the absence of these it was impossible to compel the Estates to pay their contributions, at least regularly, and impossible to collect their armed contingents in time to be of any use, if at all. The deliberations of the Diet had degenerated into a solemn parade, and, with much ceremonious debate about trifles, it transacted nothing of importance.‡ As for the

* Bedenken welchgestalt Securitas Publica interna et externa, etc., §§ 94. Œuvres (Paris, 1865), vi. p. 133.

† Ibid. p. 124. ‡ Ibid. § 21.

Imperial Chamber, in view of the uncertainty of the rules of law it had to apply, it had become the happy hunting-ground of hungry jurists, and in the extreme dilatoriness of its procedure it easily beat the record of the old English Court of Chancery. In short, the Holy Empire, as an experiment in international government, was certainly not encouraging. It completely failed to keep the peace between the German States; and, so far as it possessed any collective weight, this was used merely to turn the scale on the one side or the other in the constant struggle to maintain the balance between the greater and more aggressive Powers. At best it illustrated, almost to the point of caricature, the probable fate of a league of nations founded on any less secure basis than a common group-consciousness far stronger than the separate consciousness of its component national elements.

In its essential features the history of the German Confederation established in 1815 is a repetition of that of the later developments of the Holy Roman Empire, but as an object-lesson it is even more striking. It may be noted at the outset that, whatever it was in fact, *de jure* the Empire was a unitary State. Leibnitz, indeed, was at pains to show that the obligations of the princes to Emperor and Empire did not detract from their status as sovereigns *; but when, in 1700, the Elector of Brandenburg became King of Prussia the style assumed showed that the status of independent sovereign implied in the royal title was recognised only in respect of those of his territories which lay outside the Empire. The Constitution established in Germany by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, on the other hand, was definitively that of 'a Con-'federation of Sovereign States.' Moreover, not only had the leading German Power, Austria, great territories outside Germany, but three foreign sovereigns were represented in the Diet of the Confederation in respect of their German territories: the King of England as King of Hanover, the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein, and the King of the Netherlands as Duke of Luxemburg. The essentially international character of the Confederation was thus from the first accentuated, and was recognised when the right of the

* See Caesarini Fürstenerii De Jure Suprematus ac Legationis principum Germaniae. Cap. xii. 1696.

ambassadors of France and Russia to attend the Diet was admitted. This ingerence of foreign Powers, as Treitschke scornfully points out, was supported by the lesser German States in their distrust and suspicion of Prussia and Austria. But it was supported also for more ideal reasons. The historian Heeren hailed the Confederation as the nucleus of a European League of Peace.* The statistician, Professor August F. W. Crome of Giessen, proclaimed that the interests of Europe and of Germany would only be secured when every European Power should have a right to a voice in the German Federal Diet.†

This view, however offensive to German patriotic sentiment, seems to have had some justification and support in the acknowledged objects of the Confederation, which was, within its limits, of the nature of a league to enforce peace. Article LXIII. of the Federal Act ran as follows :

> 'The Confederated Courts engage . . . not to make war against each other, on any pretext, nor to pursue their differences by force of arms ; but to submit them to the Diet, which will attempt a mediation by means of a Commission. If this should not succeed, and a juridical sentence become necessary, recourse shall be had to a well-organised Arbitral Court (*Austrägalinstanz*), to the decision of which the contending parties are to submit without appeal.'

In the Federal Act itself no provision was made for enforcing such decisions : this was among the constitutional questions left for future settlement by the Diet. The result is instructive. In view of the mutual jealousy of Prussia and Austria, and of the distrust inspired in the lesser States by both, it was three years before even a provisional arrangement could be made as to the organisation of the common army and the quotas to be supplied by each State ; and provisional the arrangement remained to the end. How feeble was the sanction of 'federal execution,' unless backed by the weight of one or other of the Great Powers, the sequel was to prove ;

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* Der Deutsche Bund in seinem Verhältniss zu dem Europäischen Staatensystem.

† Ueber Deutschland's und Europa's Staats- und National-Interesse bei und nach dem Congresse zu Wien. (1814, 2nd ed. 1817.)

and for the Great Powers, from the first, the Confederation and its organs were only valuable in so far as they could be made to subserve their own particular ends.

It is unnecessary for our purpose even to outline the history of the German Confederation during the fifty years of its existence. Stated briefly, it was that of the struggle of Austria and Prussia for supremacy, and of the lesser States to maintain their independence by holding the balance between them. So far as the influence of the two Great Powers in the Diet was concerned, the struggle was brief enough. The indiscreet zeal of the Prussian envoy Hänlein, by a premature revelation of Prussia's claim to military hegemony at least in the North, gave Metternich the opportunity he desired for winning over the lesser States to the interests of Austria. Secure of their votes, Austria became supreme in the Diet, and used her supremacy to prevent its ever becoming anything more than a congress of envoys, powerless to come to any decision of the least importance without special instructions from their Courts, and therefore in practice powerless to come to any decision at all. 'The Federal Diet,' wrote Treitschke, 'had 'already the reputation, which it preserved till its dissolu- 'tion, of being the great exchange for the subaltern diplomatic 'gossip of Europe.'

As for Prussia, she virtually ceased to take any interest in the proceedings of the Diet, which was useful to her mainly as a diplomatic-military observation post. Humboldt, who succeeded Hänlein at Frankfurt, reported that nothing was to be expected of the Diet, and that institutions for the common good could only be established by means of separate intercourse with the individual German States themselves. The policy of Prussia, he said, must aim at weaving these neighbour States more or less into the web of her own political and administrative system. 'In these words,' comments Treitschke, 'lay the whole programme of the Prussian '*Bundespolitik*.' The hegemony of Prussia was thus prepared by the Zollverein, which bound the German States to her by ties of self-interest; it was consummated by Bismarck's policy of blood and iron, and under the hammer-blows of Prussia the Confederation of Sovereign States was welded into a national unity more self-conscious and self-assertive than any that the world had yet seen. The net result, then, of the

experiment in the organisation of peace inaugurated by the *Bundesakte* was that it disguised from the world, behind the *camouflage* of an international system, the preparations of Prussia for continuing her advance towards the mastery of Europe.

To fear a similar result from a more general system may seem to many the very *reductio ad absurdum* of alarmist pessimism. It may be admitted at once, indeed, that the analogy between the German Confederation and any proposed world-federation is not perfect, and that the strong development of nationalism in Germany paved the way for the domination of the State in which this national consciousness seemed to be most effectively embodied. In a world-confederation it is improbable that any one Power would be able to profit by any such general sentiment. But at the outset, and indeed for many years, there was really no strong unitary sentiment in Germany, and the factors which from the first vitiated the federal experiment were precisely those which are recognised as most difficult of adjustment in wider schemes of international federation. Of these the most important was the want of proportion between the constitutional powers of the constituent States of the Confederation and their actual force and power. By Article LV. of the *Bundesakte* the members of the Confederation were declared to be, as such, equal in respect of their rights, and for the purposes of the normal business of the Diet this equality was all but absolutely recognised. In the plenary assembly, which alone was competent to make or to alter ' fundamental laws,' the distribution of the votes was, to quote the language of the Act, ' calculated according to the respective extent of the individual ' States.' Of such a calculation there is, however, little enough sign, and actually the voting power of Austria or of Prussia was only four times that of the tiny principality of Liechtenstein. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that the Great Powers would rely on their separate force for the attainment of their ends, and use or neglect the organs of the Confederation as it might suit their convenience of the moment.

If this happened in the case of the German Confederation, which had at least some sort of common national and cultural tradition, it would be far more likely to happen in so artificial a construction as an organised general league of nations.

The stability of such a league, in the absence of a common group-consciousness, would depend on the establishment within it of a balance of power based on the actual force of its constituent States, and of a mechanism for the readjustment of this balance from time to time without violent conflict. The problem of devising such a mechanism has exercised the minds of some of the supporters of the idea of a universal union.* Of the suggested solutions that of Signor Eugenio Rignano, editor of the international review 'Scientia,' is for our present purposes of particular interest. He takes as his model the Federal Council of the present German Empire, in which Prussia now has twenty votes, Bavaria six, and the other States in proportion, down to the small principalities and city republics, which have one each. This represents an attempt to approximate the voting power of the States to the actual force at their command, and so to avoid the most crying anomaly of the old German federal system. To apply this principle to the 'Federal Council of Europe' would, Signor Rignano admits, not be easy. In judging the effective power of States many factors have to be considered besides population, and since these factors (e.g. wealth) fluctuate, the balance would have from time to time to be adjusted. Since, however, if the principle of representation were once established, this readjustment would be a purely technical operation, Signor Rignano thinks that it might be safely left to the Hague Tribunal.

This may serve as an example of proposals which, however ingenious, do not carry conviction. As for the German *Bundesrat*, the moral to be drawn from its character is hardly that which Signor Rignano teaches; for, whatever the attempted balance of power in its formal constitution, in effect its dominant factor is the immense preponderance of Prussia. It is true that Prussia commands only twenty votes out of fifty-eight; but, as Signor Rignano himself points out, she has only to secure ten additional votes to obtain a majority. In the absence of any other Power in the Confederation comparable to her in force and influence, this is no

* See, e.g., the 'Avant-projet d'un traité général relatif au règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux, par la Commission néerlandais d'Études,' in 'Recueil de Rapports,' p. 241.

difficult matter; it would be otherwise were another Great Power, Austria for instance, included in the Confederation and competing with her for supreme influence within it. The establishment of an approximate balance of power in the central organ of the world-federation might modify, but would not remove, the objections to it as an effective instrument for securing international harmony.

It is doubtless the extreme difficulty of solving this particular problem that accounts for the fact that the programmes of peace most widely accepted avoid all mention of it. In commenting on the first article of the programme of the League to Enforce Peace, Sir Frederick Pollock commends this reticence. 'The constitution of the Tribunal,' he says, 'is wisely not specified in detail.' The wisdom is indeed obvious, if the object of the League be merely to obtain the general endorsement of a principle by disguising its dangerous implications. For the question of the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and of the Council of Conciliation is, as a matter of fact, the most important and critical which the framers of an international system have to face. The decisions of these bodies would carry enormous weight, even were they backed by no more than a moral sanction. Were they to be enforced by the collective power of the League, they would be acts of sovereign authority, and the organs of the League would constitute an international government in a true sense. It has been recognised by serious and not unsympathetic students of pacifist programmes that it is all but impossible to set up a tribunal to try international causes that shall in itself inspire complete confidence; the factor of national bias is too persistent. Nor does the question of the possible corruption of the judges seem ever to have been raised; and yet the possibility of such corruption in an international court, consisting of somewhat heterogeneous elements, has to be considered. If the court were really to receive effective general powers, there would practically be no limit to the amounts it might be worth while for a litigant Power to offer in order to secure a favourable decision. This being so, the question of the measure of representation to be given to each of the constituent States in the governing organs of the League becomes of vital importance. Is this representation to be based on the actual size and power of the nations, or on the

principle, consecrated by international law, of the equality of all sovereign States ?

Difference of opinion as to the answer to this question was the rock on which the proposal to set up a permanent Court of Arbitration was wrecked at the second Hague Conference. The small States, jealous of the preponderance of the Great Powers, claimed an equal representation. The Great Powers insisted on a preponderance proportioned to their *de facto* pre-eminence ; and, to judge by precedent, they will secure it, whatever compromise may be agreed upon. Were the most perfect equilibrium devised at the outset in the new organs of the international government, nothing would prevent these from being made sooner or later fresh battle-grounds between the States. All the arts of the old diplomacy would be used to gain a preponderant influence in them ; groups, and even ' partial alliances,' would be formed within the League ; and the result would be at best ' a precarious equipoise,' at worst the predominance of the strongest Power. The final argument of a Great Power which should conceive its vital interests to be jeopardised would be the threat of secession, as Prussia seceded from the German Confederation in 1866. Needless to say, were Germany or any other Great Power left out of the combination, the risk of such secessions would be greatly increased, since it would be to her interest to sow dissensions in the League. It was the realisation of the fact that an ostracised France might easily become the nucleus of a new alliance that persuaded the Four Powers, at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, to admit her to their fellowship.

It will again be objected that all this argument drawn from a dead past is beside the mark ; that the conditions have changed and, as a result of the great war, will change yet more completely. The day of Kaisers and capitalists, the fount and origin of all evils, is over, and with the universal reign of Democracy will come also the sense of universal brotherhood and a peace securely based on the mutual love of nations. The very word ' Powers ' is an anachronism ; henceforth we should speak not of Powers but of Peoples.*

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* J. A. Hobson, ' Towards International Government ' : ' So long as nations are conceived as Powers . . . no stable international arrangements are possible ' (p. 181).

It seems an act of obstinate and ungracious scepticism to do anything to dash so fair a hope by suggesting that it is founded less on facts than on phrases. But, especially since the Russian Revolution, there has been a danger that increasing numbers of people may be led by 'wandering fires' into perilous political quagmires, and it thus becomes necessary to illuminate their path, as far as may be, with the clear, cold light of history. History tells us that in this proclamation of a cosmopolitan gospel by the Petrograd revolutionists there is nothing new; it seems to be due to a reaction natural in the minds of an oppressed people which, having escaped from bondage, tries its wings for the first time in a strange and unfamiliar world. It is as yet far too soon to say what direction things are likely to take in Russia. But we may note that the language of the Russian revolutionists is precisely the same as that used by the French revolutionists, under very similar circumstances, during the earlier stages of the great Revolution. They, too, proclaimed the brotherhood of man as their ideal; they, too, announced the dawn of an era of international peace and fraternity to be guaranteed by the universal recognition of the Rights of Man; they, too, when they threw down the gage of defiance to the tyrants of the world, disclaimed the intention of making any conquests except for Liberty. And all this was but the prelude to twenty-five years of aggressive war: not for the benefit of humanity, but for the predominance of France and of French ideas. Whatever moral applicable to the situation in Russia we may draw from this, at least it proved quite clearly, and once for all, that organised peoples *are* Powers. As for modern democracy, this has not passed out of the first stages of experiment, and its great possibilities are yet in the future. He would be a bold man, however, who should affirm that democracy has hitherto tended to reduce the bitterness of rivalry among nations. The concentrated hatreds of the present gigantic *Völkerkrieg* are without parallel in the ceremonious professional wars between the potentates of the old order. Nor, in view of the fact that, inside the democratic States, powerfully organised popular groups have over and over again refused to subordinate their particular interests to the general good, even in the face of grave national danger, is it to be supposed that democratic State-groups would be

any more willing than sovereign princes to submit to the supremacy of an international organisation, or to claim in that organisation anything less than the exact weight to which their effective power would seem to entitle them.

It may be supposed that on this question some light might be thrown by the experience of the United States, of which the constitution is that of a federation of sovereign States based on democratic principles. But in reality this experience is only partially applicable to the question of a general international federation. To begin with, though each of the thirteen States forming the original Union had a very strong separate group-consciousness, no question was involved of what we now understand by nationality. All the States were English in speech and in their traditional customs and institutions. The surprising thing is not that they agreed to delegate some of their rights to a Federal Government, but that after their common experience in arms they were so reluctant to do so, and that it was only after years of debate and strife that a Federal Constitution could be agreed upon. In framing this Constitution, as in the case of those of the several States, the Fathers adopted the principle of checks and balances, and in this respect it has at least a negative value for our inquiry. The difficulty of proportioning the weight of the constituent States in the central authority to their actual size and power was overcome, or rather compromised, by an expedient obviously inapplicable to a true international federation. The principle of the sovereign equality of the States was preserved by their absolutely equal representation in the Senate, to which each State, great or small, sends two representatives. The balance was redressed by the fact that both the supreme executive authority, the President, and the members of the House of Representatives were to be elected by the people at large. Although, then, the name of Congress preserves the idea of an inter-State delegation, the assembly at Washington from the first assumed a national rather than an international character ; and the tendency has been to increase this national character as, with the growing complications of relations created by modern social and economic development, the need has been felt for a more general competence in the central power.

From the first, indeed, the Constitution deprived the States

of rights without which, according to any accepted definition, they could not be considered as sovereign. They surrendered the most fundamental prerogative of a sovereign people—that of choosing their own form of government ; for all were bound to the republican model. They surrendered absolutely the right to enter into separate relations, either of peace or war, with foreign Powers. They were forbidden by the Constitution to maintain separate armed establishments, though in this case the prohibition has not been obeyed.* Finally, the right of secession—though on strictly democratic principles this is the concomitant of the right of association—was definitively taken away as the result of the Civil War. As the outcome of this war the United States became established both in idea and in fact as a unitary nation. In American consciousness the States no longer represent a plurality, but a unity, and this consciousness is so strong that it contentedly ignores the rules of grammar. Officially the United States *is* a nation.

Clearly we have here a process which, within any measurable distance of time, could not take place in the case of any confederation of nations divided from each other by fundamental differences of tradition and sentiment. It has been claimed that the United States has solved the race problem, so far at least as the European elements of her population are concerned ; but it has been solved, or is in process of being solved, by a process of assimilation. In this, at least, democracy has shown its power. The United States has succeeded where, e.g., the Habsburg Monarchy has failed ; it has imposed the use of a common language on all its citizens, in the schools, and in the conduct of public affairs generally. For the rest, there has been a large tolerance, and of recent years an increasing tendency for considerable groups of foreign immigrants to combine their new allegiance with a conscious effort to preserve their separate national traditions. These 'hyphenated' Americans also have been tolerated ; but what would not be tolerated would be any attempt on their part to remodel the Constitution of any State, in which they might chance to secure a majority, on the lines of separate nationality. Herein lies

* The position of the 'National Guards,' or State Militia, was regularised by Congress in 1905.

the essential difference between American federalism and federalism as alone it can develop in the British Empire. The task of the Americans has been to unite many commonwealths into one nation ; that of the British is to unite many nations into one commonwealth.

The measure of success attained by the British Empire in the accomplishment of this task—and how great it is the present war has proved—seems in some degree to justify the hope of a world-order based on the same principle of co-operation between nations. There are, of course, elements in the constitution of the Empire which would be absent from any general commonwealth of nations—elements which combine to produce that separate group-consciousness to which reference has already been made. But, from the point of view of the desire to reinforce the comity of nations in general, it is of interest to note that this ' Imperial Commonwealth ' flourishes in spite of, or rather because of, the extreme looseness of the political ties which unite it. It is not a federation : the groups of which it is composed are bound together mainly by a sense of common interests and devotion to a common ideal of liberty ; and its effective cohesion has increased in exact proportion to the abandonment in practice of the theoretical supremacy of its metropolis. It has already been pointed out in an article on ' British Imperialism ' appearing in this Review in July 1915 that in these respects the British Empire has a special claim to be regarded as the best model for an international system.

This view has since been put forward, with far greater weight of authority and far more persuasive eloquence, by General Smuts, notably in his great speech at the banquet given in his honour at Westminster and at the debates of the Imperial Conference. ' People talk,' he said, ' about a ' league of nations and international government, but the only ' successful experiment that has ever been made in Inter- ' national government is the British Government, founded on ' principles which appeal to the highest political ideals of man- ' kind.' He strongly deprecated any attempt to stiffen the bonds of the happy unity thus attained by setting up a strictly federal system. So far from the Dominions being asked to surrender any of their rights, as in the case of the States of the American Union, he declared that such centralisation

as still exists in theory, and to a less degree in practice, in the British Empire will have to be abandoned, and that it will be necessary, 'to some extent,' to recognise the status of the Dominions as equal nations of the Empire. 'To a 'very large extent,' he said, 'we are a group of nations spread 'over the whole world, speaking different languages, belonging 'to different races, with entirely different economic circum-'stances, and I think that to attempt to run even the common 'concerns of that group of nations by means of a Central 'Parliament and a Central Executive would be absolutely 'to court disaster.'

If this be true of the British Commonwealth, in which the existence of a 'general will' has been so admirably proved, it is far more true of that wider commonwealth of the nations which it is hoped to establish. Without this general will an international federation would be impossible; with this general will it would be at best superfluous, at worst the cause of fresh dissensions. It will doubtless be necessary when this war is at last over to keep an alliance in being, in order to maintain peace during the long and perilous process of reconstruction that will follow, and even perhaps for some time after this process has been completed. But if our statesmen are wise, they will watch with a jealous eye, as their predecessors did a hundred years ago, any attempts to convert this alliance into a permanent system of international government.

WALTER ALISON PHILLIPS.

# THE FOUNDATIONS OF FOOD POLICY

**Report of the Royal Society Committee on the Food Supply of the United Kingdom.** Cd. 8421. 1917.

IN considering any big and complex problem, such as that currently presented by the food situation, it is of primary importance to take a comprehensive survey of the whole ground, map it out in strong lines and bold colours, and keep steadily before the mind a condensed picture, a bird's-eye view, of the subject as a whole. Only so can the problem be got into proper perspective and the component parts of it be seen in their correct proportion. The picture will, of course, always be 'subject to alteration without notice,' for the various elements of the situation wax and wane in importance with each turn of events, while the emergence of new factors compels a constant redistribution of emphasis. Within the last few months the rapid increase and subsequent decline in the losses of ships and cargoes, as also the entry of America into the war, have to some extent shifted the centre of gravity and the lines of most effective action; while the progressive condition of the world's crops calls for a periodical readjustment of present policy in relation to future contingencies. Yet through all these mutations the broader features of the food situation persist, and it is only by bringing these out in high relief and examining them well that a basis for sound judgment and policy can be formed.*

Prominent among such features is the ratio between our home-production of food and our total requirements as measured by the peace standard. There are now available, for the first time, in the report of the Royal Society Committee on Food Supplies, the data necessary for computing that ratio. The report embodies certain errors—it overlooks the fact that a considerable part of the meat, milk, cheese, eggs, and butter

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* For the investigation on which this article is based, I am indebted to sources and facilities placed at my disposal by the Garton Foundation.

'produced at home' is raised on imported feeding-stuffs, and that practically the whole of our home-produced margarine is made from imported materials—and corrections must be made on these accounts. When this is done, it appears that in the five years before the war we produced at home 45 per cent. of the protein, 39 per cent. of the fat, and 30 per cent. of the carbo-hydrates we consumed; or altogether 36 per cent. of the energy value in terms of calories represented in our total consumption of food. Putting this into a rough statement it may be said that before the war we produced at home a little over one-third of the food-stuffs we were accustomed to consume in one way or another; we imported the remaining two-thirds.

These figures suggest without more ado one dominant conclusion which, though commonly taken for granted, may still be investigated to advantage: that even though the most rigid economy be universally practised, and the output of our home fields be increased to the utmost extent possible at such short notice and with such a depleted labour supply, we shall still remain vitally dependent on imported foodstuffs. If this impression be confirmed by facts, certain momentous consequences follow.

How near can we get, by economy and by the utmost increase in home food-production that may be considered feasible, towards becoming nationally self-sufficing? In regard to production, two facts give, perhaps not a basis for reckoning, but at any rate a clue—first, that we normally produced at home one-third of the foodstuffs we were accustomed to consume, and second that the production of that one-third occupied about two million people. Therefore, if the Rule of Three could be assumed to hold good, to produce at home all the food we were formerly in the habit of consuming (were that otherwise possible), would require an additional four million workers on the land; or, to bring the statement more within the realm of immediate possibilities, for every 60,000 additional workers placed on the land, 1 per cent. more of our accustomed food requirements can be produced at home. The Rule of Three cannot, of course, be applied without innumerable allowances and reservations. Greater zeal, improved and multiplied machinery, an extended and more carefully studied use of artificial manures, better organisation and methods, and the

extension of spare-time horticulture, would, on the one hand, all contribute to a larger yield in produce per person employed; while the law of diminishing returns and the fact that the mass of the additional labour would of necessity be inexperienced, would, on the other hand, tend to make the yield per worker less. When these considerations are duly weighed, it will be seen that the Rule of Three is not so unreliable as might have been supposed. At any rate, it is clear that if we cherish the notion of increasing home supplies to any relatively important and material amount we must think, not in thousands, but in hundreds of thousands of additional agricultural workers; and if we have any dreams of making the British Isles self-supporting in the staple foodstuffs, we must dream in millions. The extra million acres stated to have been put under the plough during the present season should afford us, except in so far as the stinting of artificials and the over-growth of weeds diminishes the yield, an additional million tons of grain—a substantial contribution towards the four or five million tons of bread-grain required for our full sustenance. The extra three million acres projected for next season might very well, under shrewdly ordered cropping, come near to making us self-sufficing in bread-grain in 1918, and might even, as Mr. Lloyd George stated at the Guildhall, place us in a position in which, 'without a ton of foodstuff from abroad, no one could 'starve us.' But neither the one million nor the three million acres will yield up their harvest without labour; and so far the labour, even for the adequate cultivation of the smaller acreage, is nowhere in sight.

It is not necessary, however, that we should produce or obtain, in order to live and labour, as much food as we managed to get through in one way or another in the years before the war: that was a peace and plenty allowance: in the face of war and scarcity we can make shift on a good deal less, and are doing so now. But on how much less could we subsist in a real emergency? The report of the Committee on Food Supplies, referred to above, presents here also data upon which an opinion, if not an estimate, can be formed.

Economies can be effected in three ways: by people eating less, by the curtailment of sheer waste, and by using all the foodstuffs at disposal in such a way as to secure from them the maximum amount of human nutriment. In regard to the

first two of these, the report expresses the opinion that, calculated on a minimum physiological standard, there were either wasted or consumed in excess of requirements in the five years 1909–1913, 11 to 14 per cent. of protein, 25 to 30 per cent. of fats, and 10 to 14 per cent. of carbo-hydrates. The rate of food consumption appears to have been reduced considerably during the first two years of war, for the Committee reports that 'up to the present (July 1916) the supply of food has 'provided a general margin of about 5 per cent. above the mini-'mum necessary for proper nutrition.' If this be correct, the limit of personal retrenchment beyond which the health and productive energy of the nation must suffer, had, even at the date mentioned, been almost reached. These figures should not be accepted too implicitly. They are based on the researches of the physiologists—who are all too much given to regarding the human being as a glorified test-tube, whereas he is in fact a much more complex affair, with a mind and spirit that can on occasion do astonishing things with protein and calories. The accounts of peculiar people who flourish on five peanuts and two small lettuces a day, as of those others who live on next to nothing by chewing it after the manner of the celestial mills, 'slowly and exceeding small,' may also be received with reservation. We are not all quite so curiously made. The truth of what a person or a people can live and work upon, when they are so disposed, lies at the bottom of a very deep well.

In considering the economies possible under the third head—the using of all available foodstuffs to the greatest nutritive advantage—we are on somewhat firmer ground. The Royal Society report mentions six ways in which economies of this nature can be effected: the coarser milling of flour; the early killing of cattle; the use of fodder for the production of milk, pork, and veal rather than of beef, mutton, and eggs; the making of more cheese and less butter; the curtailment of brewing; and the diversion of a certain quantity of the material used for stock-breeding to human food. The conclusions reached, especially in regard to the food-value of beer, are somewhat indeterminate; but the gross saving that may be accomplished on the six counts appears to range between 10 and 11 per cent. The limitation of brewing, as well as the coarse grinding of flour, has been in force for some time past.

We are not on that account much nearer absolute knowledge of the economies effected. We do not know what has been the gain or loss in productive energy, what if any has been the compensating consumption of solid food resulting from the limitation of the beer supply ; we do not know whether coarse-milled and diluted flour has benefited or impaired the national stomach, has raised or lowered the national morale.

No estimate is attempted in the report of the gain to be effected by reducing the numbers of live-stock kept and giving preference to those which are most efficient ' converters ' of starch into protein and fat. In any case, there is an undoubtedly heavy loss in converting vegetable products into animal food, and it is therefore arguable that in time of dearth no agricultural produce should be grown specially to feed live-stock, and that the food-animals kept should be limited to such a number and kind as could be maintained on the grass crops of land unsuitable for arable cultivation and the offal portions of the table-produce grown. But such a conclusion cannot be accepted without qualification. Almost the only home source of edible oils and fats, items essential to our proper nutriment, is animal food. Moreover, the raising of beef or mutton results not only in food but also in wool, leather, and such by-products as gelatine, etc., all of which are necessary to our economic life ; and if we did not raise these things we should have to import them. For these reasons alone, and there are others, it is highly probable that to confine stock-raising within the limits suggested by the ' conversion ' argument would be economically and nutritively disadvantageous.

The reduction of food consumption by the inculcation of better kitchen economy offers a tempting field of effort, for the waste due to ill-chosen and ill-prepared food is incalculable. By far the greater part of this particular kind of waste occurs among the wage-earning section of the population : not because the wage-earner's wife is incompetent or wantonly slipshod, but because her traditional methods of food preparation are not helped out by knowledge of food requirements and food values, and also because she has not the appliances, nor in many cases the time, for economical cookery. Something can be done, and is being done, to remedy the lack of knowledge by instruction through the medium of the press, the leaflet, the lecture, and

the demonstration, but the indifference of generations cannot be repaired in a day or a year. To effect any really substantial reform, one would have to begin with the schoolchildren, and at the same time re-order and re-equip on more leisured and generous lines the wage-earner's home life—and in the meantime the nation has to be fed. The most hopeful line of approach, so far as concerns immediate results, is to be found in the establishment of municipal kitchens to supplement and compete with the 'ready-cooked' shop and the fried-fish bar; but the scale on which this remedy can be applied is obviously limited.

Whatever is done in this way, the educational propaganda must go on, and perhaps it is not too late to utter a word of criticism as to the tone of the exhortations to food economy which have hitherto been made. The dominant note of these exhortations has been 'Food is going to be scarce: eat less.' Now in the complex of instincts that make up human nature there happens to be one which, at the suggestion of probable scarcity to-morrow, prompts a desire to eat more than one's fill to-day. We are all vastly amused to tell each other of the 'perfectly wolfish appetite' we develop, and have to restrain, when we read the jumpy headlines and solemn admonitions of our breakfast newspapers upon the scarcity of food and the need for going on short commons. Certainly it is comical; but behind the joke is a moral. By our mode of appeal we have done much to generate the inordinate appetites we ask people to curb. There is no need to hide the facts of the food situation, even were the desirability of so doing governed solely by its effect upon consumption, for the appeal to reason and patriotism finds response; but in view of the force of instinct and the power of suggestion, more emphasis might with advantage be laid on the perfectly valid contention: 'You have eaten more than was good for you in the past: 'eat less, and you will fare better.'

The total maximum economy which could be effected in the ways above described can hardly be estimated, but the actual effect of any given diminution of consumption is readily ascertainable, and the figures are more than a little startling. If six million workers would be required to produce the whole of the food we were in the habit of consuming, then it requires no less than 60,000 additional agricultural workers (or their

equivalent in zeal, machinery, overtime, spare time, organisation, or direction) to produce at home each additional 1 per cent. of our customary food requirements ; or, contrariwise, every 1 per cent. reduction in the amount of food we consume saves the labour of 60,000 persons. If we may assume that by judicious eating, the curtailment of waste, and the using of all available foodstuffs to the best nutritive advantage, we can manage on 20 per cent. less food than would otherwise be consumed, we thereby save the labour of 1,200,000 agricultural workers. These are facts worth pondering by all who may be inclined to argue to themselves that a little personal carelessness or indulgence makes no matter, but that a few thousand workers more or less in home agriculture will make all the difference in the world—will make the difference between victory and defeat.

Yet when the last economy compatible with health and energy is made, even though we cut down our consumption by one-third, we should have in our normal home supplies not more than half the food required for our sustenance. The provision of the remaining half rests between the extension of our agricultural output at home and the maintenance of the services that ensure our overseas supplies. In shaping from day to day our food policy, we have to determine, as between these two, the order and degree of precedence which one or the other shall enjoy.

Let it be noted that it is particularly useless here to proceed by the always treacherous argument of ' In the last resort,' or its milder form of ' We must be prepared for every eventuality.' If the curve of the submarine depredations were suddenly to swing upward again and we found ourselves rapidly becoming isolated, not even a miraculous development of home agriculture right up to the level of national self-sufficiency would enable us to continue the war, for other things than food—things that cannot be produced within our own shores—are indispensable to our military efforts ; whilst *pari passu* with the severance of ocean communications would almost certainly come a hold-up of cross-Channel traffic. Sound policy can only be arrived at by a careful weighing of present tendencies and immediate probabilities ; and the prospects at the time of writing are that the activities of the submarine will be more and more effectively countered. What we have to anticipate and provide for is,

therefore, a situation in which the volume of shipping at call is still substantial, though much reduced and still sailing at some peril; in which an even larger demand on our own tonnage may be made for military and naval purposes, but in which the breach created by the depredations of the submarine is rapidly being filled by new construction both in the United Kingdom and in America, supplemented by the chartering of the numerous German ships in United States and Brazilian ports.

With these conditions in prospect, and keeping in mind the great scarcity of labour, we have to determine how effort shall be directed in order to yield the maximum amount of food per unit of labour employed. The food-provision services fall into three categories: home production, including agriculture and sea-fishing; shipbuilding to replace tonnage sunk; and transport, including both sea transport and the conveyance of goods from the docks to the consumer. All these services require labour, and a lively competition is all the time going forward between them for men. If men are to be withheld or released from the forces in order to ensure our food supply, or if workers ineligible for military service are being allocated to work of national importance, to which of these services should priority of claim be given: to agriculture, to sea-fishing, to shipbuilding, to the docks, or to port-to-city goods transport? The material available for such a calculation is neither very full nor very reliable—whilst here again many of the factors are modified by each turn of events—but it is possible to estimate with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes the main facts of the situation.

The food for human consumption produced in the United Kingdom in the five years immediately preceding the war averaged a little over 12,000,000 tons a year and occupied the labour of about 2,000,000 people. In agriculture one person employed produced, therefore, about six tons of food for human consumption per year.* This figure may usefully be taken as a basis of comparison.

* That is, six tons of food in its final form as bought and eaten by people. The food grown for and eaten by animals is not included, only the meat and dairy produce which they in turn furnish. Allowance has been made for the home-grown oats eaten by horses.

In sea-fishing one person produces sixteen tons of human food in a year—nearly three times the weight produced by the agricultural worker. Fish is low in fats and starch as compared with other foodstuffs, and the energy value of the fisherman's product is for that reason only about the same as that of the agriculturalist; but it is twice as rich in protein, so that a unit of labour employed in fishing yields six times the protein of a unit applied to agriculture. This is a point of some moment, for the present shortage is greater in the case of body-building foods than in fats and starchy foods. It is pertinent, moreover, at the present juncture to remember that the fisherman's harvest is laid on the quay the next morning, and with proper organisation can be on the table of the consumer within twenty-four hours afterwards. On the other hand, the fishing-boat is subject to the submarine peril, and a very heavy call is made by the Navy on fishing-craft and fishermen. It is fully realised in the fisheries that this must be so, and that mine-sweeping gives even better results by protecting than sea-fishing by producing food. The sources from which trawler crews can be supplemented are more restricted than in the case of workers on the land, but a certain amount of dilution is feasible, and is in fact at present being introduced to excellent purpose. It may be said broadly that labour, capital, and organising ability applied to the extension of sea-fishing at the present juncture would yield six times more food (in terms of nutriment value) than if devoted to agriculture, and would lay its produce on the shop counter not in three or fifteen months' time, but the day after to-morrow.

So much for the home-production services; now what of the services that provide us with our overseas supplies? The shipyards can do with more and yet more men, and are clamouring for them. Is it really nationally advantageous to set men building ships to bring food from abroad, or would their labour result in more food if it were devoted to the cultivation of our home fields? To answer the question a good many assumptions of a very hypothetical nature have to be made. One ought, for instance, to know the 'expectation of life' of a new ship exposed to the prospective submarine peril, and one ought to know the date of the end of the war. Not to enter into competition with Lloyds and the prophets, let it be assumed that the new ship will have a twelve-months' run after launch-

ing and that the labour devoted to shipbuilding will materialise in food as opportunely as labour expended on the land. One must also assume that the requisite food is on offer abroad; and that British credit and the state of the exchanges are good for payment by long-date bills or other financial accommodation. Unless this last assumption can be made, the procuring of food from abroad must entail not only shipyard and transport labour, but also labour devoted to the production of coal and manufactures to pay for the food brought in, which would radically alter the case.

These premises being accepted, the calculation is as follows: Shipbuilding and the production of shipbuilding material employed, at the time of the Census of Production (1907), some 400,000 persons, and resulted in an output of 1,670,000 tons gross of new shipping in the year. The year's output per worker employed was thus a little over four tons gross. Taking as a basis a steamer of 4200 tons register, this 4·2 gross tons would bring into the United Kingdom: from the States (allowing five cargoes of 7000 tons of grain each) 35 tons of grain per annum; from South America or India (allowing three cargoes of 7000 tons of grain each), 21 tons of grain per annum; or from Australia (allowing 2½ cargoes of 7000 tons of grain each), 17½ tons of grain per annum. By weighing and averaging these figures one arrives at the result that on the average of the four principal grain routes the shipping produced by one worker in a year would bring into this country in one year's run about thirty tons of grain. Coal and labour are absorbed in making the voyages, but these are insignificant items compared with the value of the cargoes carried. On the other hand, the rate of tonnage output can be, and is being, greatly accelerated by concentrating on standardised vessels of large cargo capacity, by improved machinery and methods, and by the extension of payment by piece in the shipyards. One may say broadly that, on the hypotheses submitted, a unit of labour devoted to shipbuilding is calculated to furnish, under the conditions immediately in prospect, at least five times as much food as a corresponding unit devoted to agricultural production at home.

Shipbuilding, therefore, is an exceedingly good labour investment for the nation at the present time, and if it be possible to carry out the programme pressed for by the Shipping

Controller, involving new construction at the rate of 3,000,000 tons a year, the hopes based by the enemy on the unrestricted submarine campaign will be very far from fulfilment. It was announced in the French Chamber of Deputies that during the first four months of 1917, 2,400,000 tons of world shipping had been sunk, and it must be remembered that the destruction of allied and neutral tonnage affects the maintenance of our overseas supplies almost as seriously as the loss of British ships. There is every reason to believe that the submarine menace is being progressively overcome, but there will inevitably be further losses of no inconsiderable magnitude. It would be unwise to moderate our programme on the score of the American reinforcements, for the new tonnage brought into being in America or seized in American ports is even now sorely needed for the supply of our Allies, whose shipbuilding resources are far smaller than our own, and for the development of America's military effort.

We cannot afford, therefore, to hedge on the 3,000,000 ton programme. To carry out this programme we need, according to Lord Curzon, the labour of 100,000 additional workers in the shipyards, together with the doubling of our present rate of steel output. The figure appears to be a good deal on the under side; but whatever the number of additional workers needed should turn out to be, it is crucially important that they should be found. In the matter of steel America can give invaluable help. The United States has gigantic capacities for iron and steel production. Her blast furnaces and rolling mills, worked at full pressure, can turn out far more steel than her own shipyards can absorb. We have equally great facilities for shipbuilding, along with inherited aptitude and skill. If arrangements can be made for America to send us the largest possible surplus of beams and plates, we can turn into shipbuilding a vast body of labour that would otherwise be occupied to very much less advantage in steel production.

To build new ships, however, is not enough. The whole of our shipping, old and new, and all allied or neutral shipping that comes to our shores, must be so served by our docks and railways that it can make the largest possible number of voyages in a given time. In this respect there is at present scope for great improvement. Before the war, on an average of all voyages and all ports, two days out of every four were

spent by steamers at sea, one day in a home port, and one in a port overseas. Since the war the time occupied in loading and discharging in our home ports has been much increased. The figure varies from month to month and from port to port, but up to quite recently 'turning round' was taking half as long again on the average as it took before the war. True, all inward ships are carrying heavier cargoes—heavier, perhaps, by 10 per cent.—but, even when that is allowed for, the waste of carrying power entailed by abnormal port delays is enormous. If ships could be turned round even in the time taken before the war (and it ought to be possible to improve a good deal upon that in a period of real urgency) the shipping at disposal could bring into the country one-tenth more cargo, which, on last year's figures, would have meant 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 tons more cargo in the year. No attempt to evaluate the food-productivity of labour applied to speeding-up at the docks can furnish a simple comparable figure; it is enough to say that the food-cost of congestion is immeasurably greater than the labour required to relieve it. Improvements are being effected, but there is still much lee-way to make up.

Many of the causes tending to produce congestion at particular docks—such as the diversion of trade to new routes and ports—are unavoidable; but even in these cases the consequent delays are preventable by intelligent anticipation and quick action. Most of the delays, however, are due to causes lying within the competence of the responsible authorities. Men were taken, for example, from the docks into the army during the first two years of the war with an utter disregard of consequences. The fact is explained, though not excused, by the fluctuating character of dock employment. Dock-labouring is a 'casual' occupation, subject to sudden rises and falls in demand according to season, weather, naval exigencies, and even pure coincidence: five thousand men may have no work to-day, but be on overtime to-morrow: and to run to-day's 'surplus labour' into the army without regard to to-morrow's 'surplus work' is a temptation that the uninitiated do not easily resist. That practice has, however, been checked during these latter months, and the shortage of labour at the docks has, moreover, in great measure been made good. To this end the creation of the Transport Workers' Battalions

has been a valuable contribution. Because of the fluctuating nature of dock employment as between port and port, it is essential to the full utilisation of the labour available that a mobile labour force should be created, working under a central organisation in touch with all the ports; and because the arrivals of ships vary seasonally, as well as fluctuate locally, the men comprising such a force ought to have some useful alternative occupation. The Transport Workers' Battalions fill both these stipulations: they are entirely mobile, they can be directed to any port where and when the demand is brisk, and the alternative occupation is provided by training for home defence. There are objections, economic as well as political, to such sectional use of military units in civil industry, and from every point of view it would have been best if the task of treating and directing the desired mobile force had been delegated at the outset to a joint committee of representatives of the Transport Workers' Federation and of the dockyard employers. In default of that, however, the Transport Workers' Battalions, comprising at their full strength 10,000 men, have rendered good service, their relations with the civilian dockers and the employers having been conducted with discretion and good faith.

Another way in which the effectiveness of dock labour could be increased is by the provision of better mechanical appliances. The backwardness of the docks in regard to the use of cranes, conveyors, runways, differential-level platforms, and other muscle-saving devices, has been proverbial for a generation past. The dockers have opposed the introduction of such appliances for fear of losing their jobs; the employers have acquiesced for fear of trouble with the men and because muscle was cheap and plentiful. Since the war these considerations have lost force, but there have come in their place other obstacles. To-day conveying appliances, however ardently desired, cannot be obtained except in small quantities and after long delays. Orders for such appliances can only be executed under permit from the Priority Committee, and at present they are only classed as A 4 in the priority groupings. Moreover, at least half a dozen different departments of State have a say in the administration of the docks and the control of the shipowners, stevedores, port authorities, and railways—and with such a divided responsibility it is difficult to discover

by whom, or through whom, orders for such mechanism should be placed. To rectify these adverse conditions labour-saving dock appliances should be re-classed on the priority lists, and 'bracketed' with shipbuilding as second only to munitions, whilst the question of divided authority and initiative at the docks badly needs a thorough overhauling.

It is possible, and indeed probable, that no amount of co-ordination between the several government departments in whose hands lies the hazard of cargoes at the docks would restore the pre-war level of efficiency. Behind all the confusion arising from divided responsibility rests the notorious fact that the taking over of so many ships by the Government has of itself greatly reduced the efficiency of our mercantile marine. The handling of a ship to maximum advantage involves a host of complex considerations. To the perception, evaluation, and balancing of these, the competent shipowner brings a life-time's experience with the instinct that long experience develops; and no government department, however ably staffed and well organised, can be expected for one moment to perform the shipowner's functions without a heavy drop in the efficiency of his fleet. Even if he be retained as consultative expert he cannot, with the best will in the world, control the employment of the vessels to the same advantage as before. The ingrained motive and habitual test of efficiency—commercial success—has gone; and no other has had time to mature in its place. The inordinate profits made by shipowners in the early stages of the war, and the very natural obloquy they incurred, doubtless gave an impetus to the movement toward government control. It is hardly to be doubted that the national necessities would have been better served by leaving the shipowners in possession and relieving them of their surplus gains under one or other of the taxation schedules. As it is, we have placated the not unrighteous wrath of the populace at the expense of its stomach.

But the conveyance of goods from ship's hold to consumer does not end with the docks. To get the maximum carrying power out of our shipping it is essential that there should be a clear run through from the ship's hold to the factory or warehouse or shop-counter. It is all too readily overlooked that a block at any point on the ship-to-counter route holds up the whole line. The responsible authorities have been brought to

recognise the importance of the docks ; if they will but project their vision a little farther along the railways and roads, transport arrangements will rapidly move a stage nearer efficiency.

The most pressing scarcity of transport labour is now in the distributing services—on the railways, the canals, the private rail sidings, and the roads. The hold-up of wagons at private sidings is at the moment a fruitful cause of halting goods transport. The firms concerned are short of labour ; whilst the railways cannot spare assistance, and in any case would probably hesitate to do so for fear of creating an undesirable precedent. As in a score of other industries, the need and the cry is here for ' strong able-bodied men '—women, boys, and men who have passed their prime, are of little avail for the goods-yards—and it is precisely such men that the military authorities are most loth to leave in, or send back to, civil employment. But the transport services stand high at the present juncture in the scale of national importance, and it is imperative that the drain of labour from the railway services should be stopped and the existing deficiency made good.

As regards the allocation of labour-power, it seems therefore clear that the services by which our overseas communications are maintained should have, unquestionably, the first call upon the available labour resources. The shipbuilding yards should be kept supplied with the requisite number of skilled workers and with as much suitable unskilled labour as can be spared, and a sufficient number of men should be allotted to the docks and railways to ensure the quickest possible unloading and distribution of cargoes. After these essential services have been provided for, every effort should be made to keep the sea fisheries at the highest level of productivity by retaining skilled fishermen, by diluting their labour with supplementary untrained labour, and by replacing the losses of fishing-craft or adding to the number afloat. Finally, while it is most desirable to retain skilled agricultural workers upon the land, additional labour for agriculture should come from those classes of workers who are unsuitable for, or not required in, the previously mentioned occupations.

Thus to relegate home agriculture to the fourth and lowest place among the services to which we have to look, at the present juncture, for the maintenance of our food-supplies goes sorely against the grain ; but the conclusion can only be

avoided at the cost of allowing that the continued vigorous prosecution of the war is not of paramount importance—that the rehabilitation of British agriculture is of greater moment, here and now, than the adequate feeding of the people, in default of which the war, so far as Great Britain is concerned, is at an end; or, a variation of the same theme, that the food problem will become even more acute in the decade following the peace, and that the dangers of the future are more grave than the necessities of the present. The immediate task in regard to the first of these considerations will be touched upon in a moment. As regards the second, the signs—as revealed by the monthly returns of the International Institute of Agriculture—are certainly ominous; but when peace comes, with its return to productive employment of some tens of millions of men, the face of the food situation, provided universal anarchy does not ensue, will rapidly be changed.

In addition to the acceleration of shipbuilding and the improvement of methods of distribution, the import of food can be facilitated to a great extent by the restriction of non-food imports to the margin of absolute necessity. The aggregate weight of all commodities which entered British ports last year—exclusive of 4,000,000 tons of non-food imports ordered on Government account, which may be assumed to represent an irreducible minimum—is estimated at 42,000,000 tons. Of this total 16,000,000 represented foodstuffs. Of the remaining 26,000,000, four items—iron and other ores, timber, petroleum, paper and paper-making materials—accounted for no less than 18,000,000 tons, and it follows that a material reduction could be made only at the expense of these classes of commodities. The consumption of petroleum is already controlled, and strenuous efforts are now being made to obtain the timber required for military construction and pit-props from the forests of France and the United Kingdom, and to increase the home production of iron ore. The consumption of paper has been cut down to 40 per cent. of the normal, and Mr. Lloyd George has stated that by these and other minor economies we may hope to effect a saving of between ten and eleven million tons of cargo space usually occupied by non-food imports. If these hopes are to be realised without starving essential

industries or creating undue friction with foreign States, it will be necessary to ensure the most rigid supervision of the use of timber for constructive purposes, whether public or private, and so far as possible to bring in manufactured iron and steel in place of ores. A policy of close cheeseparing applied to the almost infinite minor items on the import list will also yield a fairly respectable total; while a still more drastic restriction of paper consumption may become necessary.

Every practical step having been taken to provide the food required, what can be done to ensure its equitable distribution throughout the population? The subject is one of the utmost complexity, and only a few of the more basic considerations of a general nature can be dealt with here.

In the first place it may be noted that the problem is essentially one of supplies and economies, and only incidentally, perhaps even inversely, one of prices. It is unfortunate, though very natural, that the food problem should appear to the public to be simply a price problem, for the retail purchaser's vision seldom goes beyond the shop counter. If oatmeal goes up from threepence to fivepence a pound, the man in the street and the woman in the shop are quite clear as to where the fault lies and what the remedy should be. The extra twopence is being pocketed by wicked profiteers, and 'there ought to be a law' to stop it. The Government should give orders that oatmeal must be sold at threepence. It does not occur to him or her that if a low price is compulsorily fixed for oatmeal, people will be encouraged to buy it; while at the same time farmers at home will be discouraged from producing oats or tempted to feed more oats to their live-stock; that foreign merchants will be discouraged from shipping oats, so that in due course there may be no oatmeal at all to be had. So with milk. If milk goes up a penny a quart, and is expected to go still higher, the popular clamour is for a legal price to be fixed for milk, regardless of the fairly obvious fact that disproportionately cheap milk means an increased demand and—as will soon be discovered—a curtailed supply. So with flour, bread, meat, vegetables, and all other foodstuffs: attempts to enforce unduly low prices in the interests of equitable distribution tend always to result in there being less of that food to distribute.

This general tendency is by no means a rigid 'economic

'law.' It is dependent, among other things, upon the extent to which prices are regulated by the higgling of actual producers and actual consumers in a free unmanipulated market and upon the transferability of demand and production. Such conditions seldom if ever obtain even in time of peace, much less in time of war. Between producer and consumer stand, in modern commerce, a long series of middlemen—some legitimate and useful, but others merely predatory—who may for awhile snatch for themselves the advantage of the high prices that should go to stimulate the producer. No market is ever 'free': probe it deep enough, and rings, combines, corners, arrangements, understandings, or thoroughgoing monopolies will sooner or later be found, in many cases deliberately 'wangling' prices and limiting production to sustain them. Demand does not move at once from the things that are relatively dear to the things that are relatively cheap, nor can the producer always switch off from producing the things that are unprofitable and turn to producing the things that are profitable. Yet, when all is said, the tendency has seldom failed to operate either in this or other countries, in regard to food-supplies during the war. High prices *have* in practice checked consumption and stimulated production and import: enforced low prices *have* in practice encouraged consumption and diminished supplies.

The subject of prices and price regulation in the United Kingdom is rendered in some ways more simple and in other ways more complicated by the concentration in official hands of the whole trade in certain staple imported foodstuffs. Whether State monopoly of foreign purchase and import has made for higher or lower prices, and for increased or diminished production abroad, need not be discussed here; but it is hardly to be questioned that once such a policy has been adopted the food brought to these shores on Government account and passed on to the wholesale dealers, at a price sufficient to cover only prime cost and expenses, must be kept under some measure of price-control all the way down the distributing channels; for otherwise the initial State monopoly creates a condition particularly favourable to subsequent private cornering. Where the article is of a kind not produced at home few adverse reactions follow from such control, the principal one being the need for some

sort of doling-out system, occasioned by the suspension of the high-price check upon consumption—as experienced in the case of sugar.

Where the article is wholly or mainly produced at home, the regulation of prices is more difficult and the reactions of price limitation more serious. Especially is this the case with agricultural produce. To control the output and price of steel bars or coal or textiles is one thing : to control the output and price of food is another. Manufacture is in the main carried on by large firms in works or factories designed and equipped for one more or less narrow line of product, and incapable of being readily diverted to any other line. The firms are in nearly every case joint-stock companies who 'keep books.' Their materials are obtained and their products disposed of through well-defined channels. To control the price and output of manufactures is for these reasons fairly feasible, if doubtfully advantageous. With agriculture it is entirely otherwise. Food production is carried on not by large companies, but by multitudinous farmers : some large, but the majority small, who do not keep books, who can obtain their materials and dispose of their produce in all sorts of odd ways, and who in the normal course of their industry produce a score or more kinds of foodstuffs in the year and expand or contract one in favour of another as prices and rotations prompt. Limit the price of milk and the farmer can churn it into butter ; limit butter prices and he can give you cheese ; limit cheese prices and instead of dairy products he can give you meat ; limit meat prices and he can put his land under potatoes ; fix a maximum price for potatoes and he can turn to the next, and the next, and the next kind of produce that is still 'free,' until such time as his last recourse is rounded up and he goes out of farming in sheer weariness and disgust. If low food prices in combination with optimal home production are considered imperative, nothing less than the bringing of the farmers into the category of 'controlled firms' will suffice, and he would be a bold food controller who would essay that. The analogy so often drawn between the State control of manufactures and the State control of farming is about as false as any analogy can well be.

Then what is to be done ? Must food prices be allowed

to soar to any height ? Before answering hypothetical questions it is well to look at the facts. Let it be constantly borne in mind that the level of food prices cannot be considered to any purpose apart from the general price-level of all commodities, for the disappearance of gold from the currency and the flotation of huge loans, among many other factors, have diminished the value of money, and what matters is not how much money the producer gets for his products, but what amount of other commodities and services he can get in exchange for the money he receives. The 'Economist' index number for all commodities in May 1917 shows an increase of 114 per cent. over the wholesale prices of July 1914, and a corresponding increase for food products of 123 per cent. The Board of Trade Labour Gazette gives the average increase in the retail price of all the items ordinarily entering into working-class family expenditure (including rent, which has not risen at all) as between 70 and 75 per cent., and of food alone as 102 per cent. Food, then, has gone up very little more than other commodities. When one remembers the manufacturing self-sufficiency of Great Britain and her agricultural dependence, remembers, too, how agriculture has for long years been at a discount in Great Britain because of the greater profitableness of manufacture, and reflects upon the fact that British agriculture has, with the difficulties and increased cost of sea transport, for the first time in a long period come into its own, it is a matter for surprise and satisfaction that food prices have not increased to a far greater extent. To jeopardise food-production and penalise food-producers by compelling foodstuffs to be sold at a relatively lower price than other commodities is, with such facts at hand, blatant folly and rank injustice.

The argument most frequently put forward in support of maximum-price legislation is that high food-prices entail special hardship on people of small means, and particularly on the very poor. That is true ; but economic inequality is not a war phenomenon : it is one of the age-long problems of our whole political, social, and economic system ; and the remedy for it, even the emergency remedy in war-time, is not to make food disproportionately cheap, but to abolish penury. If we are going to allow the contention that the prime necessaries

of life must for charitable reasons be kept down by Act of Parliament, or social pressure, at a price below their real exchange value, then we must either reward the food-producer in some indirect way or see him for ever at a disadvantage as compared with the producers of amenities and luxuries. That all production should come to be looked upon as a form of public service is a consummation to be wished; but that in the meantime the food-producer should be singled out for the rôle of a public benevolent institution is neither fair nor salutary. If we deny him the market price of his labour and skill, in what coin are we prepared to make good his loss? In honour? In gratitude? '. . . and none so poor to do 'him reverence.'

Up to now our food administrators have hovered confusedly between penalising the food-producer, out of tenderness for the poor, and spoon-feeding him to the greater prosperity of agriculture. At one moment he must sell his milk for less than it is worth; at another he must have a bounty if the bottom falls out of the grain market. Yesterday he must not receive more per ton for the remnant of his frost-killed and disease-perished potato harvest than he would have got had his stocks remained intact; to-day he must have a maximum price changed to a minimum price, apparently on the ground that 'he seems somehow keen on it, and, any-'how, it's only a matter of two letters.' In the Corn Production Bill an attempt is made to reconcile these two conflicting objects by allowing grain prices to take their course and compensating the farmer out of public funds in case of prices falling below a certain level. It is an ingenious scheme; but since it hinges on money-prices to the entire disregard of food and non-food exchange values it is beside the point. Still, if the farmer really derives confidence from the assurance that in the event of the moon turning into green cheese he will receive a small solatium that he may not be able to keep, paid in money of indeterminate value—why, so be it; but let us not leave the rehabilitation of British agriculture at that. For the rest, it would be well if the Food Control and Food Production Ministries could get together a little more and decide which, if either, is to be called upon to make sacrifices on behalf of the other: the food-producer, or the nation as the guardian of the poor.

Meanwhile, the producer of food might advantageously be left to work out his own salvation.

There remains the problem of the 'profiteer.' What is to be done about the people who come in between the retail purchaser and the producer, who snatch private gains out of public necessities? It would make for clarity if 'profiteer' were defined. Is a 'profiteer' one who in the ordinary course of business is able to secure a margin of profit on the goods he acquires from the producer and places at the disposal of the consumer? If so, will those who denounce profiteering be prepared to compensate the profiteer if and when the market turns against him and he suffers a loss? Or is the term confined to the pure gambler who by plunging into this or that market tries to turn a speculative penny out of the national need? If the latter be all that is meant it is surely worth while before proceeding any farther to inquire what is the actual magnitude of the evil of profiteering. On this point it is instructive to observe that committees of inquiry, however strong be the representation of able and vigilant labour men upon them, hardly, if ever, find evidence of any material amount of pure speculation. Nor is it easy to discover any net injury to the nation. We hear much of the speculators who gain, nothing of those who lose; probably the losses are not very far from offsetting the gains. If anyone believe the contrary, let him try his luck in and around the produce exchanges with such a sum as he can command.

Until some definite proof has been furnished of real national injury resulting from what the mob orator calls 'profiteering' we should do wisely to keep clear of the gigantic evils that result from any attempt on the part of the State to control the machinery of commerce. Of these evils the experience of Germany since the war began furnishes endless examples. Yet no attempt has been made by our Government to take warning from Germany's mistakes. Not one of the blunders made by our Food Controller in the past six months but was made two years earlier by the German Government, only to be repaired at great cost. We have, however, up to now been more fortunate than Germany in that we have managed to check ourselves in mid-career down the slope of food-price regulation. It is to be hoped that we may still retain this relative good fortune.

But it will not be easy. The fixing of prices for one commodity almost inevitably necessitates the fixing of prices for another, and yet another, until the entire trade of the country is bound up in an inextricable tangle of official regulations. The resulting lack of correlation between demand and supply then compels a rationing system. That in turn, as the experience of Germany demonstrates, involves long queues of people wasting hours of valuable time while they wait for their allotted rations ; it involves countless clerks and officials, masses of printing and paper, and all the interminable delays that accompany official action ; it also involves endless frauds, including the wholesale forgery of food tickets, together with a general lowering of the moral standards of the community. We may congratulate ourselves and our late Food Controller that so far we have been saved this fate.

JOHN HILTON.

# COLONIAL 'RETRIBUTION'

1. The Colonising Activities of the English Puritans. By A. P. Newton. Yale Historical Publications. 1914.
2. British Colonial Policy, 1754–1765. By G. L. Beer. New York. 1907.
3. The Genesis of the United States. By Alexander Brown. London. 1890.
4. The Navigation Laws. By John W. Gulland. Lord Rector's Prize Essay. Edinburgh. 1884.

'RETRIBUTION.—Repayment. Return accommodated to 'the action' is Dr. Johnson's definition of a word we have taken to using in a far narrower sense. But it is lawful to return to our ancient freedom, and after due warning to speak of the 'retributions' which the Colonies have made and are making to the actions of the Mother Country. The word was so used by White of Dorchester in his 'Planters' Plea,' published in 1630 on behalf of the Massachusetts Company, and we will take leave to follow his example.

The all-enveloping war in which we now live has brought —and we must resign ourselves to know that it will continue to bring—suffering and the call for sacrifice. But it has also given us the long-deferred fulfilment of old hopes, and has justified the schemes of ancient wisdom. For the first time in our history the Colonies have all come forward spontaneously to range themselves by the side of the Mother Country, and to fight the same battle with her in a spirit of Imperial patriotism. There have been many cases in which colonists have taken a share in wars, but it was when some advantage was to be gained, some danger was to be averted on their own borders. What is new is the voluntary combined action in a common cause when the enemy was distant, and the peril might conceivably appear to be remote, or even not to exist. How came it that we have waited so long?

A little more than three hundred years have passed since our first permanent settlement was made in Virginia. Raleigh's

venture in Roanoke, and his half-brother Sir Humphrey Gilbert's earlier attempt to hold Newfoundland, may indeed be taken as the starting-points of our colonial history. Yet both failed. They were forerunners, examples, or warnings. Our plantations began truly when Englishmen first landed on the soil of America never to return, and that was when the servants of the London Virginia Company made their first fort on the James River in 1607. Englishmen were already well acquainted with the Atlantic seaboard of America, and were still more familiar with the Antilles, as privateers, raiders, or even as fishermen. They were so well known in their character of armed smugglers or semi-piratical intruders to those most concerned in watching their activity—the Spaniards to wit—that the ambassadors of Philip III. at the Court of James I. kept a nervous eye on the establishment of 'the New Algiers' in Virginia. The servants of the 'Sacra 'Católica y Cesárea Majestad,' his Sacred, Catholic, and Cesarean Majesty at Madrid, would have been comparatively easy in their minds if they could have been sure that those English poachers beyond the line of demarcation drawn by Pope Alexander VI. from north to south to secure the sphere of influence of Spain, could be trusted to apply themselves only to raising crops. They would even have regarded the spread of the destructive heretical principles of Luther and Calvin among the remote Indians of the North with resignation, though the spectacle was pain and grief to them. They said it was so, often and eloquently. But then it was incredible to Don Pedro de Zuñiga, Don Alonso de Velasco, and Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar, that the English would poach in this comparatively innocent fashion. The Spanish diplomatists, looking to experience, relying on their knowledge of human nature, and diligently collecting gossip, were convinced that the true purpose of the newly formed Virginia Company was very different. In December 1609, Don Pedro de Zuñiga had no hesitation in assuring his master that what was really meant was this: all English pirates, then a numerous body along the Channel and on the west coast of Ireland, were to be offered a pardon on condition that they went to Virginia to make 'a New Algiers.' He had the best authority for saying that 'the thing is so perfect—'according to what they say—for making use of these pirates,

'that your Majesty will not be able to get silver from the 'Indies unless a very large force shall be kept there, and that 'will make your Majesty's vassals lose their trade.' Therefore, so he pleaded again and again, let no time be lost in stamping the settlement out.

It cannot fairly be said that the fears of Don Pedro were absurd. Yet he was wrong. The colonists went to Virginia for quite different objects, and throve by ways most unlike piracy. If we try to put the whole purpose and spirit of the first English plantations into a nutshell we shall have to say that their purpose was to complete England by providing her with territory wherein she could find mines and could cultivate many native products she did not grow at home. Their spirit was one of sober, practical, businesslike morality. Incidentally, but with a very present sense of the advantages to be obtained, they hoped to draw off and reform by profitable industry the large and then most pestilent vagabond population by which the land was afflicted. It was the product of social and economic changes, and of generations of civil war. The first organisers made the attempt with the inevitable result. Elements, whereof the last quality which could be predicated was morality, were included in the first settlement. Bacon was thinking of them when he said:

'It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people, and wicked condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but it spoileth the plantation; for they will ever live like rogues, and not fall to work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary, and then certify over to their country to the discredit of the plantation.'

It was not long before the Virginia Company had to confess its error, and mend its choice of settlers. But it was prompt to learn its lesson. There is a little passage in its history of an illuminative character. After struggles of a painful rather than heroic kind the plantation was beginning to prosper: not by the plunder of Spanish plate ships, but by the cultivation of tobacco. This drug, this weed, was denounced by all wise men, but it paid and it conquered. But if it was to be raised steadily the Company saw that there must be a permanent English population to carry on the cultivation, whether with or without the service of bondsmen. The planters so far were a somewhat unstable community, liable for one

thing to be tempted away to the Antilles. It was manifestly desirable to tie them to the soil. The Spanish government of the time, or the French, would have made laws and threatened penalties—probably to no purpose. The Company found a way at once gentle and efficacious. It provided them with wives. A small joint-stock company was formed within the great one, and a capital of £1200 was subscribed. Sixty young women of good character (the Company called them uncorrupted virgins), and we may assume of not unpleasing personal appearance, were collected and sent out under charge of a judicious widow. The cost of transport was estimated at £12 10s. a head. Care was taken to explain to the planters that marriage was really what was meant, and that freedom was essential to the validity of matrimony. But as the Company had been at the trouble and the cost of making them happy the least the planters could do was to show a sense of the obligation by paying to its agents so many leaves of the best tobacco as would cover the expenses of the passage, and allow the shareholders a little honest profit for themselves. It is unfortunate that no record remains of any of the courtships conducted in these circumstances. One thing, however, is certain, and it is that the wooings were not long adoing. The young women were 'very loving received,' and all married off in a few weeks. The planters paid their tobacco-leaves manfully, and the net profits of the transaction were £540.

This humble undertaking must be allowed to lack the romance of the conquest of the lake city of Tenochtitlan, or Gonzalo de Pizarro's stupendous march in search of El Dorado, or the Odyssey of Hernan de Soto in the Mississippi valley. But it had in it the future of an orderly, industrious, and eminently human, English community. Spain tried to keep down and even to prevent the entry of Spanish women into the Indies. France sent out wives to its colonists, but they went out either under charge of nuns and as mere instruments in the hands of a clerical domination, or they were recruited in the way we may read of in the story of Manon Lescaut. The Virginia Company aimed at founding a free oversea England, based on a population working for wife and child in an honest English way. Manon Lescaut did indeed find her way to America, and criminals were sent out as bondsmen. So were Scotch and Irish prisoners of the Civil War.

Some justified the system of transportation by adding themselves in time to the orderly population. And that was particularly the case with the Scotch prisoners of Preston, Dunbar, and Worcester. Others followed their natural instincts, which carried them to piracy and to the freebooting life of the Brothers of the Coast. The Adam and Eve of Virginia did not come from Newgate : only a part of their servants came from that starting-place.

It would be quite superfluous to labour to prove that the Puritan settlements at Cape Cod and on Massachusetts Bay were designed to be free English communities leading a normal life. But even now it is not quite superfluous to contradict the still surviving assumption that the Puritan was an ascetic and a kill-joy. When you wish to know what men thought, not the worst way of learning is to look at what they said. ' The abuse of the creature ' was a phrase much in use among them. It sounds strange, even absurd to some of us. And yet it was not meaningless. Let us put aside the rather silly disinclination to use religious phraseology, for we shall never get near the real meaning of the Puritan if we do not. ' The ' creature ' was all the creation of God, given to man for his use and enjoyment, subject to the stern warning that he would be brought to judgment for abuse of God's work. The Puritan found a code of morals in the text ' Rejoice, O young man, in ' thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy ' youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart and the sight of ' thine eyes ; but know thou that for all these things God will ' bring thee into judgment.'

The old Low Country soldier in Massachusetts, of whom it is recorded that he said he had received his ' assurance of ' grace ' while he was ' drinking a pipe of the good creature ' tobacco,' may have been an impudent scamp. He cannot have wished to arouse the suspicions of the men he was speaking to. They can have seen no incompatibility between being in grace and using the ' good creatures.' Sin lay in the abuse of them.

It was a manly standard of morals, infinitely superior to the formalism and fetishism of the Spanish American world, or the queasy pietism and the clerical dictation of French Canada. Moreover, it was intensely English. The New England settlers were English to the marrow of their bones. When the proposal

was made to them that they should leave the poor soil and hard climate of Massachusetts and swarm off to the warm West Indies, Winthrop answered for them that they would stay where they were because there it was possible for them to live as they had lived in England. That they might fulfil their wish the better, they set their faces against that mixture with the Indian races which filled Spanish America with 'mestizos' and French Canada with 'Bois Brûlés.' They would be an uncorrupted English community, living a human life with the certainty of judgment before their eyes.

In that very determination, however, lay one of the causes of the long unwillingness of English colonists to unite among themselves or to feel that they were really one with the Mother Country. His own community was much to the English colonist—a home apart from other homes—and then he was forced to think much of his 'rights' in all his relations with the Mother Country. There is one history of Virginia, another of Massachusetts, and another of the settlements in the islands. Yet, however much they might differ, they had one feature in common: they were founded at the charges of those who sent the settlers out, and at the hazard of those settlers. The State—and in the seventeenth century the word meant the King—would encourage plantation, would give charters, for which he was paid fees; would authorise lotteries for the purpose of raising money; he would, in short, do whatever cost him nothing. Neither funds nor protection were to be expected from him. The statesmen, lawyers, and merchants who formed, and, while it was allowed to live, governed, the London Virginia Company—Southampton, Warwick, Sandys, Sir Thomas Smyth, and others of less renown—were in the old sense of the word the 'adventurers' who risked their money. Smyth assured Gondomar that the Company had sunk £47,000 and had as yet had no return. Now, if we measure not by the purchasing power of money—an obscure subject—but by the relative importance of sums of money, £47,000 in the London of James I. was at least as large a part of the capital available for investment as some round millions would be now. And to this the King contributed nothing. The Western, or Exeter, or Plymouth, Virginia Company, whose territory lay to the north of that assigned to the London Company, spent less, but gained no more. It had in the end to make

good its losses by selling bits of its reserve. The Plymouth colony bought one and paid its debt in time. The Massachusetts Company bought another. Whatever they took with them they provided for themselves. When they had reached the wilderness they had to protect themselves. They went under a religious influence, but there was no lack of practical common sense among them. As they took blacksmiths to keep their ploughs and other tools in order, or shipwrights to build fishing-boats, so they paid soldiers to train and lead them in war with the Indians. Miles Standish was the best known of these soldiers of fortune from the Low Countries, who took service under the Puritan settlers, but he was not the only one. They served precisely as Sir Horace Vere or Sir Edward Cecil served the United Netherlands.

Whether they went for profit alone, or stimulated by religion, whether to that part of Virginia which has kept the name, or to other parts which have broken off under other names, the settlers considered that they still belonged to the realm. Winthrop and the fathers of the Massachusetts settlement solemnly recorded their belief that they still belonged to the Church of England. But in what sense? With what limitations? Winthrop and his colleagues did not mean the Church as shaped by Laud. If they had not intended to sail 'beyond 'Canterbury' they would not have gone at all. Neither they nor any other colonists would have been prepared to accept the realm as Strafford would have shaped it if he could. It was in the nature of things that a conflict should arise, and that quickly, between the settlers and 'the realm.' Harrington of the 'Oceana' predicted that European settlements 'in the Indies,' whereby he meant America, would not remain subjected when once they had passed the stage of infancy. There were others who saw a danger in the flight of swarms of the King's subjects across the Atlantic. White of Dorchester no doubt had them in his mind when he wrote certain remarkable words in his pamphlet, 'The 'Planters' Plea, or the Grounds of the Plantation Examined, 'the usuall objections answered'—published on behalf of the Massachusetts settlement, in 1630.

'In all Colonies it is to be desired that the daughter may answer something backe by way of retribution to the mother that gave her being. Nature hath as much force and founds as strong a relation

betweene people and people as betweene person and person. A Colonie denying due respect to the State from whose bowels it issued is as great a monster as an unnaturall childe.'

The Patriarch of Dorchester was a prophet, and the Lord spake by his mouth as we now see. How came it that three centuries were to pass before his prophecy was fulfilled? The answer to these questions is easily given when we know what was the nature of the ' retribution ' which the mother wished to have answered back to her by her daughter. It is all that was comprised under the convenient name of ' The ' Navigation Acts.' The term is not exactly accurate—or at least not quite comprehensive—but it is convenient, and it will suffice.

Yet before these Acts came into being, the plantations, while still in their infancy, had begun to react on the Mother Country in ways which some may have foreseen, but which the King at least cannot have desired. They were barely in existence before they became part of the opposition to the political and religious policy of the Stuart Kings. If we can rely on the report of the testimony of Nicholas Ferrar—he of the Little Gidding ' Protestant Nunnery '—their capacity in this way had alarmed James I. And Ferrar is a good witness. His father, a London merchant, was one of the founders of the Virginia Company. The council met for years in his house in the City. Nicholas was Secretary to the Company during the administration of the Earl of Southampton and Sir Edwin Sandys, and was wholly trusted by them. He was as well placed as man could be to know the truth. Whatever we may think of his character, we cannot suspect him of positive lying. If he said that the Marquis of Hamilton and the Earl of Pembroke told Southampton that they had heard Gondomar warn the King against the Virginia Company, he was not inventing the tale. The Spanish Ambassador had pointed out to James

' that it was time for him to look to the Virginia Courts which were kept at Ferrar's house, where too many of his nobility and gentry resorted to accompany the popular Lord Southampton and the dangerous Sandys. That though they might have a fair pretence for their meetings, yet he would find in the end that court would prove a seminary for a Seditious Parliament.'

So Gondomar may well have spoken, and James would easily

believe him. And they would have been right, for the Virginia Company, until its suppression in 1624, and the Providence Company, which rose from its ruins in 1630, were the training-grounds of the Parliamentary opposition which checked James and finally ruined his son.

The history of the long-forgotten Providence Company has now been well told by Mr. Newton in his 'Colonising Activities of the English Puritans.' As a colonising venture the Company was doomed to failure because it attempted to do the impossible: it wished to found an English agricultural and Puritan colony in an island on the coast of the Mosquito Reserve. There was an element of aggressive hostility to Roman Catholic Spain in it from the beginning. Its promoters would willingly have drawn the New England settlers to desert their harsh home on Massachusetts Bay and plant themselves in the West Indies. In the end the Company's servants on the spot—that is to say, in the island they named Providence (the Spanish Santa Catalina), which must not be confounded with Providence in the Bahamas—ran away with their masters. The growing buccaneer element of the lawless West Indies was strong among these men. They turned the proposed Puritan colony into a centre of sheer piracy, and it was stamped out by the Spaniards on the eve of the Civil War—not before it had given gross provocation.

Nevertheless, the Company was no failure. During the ten years or so of its activity it provided the future leaders of the country party in the Long Parliament with a common centre, with opportunities to gain knowledge and to confirm their confidence in one another. Nearly all the great chiefs of the Parliament—Pym, Hampden, St. John, Saye and Sele, Brooke, together with many of the lesser men—were shareholders. The Earl of Warwick, and the whole Rich connexion, were of the body. Mr. Pym was pre-eminently diligent on committees and in courts. They formed no mere trading body. They had to consider and decide questions of administration ranging from the equipment of ships to the relations of Church and State. If the Parliament leaders proved eminently capable of affairs the reason was not only because they were country gentlemen familiar with local government: it was also because they had been well trained in colonial management. And they knew well where they were going. Behind their modest

avowed purpose there lay another and a far greater. It was nothing less than the formation of a reserve of strength to be used when the time should come for the inevitable struggle to rescue the old principles of government in England from being ruined by the distortion of them which in their opinion was being attempted by the King.

The Providence Company was a school, but the Massachusetts Company was an opposition from the first. Nothing proves the utter incapacity of Charles I. to understand what was passing before his eyes better than the fact that this body was allowed to do what it did. Other colonial companies were subject to control by a council in England. The charter was in their keeping, and both were under the King's hand. But the Massachusetts Company insisted on taking its charter with it, and on transferring itself bodily to America. Ever since the violent dissolution of Parliament in 1629, numbers of Englishmen, and men of mark too, had been openly preparing to cross the ocean in order to flee not only beyond Canterbury but beyond Whitehall. The most modest endowment of foresight would have shown the King and his servants what must be the consequence of allowing a large body of discontented Englishmen to transport themselves far beyond the King's reach with money in their purses, cattle, food, implements of industry, an ample supply of arms, and an instrument of government.

Yet they were allowed to go. Within far less than a year and a day they had taught Canterbury, and Whitehall too, a lesson. Certain smart persons, who conduct controversy on the principles of Tom Thumb (he made his giants first, and then he killed them), have triumphed at a cheap rate over the New England Puritans. They went, so the smart people predicate, professing only to wish to find a place where they could worship after their own manner, and then they persecuted others. They went for another purpose, and they would not have been left free if they had allowed Canterbury to go with them, or had tolerated dissensions among themselves which would have given Canterbury an opening to come in. Therefore they expelled the known agents, and the possible, if unconscious, allies of the power they had fled from, to the wilderness. They acted at once and in an unmistakable fashion. They expelled all such as were not in harmony with them.

Then when it was too late their enemy discovered his mistake. The emigrants were going by swarms of thousands, 20,000 in all first and last, going seventy or eighty at a time in small vessels of about 200 tons. There could be no question as to their spirit. The care they took to make sure that vessels bringing emigrants and goods should also carry arms and gunpowder was warning enough. And now His Majesty's servants began to get nervous. Measures to stop emigration were first taken, and then, in the endless vacillations of the King's government, withdrawn. A demand was made for the surrender of the charter and was refused. The words used were respectful, even pathetic. The settlers avowed their loyalty. They pleaded their sacrifices, their sufferings in the wilderness, their toils and hazards. But they spoke with finger on trigger. Four regiments were raised and a fort was built to cover Boston. There was no lack of Low Country soldiers to drill them, and no lack of arms and powder.

Speculative minds have asked what would have happened if King Charles had not tried to force a Church Service on the Scots. What would have happened would very probably have been that a quarrel with New England would have forced him to summon Parliament, and the same storm would have broken loose. The majority of the 20,000 emigrants were grown men. Only a powerful fleet and army, as fleets and armies then went, would have sufficed to subdue their resistance. The King's pocket was too empty to allow him to provide the needful force without appeal to Parliament, and an appeal to Parliament meant the downfall of the system of government he had followed since 1629 with obstinacy of wish and vacillation in act. We know what did happen. The emigration ceased when New England was no longer needed as a refuge from Canterbury. Not a few of the emigrants came back to fight on the side of the Parliament. The first 'retribution' the daughter made to the mother was to help her to take her destinies out of the hands of the House of Stuart. And can we deny that it was a service? Some do ask whether it was a real advantage for us that we missed the happiness of possessing a strong monarchy. But our ancestors had not to deal with a desirable strong monarchy. They had to decide whether their destinies would be less safe in their own

hands than in those of certain princes—of Charles I., Charles II., James II., the Old Pretender, and the Young Pretender. If any man believes they would have been, he must be left comfortably beyond the reach of argument in the congenial fellowship of those who deny the Irish Massacre of 1641, or who affirm the innocence of Mary, Queen of Scots.

The fall of the monarchy of Charles I. left mother and daughter face to face. Henceforward the Crown acted with Parliament, save in rare instances when its operation was transitory. And if Parliament did not truly represent the nation it did at least speak for those who possessed effective power. They were the classes of Englishmen who looked to the extension of commerce to make the country great and prosperous. It would be no less stupid than unjust to assume that they wished to limit the prosperity of the Colonies: the thought was far from them; but they had certain definite ideas as to what was best for those colonies, and though they would have repudiated in all honesty of intention the charge that they were subordinating the prosperity of the colonists to their own, this was in reality what they did.

The principles have been so exhaustively discussed, and the question may seem to have been so completely settled, that it may appear a mere slaying of the slain to point out at this time of day what were the errors and the consequences of the policy embodied in the Navigation Acts, and the endless devices adopted for the 'regulation of trade.' But the old ghost is visibly struggling to escape from its grave, and old controversies have regained a contemporary interest. The spirit of the thing, as it was practised for some two centuries, is stated with precision in a letter from Lord Cornbury, who was Governor of NewYork in 1705, printed by Mr. O'Callaghan in his 'Documentary History of New York,' vol. i. pp. 712–713. The Governor reports that the colonists have entered

'upon a course which I am sure will hurt England in a little time; for I am well informed that upon Long Island and Connecticut they are setting up a woollen manufacture, and I myself have seen serge made upon Long Island that any man may wear. . . . I declare my opinion to be that these Colloneys which are but twigs belonging to the main tree (England) ought to be kept entirely dependent upon and subservient to England, and that can never be if they are suffered to goe on the notions they have that as they are Englishmen, soe they may set up the same manufactures here

as people may do in England; for the consequences will be that if they once see that they can cloath themselves, not only comfortably but handsomely too, without the help of England, they who are already not very fond of submitting to Government would soon think of putting in Execution designs they had long harboured in their breasts. This will not seem strange when you consider what sort of people this country is inhabited by.'

The tone of Lord Cornbury's letter is more notable than the matter. The woollen manufactures came to nothing in particular; but all this insistence on 'dependence' and 'subservience,' on the evil designs of the 'sort of people' who could not see why they were to be less free than other Englishmen simply because they had passed to the King's dominions beyond the Atlantic, or had been born in them—all that came to the Declaration of Independence. We find the same spirit in the pamphlets of Dr. Tucker, and in debates in Parliament. And we are far better able to understand what really was at issue between mother and daughter, if we keep to this same spirit and style, than when we look to the more immediate causes which were commonly but pretexts for a quarrel.

It is nowhere easier to lose sight of the wood because of the trees than in the thicket of Acts of Parliament, Orders in Council, and of the Lords of Trade, which founded, defined, limited, and propped the colonial system. The meaning of the whole elaborate structure is not difficult to state. From the very first the aim of the promoters of a plantation—other than the Puritan settlements of 1620 and 1630—had been to occupy territory for the purpose of obtaining produce which England either did not possess at all or had only in insufficient quantities. These territories were to make of her a self-contained State free from all obligation to pay 'tribute' to other peoples. The doctrine was well set forth in the 'Reasons' to move the High Court of Parliament to raise a stock for the 'maintaining of a colony in Virginia,' drawn up about the year 1606. Nor had the right of the Crown to regulate the trade of these territories, when acquired, been at any time seriously disputed. Mr. Beer, in his 'Origins of the British Colonial 'System,' has shown very convincingly that Charles I. did attempt to regulate the Virginia tobacco trade, and that for the purpose of confining it to the Mother Country, and of granting to the planters as compensation the monopoly of

the home market. And this is the whole colonial system in a nutshell. The weakness of the King's Government and the Civil War left the Colonies entire freedom. Only when Parliament had won, and could attempt to satisfy the wishes of English merchants and manufacturers, did the colonial system begin to pass from doctrine to practice. The Navigation Act of 1650 laid the foundation. The building was raised by successive acts in a long series, and innumerable executive decrees, designed to fortify the Acts. We must get out from among the trees and look at the wood where it can be seen as a whole.

Whatever produce of the Colonies was not needed by the Mother Country might be sent to a third market. Rice, for instance, from the Carolinas, might be sent anywhere to the south of Cape Finisterre. Such goods as the Colonies needed, and the Mother Country did not produce, might be bought in a third market—as, for instance, pipe-staves. They were imported to make barrels to hold the rum, which was exported to Africa to buy slaves. But apart from these exceptions the products of the Colonies were 'enumerated goods' which could be exported only to the Mother Country—England, before the Parliamentary Union with Scotland, Great Britain afterwards—then Ireland, subject to wavering restrictions. Those products were to be raw materials. The Colonies were to have a monopoly of the home market. In return they were to take manufactures from or through the Mother Country alone.

It has all been exploded a long while ago, and yet it continues to be defended, as it was from the first, by arguments of shameless irrelevance. Our fathers rebuked the complaints of colonists by pointing out that the Navigation Acts were far more liberal than, say, the Spanish Laws of Trade for the Indies. So they were; but if those Spanish Laws of Trade could have been enforced the 'Indies' would have been driven to revolt two centuries before they actually rebelled. They were tolerated because they were nullified by a wholesale contraband trade in which we had the chief share. Again, we insisted, even vindictively, that the colonists had no right to complain of restriction on manufacture because their economic conditions did not favour the growth of manufactures among them. If so, the restrictions were superfluous, but the offensiveness of the intention was never a jot the less.

We were much in the habit of taunting the colonists—Dr. Tucker did so among others—with the fact that some manufactured goods could be sold more cheaply among them than at home. It was true, and was one of the many proofs of the absurdities which sprout from every system of regulated trade. The British Government had to consider the interests of conflicting claimants. The British producer of manufactured goods, and the colonial producer of raw material, were to be protected. But the shipping interest and the carrying trade had a claim too. Now the shipping interest was that there should be the greatest possible amount of goods to carry. So foreign manufactured goods could be introduced into Great Britain on payment of duty for the encouragement of the shipping interest; and then for its further encouragement, a rebate—sometimes equal to the whole amount of the duty—was granted on re-export. So it was quite possible to sell some goods of foreign origin at a cheaper rate than British goods in our Colonies. And that was all the more possible because the British manufacturer might be restricted to the use of colonial raw material. As a matter of fact goods of foreign origin were taken in large quantities to our Colonies. Between 1723 and 1747 the value of British goods landed in Pennsylvania was £969,049. The amount of foreign goods was £343,789.

The answer of the colonists was simple and to the point. They would have obtained what they wanted still cheaper if they could have dealt directly with the original producer. In a general way the effect of the regulation of trade was to compel the colonists to sell somewhat cheaper and buy somewhat dearer than would have been the case if they had been free to trade in an open market. The more and the less constituted, in their opinion, a tribute they paid to the Mother Country, and it was the only one they were disposed to pay.

Yet the Navigation Laws, and all they meant, were endured for more than a century, and the Colonies grew prosperous. This is true, but it is certain that they were felt as a grievance from the day that the exclusion of the Dutch carriers enabled English shipowners to double, or more than double, their freights; and there were very plain reasons why they were endured. They were, to begin with, rather vexatious than oppressive. The Mother Country could supply what the

Colonies wanted, and there was competition enough to restrict mere fleecing within tolerable bounds. Indeed, their command of the home market enabled them to do some fleecing on their own account, and to be—it may be added—rather unscrupulous at times in the matter of the payment of their debts. Then there were causes of dissension among them. English writers then and now have been rather addicted to jeering at these quarrels. They were in fact inevitable, partly because the borders of the 'tidewater colonies,' as they were commonly called—the settlements on the Atlantic seaboard—had often been very carelessly marked in the charters; but more because they could extend only by spreading themselves inland, and geographical necessity brought their lines of advance into collision. Parish pump vanity was also at work, no doubt. The disputes were loud-mouthed, and there were occasional breakings of heads. Critics who forgot that the Englishman has a leaning to bluster in controversy, and that to speak daggers is one thing, while using them is another, were wont to say that these dissensions would set the colonists at one another's throats if once the control of the royal government were removed. Our friend the enemy on the continent of Europe goes on making the same mistake about us to this day. He finds that our domestic differences do not prevent us from closing up against the outsider.

Two other causes combined to render the Navigation Acts tolerable. The first, as all men know, was the presence of the French in Canada. This is justly a commonplace, and no more need be said about it except on one point, for which sufficient allowance is not always made: the French settlement was at once religious in spirit as was the Puritan, and also the precise opposite. It was begun and promoted by the vigorous Catholic revival in the France of the seventeenth century, and it was dominated by the Jesuits. The New England colonists were perfectly well aware that the Company had brought Bohemia back to Roman Catholicism by the unmeasured use of the whip. It was to the knowledge of all men the instigator of the successive attacks on the Edict of Nantes, which preceded the final revocation. New England captives found to their cost within the walls of religious houses in Quebec that the methods of conversion were the same on either side of the Atlantic. If the two types could have been

shut off to fight it out, New England would have made a speedy end of French Canada. But behind the friars and nuns, the missionaries and handful of fur-traders, who formed the feeble French colony, were the fleets and armies of France. New England took her ample share in the fight, contributing more men and more money than all the other colonies put together. But she needed the armies and fleets of the Mother Country, and to obtain them she bore the Navigation Acts without open opposition.

When all the other causes are allowed for, the most important still remains. The colonial system was tolerable because it was constantly evaded. The active agents of this evasion were the New England colonists. Simply because men could live there as they had done in England—or their fathers had—they produced less of those colonial products which the Mother Country needed, since she did not grow them herself. They had comparatively little intercourse with home. They sought their prosperity in the round of trade allowed to the Colonies outside the commerce reserved to the Mother Country, though they took some share in that. To carry non-enumerated articles to Southern Europe; to bring back pipe-staves, and molasses from the French islands of the West Indies, which were the chief source of supply; to make rum, carry it to Africa to exchange for slaves to be sold in the southern plantations or smuggled into the Spanish colonies:—that was the course of New England trade. It lay by the side of the main commerce guarded by the Navigation Acts, and though permitted was not of a nature to breed community of sentiment with the Mother Country.

But it did more. It was a constant invitation to contraband. In the seventeenth century New England provided herself with tea and other produce of the East Indies by sending out pirates who plundered Moor ships (to plunder the heathen was always lawful by sea morality), and brought their booty home. When piracy was suppressed, smuggling took its place. The prosperity of New England depended on this commerce so much that, though she would contribute freely to the fight with the French in Canada, she would not give up her intercourse with the French islands in war. Naval officers complained, and with truth, that the enemy was constantly supplied with food by New England ships. But what was to be

expected? If a colony is told it is to be kept in subservience and dependence it can hardly feel grateful. If we profited by the smuggling into Spanish colonies, to which New England contributed largely, was it wonderful that the smuggler extended his operations wherever he found his profit? A common patriotism is not generated under such impulses.

When the French rule in Canada had fallen we know what happened. The fact that it did come to pass does not prove that it was inevitable. And it might have been avoided in one way. The rights of kings and peoples agree best in silence, said the Cardinal de Retz. Hitherto mother and daughter had lived not without occasional squabbles, but on the whole peacefully, because the fatal question of rights had been left in a judicious obscurity. In an evil hour the mother dragged it into the light, and henceforward all hope of peace was at an end. We need not revive the memory of the controversy now. Few are more infested by the hair-splitting, and distinctions without a difference, which Burke dismissed as 'metaphysics.' He said he hated the very sound of them, and indeed they are dreary enough in the pages of Adam's 'Novanglus,' or the pamphlets of Otis, and a wilderness of others, whether the authors were American or English. 'The 'Controversy between Great Britain and Her Colonies Re-'viewed,' written by William Knox and inspired by George Grenville, is as bad as any of them. But it contains a few lines worth quoting, for they afford a text and apply wonderfully to events of to-day. The author, in a shrill triumphant manner, asks how any man can think it other than absurd that the King should apply to the Colonies for a free grant of money, and parades his *reductio ad absurdum*.

'A war in Germany becomes the occasion for a requisition: rice, sugar, and tobacco all go there, but no fish. Why, then, should New England, Nova Scotia, or Quebec give anything? If it was for support of the Italian States these colonies might indeed contribute something, as they buy their fish; but if that were the occasion, would Pennsylvania or Carolina do so?'

The words, occurring not in a pamphlet written by some literary man, but in what was really the defence of a minister's policy, composed under his direction by an important official (Knox had been agent for Georgia, and became Under-secretary for the Colonies), make nonsense of the plea that the revenue

to be raised by the Stamp Act was meant only to provide part of the expenses of colonial defence. It is manifest that Grenville looked upon taxation of the Colonies as a source of revenue to be used for general purposes, and to be imposed by the Mother Country. But by that way we might slip back into the old quarrel. These sentences are worth quoting now because of the writer's manifest assumption that the Colonies could not be expected to aid the Mother Country save when their own pockets were threatened with loss, or flattered by hope of profit. And perhaps he was right. And what else could be the patriotism and morality bred by the old colonial system? It was based on a sordid foundation of cash. The Colonies were avowedly considered to be valuable because they gave prosperity to the Mother Country. Such prosperity as they might win was to be kept in strict subordination to hers. They had founded themselves by the efforts and at the risk of the settlers. When they began to have productive value their trade was regulated so that the Mother Country should be the greater gainer. Where was there room for a common patriotism in such a huckstering bond as this? It brought the retribution, in all possible senses, that it deserved—the repayment was just equal to the action.

When the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1783 the colonial system, as far as we were concerned, was mortally wounded. It did not die at once. Men and institutions are not to be easily persuaded that they are logically dead. The colonial system went on by its acquired momentum, growing ever weaker as friction wore it down. The most pestilent of all its errors was revived when the colony of New South Wales was founded as 'a place to send the thieves to.' White of Dorchester had noted with truth, if not with elegance, in 1630, that 'it seems to be a common and gross error that 'colonies ought to be emunctories or sinckes of States to 'drayne away their filth.' The common and gross error died hard, or indeed it did not die till it was killed by the threat of colonists at Melbourne to fire on the ships bringing convicts.

Nevertheless the colonial system, and all that it implied, was sick unto death by the close of the eighteenth century. The remainder of its story is merely the history of the graceless

end it made. Experience could teach its supporters nothing. Not even the immense increase of British trade with America, which began on the very morrow of the recognition of the independence of the States, could convince them that the colonial system was of no real use even for the material purpose it was supposed best to serve. Dr. Tucker—though denounced for it by Burke, as a lackey in search of a basely won bishopric—lived to see his prophecy, that British trade would gain by the independence of her colonies and a fair treaty of commerce, more than fulfilled. The Navigation Acts were defended to the last moment by shipowners, who hoisted flags half-mast high when they were repealed in 1849. These men of business soon found that Josiah Child spoke truly when he said that merchants were not the best judges of the kingdom's interest in trade, for they were too exclusively devoted to their own. He might have added that they were not always the best judges of even this. The consequences of the repeal of the Navigation Acts would have borne him out. British shipping has at no period of its existence grown so rapidly, improved so fast, or formed so large a share of the total tonnage of the world, as since the laws meant for its protection were swept away. It would be bad logic to say that the growth was the result of the repeal alone: many causes helped. But, after all, the protection did not protect: it only hampered; and in so far as it gave men security that they might do business badly without incurring ruin, it did harm.

Prosperity, as interpreted in balance-sheets, is certainly not everything. Nor is it the highest thing. Burke might have agreed with Tucker that the independence of the Colonies would do our trade more good than harm, and yet have been justly wroth with him for assuming that nothing was so well worth considering as trade. The Dean of Gloucester did lay himself open to the charge that this was his conviction. Was a common nationality nothing, was a brotherhood of race and sentiment a small matter? Burke would have dismissed with scorn the mere suggestion. All through the American quarrel he laboured to persuade his countrymen that the one way of winning the lasting loyalty of the Colonies was to rely on their affection. Yet he would not go the whole way. The Revolution Settlement and the awful dignity of Parliament awed him, and he was always for insisting on the theoretic

supremacy of the Mother Country. He never came quite far enough to recognise that when you rely on affection it is at the best superfluous to reserve a power of coercion—and that a power which is to be hidden away and never used. The mere reminder that it is there and may be used irritates. There can be no equality when one of the two can punish.

Before Burke had been many years dead, men who had not a tithe of his wisdom were beginning to see what he would not recognise. Step by step, but with ever-increasing readiness, and at last even to absolute completion, the mother resigned all claim to control the daughter. We have heard much denunciation of the unwise persons who would talk about 'cutting the painter,' and yet they were not so foolish as those who would keep on referring to the painter as a limit of freedom. They have given up talking on both sides. Who dreams of coercing a colony, and what colony dreams of cutting itself loose? And now, first in the Boer War, and now in the infinitely greater war of to-day, the vision of the promoters of plantation in the seventeenth century has come true. The most wonderful part of it all is that the Boers we were fighting a few years ago are on our side. The kind of colonist we have most of us known—the man of the middle nineteenth century who had some lingering affection for the old country and a lively affection for some persons in it, but to whom it appeared on the whole to be a meddlesome nuisance, and who became furious at the mere suggestion that it retained any authority—is as dead as the gentleman who was Governor of New York in 1705. There is no place for him, when the mother no longer meddles and the daughter has nothing to resent. The long generations of Englishmen who were so concerned to bind the Empire together by a reciprocity of monopolies and by elaborate harness would have been provoked to derision if they had been told that the best way to achieve their purpose was to let things alone. They failed, and we had the sense to see that they failed, because they wished to foster by regulation. The 'retribution' has come soon and in full measure. The South African War was the forerunner of the spontaneous and ample help given to-day. And in both cases the aid has been given because after many years and after many errors the Mother Country has decided to lead *matris non dominae ritu*.

DAVID HANNAY.

## THE GALLANTRY OF FRANCE

1. **Ma Pièce. Souvenir d'un canonnier, 1914.** Par PAUL LINTIER. 35me éd. Paris: Librairie Plon. 1916.
2. **En Campagne (1914–1915). Impression d'un officier de légère.** Par MARCEL DUPONT. 53me éd. Paris: Librairie Plon. 1916.
3. **L'Appel du sol.** Roman par ADRIEN BERTRAND. 12me éd. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 1916.
4. **Ma Campagne au jour le jour.** Par LE CAPITAINE HASSLER. Préface de MAURICE BARRÈS. Paris: Perrin et Cie. 1917.
5. **La Jeunesse Nouvelle.** Par HENRI BORDEAUX. Paris: Librairie Plon. 1917.
6. **Autour de la Guerre Actuelle.** Par ÊMILE MAYER. Paris: Chapelot. 1917.
7. **Anthologie des Écrivains français morts pour la Patrie.** Par CARLOS LARRONDE. Préface de MAURICE BARRÈS. I.–IV. Paris: Larousse. 1916–1917.
8. **Sous Verdun.** Par MAURICE GENEVOIX. Préface d'ERNEST LAVISSE. Paris: Hachette. 1916.

THE spirit displayed by the young French officers in this war deserves to be compared in many essential respects with that which is blazoned in the glorious 'Chanson 'de Roland.' It is interesting to remember that during the long years in which the direct influence of that greatest of medieval epics was obscured, it was chiefly known through the paraphrase of it executed in German by the monk Konrad in the twelfth century. Many years ago, Gaston Paris pointed out the curious fact that Konrad completely modified the character of the 'Chanson de Roland' by omitting all expressions of warlike devotion to 'la douce France,' and by concentrating the emotion of the poem on its religious sentiment. But the real theme of the 'Chanson de Roland,' as we know now, was the passionate attachment of the heroes to the soil of France; 'ils étaient poussés par l'amour de la patrie, de 'l'empereur français leur seigneur, de leur famille, et surtout 'de la gloire.' It is a remarkable instance of German 'penetra-'tion' that in the paraphrase of the 'Chanson de Roland'

which Germany so long foisted upon Europe, these elements were successfully effaced. There is a sort of poetical revenge, therefore, in the attitude of those who answered the challenge of Germany in the true spirit of Roland and Oliver.

Vauvenargues—to whose memory the mind incessantly reverts in contemplation of the heroes of this war—says in one of his 'Maximes'—written nearly two centuries ago—'The earliest days of spring are less graceful than the budding 'virtue of a brave young man.' No figure of 1914 exemplifies this quality of grace more surprisingly than Jean Allard (who called himself in literature Méeus). He was only twenty-one and a half when he was killed at Pierrepont, at the very beginning of the war, but he was already one of the promising figures of his generation. Allard was known as an incipient Admirable Crichton; he was a brilliant scholar, an adroit and multiform athlete, the soul of wit and laughter, the centre of a group of adoring admirers. This sparkling poet was suddenly transformed by the declaration of war into the sternest of soldiers. His poem, called 'Demain,' created, or rather expressed, the patriotic passion which was simultaneously evoked all over France; it is really a lesser 'Marseillaise.' Not less popular, but more elaborate and academic, is Allard's aviation poem, 'Plus haut toujours!'—an extraordinary vision of the flight and ecstasy and tragic death of a solitary airman. We may notice that in this, and many other verses describing recent inventions of science, the young French poets contrive to be very lucid and simple in their language, and to avoid that display of technical verbiage which deforms too many English experiments in the same class.

It is not, however, so much by his writings, which are now collected in two, or perhaps three, little volumes, that Allard-Méeus strikes the imagination of a foreign spectator, as by his remarkable attitude. From the first, this lad of twenty-one exemplified and taught the value of a chivalrous behaviour. In the face of events, in that corruption of all which could make the martial spirit seem noble, that Germany has forced upon the world, this attitude of young French officers at the very opening of the war is pathetic, and might even lend itself, if we were disposed for mirth, to an ironic smile. But it should be recorded and not forgotten. It was Allard who revived the etiquette of going to battle dressed as sprucely as

for a wedding. We shall do well to recollect the symbolic value which the glove holds in legends of medieval prowess. When the dying Roland, under the pine-tree, turns to the frontier of Spain, he offers, as a dying soldier, his glove to God—

'Pur ses pecchiez deu puroffrid son guant.'

Allard-Méeus at St. Cyr made all the young officers swear that they would not go into battle except in white gloves and with their *képi* adorned with the *casoar*, the red and white dress-plume. 'Ce serment, bien français, est aussi élégant 'que téméraire,' he said, and the rest followed him with acclamation. He was one of the first French officers to fall in battle, at the head of his infantry, and his mother was presented by the regiment with his *casoar* and his gloves, worn at the moment of his death, on the 22nd of August 1914, and stained with his blood. Allard offers a fugitive but typical specimen of the splendour of French sentiment in the first flush of its enthusiasm.

On the 26th of March 1917, the Société des Gens de Lettres in Paris held a solemn assembly under the presidency of M. Pierre Decourcelle to commemorate those authors who, during the present war, have fallen in the service of France. Touching and grave in the extreme was the scene, when, before a crowded and throbbing audience, the secretary read the name of one young writer after another, pausing for the president to respond by the words 'Mort au champ d'honneur!' In each case there followed a brief silence more agitating in its emotion than any eloquence could be.

The great number of young men of high intellectual promise who were killed early in this war is a matter for grave and painful reflection. Especially in the first months of the autumn of 1914 the holocaust was terrible. There was no restraining the ardour of the young, who sought their death in a spirit of delirious chivalry, each proud to be the Iphigenia or the Jephtha's Daughter of a France set free. It has been noted since that the young generation, born about 1890, had been prepared for the crisis in a very significant way. The spiritual condition of these grave and magnificent lads resembled nothing that had been seen before, since the sorrows of 1870. They gave the impression of being dedicated. As we now read their letters, their journals, their poems, we are

astonished at the high level of moral sentiment which actuated them all. There is often even a species of rapturous detachment which seems to lift them into a higher sphere than that of vain mortality. Examples might be given by the sheaf, but it suffices here to quote a letter from the youthful Léo Lantil, who was killed early in 1915, in one of the obscure battles of Champagne. He says, in writing to his parents, shortly before his death, 'All our sacrifice will be of sweet 'savour if it leads to a really glorious victory and brings 'more light to human souls.' It was this Léo Lantil, dying in his twenty-fifth year, whose last words were 'Priez pour 'la France, travaillez pour la France, haussez-la!'

A story is told by M. Henri Bordeaux which illustrates the impression made by these young soldiers. A peasant of Savoy, while ploughing his fields in the autumn of 1914, saw his wife crossing to him with the local postman, who had a letter in his hands. He took it from them, and put on his spectacles, and read that his two sons had been killed in an engagement in the Vosges. He said quietly 'God has found 'them ready,' and then, slowly, 'My poor wife!' and he returned to his yoke of oxen. It would seem that the French accepted, without reserve and without difficulty, an inward discipline for which the world had formed little conception of their readiness. There is no question now, since all the private letters and diaries prove it, that the generation which had just left college, and had hardly yet gone out into the world, had formed, unsuspected by their elders, a conception of life which might have been called fatalistic if it had not been so rigorously regulated by a sense of duty. They were singularly calm under a constant presentiment of death. When the war came, they accepted the fiery trial not merely with resignation but even with relief. Their athletic stoicism took what fortune offered them, instead of attempting to rebel against it. Their sentiment was that a difficulty had been settled. Life had been producing upon their consciences a sense of complication, a tangle of too many problems. Now they might, and did, cheerfully relinquish the effort to solve them. One of the most extraordinary features of the moral history of the young French officers in this war has been the abandonment of their will to the grace of God and the orders of the chief. In the letters of the three noble brothers Belmont,

who fell in rapid succession, this apprenticeship to sacrifice is remarkable, but it recurs in all the records. 'God found 'them ready!'

When all is of so inspired an order of feeling, it is difficult, it is even invidious, to select. But the figure of Paul Lintier, whose journals have been piously collected by M. Edmond Harancourt, stands out before us with at least as much saliency as any other. We may take him as a peculiarly lucent example of his illuminated class. Quartermaster Lintier died on the 15th of March 1916, struck by a shell, on the Lorraine frontier, at a place called Jeandelincourt. He had not yet completed his twenty-third year, for he was born at Mayenne on the 13th of May 1893. In considering the cases of many of these brilliant and sympathetic young French officers, who had already published or have left behind them works in verse and prose, there may be a disposition, in the wonderful light of their experience, to exaggerate the positive value of their productions. Not all of them, of course, have contributed, or would have contributed, durable additions to the store of the literature of France. We see them, excusably, in the rose-light of their sunset. But, for this very reason, we are inclined to give the closer attention to Paul Lintier, who not only promised well but adequately fulfilled that promise. It seems hardly too much to say that the revelation of a prose-writer of the first class was brought to the world by the news of his death.

His early training predicted nothing of romance. He was intended for a career in commerce, but, showing no aptitude for trade, he dallied with legal studies at Lyons, and 'com- 'menced author' by publishing some essays in that city. At the age of twenty he joined a regiment of artillery, and seems to have perceived, a year before the war, that the only profession he was fitted for was soldiering. Towards the close of September 1914, in circumstances which he recounts in his book, he was severely wounded; he went back to the front in July 1915, and, as we have said, fell fighting eight months later. This is the history of a young man who will doubtless live in the annals of French literature; and brief as it seems, it is really briefer still, since all we know of Paul Lintier, or are likely ever to know, is what he tells us himself in describing what he saw and practised and endured between the 1st of August and the 22nd of September of the year 1914. This wonderful book,

'Ma Pièce,' was written by the young gunner, night after night, on his knee, during seven weeks of inconceivable intensity of emotion, and it is by this revelation of his genius that his memory will be preserved.

The style of Paul Lintier is one of the miracles of art. There is no evidence that this youth had studied much or had devoted himself to any of the training which adequate expression commonly demands. We know nothing about him until he suddenly bursts upon us, in the turmoil of mobilisation, as a finished author. What strikes a critical reader of 'Ma Pièce,' as distinguishing it from other works of its class, is a certain intellectual firmness most remarkable in a lad of Lintier's age, suddenly confronted by such a frenzy of public action. There is no pessimism, and no rhetoric, and no touch of humour, but an obsession for the truth. This is displayed by another and an extremely popular book on our list, 'En Campagne' by M. Marcel Dupont, which exhibits exactly the same determination to exaggerate nothing and to reduce nothing, but to report exactly what the author saw with his own eyes, in that little corner of the prodigious battle-field in which his own regiment was fighting. Truth, the simple unvarnished truth, has been the object of these various writers in setting down their impressions, but the result exemplifies the difference between what is, and what is not, durable as literature. For this purpose, it is well to turn from Lintier's pages to those of the honest writers of whom Dupont is the type, and then back again to Lintier. All evoke, through intense emotion, most moving and most tragic sensations, but Lintier, gifted with some inscrutable magic, evokes them in the atmosphere of beauty.

A quality of the mind of Paul Lintier which marked him out for a place above his fellows was the prodigious exactitude of his memory. This was not merely visual, but emotional as well. Not only did it retain, with the precision of a photograph, all the little fleeting details of the confused and hurried hours in which the war began, but it kept a minute record of the oscillation of feeling. Those readers who take a pleasure in the technical parts of writing may enjoy an analysis of certain pages in 'Ma Pièce,' for instance, the wonderful description of an *alerte* at 2 A.M. above the village of Tailly-sur-Meuse (pp. 131, 132). With the vigorous picturesqueness of these

sentences we may compare the pensive quality and the solidity of touch which combine to form such a passage as the following account of a watch at Azannes (August 14, 1914) :

' La nuit est claire, rayée par les feux des projecteurs de Verdun qui font des barres d'or dans le ciel ; merveilleuse nuit de mi-août, infiniment constellée, égayée d'étoiles filantes qui laissent après elles de longues phosphorescences.

' La lune s'est levée. Elle perce mal les feuillages denses des pruniers et le cantonnement immobile reste sombre. Çà et là, seulement, elle fait des taches jaunes sur l'herbe et sur les croupes des chevaux qui dorment debout. Le camarade avec qui je partage cette nuit de garde est étendu dans son manteau au pied d'un grand poirier. Devant moi, la lune illumine la plaine. Les prairies sont voilées de gaze blanche. Les deux armées, tous feux éteints, dorment ou se guettent.'

Lintier has no disposition to make things out better than they were. His account of the defeat at Virton, on the 22nd of August, is grave and calm in its sad stoicism, it is even harsh in its refusal to overlook any of the distressing features of the affair. But hope rises in his heart like clear water in a troubled well, and it is just after this melancholy set-back that the noble French spirit most vividly asserts itself. In the very forefront of physical and moral misery, ' quelle émouvante ' compréhension de la Patrie s'est révélée à nous ! ' An army which is instantly and completely victorious can never experience the depth of this sentiment. It is necessary to have fought, to have suffered, to have feared (if only for a moment) that all was lost, in order to comprehend with passion what the mother-country means to a man. Lying in the fog, soaked with rain, at the edge of the copses from which the German guns had ejected them, it was at that wretched moment that the full apprehension came to Paul Lintier that France comprised for him all the charm of life, all the affections, all the joys of the eyes and the heart and the brain. ' Alors, on préfère ' tomber, mourir là, parce qu'on sent que la France perdue, ' ce serait pire que la mort.' This is a feeling which animates the darkest pages of his book—and many of them perforce are gloomy ; through all the confusion and doubt, the disquietude, the physical dejection, the sense of a kind of blind-man's buff intolerably wearisome and fatiguing—through all this, which the young author does not seek to conceal, there runs the ceaseless bright thread of hope sustained by love.

For us English the book has a curious interest in its unlikeness to anything which an English lad of twenty would have dreamed of writing. It strikes an English reader, in comparison with the equally gallant and hardly less picturesque records which some of our own young officers have produced, as extraordinarily 'grown up.' The new generation which France sent into the war of defence was more simple and more ardent at the outset than our own analogous generation was. It was less *dilettante* and more intellectual. The evidences of thought, of reasoned reflection carried out to its full extent, of an adequate realisation of the problems presented by life, are manifest, though in various degree, in all these records of French officers killed in the months which preceded Christmas 1914. These Frenchmen did not go out light-heartedly, nor with a pathetic inability to fathom the purpose for which they so generously went, but they had given the matter a study which seemed beyond their years. They marched to the blood-baths of Belgium and Lorraine with solemnity, as though to a sacrament.

It must be remarked as an interesting point that this generation had recovered a sense of the spirituality of a war of national defence. In simpler words, it had recovered that honest pride which France, in certain of its manifestations since the war of 1870, seemed to have lamentably lost. Posterity will compare the serene simplicity of Péguy and Lintier with the restlessness and bitter disenchantment of the 1860 generation, which arrived at manhood just when France was most deeply conscious of her humiliation. If we seek for the sources of this recovery of self-respect, which so beautifully characterised French character at the immediate crisis of 1914, we have to find it, of course, in the essential elasticity of the trained French mind. The Frenchman likes the heroic attitude, which is unwelcome to us, and he adopts it instinctively, with none of our national shyness and false modesty. But, if we seek for a starting-point of influence, we may probably find it in the writings of a soldier whose name is scarcely known in England, but whose 'Études ' sur le Combat,' first published in 1880, have been the textbook of the young French officer, and were never being so much read as just before the outbreak of the war.

The author of these 'Études sur le Combat' was Colonel

Ardent du Picq, who fell at the battle of Longeville-lès-Metz, on the 15th of August 1870. He had predicted the calamity of that war, which he attributed to the mental decadence of the French army, and to the absence of any adequate General Staff organisation. Ardent du Picq had received no encouragement from within or from without, and the reforms which he never ceased to advocate were treated as the dreams of an eccentric idealist. He died, unrecognised, without having lived to see carried out one of the reforms which he had so persistently advocated. His tongue was rough and his pen was dipped in acid; the military critic who ridiculed the 'buffooneries' of his generals and charged his fellow-officers with trying to get through their day's work with as little trouble to themselves as possible, was not likely to carry much weight at the close of the Second Empire. But the scattered papers of the forgotten Colonel Ardent du Picq were preserved, and ten years after his death a portion of them was published. Every scrap which could be found of the work of so fruitful a military thinker was presently called for, and at the moment of the outbreak of the present war the 'Études sur le Combat' had become the text-book of every punctilious young officer. It is still unknown how much of the magnificent effort of 1914 was not due to the shade of Ardent du Picq.

Although the name of that author does not occur in the pages of 'Ma Pièce,' we are constrained to believe that Lintier had been, like so many young men of his class, an infatuated student of the 'Études.' He had comprehended the essence of military vitality and the secret of military grandeur. He had perceived the paramount importance of moral force in contending with formidable hostile organisations. Ardent du Picq, who possessed the skill of his nation in the manufacture of maxims, laid it down that 'Vaincre, c'est d'être 'sûr de victoire.' He assented to the statement that it was a spiritual and not a mechanical ascendancy which had gained battles in the past and must gain them in the future. Very interesting it is to note, in the delicately scrupulous record of the mind and conscience of Paul Lintier, how, side by side with this uplifted patriotic confidence, the weakness of the flesh makes itself felt. At Tailly, full of the hope of coming battle, waiting in the moonlit forest for the sound of approaching German guns, suddenly the heroism drops from him, and

he murmurs the plaintive verses of the old poet Joachim du Bellay to the echo of 'Et je mourrai peut-être demain!' The delicate sureness with which he notes these changes of mood is admirable; and quickly the depression passes: 'vite 'notre extraordinaire insouciance l'emporte, et puis, jamais 'heure a-t-elle été plus favorable à la revanche?'

In defining the particular principles which have actuated the magnificent French General Staff in the present crisis, Lord Haldane has dwelt on the fact that the French have displayed throughout 'that moral effect which comes from certainty 'of purpose and which only concentrated thought can give.' The value which the higher authority sets on the cultivation of moral enthusiasm is exemplified by the fact that the French Ministry of War has encouraged the publication of those personal records, from which we have here made a selection, on the ground that they carry throughout the army a contagion of energy and courage. We are far here from the obscure jealousy of thought which made a military representative of the British War Office the other day lay down the brilliant axiom 'A hairdresser is of more value to the country at war than a 'librarian!' Such a man could not exist in a French community, where, at the very height of hostilities, so prominent a military authority as Colonel Émile Manceau could pause to say 'Let us read, let us give much time to reading!' It is a curious reflection that the present struggle has been, for the French, the most literary of all wars, the one in which the ordered expression of clear thought in language has been most carefully and consciously cultivated.

This was very far from being the case with the war of 1870, when the absence of literature was strongly felt during and after the crisis. The old satirist of the 'Iambes,' Auguste Barbier, whose violent verses were not long ago introduced to the readers of this REVIEW, wrote, immediately after the declaration of peace, a poem in which he rehearsed the incidents of the war, and commented on the absence from the list of its victims of a single distinguished writer. He said:

'La Muse n'a pas vu tomber un seul poète,'

and it was out of any one's power to refute the sinister and prosaic verse. The contrast with 1914 is painful and striking. In the existing war the holocaust of victims, poets and

historians, painters and sculptors, musicians and architects, has been heartrending, and it can never in future years be pretended that the Muses have this time spared us their most poignant sacrifices. A year ago the ' Revue Critique,' one of the most serious and original of the learned journals of Paris, announced the losses it had endured. It was conducted by a staff of forty scholars ; by the summer of 1916 this number was reduced by twenty-seven ; thirteen had been killed, eleven severely wounded, three had disappeared.

Many writers have asked, and M. Maurice Barrès prominently among them, what is the reason of the fact that intelligence has taken a front place in this war ? What has been the source of the spirit of self-immolation which has driven the intellectual and imaginative section of French youth to hold out both hands to catch the full downpour of the rain of death ? There is no precedent for it in French history, and we may observe for ourselves how new a thing it was, and how unexpected, by comparing with the ardent and radiant letters and poems of the youngest generation the most patriotic expressions of their elders. A single example may suffice. No man of letters has given a nobler witness to the truth of his patriotism than Colonel Patrice Mahon, known in letters as Art Roë. His novels, which dealt largely with modern Russian life, in relation with the French army, were virile and elevated productions, but he was a man of fifty at the time of his heroic death at the head of his troops, in the battle of Wisembach (August 22, 1914), and his tone was not that of such young men as Camille Violand and Marcel Drouët. To read again the ' Pingot et moi ' of Art Roë is to return to a book of the utmost sincerity and valour, but it was published in 1893, and there is no touch of the splendour of 1914 about it.

A figure which stands midway between the generation of Art Roë and that of the adolescent comrades of a new Sophocles of whom we shall presently speak, is Captain E. J. Détanger, who seems to be transitional, and to share the qualities of both. This name has, even now, scarcely grown familiar to the eye and ear, but it proves to have been the real name of Émile Nolly, whose romances of modern life in the Extreme East had been widely read just before the war. Nolly's earliest books, ' Hien le Maboul ' and ' La Barque Annamite ' (but particularly the latter), gave promise of a new Pierre Loti or

a new Rudyard Kipling, but totally distinct in manner from both. Détanger was just thirty-four when the war broke out, and he was one of its early victims, dying at Blainville-sur-l'Eau on the 5th of September. He greatly distinguished himself by his personal bravery, and the cross of the Legion of Honour was pinned to his blood-stained uniform on his last battle-field. The tribute of a fellow-officer to this devoted man of letters may be quoted here. It is an example of the sudden and complete transformation which turned artists into soldiers at the first sound of the bugle :

'Émile Nolly proved a magnificent soldier. He had a youthful, blithe, fervent and resolute soul ; he had the soul of a hero completely prepared to sacrifice himself with joy for his country. After having served valiantly and brilliantly in Indo-China, and then in Morocco, it was with a radiant hope that he set out for the frontier of Lorraine. "What does the life of any one of us matter ?" he said to me just before he left. "All that is essential is that France should live, that she should be victorious." '

Marcel Drouët, who has just been mentioned, was much younger. He was a native of the invaded department of the Ardennes, and had not completed his twenty-sixth year when he was killed in the trenches of Consenvoye, in the Woëvre, when he was taking part in the outer defence of Verdun. He seems to have been distinguished by a refinement of spirit, which is referred to, in different terms, by every one who has described him. He leaves behind him a volume of poems, 'L'Ombre 'qui tourne,' and various essays and fragments. The journal of the last days of his life has been edited by M. Maurice Barrès, and is a record of singular delicacy and courage. We see him facing the dreadful circumstances of the war, made the more dreadful to him because the horrors are committed in the midst of the familiar scenes of his own home, and we find him patiently waiting for the signal to lead his men into action while he holds a volume of Chateaubriand open upon his knee. The reflections of Marcel Drouët differ in some respects from those of his most enthusiastic companions. There is a note of tenderness in them which is unusual, and which is very pathetic. At the very close of his brief and heroic life, the thoughts of Drouët reverted to the historic town in which he was born, to Sedan which still shuddered in his infancy at the recollection of the horrors of 1870. He

thought of the dead who fell on that melancholy field; and then his thoughts turned to those dear faces which he had so recently left behind. The following passage, in its simplicity, in its sweetness, deserves to live in the memorial literature of the war:

'Je pense à vous, mes chers vivants, aux mains des barbares en ce moment sans doute, mais en le cœur de qui j'ai foi, tant je connais votre dévouement aux choses sublimes.

'Mais aussi je pense à vous, mon Dieu, qui avez voulu toutes ces choses pour votre plus grand gloire et pour l'établissement de votre justice. Tous ces malheurs, ces tristesses, tout ce sang répandu sont imposés par vous, mon Dieu, en manière de rédemption. Mais votre soleil glorieux éclairera bientôt j'en suis absolument certain, la victoire du bon droit qui attend depuis près d'un demi-siècle. J'y co-opère de toutes mes forces, de toute mon âme. Et si vous me retirez de ce monde, ô Dieu de bonté, permettez que ce soit pour me joindre à ceux qui m'ont précédé dans votre séjour, et dont l'affection terrestre me fut précieuse. C'est toute la prière ardente que je fais devant le soleil levant, ce jour de Toussaint que sillonnent déjà les obus semeurs de mort, en cette année 1914 qui verra rétablir la paix du monde, par l'anéantissement du peuple barbare, et la régénérescence de la nation française.'

In most cases there rests an obscurity over the brief lives of these gallant young officer-authors, whose nature was little observed until the flash of battle illuminated them for one last brilliant moment. We feel a strong desire, which cannot be gratified, to follow them from their childhood to their adolescence, and to see for ourselves what impulses directed them into the path of heroism. It is rarely that we can do this, but one of these poets has left behind him two friends who have recaptured the faint and shrouded impressions of his early life. The piety of M. Henri Albert Besnard, who was his intimate companion, and of that practised narrator M. Henri Bordeaux, who is his biographer, enable us to form a clearer and fuller conception of Camille Violand than of any of his compeers. Born in 1891, he was typical of that latest generation of which we have spoken, in whom all seemed to be unconsciously preparing for the great and critical sacrifice. He was born at Lyons, but was brought up in the Quercy, that wild and tortured district just north of the Pyrenees, where nature seems to gather together all that she possesses of the grotesque and violent in landscape; but he was educated at Alençon, and trained at Vouziers, in the midst of the orchards

of Normandy. Thus both sides of France, the Midi and the Manche, were equally known to him, but the ceaseless peregrinations which he underwent, so far from enlarging his horizon, seem to have plunged his soul in melancholy. At the age of twenty he struck M. Bordeaux as being the typical *déraciné*.

The letters of Camille Violand and the memories of his friends present to us the record of a vague and uneasy boyhood. He began quite early to exercise his mind in prose and verse, but without energy or aim. He was not fixed in any plan of life. His letters—for he wrote with abundance, and something undefined seems to have induced his family to keep his letters—are steeped in sombre and objectless melancholy. He was tormented by presentiments of misfortune; he indulged a kind of romantic valetudinarianism. In the confusion of his spirit as he passed uneasily from boyhood into manhood, the principal moral quality we perceive is a peevish irritation at the slow development of life. He was just twenty-one when the death of his mother, to whom he was passionately attached, woke him out of this paralysed condition, and it is remarkable that, in breaking, like a moth from a chrysalis, out of his network of futile and sterile sophisms, it was immediately on the contingency of war that he fixed his thoughts. The news of his mother's death, by a strange and rapid connexion of ideas, reminded him of his future responsibility as an officer in the coming struggle. He wrote, in 1913, 'Je m'effraie 'en pensant à cette responsabilité qui pèsera certainement un 'jour sur moi, car je considère la guerre comme à peu près 'certaine à bref délai.'

Having once formed this conviction, a complete revolution affected the character of the young Violand. His melancholy ceased; his uncertainty fell from him; it seemed as though his soul threw off her fetters. From the close of 1913, when the chancelleries of Europe were still profoundly unconscious of the tremendous upheaval which was in store for them, this young man, hitherto so timorous and irresolute, is seen to be filled with a species of prophetic ecstasy:

> 'The boundless, overflowing, bursting gladness!
> The vaporous exultation not to be confined!
> . . . the animation of delight
> Which wraps me, like an atmosphere of light,
> And bears me as a cloud is borne by its own wind.'

This remarkable change of character was encouraged by the military discipline which now regulated his life, and which he accepted with rapture and devotion. His mother's one aim had been to make of Camille a soldier and a Christian, and he became the very type of that combination.

To use a striking phrase of M. Henri Bordeaux, the war found Camille Violand in a state of preparedness. He saw it arrive, not with anxiety or trepidation, but with solemn joy. His father was placed in command of a brigade of dragoons, and he himself, at another part of the frontier line, was given the rank of second lieutenant and a command which filled him with the pride of responsibility. Three weeks later he was wounded in the head at the battle of Virton, but not until he had seen the Germans, after a hard fight, retire before the attack of his men. 'Il a connu l'ivresse de la victoire : il a vu fuir 'l'ennemi'—so a friend announced it. He was taken back to the hospital at Limoges, but the victory of the Marne intoxicated him, and it was found impossible to hold him back. With a head still bandaged, he made his appearance once more in his beloved regiment, which was now fighting in the forest of the Argonne, but on the first occasion on which he led his men, Violand was wounded again, now in the shoulder. He was sent far back, into Brittany, to Quimper, where, a second time, by a subterfuge he contrived to escape from the hospital before his wound was properly healed. He was absolutely intractable in his determination to get back promptly to the fighting line : 'il était comme ça, avec son air délicat et tran-'quille ! ' Again brought back, he was set to training men at Quimper. But he could not endure the restraint, and his nerves broke down.

It was found impossible to hold him back, and on the 8th of October the military authorities consented to his return to his regiment, and with the permission was combined the news that he had been nominated for the cross of the Legion of Honour. The letter in which he announces that fact to the ladies at home—'mes chères Grand'mère et Tante '—is charming in its simplicity. 'La croix gagnée sur un champ de ba-'taille, c'est à mes yeux le plus beau rêve qu'un jeune Français 'pût faire ; je regrette seulement de ne pas l'avoir méritée 'davantage ; mais l'avenir ne permettra, j'espère, de justifier 'cette récompense, que je considère comme anticipée.' The

official notification specifies the wounds which he had received, and the fact that, by the testimony of all who saw him under fire, the young lieutenant gave evidence of very great courage and of indomitable energy. That he was, by what he calls a queer coincidence, the youngest officer of his regiment and its only member of the Legion of Honour, afforded him an unaffected satisfaction.

From this time—the end of October 1914—the letters of Camille Violand testify to the rapid development of his mind and character. He loses a certain childishness which had hitherto clung to him, and he expresses himself with a more virile sobriety. Nothing could exceed the pathos of his pictures of the terrible life in the Argonne, and we are made to feel how rapidly the suffering and the responsibility of his military life were bringing out all the deepest and most serious elements in his character. There is a remarkable letter of the 7th of January 1915, describing an engagement in which he lost several of his best men, and in particular an experienced corporal in whose skill he much confided. The briefest fragment broken from this pathetic description, addressed to his father, will give a notion of the tone of it :

' J'étais absorbé par les blessés dans mon poste de commandement et quand je pus me rendre dans la tranchée où il était, il tombait dans le coma. Ses derniers mots avaient été : " Adieu, ma Patrie ! " Pourtant, il me reconnut à la voix, me répondit faiblement. Je l'assistai dans ses derniers moments. Ce fut bien rapide, bien simple et bien beau. *J'étais pour lui le chef, ce qui est plus que le Père et le Prêtre réunis.* Je l'ai bien senti là ; quand ce fut presque fini, je l'embrassai et le quittai pour retourner aux soucis que nous donne l'ennemi.'

Thus was this lad of three-and-twenty fortified and ripened by the arduous warfare in the Argonne. He was now spending what leisure the fighting gave him in a careful study of Homer. We gather that he had just finished re-reading the ' Iliad ' when the end came. On the 4th of March 1915, at Mesnil-lès-Hurlus, a ball pierced his heart, splintering in its passage the cross of the Legion of Honour of which he was so proud. In his pocket was found his last letter, still unposted, in which he told his father of a fresh distinction for valour which he had just received, and in the course of which, with a manifest presentiment of his approaching end, he wrote, ' Je mourrai, si ' Dieu veut, en bon chrétien et en bon Français.'

It is not to be denied that ordinary observers before the war were not in any degree prepared for the heroic devotion displayed by such young officers as these at the beginning of the war. The general opinion was expressed by M. Maurice Maeterlinck when he laid it down that 'courage, moral and 'physical endurance (if not abnegation, forgetfulness of self, 'renunciation of all comfort, the faculty of sacrifice, the power 'to face death) belong exclusively to the most primitive, 'the least happy, the least intelligent of peoples, those which 'are least capable of reasoning, of taking danger into account.' It was the common hypothesis among moralists that, as their nerves grew more sensitive and the means of destruction more cruel and irresistible, no human being would be able to support the strain of actual fighting. It seemed inevitable that men would rapidly become demoralised, when exposed to the multifarious horrors of modern mechanical battle. Nothing, therefore, could have been more surprising than the temper shown by thousands of young men, suddenly called up from sedentary and safe pursuits, and confronted by the terrors of shrapnel and liquid fire and mines and gas, and all the other horrible ingenuities of an unseen enemy for killing and mutilating. Their imaginations were unaccustomed to these terrors, but the higher faculties of the human mind asserted themselves, and in the vague collective battle of the trenches these young French officers, despite the refinement and the security in which they had always been accustomed to exist, instantly reverted to the chivalrous attitude which their remote ancestors had adopted in a warfare that was romantic and personal in its individualism.

No doubt a not inconsiderable part of the serenity, which is so remarkably evident in the letters and journals of these young men, was due to the fact that they had arrived, for the first time, at a comprehension of the unity of life. There is no tedious alternative of choice in the active military career. All is regulated, all is arranged in accordance with a hierarchical discipline, and war becomes what definite religion is to a weak soul that has been tossed about by the waves of doubt. It must be also borne in mind that the incessant dread of invasion, especially in the neighbourhood of the eastern frontier, had kept the spirits of those who knew that responsibility would fall upon them, in a state of unceasing agitation. It is a para-

lysing thing to exist under a perpetual menace which nothing can precipitate and yet nothing can avert. Captain Belmont, in his admirable letters, speaks much of the 'romanticism' which attracted many of his companions, and of the natural satisfaction which the declaration of war gave to their restless faculties. The two sentiments were probably one and the same, and to a poetical temperament that might well seem 'romantic' which filled a less vivid mind with restlessness and languor.

It is noticeable, too, that when once the sickening suspense was removed, and the path of pain and glory lay clear before these youthful spirits, they grew very rapidly in intellectual stature. They had found their equilibrium, and no more time and force were wasted in useless oscillations. Each of them had, at last, the occasion, and therefore the power, to fill out the lines of his proper individuality. As M. Henri Bordeaux excellently says, 'L'esprit inquiet ne se contente de rien, le 'cœur inapaisé se croit incompris.' But now these men knew their vocation, and a precocious experience of life developed in them a temper of meditation. It is extraordinary what an intelligent philosophy, what a delicate study of nature, were revealed at once in the writings of these heroic boys of twenty. Lieutenant Belmont, who fought in Alsace, had spent his infancy and adolescence in the neighbourhood of Grenoble, and his memory was full of the rich Dauphiné valley, with its great river and its eastern horizon of the Alps. In the misery of the September nights of 1914, in the harshness of misty mornings among the Alsatian pines, his thoughts return to the luminous twilights of his old home under the great oaks of the Isère, and he expresses his nostalgia in terms of the most exquisite and the most unstudied grace. Here is a fragment of one of his letters home (October 1914):

'Les journées sont exquises, tristes et pâles, également différentes des crudités de nos idées et des ténèbres de l'hiver. L'imagination a vite fait de s'envoler, à travers cette lumière adoucie, vers tous les horizons familiers de la petite patrie, vers la vallée de Grenoble, paresseusement allongée dans ce bain de léger soleil, au pied des Alpes déjà engourdies, vers les terres rousses de Lonnes longées par les futaies jaunissantes où s'abritent les gibiers, tranquilles cette année.'

No doubt, the reason why this war has been, for France,

so peculiarly a literary war, is that the mechanical life in the trenches, alternately so violent and so sedentary, has greatly enforced the habit of sustained contemplation based on a vivid and tragic experience. This has encouraged, and in many instances positively created, a craving for literary expression, which has found abundant opportunity for its exercise in letters, journals, and poems; and what it has particularly developed is a form of literary art in which Frenchmen above all other races have always excelled, that analysis of feeling which has been defined as 'le travail de ciselure morale.' This moral carved-work, or chasing, as of a precious metal, revealing the rarity and value of spiritual surfaces, is characteristic of the journals of Paul Lintier, of the beauty of which we have already spoken. His art expends itself on the effect of outward things on the soul. He speaks of mysterious sights, half-witnessed in the gloaming, of sinister noises which have to be left unexplained. He does not shrink from a record of unlovely things, of those evil thoughts which attend upon the rancour of defeat, of the suspicion of treason which comes to dejected armies like a breath of poison-gas. That portion of his 'Souvenirs' which deals with the days of the retreat on Paris is written in a spasm of savage anger; a whole new temper is instantly revealed when once the tide turns at Nanteuil. Nature herself thus endorses his new mood, as he writes 'There are still clouds heaped up to the west, but 'the blue, that cheers us, is chasing them all away.'

Among the noble young poets whose pathetic and admirable fragments the piety of surviving friends has preserved, it is difficult to select one name rather than another. But in the rank of these Rupert Brookes and Julian Grenfells and Charles Listers of France, we may perhaps pause before the ardent figure of Jacques de Choudens. He was a Breton, and was trained for the law on the other side of France, at Lille. He found that the call of the sea was irresistible, and after two years at a desk in that dreary and dusty city, he suddenly flung up his cap and would have no more of such drudgery. To the despair of his family, he started on the high seas, and explored the wonderland of Haiti. After various adventures, he was about to return to France, when the sea again took him by the throat, and he vanished, like Robert Louis Stevenson, in the Pacific. Having sailed twice round the

world, 'beyond the sunset and the baths of all the western 'stars,' a tired Ulysses under thirty, Jacques de Choudens had just come back to France when the war seized him with a fresh and deep enchantment. He entered into it with a profound ardour, and proved himself to possess exceptional military qualities. He was severely wounded on the second day of the battle of Charleroi, but slowly recovered, only to be killed in an engagement on the 13th of June 1915. His poems, written since war broke out, have been carefully collected and published by his friend, M. Charles Torquet. They are few, and they suffer from a certain hardness of touch; Jacques de Choudens had, as yet, a deeper acquaintance with life than with literature; but they breathe a spirit of high and romantic heroism. Let the sonnet called 'Autre 'Prière' be offered as an example:

'Terres, fleuves, forêts, ô puissances occultes,
C'est votre âme qui bat au bleu de nos poignets;
Notre orgueil s'est enfin cabré sous les insultes
Dont, depuis quarante ans, ô France, tu saignais.

Dans le livre où s'apprend le plus hautain des cultes,
Marque la page avec nos sabres pour signets;
Ceins la couronne d'or qu'en l'An deux tu ceignais,
Car c'est dans notre chair à nous que tu la sculptes.

France! France! Bénis chaque arme et chaque front;
C'est d'ardeur, non de peur, que tremble l'éperon.
Nous sommes tes martyrs volontaires, superbes,

Sous l'auréole d'or des galons du képi. . . .
Nous allons préparer aux faucilles des gerbes,
Puisqu'où tombe un soldat pousse un nouvel épi.'

The poet, shortly before he fell, wrote to a friend 'Nous 'travaillerons mieux après la victoire, ce que nous ferons 'ayant été mûri par la fatigue et les angoisses. La vie est 'bonne et belle et la guerre est une chose bien amusante.' This is the type of Frenchman who fights for the love of fighting, who puts above all other happiness the prize of military honour and glory won in a good cause. We meet with it in the lyrical effusion of an adventurous poet like Jacques de Choudens and in the straightforward evidence of a practised soldier like Captain Hassler, whose 'Ma Cam-

'pagne' is a record extraordinary alike for its courage, for its vivacity, and for its modesty.

The peculiar spirit of ardent gallantry to which we have dedicated these few pages is illustrated, as will be observed, by examples taken without exception from the first months of the war. It would be rash to say, without a careful sifting of evidence, how much of this sentiment survived the days which preceded the battle of the Marne. France has, in the succession of her attacks up to the present hour, continued and confirmed the magnificent tradition of her courage. But it is impossible to overlook the elements which have taken the romantic colour out of the struggle. No chivalry could survive close experience of the vile and bestial cruelty of German methods. The sad and squalid aspects of a war of resistance, fought in the very bleeding flesh of the beloved mother-country, were bound to be fatal to 'cette bonne humeur bienfaisante' which so marvellously characterised the young French officers of August 1914. Moreover, the mere physical element of fatigue has been enough to quench that first radiant flame. We find it deadening, at last, even the high spirit of Paul Lintier, and we listen to his confession: 'To sleep! to sleep! 'O to live without a thought, in absolute silence. To live, 'after having so often nearly died. I could sleep for days, 'and days, and days!'

These are considerations which belong to a heavier and a wearier time. As a matter of history—so that in our hurrying times a gesture of so much beauty may not, because it was so ephemeral, be forgotten—we have endeavoured to catch a reflection of the glow which blazed in the hearts of young intellectual officers at the very beginning of the war. If, in the inevitable wear and tear of the interminable struggle, this beauty fades into the light of common day, so much the more is there need that we should fix it in memory, since in a world which savagery and treason have made so hideous, we cannot afford to let this jewel of pure moral beauty be trampled into oblivion.

EDMUND GOSSE.

# MACHIAVELLI AND MODERN STATECRAFT

1. **Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio ; Il Principe ; Istorie Fiorentine ; Dell' Arte della Guerra, etc.** By NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI.
2. **Erinnerungen und Gedanken.** By BISMARCK.
3. **Central Europe.** By FRIEDRICH NAUMANN.

THE work by which Nicholas Machiavelli is best known is 'Il Principe': a treatise popularly regarded as the standard manual of unscrupulous diplomacy. The word Machiavellism, like its counterpart Jesuitism, is a current term with a definite meaning: the former may be employed by an admirer of Machiavelli, as the latter by a lover of the Jesuits. It signifies a philosophy of pure expediency; the subordination of every moral and human consideration to the political needs of the hour.

'The Prince' is a work as characteristic of its author as any of the others; though we may add that it will be best understood by those to whom it is not the only one with which they are acquainted. Some students of Machiavelli have, indeed, tried to place this book in a special category: they have regarded it as ironical; or as a description of the vices of princely rulers cast into the illusory form of a treatise for their guidance; or even as just a time-serving effort to enter into grace with the Medicis, when thus alone its author could hope to obtain public employment.

This last motive may, indeed, have had something to do with the actual form of the work; but as for the other interpretations they are surely uncalled for. If ever a writer was clear and consistent and characteristic throughout his works, it is Machiavelli; we may not always like his meaning, but we can never mistake it. Some of the most unscrupulous passages from 'The Prince' could be set beside others from the 'Discourses on Livy,' though the first is on tyrannical and the second on popular government. Thus in chap. xviii. of 'The Prince,' having given reasons why a prince cannot always keep his word, Machiavelli concludes that a

prudent ruler 'neither can nor ought to keep faith when to 'do so would be to his disadvantage, and when the motives 'for which he made his promise are no longer existent.'

But in the 'Discourses on Livy' Machivelli applies the same principle of expediency to the conduct of the loyal citizen: 'No sensible person will reproach anyone for however extra-'ordinary an action that is directed to the well-ordering of 'a kingdom or the founding of a republic.'

And in another place: 'When the salvation of our country 'is at stake all questions of justice and injustice, of mercy 'and cruelty, of honour and dishonour must be set aside; 'every other consideration must be subordinated to the one 'aim of saving her life and preserving her honour.'

We need not multiply examples. The consensus of opinion is that, whatever else he also was, Nicholas Machiavelli was Machiavellian: as Machiavellian as Bismarck; as Machiavellian as the German General Staff; as Machiavellian as the rest of us, and the best of us, in the realm of diplomacy, unconsciously or protestingly, are to some extent bound to be.

Machiavelli was a diplomat: a statesman in so far as his position permitted of it; and, in all his strivings, a state-builder. He was in love with ancient Rome, with all her works, and all her pomps; with her wisdom and her perfidy; her magnanimity and her ruthlessness. He studied, with passion and admiration, the story of her political evolution; of the emergence of a self-governing people from the warfare of conflicting sects. He held that men changed but little in the course of history, and that what had been done could be done again. He dreamed of a modern Florence fashioned according to the lessons of Livy: a free, strong, democratic and austere republic. But with Latin sincerity he set forth his doctrine of ways and means, and in that doctrine is the philosophy of Machiavellism, though, as we shall see, there is also something besides.

But once again, just because he was a thorough Latin, his subject interested him for its own sake, apart from its practical bearings. Thus in dealing with the question of tyrannical government, even had there been no living tyrants with whom he had to reckon, the subject would have interested him for its own sake, and he would have set forth the rules that should guide the conduct of a prince, who aimed at despotic power

for purely selfish ends, just as calmly and fully as though he were advocating tyranny as his own ideal.

To the ordinary English mind this moral detachment is perplexing and misleading, like much else in the Latin temperament. The Englishman is more truthful than the Latin, but he is not so great a lover of truth. The Latin thinks it and speaks it as his intellect moves him to do, the Englishman speaks it because he holds that he ought to do so; his moral life is more vigorous, his intellectual life is not so keen. Hence the quiet indifference with which a Latin will declare certain actions to have been admirably fitted to the attainment of their own end, without uttering or implying further comment: the manner, for instance, in which Machiavelli describes the clever trapping and murdering of his enemies, Vitellozzo Vitelli and three others, by the Duke of Valentinois, will confuse the Anglo-Saxon, but not the Latin, to whom it is the fact, and not its moral bearings, that presents the main intellectual interest.

But even with this proviso Machiavellism remains a distinct code of action, of ethical as well as intellectual import: a statement of politics and diplomacy not originated by its namesake, but by him put into work and system. Therefore, the first thing we want to understand in Machiavelli is his Machiavellism, and its relation to modern statecraft; only then can we see whether, and how far, Machiavelli is greater than Machiavellism, just as we can also, by a frank estimate of our own Machiavellism, best appreciate how far our own policy is set towards higher ends.

One of the first and most fundamental characteristics of Machiavellism is its estimate of human nature. The majority of men are mean, cowardly, and self-interested; this is the primary fact with which the statesman has to deal. He may start with another view if he likes, but he does it at his own risk and that of his country.

'It may be said of men in general [he writes in 'The Prince'] that they are ungrateful, plausible, deceitful, cowardly, and avaricious; so long as you benefit them they are yours—they offer you their blood, their possessions, their life, their children, while danger is distant; but when it comes too near, they turn. And then the Prince, who has made no other provision than his trust in them, is ruined.' (Ch. xvii.)

There are two ways of dealing with men, he tells us in the next chapter : by law and by force. Law is properly for men, and force for beasts ; but since human beings are in part beasts, the prince must be fox and lion as well as man. It is a fine thing to keep faith, but only with those who are correspondingly loyal. Mutual distrust is a primary principle of sound diplomacy.

The next guiding principle of Machiavellism is the avoidance of half measures. ' He who would be a tyrant, but slays not ' Brutus, and he who would free his country, but slays not ' the sons of Brutus, is doomed to failure.' (Discorsi, Bk. III. ch. iii.)

Nor is it enough to kill some of the children of Brutus and leave others ; all must go. Machiavelli often refers to the downfall of his friend Piero Soderini, one time Gonfaloniere of Florence, as the consequence of an admixture of human with political motives ; while the Duke of Valentinois (Cesare Borgia) was, even from the humanitarian standpoint, more successful, in virtue of his swift and ruthless action.

*Krieg ist Krieg* ; for Machiavellism there is no other conception of war. For war is, indeed, the supreme occasion in which it is man as beast, and not man as man, with whom we are dealing. Law, as Machiavelli has already stated, is for man ; force is for the brute. If, between ruler and people, occasions arise on which the bestial and not the human element is to be taken into count, how much more is this the case when it is with avowed enemies that we have to deal. We have yet to see if, in the philosophy of Machiavelli, there be any hint of pacifist tendencies ; but in war itself he allows no place for half-measures. For him peace was peace, and war was war : ' You cannot call it peace,' he says, ' when ' States are continually falling on one another with armies ; ' nor can you call it war when men are not killed, cities are ' not ravaged, governments are not destroyed.' And he adds regretfully that war at one time became so decadent, ' that it ' was undertaken without fear, waged without danger, and ' concluded without loss.' (Istorie Fiorentine, Bk. V.)

To be thorough, and also to be fearless and to be swift : this is Machiavellian wisdom. The *Pecca fortiter* of Luther, which has been so wholeheartedly adopted as a German motto, is in perfect consonance with this principle of moral fearless-

ness. Machiavelli relates, with pity and contempt, how Giovampagolo Baglioni, having the opportunity of murdering Pope Julius II. and a number of his cardinals through the rashness of the former, failed to take advantage of it. Machiavelli would not have blamed him had he been a good man, deterred from the crime by conscientious motives. But, as he explains :

'It was not his goodness nor his conscience that restrained him; there was no room for considerations of duty in the breast of a wicked man who lived with his own sister, and had murdered his cousins and nephews in order to reign; but the fact is that few men are capable of being honestly bad or perfectly good, and, when a bad deed demands a certain measure of greatness and generosity, they are incapable of it.' (Discorsi, Bk. I. ch. xxvii.)

Machiavelli implies, in this chapter, that Julius II. proved himself in every sense the greater, and the stronger, and even the better man, by daring his lesser adversary to commit a crime whose greatness appalled him, though its actual wickedness would have counted but little. Baglioni desired the end, but he shrank from the means; and no greater sin can be committed against the principles of Machiavellism.

Yet this same doctrine of the means to the end as consistently reprobates useless daring as it commends that which can be successful. No vain sacrifices, in the name of courage and honour, can find place in Machiavellian policy. To die for your country—yes, a hundred times if need be—but only provided your death truly saves her. A military expedition, however desperate and daring, when necessity demands it, and when there is some hope of success; but no sheer waste for however honourable a cause. The good of the country is the supreme end; 'whether by glory or by humiliation she 'is to be served and saved.' (Discorsi, Bk. III. ch. xli.)

It is in this chapter that he refers to the advice given by Lentulus to the Roman Army trapped within the Caudine Forks; surrender might be ignoble, and those who advocated it might be accused later on of regard for their own skins, but in this way alone could Rome be saved. A good end, according to Machiavellism, may justify questionable means; but the best of ends cannot justify hopeless and inadequate measures.

Machiavellism manifests that kind of respect for religion which we have seen advocated in recent years by a modern

French school. 'Princes and republics that would preserve 'their State from corruption must, above all things, maintain 'the ceremonies of religion incorrupt, and treat them with 'veneration; for there is no more emphatic sign of the ruin 'of a province than the contempt of divine worship.' (Discorsi, Bk. I. ch. xii.)

And the next chapter is entitled: 'How the Romans made 'use of religion for the good order of the city, for the success 'of their enterprises and the suppression of tumults.'

But, at the same time, the character of the Christian religion may prove dangerous to the State, for whereas in Pagan religions the brute element of man had its share, in the Christian religion the human and the divine elements are supreme:

'They [i.e. ancient religions] lacked neither pomp nor magnificence of ritual, but to these was added the practice of bloody and ferocious sacrifices, in which multitudes of animals destroyed one another; which awful sight inspired similar sentiments in the beholders. Also ancient religions only beatified men full of worldly glory—such as military captains and political leaders. Our religion has glorified the humble and contemplative rather than the energetic. It has placed the highest good in humility, abjection, and the contempt of human things; while pagan religion aimed at greatness of soul, strength of body, and everything that contributed to valour. And though our religion would have us strong, yet it asks of us rather to suffer than to act as though we were strong. This manner of life appears therefore to have weakened the world and left it the prey of wicked men, who can easily control their fellow beings, seeing that the majority of the latter, for the sake of Paradise, are more ready to support ill-treatment than to revenge themselves.' (Discorsi, Bk. II. ch. ii.)

SS. Francis and Dominic, who, in the view of Machiavelli, saved Christianity from utter extinction, by reanimating its early fervour, also, incidentally, encouraged the vices of prelates; for they taught the people 'that it is evil to speak 'evil of the bad, and that it is better to live in obedience, and 'leave the punishment of wicked superiors to God; as a result 'of which doctrine these latter have done the worst they 'could, since they had no dread of a punishment they neither 'saw nor believed in.' It may be remarked, in passing, that the contemporary Pope and prelates, who allowed the writer of this passage to go by unchastised, must, in spite of the vices of their day, have exercised a tolerance of which our own age does not always show examples.

Yet Machiavelli will not allow that this is the last word in the matter. He was a cynical Churchman, but a believing Christian ; and he goes on to say, after the former of these two passages :

'Though it would therefore appear as though the world were effeminate and heaven disarmed, this result arises, in reality, from the meanness of men, who have been influenced by sloth, and not by virtue, in their interpretation of religious teaching. For if they remembered how our religion permits us to glorify and defend our country they would see that she expects us to love and honour it, and make ourselves such that we are able to defend it.' (Discorsi, Bk. II. ch. ii.)

As Machiavellism distrusts men in general, so also it contains special warnings against the danger to the State of over-powerful individuals. On this point Machiavelli treats princes and republics to the same advice : not because he esteems them equally, but because their case and its dangers are the same. Men are out for their own ends, and the individual is out for individual ends : this is the teaching of Machiavellism, then as now. Hence king and republic must jealously watch their own best servants, and must put an end to them, whatever their claims to gratitude, if they are taking advantage of their credit for the satisfaction of their private ambition.

There is, in one case he introduces, a curious similarity to one of recent occurrence in our own country. The Florentines had made the mistake of sending *two* envoys to treat with France of the restitution of Pisa. Giovambattista Ridulfi was the better known man, and consequently the chief ; Antonio degli Albizi was the more really capable. But this second, seeing that the other overshadowed him, took refuge in silence, and did nothing for the good of the mission. As Machiavelli remarks, he gratified his vanity and ambition not by opposition, but by silence and disdain ; and only exerted his superior powers when the other man was withdrawn.

Machiavelli, as was natural in those days of mercenary armies, was particularly alive to the danger accruing to a ruler from a successful general. It is painful to kill the man who has led his armies to victory ; it is happier for him if the same should die in a natural manner ; but, on the whole,

there is but one way of avoiding the dilemma, and that is for the prince to lead his expeditions himself. We shall see, later on, in what way a republic was to avoid the same danger.

We are reminded once more of things that have taken place in a neighbouring country when Machiavelli warns statesmen of the need of suspecting even pious and charitable works, which may contribute to the excessive power of those who direct them.

Last among the main principles of Machiavellism which we will select for its better definition, may be placed its deep sense and acknowledgment of Fate; of the restriction of human power by the great *Hinterland* of uncontrollable forces and circumstances. Fate, or Fortune, as Machiavelli calls it, limits the attainable and narrows the domain of conscience and ethics. In by no means the best of worlds neither can a man always do his best. The *ought* and the *must* are to be measured by the *can*. Men may 'follow fortune, but not 'oppose her; they can weave her webs, but not break them.' It is the fool, and not the wise man, who, ignoring 'the just 'bounds of hope, and looking not to what can be done, but 'to what he would wish to do, is brought to ruin.'

Machiavelli's description of the ever recurring round of good and evil in human life almost suggests the 'Ewige 'Wiederkehr' of Nietzsche.

'Nature [he says] allows not of rest. So soon as earthly things have attained perfection they begin to sink, because they can rise no further; and when, through disorder, they have fallen as low as they can, not being able to descend further, they begin again to rise, and thus they swing perpetually from good to bad and from bad to good. For virtue begets tranquillity, tranquillity sloth, sloth disorder, and disorder ruin; and similarly, from ruin springs order, from order virtue, and from virtue happiness and glory.' (Istorie Fiorentine, Bk. V.)

So much for some of the main principles of Machiavellism. It is hard to resist the temptation of giving much fuller quotations from the mass of shrewd wisdom, truly Italian wisdom, which the works contain. In the more intellectual days of English life, when the young man with pretensions to a good education made his tour of Europe, the works of French and Italian wisdom were more familiar to our country than they now are. The keen Latin intellect had its share in moulding

the richer Anglo-Saxon mind and clarifying its power of utterance. We are more left to our own intellectual resources in these days, though we are now looking forward to better times, of fuller intellectual community.

And now we have to see whether Machiavelli can teach us anything besides Machiavellism. That he systematised the policy that bears his name is undoubted; but that his philosophy also contains principles that morally and spiritually transcend it, will be, I think, to any careful student of his works, equally positive. And for those who believe that nearly all statecraft yet contains its admixture of Machiavellism, this will be a question of high interest; for what we shall want to know is whether an unavoidable blend of Machiavellism precludes, in any State philosophy, the hope of eventual development into a more human system from which such elements may be finally eliminated.

'In what,' asks Cosimo Rucellai of Fabrizio Colonna, 'would 'you have us copy the ancients?'

Fabrizio replies that he would have the modern State 'honour and reward virtue; not despise poverty; respect 'the methods and laws of military discipline; compel citizens 'to love one another, to avoid factions, and to set the public 'above the private good.'

The speaker goes on to maintain that such ideals are not mere dreams, but have only to be rightly set forth in order to be accepted. 'Their truth,' he says, 'is so evident that the 'most ordinary intelligence can perceive it. And to labour 'for such an end is to plant trees under which mankind could 'rest with greater peace and joy than the present state of 'things can afford.' (Arte della Guerra, Bk. I.)

In the same work, speaking of that very Cosimo, Machiavelli says of him, as the highest praise he could bestow: 'I know 'not what thing that belonged to him, not even excepting his 'own soul, he would have refused to his friends; I know not 'what enterprise would have daunted him if he had seen in 'it some good to be achieved for his country.'

The statesman that planned for his city such an ideal of well-being, and planned it even while composing a treatise on war, aimed at something more than mere Machiavellian prosperity. This man, living amidst that turmoil to which one of the fairest and most intellectual lands of Europe had been

reduced by the quarrels of her neighbours, and the rival ambitions of Pope and Emperor, kings and small princes, cast a yearning glance back through history to the days of Roman greatness and liberty. Not even an American president, in these democratic days, can be more convinced that the greatest menace to 'peace and freedom lies in the existence of auto-'cratic governments, backed by organised force which is 'controlled wholly by their will and not by the will of their 'people,' than Machiavelli, who believed that in freedom alone could political salvation be found. A republic was, for him, the highest form of government; but his was too unprejudiced a mind not to see that liberty has been consistent also with the well-constituted government of a monarch. And this was to him a truth of considerable moment; for his aim was practical and immediate, not abstract and remote: he wanted the good of his own beloved Florence; and if he could not have it in the best way, by means of a republic, he would have it in the second best way, by forming good rulers. He distinctly sets forth in one place (Discorsi, Bk. I. ch. ix.) his belief that, for certain crises of growth or transformation, the government of one man is best; though for the continuance of the State the republican form is alone satisfactory.

In one of his most eloquent passages he invites reigning princes to look back on the days of Nerva and Marcus Aurelius, to compare them with those that went before and those that came after, and to ask themselves in which time they would have chosen to live and reign. In those days of good rulers you may see

'a prince secure amidst a secure people, a world filled with justice and peace. You will behold the Senate established in authority and magistrates in honour. The rich there enjoy their own riches; virtue and nobility are exalted; peace and goodness prevail; rancour, licence, corruption and ambition are extinguished. Those were the golden times in which each one could hold and defend his own opinion. Then did the world triumph, for the prince was full of reverence and glory, the people of love and confidence. Glance, then, at the state of things under the other emperors, and you shall see terrible wars, discords and seditions; cruelty in peace and in war; princes slain by the sword, civil dissensions, foreign wars; a sorrowful Italy torn by misfortune, with her cities ravaged and ruined. You shall see Rome burnt, the Capitol destroyed by the citizens, the ancient temples desolate, their ceremonies neglected, the town filled with adulterers, the sea covered with exiles, her

rocks stained with blood. . . . You shall see informers rewarded, slaves seduced against their masters, servants against their patron ; while those who have no enemies are persecuted by their friends. Then you will know what Rome, Italy, and the world owed to Caesar. . . . Indeed, if a prince seek worldly glory he should desire to rule a corrupt city : not to spoil it like Caesar, but to re-order it like Romulus.' (Discorsi, Bk. I. ch. x.)

And later on : ' The true salvation of a republic or a kingdom ' is not to have a prince who rules it wisely in his lifetime, but ' one who orders it in such manner that it goes on well after ' his death.'

But such princes are rare, and, in the opinion of Machiavelli, the hereditary principle is fatal to the chances of finding them. ' That the sins of the people are caused by their princes,' is the title of one chapter of the ' Discorsi,' in which he goes on to warn princes that they have no right to complain of the faults of their people, which arise from their own negligence or from similar faults in themselves. In another chapter he tells us that the people are wiser and more constant than princes ; in the following one that republics keep faith better than kings.

Thus Machiavelli would have endorsed a recent utterance, according to which ' a steadfast concert for peace can never ' be maintained except by the partnership of democratic nations. ' No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith ' within it or observe its covenants.'

In chapter xviii. of ' The Prince ' his very counsels lightly cloak his intimate conviction that the government of one man is too unavoidably selfish to be really clean and honourable. ' That it is praiseworthy in a prince to keep faith and practise ' honesty rather than fraud is obvious. Nevertheless, we see ' by the experience of our own day that those princes have ' done best who made light of their promises.'

Elsewhere he describes the misery that a prince is forced to inflict upon the State over which he would tyrannise. He must change everything, upset all peace and happiness ; behave not only as an enemy of Christ but as the foe of mankind. ' It were surely better,' he adds, ' to live as a private citizen, ' than to rule at the cost of so much human misery ; ' but there is no middle course. The despot must renounce his ambition or take the necessary means to its fulfilment. Machiavelli hated tyrants ; but he more than hated—he despised—the man

who tried to satisfy his conscience as well as his greed: an attempt that ended in greater misery to others as well as personal failure. Rather would he follow such a man as the Duke of Valentinois than a pious tyrant. Knowing too well the selfishness of man to suggest to the Medicis, at a certain crisis in Florentine affairs, that they should actually free the city, he submitted to Leo X. a scheme that would, he hoped, satisfy both objects. They were to prepare the State, during their lifetime, for the exercise of republican freedom, into which it was to enter at their death. But the scheme was, of course, too noble for their moral reach.

As to the individual citizen, he would, in the ideal State, enjoy freedom and happiness, but it would be at the price of loyal and devoted citizenship.

Machiavelli speaks little of the rights and much of the duties of citizens in a free State: their glory is in the service they can render and not in the power they can exercise. It was not of his age to lay stress on the claims of the individual: it is not, perhaps, of any age with strong idealistic tendencies. Freedom for him was of a corporate and not a private character; and the main privilege of free citizenship was co-operation to the good of the State. He lauds the great Roman dictator generals, who faced danger in the moment of national emergency, and, after their hour of glory, returned to their little farms. 'Restored to private life, they became frugal, humble, 'careful administrators of their modest possessions, obedient 'to the magistrates, reverent to their betters; it was indeed 'a marvel to see one man capable of sustaining two such 'different lives.'

A story is told of General Joffre that is not unworthy of this passage. When, after the battle of the Marne, some one said to him 'General, you have gained a great victory!' his reply was 'I hope that I have gained the right to return 'to my country farm.'

To maintain this character of true citizenship Machiavelli regarded poverty as essential. The austere ideal of Roman republicanism was ever before him. And as the true citizen was to serve, but not for reward, so he was 'to forget private 'injuries for the love of his country.'

In Machiavelli's days the notion of a 'concert of peace' would have been an anachronism. Furthermore, in the actual

waging of war Machiavelli is thoroughly Machiavellian. For him, indeed, war was war, and he would not have attached much importance to the greater or less ferocity with which it was carried on. Yet he was, even in those savage days, no militarist; and if he could not advocate universal peace yet he dealt a solid blow at the idea of war for war's sake by his endeavour to substitute a national for a foreign and mercenary army. This was a really remarkable effort at that time. Europe was ploughed up by a professional and mercenary soldiery, as deadly, in the end, to those who employed them as to those against whom they were led. Owing to the hopelessness of his circumstances Machiavelli's attempt was unsuccessful, but it was a noble failure.

Not only did he aim at the formation of a national army, but he would have had it constituted on territorial lines: the soldiers were to be well acquainted with one another and with their leaders; for only amongst those who have been born and have lived in the same place does there exist that confidence which makes for success.

Though he wrote a treatise on 'The Art of War,' yet he opens it with a protest against regarding war as an art; for it is by so doing that war becomes prized for its own sake, and creates the demand for a professional soldiery. Professional soldiers, he says, 'are scandalous, idle, undisciplined, 'irreligious, fugitives from paternal rule, blasphemers, gamblers, 'badly educated, . . . which characteristics are the very 'opposite of what is needed for a strong and efficient army.' And to those who feared an armed people his advice was to govern them well, and then there would be nothing to apprehend.

Though war admits of fraud, yet such fraud must only be practised 'against those who do not trust you'; to break faith with those who believe in you may indeed be profitable, but it is inglorious.

Also there is such a thing as magnanimity in victory. Like the old Roman leader, the general must be too proud to take advantage when the enemy is at his feet. He cites from Livy the words put in the mouth of Scipio, who granted to Antiochus, after a further defeat, the very terms he had previously refused; for 'Romani, si vincuntur, non minuuntur animis, 'nec si vincunt insolescere solent.'

In religion he was cynical, as those must have been who saw their country ruined by the ambition of the Church. And yet the sum of his charge, in one remarkable chapter, is not that the Church has directly ruined the State, but that her ambition has ruined religion, and thereby, indirectly, weakened and corrupted the State.

He speaks first of the piety and reverence of ancient Rome; of the strictness with which she upheld all religious laws and ceremonies. Had the Christian Church protected religious observance in the same way—

'Christian republics would be happier and more united than they are. Nor can we better gauge the decline of religion than by seeing how those countries that are nearest to the Roman Church, the head of our religion, are the least religious. . . .

'And whereas some maintain that the good of Italy depends on the Roman Church, I will refute this view by the arguments that occur to me.

'The first is that, through the evil example of that Court, this country has lost all her piety and religion, which is the cause of immense inconveniences and disorders. . . . So that the first obligation we Italians owe the Church and her priests is to have become through them irreligious and bad; but there is yet another and a greater one, the true cause of our ruin—that is, that the Church has kept, and still keeps, our country in a state of division. . . . Not being powerful enough to hold Italy herself, nor allowing any other power to hold her, the country has not been able to come under one rule. . . .

'This is what we Italians owe to the Church, and to no one else. And if any would prove the matter, and were strong enough to send the Roman Court to dwell in Switzerland, with the same power that it possesses in Italy, they would soon see how in that land, where at present the people live, both in religious and military matters, most like the ancients, there would result greater disorders from the evil customs of that Court than could arise from any other cause.' (Discorsi, Bk. I. ch. xii.)

In sum, the ideal State of Machiavelli was one in which the people should be self-governing, but should sacrifice private aims to the welfare of their country; one in which property should be protected, but in which the citizens should be poor and austere. The highest privilege of their freedom would be the right to serve their country while co-operating in her government. They should be fully equipped for her defence, but should defend her themselves at the cost of their own peace and comfort, with no mercenary army to suggest

war for its own sake or for purely ambitious ends. Yet in his Machiavellism its author faces the un-ideal state of things that actually existed: he takes count of the selfishness of mankind; and gives precepts as to how, given the psychological and physiological facts of human nature, the bark of the State is to be steered with safety and success.

Thus do we find in Machiavelli, first of all Machiavellism in the most cold-blooded and inhuman sense of the word; but afterwards the germ and promise of a state-craft inspired by more human and spiritual ideals. To Machiavelli the former was a necessary constituent of the latter, and in his highest flights of idealism he would not have denied those maxims of selfish, worldly wisdom, simply because to have done so would have been, for him, not to deny an immoral principle, but to deny a non-moral fact.

Actually, is not all state-craft even yet in the same predicament? Can statesmen, of whatever country, safely and patriotically act on the assumption that men in general are good and unselfish and disinterested? Can a diplomatist successfully eschew all vulpine wisdom? Can a general restrain, in himself or his soldiers, all that savours of the ferocity of the lion? Can war be waged without fraud and violence or without the sacrifice of the innocent and helpless? Must a government put blind trust in even the best of its own citizens? Must not the most gentlemanly of our politicians sacrifice, at times, their own high code to the exigencies of diplomacy? Do not half-measures prove as fatal now as they did in the days of Machiavelli? Is not a disregard for unpleasant and immoral facts as disastrous as ever in its results? Is not ruthlessness, now as then, sometimes more merciful in its results than a half-hearted severity? To sum up these questions in one, Can or does any State, even in our more civilised days, behave in its corporate capacity as a man of perfectly noble character can behave in his individual capacity? Can it exercise meekness, altruism, brotherly love in its dealings with neighbouring States, or even with its own citizens? Can a State behave like a perfect Christian or even like a perfect gentleman?

We know quite well what is the only truthful answer to such a question, but what we are persistently unwilling to admit is that, in so far as state-craft precludes the acceptance of an

unreservedly human and a wholly Christian * ideal, so far also does it necessitate an admixture of Machiavellian principles and practice.

That another political attitude is possible and imperative is the claim of Christian idealists, first among whom may be named Tolstoi, who has followers, nowadays, amongst the genuine conscientious objectors.† To this school the human ideal so entirely transcends all claims of mere patriotism that they would ask of their country, as they would ask of an individual, the sacrifice of life for so noble a cause. The early Christians were, in the opinion of Roman politicians, a danger to the State from their contempt of the State religion. Therefore the State endeavoured to exterminate them, as it would now exterminate those who prize their own moral judgments above their duties of citizenship. The early Christians proved that men could be good citizens, and even good soldiers, without belief in the Pagan religion of the State; but the misgivings of their rulers were justifiable, for indeed Rome, without her religion, was bound to become, at last, another Rome. Christianity was an enemy to the Pagan State.

So, too, is the full spirit of Christianity hostile to the modern State, and the Tolstoyan, or genuine conscientious objector, is a proof of the fact. The State cannot do with him, for the State is not wholly Christian; it has as much right to persecute him as he has a right to maintain his own principles at the cost of his life as a citizen.

Yet the conscientious objector, or the unqualified pacifist, is probably not the one who does best for the promotion of his own ideals. Good is not worked in isolation, and there are truer forms of humanism, humbler forms of Christianity, more hopeful forms of pacifism, which do not wholly deny the fact and the duties of citizenship; which accept the moral resulting obligations of having drawn life and education and nurture from a certain country; and which therefore admit of the corresponding necessity to share the moral inadequacies, even the sins of that country.

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* I use here the word Christian in a moral sense, as denoting a principle of unselfish love and devotion.

† I believe that such exist, though not all who refuse military service on those grounds deserve the name.

'Justum est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma quibus 'nisi in armis nulla spes est.'

Such pacifism will not allow of abstention in the hour of our country's need; though it will unrestingly endeavour to transform the politics of the world in accordance with its ideal.

But, on the other hand, I would urge that pacifists, whether of the former or of the latter category, are consistent: just as those who admit that the prevailing state-craft inevitably contains certain non-Christian and non-human elements are consistent. But those, on the contrary, who would maintain that state-craft can admit of diplomacy, in the classical sense, without any admixture of Machiavellism, or of warfare that can be termed Christian, are not consistent nor sincere; and they justify the position of the unqualified pacifist, as those do not who confess that the best of us are yet far from the attainment of a purely human and Christian ideal in politics. To deny Machiavellism is to deny facts.

But as in the philosophy of Machiavelli, so in modern state-craft, the question is not, does it actually and always set forth a wide and human and disinterested policy? but does it admit of it? The philosophy of Machiavelli did—the philosophy of his Machiavellian disciple Bismarck did not; for the former aimed at the formation of a free, self-contained State, with an army for defensive purposes, and citizens whose pride it would be to govern and to serve; while the latter set himself to constitute a powerful autocratic government, strong for purposes of world-dominion.

Even the Mid-Europe policy, as set forth by Friedrich Naumann, which is not indeed wholly and heartlessly Machiavellian, is yet exclusive of any widely human policy. Not a great wall, but a great ditch, is to include the German State of the future, and all its dependent States, and to exclude the rest of the world from a share in German wealth and power.

The ideal citizen of Naumann is, indeed, to live for the State, but not as the austere and disinterested citizen of Machiavelli, who has his ever active share in the shaping of her destiny. For Naumann's citizen it is a question of commercial success: 'For the sake of personal interest he becomes a member 'of an impersonal institution and works for it as for him-

'self. . . . Individualism is fully developed, but it is then 'carried up into the next higher form of economic co-operative 'existence.'

The State, on the other hand, uses individuals for her purpose, as those same individuals seek their purpose in her. 'For it is only by means of healthier, better edu-'cated, and better nourished masses that the military, 'financial, and civilised Mid-Europe of which we dream can 'come into existence.'

Mr. Bertrand Russell, in 'Principles of Social Reconstruc-'tion,' has divided the impulses of political life into two groups: 'the possessive and the creative, according as they aim at 'acquiring or retaining something that cannot be shared, 'or at bringing into the world some valuable thing—such as 'knowledge, or art, or goodwill—in which there is no private 'property.'

'*Ecco chi crescerà i nostri amori*,' said Machiavelli's great countryman, in describing that love which knows not envy nor rivalry. To act as though such love could be the law of political life, before its sun has risen above our horizon, is the dangerous mistake of the idealist without a sense of facts. But this same idealist would be less excusable if our State philosophers had the candour to confess the Machiavellism they cannot avoid. Then would they be justified in demanding of the citizen that he should not be too good for the country to which he owes the protection of his life and his interests; that he should work along with her, but not apart from her, in the pursuit of a greater international ideal.

That ideal has at last found expression in the mouth of a statesman who has not disregarded facts, on the lips of a pacifist who has accepted the necessity of war:

'We are glad [said President Wilson] now that we see facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world. . . . The world must be safe for democracy. . . . We desire no conquests and no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, and no material compensation for sacrifices we shall freely make. . . . Right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for the universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as will bring

peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.'

It would be rash to take these words as the absolute due of our own cause, just and righteous as that cause may be. It is through a higher fatality than our own statesmanship that we are now fighting alongside of an emancipated Russia, and not a Czar. We are yet in a state of confusion in regard to national and international ideals which is significant of effort rather than attainment. In all our talk of a new Europe there has been, as yet, but little preoccupation with the ideal of a new Africa, with a new standard for the treatment of native races. Until Russia found her soul there was yet the danger that her alliance might be rewarded regardless of the true interests of some of the lesser nations.

These words of the American President are rather the noble expression of a deep and universal human aspiration than of the actual policy of any one of us, and we should be nearer the attainment of that higher policy if we believed it. As George Tyrrell writes in his 'Essays on Faith and Immortality':

> 'This is the meaning of Christ Crucified—man agonising for goodness and truth even unto death, and thereby fulfilling the universal law of God in Nature and in himself. . . . Hence, instead of hell-fire, I should preach the hollowness of the self-life in and out, up and down, till men loathed it and cried "*Quis me liberabit?*"'

Such cannot yet be the spirit of diplomacy; but for those who believe in the union of nations, and in a world-wide policy inspired by human love, it is on these lines that their ideal is to be sought.

It is a frightening thought that a few men will, by and by, sit round a table to settle the welfare of the world. It would be a still more alarming thought if we believed that they really would settle it, and that the visible actors on the world's stage were as potent as they appear to be. Yet their opportunity is a great one, and could we hope that fifty per cent. of the future Peace Conference would be inspired by the temper of President Wilson's speech; that disinterestedness, altruism, humanity, and a pride magnanimous but not boastful, would be their characteristics; then, indeed, their efforts, seconded by a greater fate and by the pressure of those nobler aspirations that are stirring in the heart of the world, might bring

good from the most awful happenings that our lives have known.

One quality we would wish them for the performance of their weighty task, and that is unflinching moral courage: a courage that will not shrink from the acknowledgment of unpleasant facts; that will not endeavour to clothe the acts of self-interest, unavoidable as they may be, in the garment of human love; a courage that will give them the strength to acknowledge wherein each country yet seeks her own, even at the expense of her friends. But their courage must go farther still, and, just as it shrinks not from admitting what we are, so must it also boldly state what we would be; having acknowledged the unpleasant truths of worldly prudence it must go on to enunciate fearlessly the nobler truths of human wisdom and love.

M. D. Petre.

## THE PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

1. **History of the Russian Revolutionary Movement.** By M. KULTSHITZKI. (In Russian.) St. Petersburg. 1908.

2. **History of the Revolutionary Movement in Russia.** By A. THUN. Russian translation by PLEKHANOV. Geneva. 1903.

3. **The Works of A. Herzen.** Geneva. 1875–85.

4. **The Works of N. G. Tshernyshevski.** Vevey. 1868–70.

5. **Lettres Historiques.** By P. LAVROV. Traduites par M. GOLDSMITH. Paris. 1903.

6. **Œuvres de Bakounine.** I.–VI. Paris. 1903–1913.

IT has sometimes been asserted that the French philosophers of the eighteenth century contributed but little to the great French upheaval; that even if Rousseau had never written, the doctrine of popular sovereignty would, in any case, have asserted itself in France sooner or later. The spirit of restlessness and discontent had long been prevalent in France. When Lord Chesterfield visited France in 1753, he said that all the symptoms indicative of great changes in government were then present. On this account it is argued that all that Voltaire, Rousseau, Condorcet, Mably, Morelli, and others did was to give voice and expression to latent feelings. It would probably be truer to say that the French philosophers sowed the seed of revolution by scattering new ideas on soil prepared to receive them. The same service has been rendered to Russia by her philosophers. Russia, real Russia, not the Russia of the Romanovs, has long been vaguely craving for reform; her philosophers have taught her how to give more or less definite shape to the vague aspirations already in the hearts of the multitude.

During the reign of Catherine II. the political, social, and philosophical ideas of the eighteenth century gained numerous adherents in Russia. Few, however, were the men capable of really assimilating the theories of Voltaire and the Encyclopædists. The influence of freemasonry was more lasting.

Basing itself upon Christianity, instead of breaking with it, Russian freemasonry aimed not so much at political and social reforms as at the perfection of the individual. Yet, indirectly, it exercised a certain influence upon the political and social ideals of the day. Fighting as it did against national and religious fanaticism, it necessarily had to point out existing abuses, and to condemn them. Its work was necessarily critical, as well as constructive. While in Germany freemasonry was of a mystical character, in Russia it became an ethical and organising movement; it grouped together men of thought and independent judgment and enabled them to exercise an influence upon the masses.

One of the most prominent figures among the masonic societies in Russia under Catherine II. was Novikov. In his paper, the 'Utrenyi Sviet,' he not only advocated a high ethical ideal but also carried on a vigorous polemic against Catherine's foreign policy, and the warfare it involved. He said that war, except for defence, should be altogether abhorred. For some time Catherine—herself a disciple of Voltaire and a friend of Diderot—allowed Novikov to continue his philanthropic and ethical Christian work, but the outbreak of the French Revolution altered her views. She then saw in every manifestation of independent social thought a political agitation. Consequently the masonic lodges were closed and Novikov himself, in spite of his advanced age, was thrown into the dungeons of Schlüsselburg. His work may be regarded as the first sprouting of independent thought in Russia, the first expression of a craving for freedom. It was hazy, vague, and mainly humanitarian and ethical, for the philosopher never dared to include in his programme the reorganisation of society and of the State. Nevertheless it was a subversive movement, as it tended to create an independent public opinion in Russia, and thus to provide the first essential requisite for any social upheaval.

Towards the end of Catherine's reign, timid voices demanding social reforms began to be heard. Russian intellectuals who had come under the influence of Rousseau's doctrine that all men are born equal were not content with the spectacle of the few living in luxury whilst the many were starving. One of the most noteworthy of the many precursors of revolutionary thought in Russia at this period was Radishtshev, the author

of 'A Journey from Moscow to St. Petersburg,' an avowed and famous imitation of Sterne's 'Sentimental Journey.' Radishtshev did not dare to demand political changes, though he was definitely an opponent of absolutism. He specially urged the need for agrarian reforms. He created no organisation and no party; he only gave expression to the ever-growing unrest of the Russian intellectuals who had absorbed the philosophical, political, and social doctrines of Western Europe. He was finally arrested, tried, and condemned to death; but Catherine, *cabotine* that she was, showed herself magnanimous and commuted his sentence to that of exile to Siberia for ten years. Paul I. recalled the exile, as he did many others whom his mother had punished, and Alexander I. invited him to take part in a legislative commission. But Radishtshev found that his radical ideas were too advanced for the Russia of his day; discouraged and weary of life, he committed suicide in September 1802.

The first revolutionary movement in Russia, in the modern sense of the word, was that of the Decembrists in 1825. It was organised by a group of officers belonging to the highest aristocracy who had familiarised themselves with the liberal and democratic ideas of the West during the wars against Napoleon, and particularly during the occupation of France by the Allies. The hopes they had based upon Alexander I. had been frustrated; the former pupil of La Harpe had formed the Holy Alliance and become a hopeless reactionary. This group of officers therefore organised a secret society, with the idea of giving to their country the liberal and democratic institutions of the West. On the 14th of December—hence the name 'Decembrists'—a demonstration took place in Isaac Square. The incipient revolt was quelled with much bloodshed: five of the leaders were hanged, the others were sent to the mines—the dry guillotine of Tsardom.

The Decembrists were revolutionary Russian patriots. Their patriotism was based upon their love for Russia and an ardent desire to see their country independent of other nations, both externally and internally. Their love for Russia's past, for those moments in her history that marked the self-assertion of the national character, made them yearn for a revival of the popular assemblies in Red Russia, and of the power and independence of old Novgorod. Though the Decembrists

aimed at introducing reforms and institutions similar to those then prevailing in Western Europe, yet these were not to be mere slavish imitation, they were to be adapted to suit Russian peculiarities. Unlike the Slavophils, the Decembrists did not believe in Russia's special mission, but they had great faith in the moral and physical qualities of the nation. Some of them were in favour of a constitutional monarchy, whilst others were republicans pure and simple. The majority were opposed to socialism as it then existed; in religion they were convinced deists. They all recognised the necessity of a revolution as the only possible means of introducing any new political or social institutions into Russia. Though their revolt was so ruthlessly crushed, it had a far-reaching effect. As Herzen wrote, 'The cannon shots on the Isaac Square had 'awakened the entire generation.' Deported for a gesture, hanged for a word, Russia's youth fought heroically against Tsardom and absolutism. In spite of persecution, medieval cruelty, and refined tortures, in spite of the dark night of suppression that followed, the idea of the Decembrists could not be crushed; it remained a living seed, destined, thirty years later, to blossom forth during the Crimean War.

Autocracy can muzzle the press, but it cannot control thought. Russian intellectuals continued to think what they were not permitted to say aloud, or to write openly. They accumulated ideas and spread them, slowly but persistently. Though some yielded to the despair to which Lermontov gave expression, others clothed their thoughts in criticism or satire, a form of literature which oppression always fosters and develops. As they were not allowed to write criticisms of the government or directly to promulgate liberal ideas, they wrote novels and comedies: Gogol, his 'Revisor' and 'Dead Souls,' and Griboyedov, his 'Gore ot ouma,' in which officialdom in Russia was criticised and ridiculed. The press also, muzzled though it was, found means to convey its criticisms between the lines. The Russians, in fact, developed to perfection the fine art—hitherto unknown in Western Europe—of *dodging the censor*!

Meanwhile Hegel's philosophy had made its appearance in Russia and found numerous followers. Officially, the Hegelian system was considered to be a conservative doctrine, therefore the Russian Government put no embargo upon it. Thus,

in the place of the clear, lucid, humanitarian, revolutionary doctrines of the French philosophers, came the abstract, heavy, nebulous German metaphysics. Russian society, not permitted to grapple directly with political problems, as the Encyclopædists had done, adopted the language of the abstract, borrowed from German philosophy. The influence of German philosophy upon Russia has been most pernicious by encouraging abstract reasoning and theorising in place of practical politics. But, temporarily, the discussion of German metaphysics had its advantages, for it enabled Russian thinkers to speak in philosophical terms not too easily comprehended of the censors of Nicholas I. Utopian socialism, too, that looked for the liberation of humanity, not to a revolution but to a moral and spiritual resurrection, slipped over the frontier without being suspected by the Tsar's censors. Thus Russian philosophers were able to reveal to Russian readers a whole world of new ideas, and to discuss in carefully veiled language the bases of religion and authority and even Tsardom itself. Groups were formed in various cities to discuss social and political questions. Aksakov, Khomyakov, Bakunin, Herzen, and Ogarev met at the house of Stankevitsh. It was in this atmosphere that the seed sown by the Decembrists took root and proved itself stronger than brute force.

The disasters of the Crimean War increased the general discontent. But the sudden death of Nicholas and the accession of Alexander II. brought some relief. Ideas of political freedom and social equality were openly discussed.

Among the writers who gave most vigorous expression to these ideas was Alexander Herzen, who has justly been called the Russian Voltaire. Herzen had been specially influenced by the Socialist utopias of St. Simon, but from the point of view of political reform he carried on the traditions of the Decembrists. He particularly devoted himself to advocating the liberation of the peasants. Though he undoubtedly exercised a deep and lasting influence upon the revolutionary ideas of Russia, he was by temperament pre-eminently a critic, destructive rather than constructive, a 'remueur des idées' rather than a creator of systems. He was at once an artist and a revolutionary philosopher; he trusted for the development of his ideas to the progress of time rather than to the employment of violent methods. He and his friend Ogarev

were frequently accused of being only negative and unable to *do* anything but sigh and lament. Herzen and Ogarev lived for some time in London, where they started the publication of 'The Polar Star' and of 'The Bell,' in which they demanded various reforms, such as the emancipation of the serfs, abolition of the censorship, and the freedom of the press.

Herzen's political ideal was a federal republic for the Slavonic nations of Russia, Poland to be independent. He was in favour of the communal system of peasant holdings, and argued that this system would make it easier to introduce the new social order and save Russia from the domination of capital and the bourgeoisie. Indeed Herzen, without being a Slavophil, saw in Russia a better prospect for a social revolution than in old Europe, because in his judgment the Russian was less a slave of the past. The rest of Europe has passed through so many revolutions that the individual cannot take a step without stumbling upon reminiscences of the past which crush the spirit of progress; whereas in Russia the individual has no past to forget.

Herzen understood the psychology of his nation better than anyone. The Russians are absolute in good as in evil, in affirmation of their rights as in their passive obedience. Liberal politics appear to the Russians a mere mockery of the real idea of the sovereignty of the people and of the rule of democracy. They know autocracy or democracy, but no middle course, no compromise. A new label on the old bottle would never satisfy them. A monarchic liberalism, called a constitutional monarchy, would never appeal to the soul of Russia. Yet Herzen was not an opponent of the State in the sense of the anarchic ideal which demands the complete abolition of the State principle. He was in favour of a 'confraternity of nations' rather than a 'confraternity of men.' The State, however, had no claim to existence *per se*; it was merely an organising function of the life of the people, and therefore bound to adapt itself to all the developments and changes of the popular life. The State was the servant of the people, not its master, as in the conception of the Western socialists.

The manifesto of Alexander II. announcing the liberation of the serfs confirmed Herzen's hopes for Russia's future, and his optimism was at first shared by the famous economist and critic Tshernyshevski. As a philosopher Tshernyshevski was,

to a certain extent, a follower of Feuerbach's materialistic philosophy, whilst his ideas upon the future state of society were based upon the doctrines of St. Simon and Fourier. Like Herzen, Tshernyshevski attributed great importance to the system of communal property. This system, he said, was already known to the people in Russia, and therefore they were prepared for the realisation of the socialist régime, whilst in Europe the system of individual property would be in the way. Russia could either at once introduce pure collectivism, or, at least, shorten the period of private property considerably. Tshernyshevski was of the opinion that the organised masses were entitled to exercise a democratic control over the government, but, considering the existing absence of education among the masses, reforms would have to come from above. In order, however, to pave the way for such reforms, a movement from below, a conspiracy, a revolt even, would be necessary. Every nation should have a right to decide its own destiny, consequently not only should Poland be independent but the Ukraine also should receive autonomy. Tshernyshevski's famous novel, 'What is to be done?' (Tshto-dyelatj), had a practical influence upon revolutionary tendencies in Russia. It was written, while in prison, for the 'Contemporary Review' (Sovremennik), and was passed by the censor. This means that the work contains no clear and definite political theories. It is, however, full of subversive theories on metaphysical and religious questions, family life, and private property. At first the authorities judged the novel to be a work of pure fiction only, but the Russian public could read between the lines, and finally the censorship grew alarmed and confiscated the book.

Tshernyshevski's ideas of socialism and his propositions for the solution of the peasant question became the starting-point of all the revolutionary programmes promulgated from the sixties onwards. The Russian intellectuals, realising the incapacity of the government and its refusal to abandon the old régime, recognised the necessity of seeking in the people themselves the strength required for a radical change in Russia. In 1861 Mikhailov issued his proclamation to the young generation, in which he pointed out the absolute necessity of throwing over absolutism and solving the agrarian problem. In 1862 the league 'Zemlya i Volya' (Land and Freedom) was founded. It advocated political freedom, the reconstruction of Russia

into a federal State, and the partition of the land among the peasants. In the meantime the Polish Revolution had broken out and had provided the government with an excuse for new reactionary measures. But no persecution could now put a stop to the revolutionary movement in Russia. It spread rapidly among the intellectuals and the students. In order to escape the cruel persecution of Tsardom, numbers of the intellectuals went abroad, especially to Switzerland ; here the Russian revolutionary movement found a new stimulus in the work and influence of the Western socialistic movement and literature. But they still lacked a banner round which they could all rally. Such a banner was unfurled by Peter Lavrov.

Lavrov was the most scientific of Russian philosophers. He attached little or no importance to the theological or metaphysical speculations of former generations ; he believed that the object of philosophy should be the study of facts, and of the deductions to be made from them. He therefore devoted his entire intellectual and moral energy to the philosophy of history and sociology, and to the elaboration of a system of social ethics. One of the principal problems which he endeavoured to solve was that of the personality of the individual. The pivots of Marx's theories are economic evolution and development of the productive forces ; the central ideas of Lavrov's theories are the progress and development of the individual. Progress, according to his philosophy, consists in the physical, intellectual, and moral development of the individual, and in the realisation of truth and justice through proper social organisation. Social happiness, according to Lavrov, is nothing but the happiness of the individuals who compose the society or group or nation, and they therefore have a right to modify the existing forms of society. The intellectual élite, possessing convictions based upon thought, are the real makers of history ; all others, slaves of customs and traditions which they accept without investigation, are beyond the pale of history. They may be as civilised and as intellectual as possible, but as long as they employ their intellectual powers merely in the defence of the existing order of things hallowed by tradition, without submitting it to a minute criticism, they are only 'civilised 'savages,' or 'savages of a superior culture.' Among those who have remained beyond the pale of history, Lavrov counts the governing classes, who obstinately refuse to criticise and

examine ; who cling to their privileges, based upon historical traditions. The others are the poor labourers who, absorbed by their daily work, by their struggle for existence, have neither time nor leisure to think, to criticise, or to examine. They are the *victims* of civilisation, the scapegoats of humanity. It is therefore the duty of the thinking minority to enlighten these victims upon the causes of their sufferings, and thus enable them to take part in the making and shaping of history, and to advance along the road of progress, through the development, at one and the same time, of the individual consciousness and of social solidarity.

In his own words :

'We are approaching an epoch when the realisation of the human ideal will be possible ; when the instinctive tendencies of the individual will be brought to harmonise with the welfare of the collectivity. Only the organisation of men into one harmonious group, united by the interests of collective work and search for justice, can constitute the happiness of the individual.' *

Men will then be able to overcome the struggle for existence, to conquer the animal world, and, above all, to bring about that domination of critical thought over nature that is the basis of true progress. But, says Lavrov, the solitary intellectual can do but little ; he must base himself upon the masses who are working and suffering. Wherever the intellectual minority have remained isolated, civilisation has perished. Witness the civilisations of antiquity when the masses, kept in slavery, found no interest in, and felt no inclination to uphold, a civilisation, the inner meaning of which they ignored. The so-called superman, who creates a gulf between himself and the people, alienates the masses and works out his own perdition. In other words, those intellectuals who are really anxious for the development of the individual and the welfare of the collectivity, should come down from their Pisgah heights into the vast plain of common humanity, take the wandering masses by the hand and lead them to the promised land flowing with milk and honey. A superior civilisation, if it wishes to exist, must be based upon democracy, for without the help of the masses, it must perish or fall a victim to some invading race, or some military adventurer.

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* Lettres Historiques.

Lavrov's famous 'Lettres Historiques' were published in 1868 and exercised a profound influence upon the revolutionary movement. They crystallised all that the intellectuals had been vaguely feeling; they gave a clear and definite answer to the question 'What shall we do?' The intellectuals, said Lavrov, have a duty towards the working classes, upon whose shoulders they are resting. They are not themselves producing any material wealth. If, therefore, they proudly and aristocratically keep aloof from the masses, they are not only selfish but are also in a social sense valueless; they declare themselves socially insolvent. They can redeem their debt to the masses, who provide them with material comforts, only by going among the people and enlightening them as to their requirements, their eternal rights, and also their strength. The intellectuals should not hesitate to advise democracy to rise and fight against the exploiting classes, and to bring about a new order of society based upon justice. The established order of society Lavrov declares to be hopelessly immoral. But what is 'immoral'? To this question Lavrov gives a clear and definite answer: 'All that impedes 'the progressive development, physical and mental, of the 'individual.' Only a society that is based upon justice, that enables all its members to co-operate for their common happiness and progressive development, that endeavours to lessen if not to put an end to human suffering, is moral. Thus Lavrov is at once an individualist and a socialist. His doctrines may be compared to those of Benoît Malon, the father of 'Integral Socialism.' Lavrov, like Malon, dismissed both Kant's 'Duty for duty's sake' and the motive of self-interest of the materialistic school. He accepted to the full Malon's doctrine, 'Altruism will be the basis of our new morality, 'which will be neither theological, nor metaphysical, but 'simply social.' To sum up, Lavrov demands not mere partial reforms but a radical change of society, and this change should, if necessary, be brought about by violent means.

Such was the programme Lavrov traced in his theory of the 'insolvency of the intellectual classes'; and it was thus he answered the questions which were agitating Russia's intellectuals. Quite a different answer was given by Michel Bakunin to the great question 'What shall we do?' Bakunin was an anarchist, whilst Lavrov was a socialist—à la Malon,

but still a socialist—hence the divergence of their opinions. In his youth Bakunin had been attracted by Hegel's philosophy which, though based upon the principle of liberty, nevertheless relegated it to the domain of the spirit. In practice, Hegel sacrificed the individual to the State, since he recognised the omnipotence of the latter. His philosophy was nothing less than an apology for absolutism and autocracy as they existed in Russia, and in Hegelianism Bakunin found some justification for the autocratic government of Nicholas I. It is interesting to note, in passing, that even the most revolutionary doctrines promulgated by Germans are not free from a certain homage to power. Bakunin had been a member of the 'Northern 'League,' which brought about the revolution of the Decembrists, but at that time he was not sufficiently interested in the movement to take a prominent part in it, and therefore escaped the 'tragic but glorious fate' of the majority of his companions. But the liberty-loving soul that slumbers in every Russian soon awoke; he abandoned orthodox Hegelianism and joined the new philosophic school known as the 'Left Hegelians,' which criticised the political absolutism and religious idealism of the master.

The leaders of the new school were Strauss, Feuerbach, and Bruno Bauer. Bakunin's intellectual world was henceforth dominated by the principle of liberty. Hegel had taught him to seek liberty in the land of shadows, in the realms of the spirit, in metaphysical worlds, but now Bakunin refused to accept dreams for realities.

'They are only pale reproductions and monstrous exaggerations of the real world, which we are inclined to treat with such contempt. We have at last learned to understand that, soaring into the more lofty regions of the spirit, we did not grow richer but poorer, both in heart and spirit, not more powerful, but more powerless. We have at last understood that when we amused ourselves, like children, by peopling the vast void with our dreams, we abandoned the real world and our entire existence to false prophets, tyrants, and exploiters of all kinds, religious, political, and economic. By searching for ideal liberty beyond this real world, we were condemning ourselves to the saddest and most shameful slavery.'*

Bakunin was persuaded that there was no other world than this real one, and that all transcendental conceptions were

* M. Nettlau, 'The Life of Bakunin,' London, 1896–99, p. 37.

inanities ; he was convinced that humanity could attain to perfect happiness in this world—the real—if it emancipated itself from all authority, and he believed it his duty to help humanity, so far as it lay in his power, to realise such an emancipation.

Being a materialist, Bakunin considered man to be merely an animal that has reached a higher stage of development : thought in itself is only a material product of the brain : man is distinguished from the lower animals by his faculty of thought and his sociability. Thanks to these two qualities, man is superior to all other animals inhabiting our planet, among whom he alone has a future. ' Sociability and human ' solidarity ' constitute the primordial causes of human progress. Jean Jacques Rousseau was therefore wrong when he maintained that man, who is perfectly free when he is isolated, has to sacrifice a portion of his freedom as soon as he joins his fellow-men.

' Man,' stated Bakunin, ' is born a brute and a slave. It is only in contact with his fellow-men, in the midst of the collectivity, that he has been able gradually to humanise and emancipate himself, to acquire the faculties of thought, speech, and will-power. He would never have developed them had he lived in isolation. Man, therefore, has only reached his present degree of development thanks to the collective efforts of all members of society, past and present.'

The destiny of men, therefore, is to live socially, to help one another, and to conquer nature. Such a goal can only be reached after a long historical evolution. The final goal of humanity will be, on the one hand, obedience to the laws of nature, not because they have been imposed upon it by external will, divine or human, by a collectivity or by an individual, but because these laws are innate in humanity ; and, on the other hand, the emancipation of the individual from all authority, which to-day his fellow-men are anxious to compel him to submit to. These are the essential conditions of liberty to which man can only attain at the *end* of his evolution, and therein lies the whole future of humanity. ' The true, ' great, supreme goal of history is the real, complete emanci- ' pation of every individual.' The past and its traditions must therefore be entirely abandoned, for progress implies the gradual dismissal and discarding of the errors of the past.

'Our animality lies behind us, our humanity, which alone can 'lend us light and warmth, is before us. We must never 'look behind us—always ahead. If we ever look back into 'the past, it should be for the purpose merely of realising 'what we have been and what we should never be.'

Bakunin criticised sharply and mercilessly both the bourgeois State and bourgeois society. He argued that in the struggle between the working classes and the bourgeoisie, the State would always and inevitably become an instrument of oppression. He thus arrived at conclusions diametrically opposed to those of the socialists and even of Lavrov, who has been called above an integral socialist. Whilst Lavrov advocated propaganda by the élite, and a preparation of the masses for the future revolution and for the new State, Bakunin called upon the oppressed, all over the world, to shake off the yoke of authority, to hurl down from their pedestals the two idols man had made himself—the State and bourgeois society. The State, he maintained, can only guarantee and maintain what it finds ready: wealth on the one hand and poverty on the other—the *status quo*. The State, too, perpetually fosters rivalry and discord among men. 'After 'all, the supreme law of the State is merely a conservation of 'the State; all States, since their inception, have been the 'cause of strife and war—rivalry between the State and its 'own subjects, and war between the different States, since 'one could only be strong and powerful if its neighbours were 'weak.' Therefore the State, the Empire, is the cause of continual wars, internal and external, and thus, by its very existence, is 'the most flagrant, the most complete and cynical 'negation of humanity.'

Though the majority of revolutionary agitators have been strong nationalists—for instance, Lassalle, a German; Mazzini, an Italian; Blanqui, a Frenchman—Bakunin, although he never ceased to be a Russian, was at the service of humanity as a whole. For him, nations and races were but fleeting waves in the vast ocean of humanity. His ideal was a brotherhood; 'a confraternity of men' instead of a 'league of nations.' In this respect, however, he was thoroughly Russian. 'We 'Russians,' wrote Dostoevski, 'have at least two countries— '*patries*—Russia and Europe. Our mission should be univer- 'sally human. Our efforts should be consecrated to the service,

' not of Russia alone, or even of the whole Slavonic world, but ' to the service of humanity at large.'

Here one notices the differences that existed between Marx and Bakunin. The former was a cold intellectual, the latter a sentimentalist and an idealist, despite his realistic conception of the world. Marx had a deep sense of justice, but no instinct of liberty, whilst Bakunin's soul thirsted for liberty. Both temperament and nationality account for much. Marx, although of Jewish descent, was thoroughly Germanised; Bakunin was a Slav. The distinctive traits in their characters are not the effect of their respective theories, but rather the cause of the latter. If we search the pages of history of human thought and action, we invariably find that those who have, or are supposed to have, worked in the service of a collectivity have been merely intellectual machines, and have rarely, if ever, been moved by the sufferings of the individual. We find that statesmen, politicians, economists, philosophers and religious teachers who, in the course of history, have evolved theories and plans to bring happiness, spiritual or material, to the masses, to a race, a nation, or a class, to a collectivity of individuals, have always been guided by intellect, rarely by love. To love prospective generations rather than individuals, who are feeling and suffering before our eyes, is not love. The *leitmotif* of the benefactors of future generations, of masses unknown to them, may be inspired by a lofty purpose; but the honest psychologist will not fail to discover in it some ingredients of ambition, self-interest, or fanaticism. The love dwelling in the human heart is, after all, only finite; therefore if it is to be bestowed upon millions, especially future millions, the fraction obtainable by the single individual will be infinitesimal. The really golden hearts, true, altruistic, unselfish emotions, and unreasoning love, are only to be found among the benefactors of individuals; among those who devote themselves to a limited number, those who work in the silence of obscurity, not in the glare of publicity or history. Such a modest, real love is never the appanage of the would-be saviour of a class, a race, a nation, or any other collectivity. All such benefactors, be they labelled socialists, nationalists, Pan-Germans, Pan-Slavs, Zionists *e tutti quanti*, who dream of the welfare and happiness of millions, though cold and indifferent to the

sufferings of individuals, are not altruists, sentimentalists, or idealists, they are merely dryasdust intellectuals, if they be not egoists. To love the parts constituting the whole is within human possibility, but to love the whole whilst despising the parts makes such a love, if love it can be called, a mere emptiness. The soldier fighting in the trenches and dying on the battlefield is doing so because he loves his home and hearth, his wife or sister, his mother or his children, not the potential children of future generations. Men have also died, and are dying, for an idea ; but this is because that idea has become a part of their very being, their precious spiritual inheritance or possession.

Bakunin and Marx, the Slav and the Teuton, clearly illustrate the above statements. The former, endowed with the simplicity of a child, was animated by a real, unbounded love for the individual ; the latter, a would-be benefactor of a class, was an intellectual machine of the finest type : ' a scientific demagogue,' ' the incarnation of a democratic ' dictator,' as Bakunin rightly said.* Space does not permit the elaboration of these points, but an impartial study of the psychology of races and nations shows that it was Germany who inoculated the world with the virus both of love and hatred of the collectivity. Germany is the home of such movements as ' Scientific Socialism,' the ' Internationale,' ' Antisemitism,' and many other ' philisms ' and ' phobisms.'

Even in their plans for the realisation of the social revolution, Marx and Bakunin counted upon different elements. The German looked to those who were sufficiently educated to understand the scientific bases of his system, whilst the Russian appealed to those who most craved for liberty. Marx believed that the nation that would first give the signal for the social revolution would be the State that was furthest advanced—Germany, for instance. (He seems, however, to have changed his views altogether after his sojourn in England.) Bakunin, on the contrary, was of opinion that the nation most richly endowed with the spirit of revolt and the instinct of liberty would be the first to give the signal. He did not believe that the Teutonic races possessed this instinct of liberty, they are so essentially authoritative ; but it was fully developed

* Preaudeau, ' Bakunine et l'Internationale,' Paris, 1911, p. 37.

in the Latin and Slavonic races. This belief explains why Bakunin took sides with France during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. He addressed a passionate appeal to the members of the 'Internationale,' especially to the Swiss, calling upon them to take up arms and to intervene in favour of the French Republic which had just been proclaimed. France represented liberty in Europe, whilst 'Germany was the common 'enemy of all European Socialists,' for she 'incarnated despotism 'and reaction.' Bakunin, the champion of liberty, to whom, paradoxical as it may sound of this atheist, he had erected a shrine, hated Germany as much as he loved France. 'Ce 'Russe,' wrote A. Richard, 'cet anarchiste, cet ennemi des 'patries . . . connaissait bien l'histoire de l'esprit français, le 'génie de la Révolution Française. Il aimait la France, et, 'bien plus, il épousait les haines de la France et souffrait 'de son abaissement.'* But what was it that interested Bakunin in France? Certainly not her political power, not the State. It was neither Imperial nor Royalist France, not even Republican France that he cared for; it was the great national character, the French spirit, the generous and heroic instincts, the revolutionary audacity that had dared to pull down all the authorities sanctioned and fortified by history, all the old gods and idols. It was this French iconoclasm, so vastly different from the Teuton vandalism, that Bakunin so greatly admired.

'If we were to lose [he wrote] this great historical nation which is called France, if it were to disappear from the arena of the world, or, what is still worse, were now to be dragged down into the mud to live as the slave of Bismarck, the world would be the poorer and a great void would ensue; it would be more than a national catastrophe, it would be a misfortune, a universal débâcle.'

For then the German State, authoritative and reactionary *par excellence*, would make Europe feel its power, and crush liberty wherever it raised its head. The German people have no instinct of liberty. They even found means to transform the 'Internationale' into a Sozialdemocratie! Therefore it was the sacred duty of every man who loved liberty and was anxious to see humanity triumph over brutality, of every man who cared for the emancipation of

* Revue de Paris, 1896, Septembre–Octobre, p. 148.

his own country, to come forward and take part in the struggle of democracy against German despotism.

In 1884 the social democratic party was founded, in Switzerland, by four militant revolutionaries — Plekhanov, Vera Sassoulitsh, Deutsch, and Axelbrod. Their novel methods of propaganda were directly inspired by the teaching of Marx and Engels. They spread the ideas of Marx among the labouring classes, thus preparing the proletariat for the economic fight. From 1891 to 1894 a series of strikes were declared all over Central Russia, at Moscow and at Petrograd. In 1895 a vast strike was organised at Petrograd by Lenin and Martov, in which 35,000 working men participated.

In 1900–1901, the socialist revolutionary party was reorganised under the intellectual leadership of Lavrov. One of the most influential members of the party was Victor Tshernov, editor of the 'Znamya Trouda' (The Banner of Work). The majority of its members belong to the liberal professions, and have exercised a considerable influence upon the 'Union of Officers' and the 'Union of Soldiers and Sailors.' The party also included some peasants, and expected a great deal from the socialist tendencies inherent in those peasants, who still clung to the form of collectivism manifested in the 'Mir.' It therefore advocated the immediate socialisation of the land. On the other hand, the Social Democrats declared that this ancient and primitive form of communism would have to disappear and make room for the modern capitalistic forms of production, as a necessary preliminary to complete social reconstruction, which could only be the result of a slow evolution. Apart from agrarian reform, the socialist revolutionary party included terrorism in its programme.

In consequence of the narrow dogmatism and sectarianism shown at the congress held in London in 1907, a split occurred in the Social Democratic party. It broke into two factions: the *Bolsheviki*, or *majoritaires*, headed by Lenin, and the *Menshoviki*, or *minoritaires*, whose leaders were Plekhanov, Martov, and Dahn. The former would have nothing to do with the liberal bourgeoisie, whom they accused of monarchic tendencies. They accused Plekhanov and his friends of being too benevolent towards the liberals and the Cadets. The *Menshoviki*, on the contrary, maintained that a revolution would be impossible unless Russia first realised the political

and social conditions prevailing in Western Europe, and that the liberal bourgeoisie must be an important factor in the revolutionary movement. It would be dangerous, they said, to alienate the sympathies of this section of the nation and thus throw it into the arms of reaction. Each section had its dogma which, with the doctrinaire temperament so common in Russia, it pursued, and is still pursuing, to the extreme.

The above survey, necessarily brief, of the philosophical currents and ideas which have led up to the Russian Revolution will perhaps shed some light upon the difficulties which have arisen, and were bound to arise, in New Russia. To understand these difficulties it is necessary to examine the deeper causes underlying the apparent state of chaos. To say that the majority of the Russian revolutionaries are pacifists—now a term of opprobrium equal to that of hooligan in those far-off days when Europe was at peace—would be an unjustifiable statement, especially with regard to men who have never shrunk from a fight with their enemies, and have fearlessly faced prison, exile, the mines, and even death for the sake of the cause; who, in short, have been good fighters all their lives. 'Traitors,' too, is an ugly word to use, besides providing no adequate or psychological explanation of present events. There may, or there may not be, traitors among the Russian revolutionaries; it is for history to judge. The causes of the trouble are much more complicated. They are briefly these. The authors of the revolution, from whatever class they were drawn and whatever creed they held, were all of one mind as far as the destructive work was concerned, even if they differed as to the means to be employed. But now that the destructive work is accomplished and Tsardom lies prostrate, the different elements composing the revolutionary forces part company. The architects cannot agree as to the plan of the new structure that is to be erected upon the ruins of the old. We are witnessing a clash, conflict and confusion of sentiments, ideas, and ideals. Men, if not actually speaking a Babel of tongues, are certainly thinking a Babel of thoughts. They are also, not infrequently, taking the 'ought to' of ethics for the 'it is' of daily life; they are taking dreams for realities. The Russians are by nature theorists, given to abstract reasoning, and they cling

to their theories with the fanaticism of the doctrinaire. The different currents of opinion—constitutional liberalism, or a liberal bourgeoisie, Socialism, Anarchism, Nationalism, Imperialism, Humanitarianism, and Internationalism, as well as many other 'isms'—are crossing each other. Some Russians are satisfied with 'political emancipation'; others are dreaming of an 'emancipation from politics.' Some Russians would be satisfied with a substitution of new gods for the old, would be content with thorough repairs in the old structure, whilst others desire a clean sweep, the complete overthrow of all the idols which humanity has hitherto worshipped, and a *tabula rasa* for an entirely new building. Some have raised nationality into a creed; others are worshipping the individual. The former, like Lavrov, are for a 'confraternity of nations'; the latter, like Bakunin, for a 'confraternity of men,' without distinction of race, nationality, or language. In the view of Bakunin and his school the individual is everything; society is, or should be, an agglomeration of pure spirits, a commerce of ideas, whose goal is liberty. Man should not be subordinate to, but co-ordinate with, his neighbour, and the aim of government should be to make itself superfluous. Some of the revolutionaries would be satisfied with a constitutional monarchy like that of Great Britain; others desire a federal republic, like that of Switzerland or the United States. Others again have more ideal dreams; they dream of establishing a Republic of the Just, and take for their models the Republic of Plato, the city of St. Augustine, More's Utopia, Harrington's Oceana, Campanella's City of the Sun, Fénelon's Salente, and the types of society imagined by Jean Jacques Rousseau, or by the ancient prophets who foretold the Kingdom of God. These dreamers forget that even Rousseau himself said that such a city presupposes a nation of gods, or, to use a more modern expression, a race of supermen. It is a city in which no man is born, and wherein no man has ever physically lived; it exists only in the realm of imagination. The men who dream of such ideals would have to legislate for pure spirits and to build a solid structure upon a foundation of clouds.

We have grown familiar, during the last three years, with the now famous phrase 'The present war is a war of 'ideas.' It is quite natural, however, that men, according

to their particular trend of thought and temperament, should put different constructions upon this phrase. To some, a war of ideas means a war with heavy guns and mitrailleuses, a war in which men kill each other to make their respective ideas triumphant. Others construe the phrase to mean a war in which ideas do all the fighting. But this is not the only reason which prompts some of the Russian revolutionaries to adopt the attitude of pacifism. Many of them draw, as President Wilson has done, a clear distinction between the German governing classes and the German people. They believe that the German people will deal with the Hohenzollerns as the Russians have dealt with the Romanovs. This is the view of the Social Democrats in Russia, who are mostly Marxists, and still cling to their faith in the German working classes. On the other hand, the Social Revolutionaries, who now style themselves 'National Socialists,' together with the anarchists like Kropotkin, have no illusions with regard to Marx and the German Socialists. They are convinced, as Bakunin was, that 'the assumption of a real difference between 'the Prussian Government and the German people is illusory 'and sentimental'; that the Germans are the most 'reaction-'ary and authoritative people' in the world, 'lacking the 'instinct of liberty.' The Social Democrats say 'Let us reason 'with the mind of Germany and thus conquer'; the National Socialists more clear-sightedly reply 'Let us conquer and 'then we will reason.' Beyond this it may be said that the Marxists in Russia are bent upon shifting the war from a war of nations to a war of classes. They care little for the map of Europe, so long as their ideas of a social reconstruction emerge triumphant from the welter of sacrifices.

Another psychological current underlying the present ferment in Russia, another idea 'struggling in the background 'of the Russian convulsion,' is the question of democracy and 'democratic control.' Here again men are apt to put different constructions upon the words 'democratic control.' When is it to begin? When will democracy really assert itself? If democratic control, they say, is to be the watchword of Europe in a not dim and distant future, if the triumph of democracy is to be the great conquest, the vast annexation wrested from Prussian militarism, then democracy should have a voice in the war, even before it has been brought to a

successful issue. Hitherto, say the democrats in Russia, war has been declared and carried on without our having been consulted; we have heard vague formulas and aspirations, but we have had no control of the war; we are ignorant of secret diplomatic arrangements and treaties; we know not to what extent the government has pledged the nation, its wealth and its future; we are told that this war is to lay the foundations for a new edifice, a new Europe; we labourers and wage-earners may have views as to the nature of that edifice different from those of the governing and capitalist classes; we are told this war is to be the end of the era of conquest; we do not want it to prepare the way for a new era of exploitation; we are all anxious to crush Prussian militarism, but you governing and capitalist classes may be anxious to do it for the benefit of the bourgeoisie; and, incidentally, the German bourgeoisie would profit, whilst our own proletariat would suffer; we Russian democrats have decided to continue the war and to carry it to a successful issue under really democratic control, which must from to-day enter into power; thus alone can we make our arrangements both for crushing Prussian militarism and for safeguarding the future of the working classes; we are quite content for our capitalists to suffer as well as German capitalists, and for the German working classes to gain as well as our own working classes.

Such are the cross-currents of the Russian Revolution, such are the thoughts and theories of the men in the forefront of the movement. They all spring from the different doctrines promulgated by the Russian philosophers, Herzen, Tshernyshevski, Lavrov, and Bakunin, who sowed the seeds of the revolution. We cannot expect the New Russia to emerge from this chaos without time and much travail.

Angelo S. Rappoport.

## SPAIN AND THE WAR

THE outbreak of war found Spain, speaking in broad terms, as ignorant of the true facts concerning the internal aspect of other European countries as those countries were themselves of Spanish internal affairs. Puzzled, perplexed, and not a little alarmed at the magnitude of the conflagration which had been suddenly ignited around them, the first gesture of the Spanish people was one of doubt and fear. The forward drive of the Hun through Belgium, and the events which took place in rapid succession until the battle of the Marne, the failure of the invaded to repel the invaders, the fall of Antwerp, all contributed to create a deep-rooted impression in the popular mind, suggesting to it the final triumph of Germany as inevitable. Russia was disorganised, France undisciplined and divided, Great Britain without an army and torn by internal struggles ; what could the Entente do against a powerful nation like Germany, possessing the best-trained army in the world ?

Ignorant as they were of the true facts concerning the different countries that became immediately involved in the war, the majority of Spanish people looked on the European arena with the same lens through which they were accustomed to regard their own internal problems and party differences. The real image was thus distorted and disfigured, and soon we saw a strong current of opinion directing itself towards one group of belligerents, which was not, unfortunately, the one towards which their sympathies should have inclined. The army, the clergy, and the aristocracy came to be regarded as pro-German.

The pro-Germanism of the army is capable of a more satisfactory explanation than that of the other two bodies. Spanish militarists did not fail to see that, at the outbreak of war, the German army was the best-trained, equipped, and organised in Europe. Every Spanish officer hoped that some day his country's army would equal that of the German Empire, in the same way as every Spanish sailor considers the British

navy to be the best navy in the world. This alone would account for the pro-German feeling that from the beginning prevailed among Spanish officers of all ranks. Strong prejudices against France served to feed and to keep alive this sentiment.

The clergy in Spain is not, as a rule, too democratic in its sentiments. It cannot forget the time when it was one of the predominant powers of the State; its constant desire is to see that power restored and its old influence recovered. It is fully aware of the unpopularity of the Catholic Church in Germany, but it believes at the same time that revolutionary and anti-clerical France, also democratic and protestant England, are responsible in a high degree for the decadence of the Church in Germany as well as in their own countries. A considerable number of the Spanish clergy profess Carlist and traditionalist sympathies; perhaps partly because they know the favour and esteem with which King Alfonso is regarded by the nations of the Entente. They persistently ignore the hardships of Catholics in Germany and in the invaded territories, preferring to recall the expulsion of the religious orders from France; they believe that a victorious Kaiser would restore temporal power to the Roman Church, and Gibraltar to Spain. German propaganda, hatred of radical France, and an ignorance truly disconcerting among men who, owing to their responsible position, ought to know better, these, and the desire again to take part in the public affairs of the nation, are some of the causes of pro-Germanism in the Spanish clergy.

The aristocracy hate democracy and republicanism; they remember that France and England contributed to Spain's decadence, and forget too readily their own grave responsibility in the downfall of their country's world power. The views of Señor Vazquez Mella, the Carlist leader, found, strange to say, a ready echo among ladies and gentlemen of the Court. A German victory represented to them the triumph of 'order, 'monarchy, and authority,' while 'corruption, anarchy, and 'radicalism' would follow a victory of England and France. Well seasoned with ignorance, these ingredients did not fail to produce a pro-German feeling among the Spanish nobility.

We have endeavoured to explain above the causes that apparently account for the pro-German feeling of a part, and

an influential part, of the Spanish population. It is necessary to understand that feeling, and not to underrate its importance. But it must be remembered that the feeling is not unanimous, or anything approaching it, among the classes concerned. There are large numbers of the nobility, of the clergy, and of the army who are unconditionally on the side of the Allies, who defend the cause of the Allies because they know that it is linked to the welfare of their country, and who are perfectly aware of the evils that a German triumph would bring to Spain and to the whole world. And it is well to remember that those of the clergy, the aristocracy, and the army who are with the Allies represent the best and the soundest portion of these three elements of the life of the nation.

The effectiveness of the German propaganda campaign, prepared beforehand and carried out with as much energy as unscrupulousness, is mainly responsible for the sympathy felt in Spain towards the German cause. The fact that there are in the country between 100,000 and 120,000 Germans, who arrived in different periods of the war from France and Northern Africa, from Italy, the Cameroons and Portugal, should not be forgotten when we wish to account for those sympathies. It is absolutely certain that many newspapers, many campaigns, and many intrigues are not pro-German, but German pure and simple.

The reason for the pro-Ally sympathies felt by a numerous and important part of the Spanish population does not require explanation to the British public. Business men are pro-Ally, because they know that the material interests of Spain are united to those of the nations of the Entente. Spanish intellectuals regard France as their Mecca, and the political status of England as the realisation of their dreams. Spanish democrats—practically the whole of the Spanish people—fully understand the distance that separates the Allies from the Central Powers. In a word, the best part of Spain is pro-Ally, and, come what may, France and England can rely on the true friendship and warm support of a very large proportion of the Spanish people. Indeed, if Spanish intervention in the war were possible at all, it could only be on the side of the Entente Powers. But as far as can yet be seen Spanish intervention is impossible. It is true that in Spain there is not a man who may be truly termed 'neutral,' that is to say, in-

different to the vicissitudes and ultimate issues of the conflict. One hears more about the war in Spain than in any other country. But the nation is itself neutral, if we regard the term as signifying opposed to intervention. Señor Dato proclaimed the neutrality of the country in the first days of the war, and his successors have not ceased to practise the same policy, which they know to be in accordance with the interests as well as with the wishes of the nation. A rare unanimity has been shown in Spain on this point. In a country which has always appeared unsettled and divided, this unanimity is remarkable, showing that it is prompted by something more than a mere desire to submit to the policy followed by different statesmen.

The fact is that Spain suffered more in the nineteenth century through wars than any other country in the world. From the Napoleonic wars to the Spanish-American disaster, Spain never ceased to sacrifice the better part of her people, now in conflicts with foreign Powers, now in colonial wars and internal dissensions. Having suffered so much from war in the recent past, Spain wishes to keep out of the present conflict at almost any cost. She has done so up to now, and will exert all the means in her power to continue to do so. She is too weary of wars which have bled her white to join in a quarrel which she does not regard as her own, and for which she is not prepared materially or financially. Finally, her own internal affairs, unsettled at the moment, added to the division of opinion with regard to the merits of the two belligerent groups, make it impossible for her to side with either of them. This is the only conclusion at which we can arrive if we study the problem calmly and dispassionately.

Let us begin by examining the attitude, or rather the successive attitudes, adopted by Señor Maura during the course of the war. For many years the head of the Spanish Conservative party, Señor Maura now leads—it would be perhaps more correct to say that he now serves—a small band of admirers, the 'Mauristas,' who organised themselves into a collective body upon his retirement to private life in the autumn of 1909. Señor Maura is a man who has provoked throughout the whole of his political career the greatest enthusiasm as well as the bitterest hate. Endowed with a strong personality and an energetic character, his politics are more theoretical and

idealistic than capable of practical application. When as Prime Minister, or as the head of the Opposition, Maura led the Conservative party, he was as cordially disliked by the extreme Right as by the extreme Left; Carlists and Catholics on one side, Republicans, Socialists, and Radicals on the other.

On April 21, 1915, Señor Maura emerged from the silence in which he had lived since he abandoned public affairs in 1909—a silence unbroken except for a few letters to co-religionists and associations friendly with him. This long silence had caused continual discussions, and the announcement of a speech to be delivered by him in the Royal Theatre at Madrid aroused the greatest expectations and excitement. The writer was present on this occasion, and confesses himself unable to describe the wild, almost unprecedented enthusiasm which prevailed among the thousands that had packed the largest Madrid theatre in order to hear the declarations of the late Sphinx. But the enthusiasm decreased visibly when Señor Maura dwelt on the foreign policy of the nation, for the larger part of his audience was pro-German, and he made it clear that he was not. He recalled the Carthagena treaties of 1907, subscribed by the Government of which he was the head; he laid stress on the unanimity, the rare unanimity, exhibited in Spain as to the soundness of the foreign policy implied by the ratification of those treaties. He affirmed the community of interests that links Spain to France and England, reminding his audience at the same time of their reciprocal promise to maintain the *status quo* in the Mediterranean; and he said, clearly and forcibly, that the situation respecting those points being in 1915 exactly as it was in 1907, the necessity and utility of the Carthagena treaties remained as great as ever.

It would be useless to deny the visible dismay that these declarations caused among his hearers, most of whom were also his political followers. They plucked up their spirits a little when he proclaimed that the possession of Tangier by Spain was demanded by reasons of justice and of international convenience. But, on the whole, Señor Maura's speech dismayed his admirers, though it was well received by the supporters of the Allies in Spain, whose cause it helped to strengthen.

On September 11, 1916, Señor Maura delivered a second

speech, this time at Beranga, province of Santander. In this speech he proclaimed the necessity of adhering to the policy of neutrality; nothing, except direct aggression, could induce Spain to enter the war; there were no treaties in existence strong enough to compel her to join either of the belligerent parties. Neutrality was doubtless a difficult policy, but adherence to it was imperative. Yet Spain could not look with indifference on the catastrophe which was shaking the whole world; her privileged soil and her privileged geographical position compelled her to choose between one of the two groups of nations in which Europe would remain divided after the war. And she could not wait to choose until peace was signed; she could not remain in 'splendid isolation' during the war and after it 'run to the aid of the victor.' She had to select at once a course that would lead her to prosperity, to the fulfilment of the national aspirations; and in order to decide, it was necessary that the organised power of the State should work together with the nation. Opinion was unsettled, divided, and this was a great evil and a great danger.

He himself, as Prime Minister—Señor Maura went on to say—had shown that in 1904 and 1907 the interests of Spain were allied to those of France and England; yet, as soon as war broke out, a strong and intelligent current of opinion had inclined towards the Central Powers. Why? Because France and England, during two and a half centuries, had followed a policy that could only weaken and dismember Spain. Spain herself had been the principal agent of her downfall, but aided and abetted by France and England. Therefore, if those countries persisted in disregarding the interests of the Spanish nation, if they did not see their way to alter, nay, invert completely their foreign policy in regard to Spain, she would be forced to seek an alliance elsewhere. It was not enough that France and England, acting in accordance with the principles of right and justice, should allow Spain a free hand in Tangier, besides assuring her of their loyal co-operation in the protectorate of Morocco. If Spain could not obtain a fundamental variation in the policy of France and England towards her, then Spain could not remain with England or with France.

It should be observed that Señor Maura, while advocating an approach towards the Western Powers, subjected it to

conditions of which he had said nothing at Madrid. But in insisting on those conditions he was following the only course which could induce the country to unite itself and move towards the Entente Powers. Old grievances of Spain against France and England had been raked up and magnified to such an extent by the German propaganda, that Señor Maura could not have overlooked them without producing a contrary effect to that which he seemingly desired. He laid emphasis on these conditions in order to prove to his hearers that, as a statesman, he took note of the present and the past, as well as the future. Even if all do not agree with his attitude, no one can feel surprise that a statesman speaking for one of the proudest nations in the world should use proud words. But why did he not speak in the same tone at the Royal Theatre of Madrid? Why did he not speak in that same tone before the war, when he occupied a responsible position and his words carried even more weight? Why did he suddenly at Beranga lay down conditions referring to things which had happened years, and in some cases hundreds of years, before? The answer is to be found in the coldness with which certain parts of his Madrid speech had been received by his followers, the 'Mauristas.'

We come now to the last of the three speeches delivered by Señor Maura since the beginning of the war. It was in the Madrid bull-ring, and so recently as April 29th last. The meeting was attended by 22,000 people, mainly Mauristas, Carlists, and pro-Germans. It was an extraordinary speech. Spain, said Maura, could not continue in splendid isolation; she belonged to the group of Western Powers, but she could not be on friendly terms with them as long as she remained mutilated and humiliated; in such a condition she could only hope to be despised. England, by remaining in possession of Gibraltar and forbidding Spain to arm her own territory, humiliated the Spanish people. France, in 1902 and 1904, had behaved in a manner incompatible with the respect due to a great nation. The present situation in Tangier annulled all that had been previously granted to Spain. The future of Spain lay in the possession of the Straits of Gibraltar. Spain had been asked to break off diplomatic relations with Germany, but she had not received any offence from the Central Powers strong enough to provoke her to commit this iniquity.

The whole speech in itself, and even more if we recall the statements contained in the two previous speeches, was one mass of contradictions and incongruities. Señor Melquiades Alvarez conclusively pointed them out a few days later, in an article that appeared in the Madrid 'Liberal.'

'On one side' [he wrote] 'we are told that Spain should join the Western Powers; on the other, that we have nothing to expect from France and England. On one side, that our sympathies should tend towards the Allies; on the other, that we must hate England, who possesses a portion of our territory. In Beranga, immediate option was advised; in Madrid, no option, no decision; neutrality only. In the Royal Theatre, that the life and independence of small nations depended on the issue of the conflict; in the bull-ring, that this is not true. In 1909, Señor Maura led us to a war in Morocco; to-day, the death of our fellow-countrymen, torpedoed by German submarines, is not sufficient motive even to demand compensation. Señor Maura did not appear to remember Gibraltar in 1904. To-day, forgetting the course of modern international ideas, he wants Spain to command on both shores of the Straits.'

Señor Maura's political theories have always been rather obscure, but his recent speech is more than obscure: it is almost absurd; for the Maura of the 29th of April is a different Maura from the one who signed the treaties of 1904 and 1907, from the one who declared war in 1909, and who delivered the two speeches of 1915 and 1916. It is precisely these incongruities which serve to make his position unintelligible to many who sincerely admire him. They cannot explain these incongruities, except by believing that of late years at least Señor Maura serves, but does not lead, a group of followers who insist on showing their leader the path he must walk in, in order to fulfil their own particular aspirations.

Following Señor Maura's retirement from public affairs in 1909, Don Eduardo Dato became the leader of the Spanish Conservative party. When war broke out, he had occupied the premiership for almost two years, ever since the death of the great statesman and leader of the Liberal party, Señor Canalejas.

Many in Spain are apt to forget that the policy of neutrality which they so strongly defend is due to the initiative, tact, and prudence of the man who, at the head of his party, has been called to occupy, for the second time during the war, the

position of Prime Minister. Señor Dato achieved something which falls short of a miracle: he contrived to impress upon the undecided nation the convenience and necessity of following a policy of strict neutrality. His own views upon the point are to be found in a speech which he delivered in Congress, on the 5th of November 1914, in reply to a question addressed to him by the Republican-Socialist minority.

'The Government' [said Señor Dato] 'perseveres in the policy of neutrality in regard to the war existing between nations with which Spain maintains the most cordial terms of friendship. We have not been attacked by any of them, and we are totally foreign to the causes of this conflict. We desire to remain aloof from the war, and all nations involved in it have not hesitated to recognise the legitimate reasons for our neutrality, which they have scrupulously respected. The Spanish Government has not remained indifferent to anything related to the defence of the nation; it has adopted the measures of precaution that its prevision and patriotism advise it to take.

'We shall maintain our neutral attitude, without ever abandoning it voluntarily; and if, contrary to what we honestly believe, circumstances such as to enforce a change of policy should arise, we shall never alter our attitude, however slightly, without previously consulting Parliament on the point.

'But if the day should arrive when Spain becomes the object of aggression, we are Spaniards, gentlemen, and we shall not hesitate to act in accordance with the traditions of our old and glorious country, sacrificing our lives in order to defend the integrity and independence of our territory.'

Señor Dato's words, which represent the policy followed by his Cabinet during fifteen months of the war, could not have been more prudent or more dignified. He has just again returned to power, and it can be safely predicted that the Allies will not have cause to find complaint with his attitude towards them. He is fully conscious of the political and commercial interests which link his country with England, with France, and with Italy, and there is no reason to doubt his future adherence to the clear statement just quoted. It is well to remember that the 'Epoca,' the official organ of the party which he leads, has, without ever evincing any servile partiality, proved more than once that it is well aware of the righteousness of the Allied cause, raising its voice constantly against the outrages of which Spanish seamen have been made the victims by German methods of warfare. Señor Dato will

defend the dignity of the country with the same courage as he will attack the delicate problems that face him.

Señor Dato's previous spell of power was followed by the premiership of Count Romanones, who had led a not very compact or disciplined Liberal party since the death of Señor Canalejas. A few months previously to his accession to the premiership, an article had appeared in the ' Diario Universal,' which was commonly attributed to his pen. It was a powerful study on the dangers of neutrality, and caused a great stir in the country ; but its unfavourable reception probably served, for the moment at least, to induce Count Romanones to await a more suitable occasion in order to renew his pro-Ally activities.

Shortly afterwards, in April 1915, the Liberal leader delivered an important speech at Palma de Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands. The speech was mainly devoted to interior politics and to the situation of the party, but Count Romanones' words on the international question were of the greatest interest and importance. He did not hesitate to affirm the durability and advantage of the work achieved by Señor Maura and the Conservative party in 1907, recalling at the same time the great political significance of the visit, made in 1913, to the French fleet at anchor in Carthagena, in the presence of a British man-o'-war, by the President of the neighbouring republic and by King Alfonso, he himself having had the honour of accompanying the heads of the two States as Prime Minister of Spain. This visit, during which the most cordial telegrams were exchanged with King George V., was nothing less than a solemn ratification, made by a Liberal Government, of the work achieved by Señor Maura and the Conservatives a few years before. Owing to Spanish interests in the Mediterranean, Conservatives and Liberals were bound to uphold the agreements of 1904, 1905, 1907, and 1912, and that same reason imposed upon them a political understanding with the Powers with whom, from the first days of King Alfonso's reign, Spain has maintained the most direct relations. This did not imply any antipathy against other countries ; it was simply the result of Spain's geographical position. As Señor Maura himself had said, we cannot ignore real facts, or make Spain different from what she is, or place her in a different position from that which she occupies on the map of the world.

These plain and emphatic words of Count Romanones made intelligible to all his opinions concerning the foreign policy of Spain, and their weight was increased by the fact that, as he himself observed, the most complete agreement existed on this point between Liberals and Conservatives. The speeches we have quoted from the three most prominent Spanish statesmen furnish a complete answer to those who are ready to believe that 'Spain is pro-German,' and who in doing so are paying more attention to the hysterical ravings of a noisy rabble than to the studied declarations of responsible statesmen.

The foreign policy actually pursued by Count Romanones and the Liberal government of which he was till lately the head confirms what we have just written. No one can forget his attitude at the time of President Wilson's appeal to neutrals, when Spain politely but firmly refused to send a Peace Note to the belligerent nations, preferring to await 'the moment 'when such a step could be favourably received by both the 'combatant groups.' A Note upon the submarine warfare, issued about the same time by Count Romanones' Government, stated clearly that Spain

'has always maintained the inadmissibility of the destruction of naval prizes as carried out by the German submarines. The Spanish Government [the Note went on to say] has adopted on this subject a more insistent attitude than any other Neutral, not excluding the United States; and further, it does not admit the interpretation given by the Central Empires to international law in the destruction of ships; it has always made representations and protests against such an interpretation.'

Needless to say, Count Romanones was vigorously attacked by Germans and pro-Germans in Spain. A 'high diplomatic 'personage in relation with the Central Powers' even went so far as to assail the Premier in his private life, attributing the tenor of his two Notes to certain material interests—an attack as devoid of legitimate foundation as it was in accordance with German political methods. But the vigorous campaign conducted against Count Romanones by the pro-Germans had a certain effect on public opinion, and when in his judgment the time arrived for a closer approach to the Allies, he lacked that general support which was necessary, and he was forced to resign. The Government passed into the hands of another Liberal statesman, Señor Garcia Prieto,

who was succeeded at the beginning of June by Señor Dato and the Conservative party.

We have in turn examined the position of the three most prominent Spanish statesmen who at different times, either before or during the war, have presided over Conservative or Liberal Cabinets. We must now direct our attention to party leaders who have never shared the responsibilities of the Government, but who nevertheless exercise a considerable influence upon the affairs of the nation. Two of them represent the only two sections of the country which have more or less openly proclaimed themselves in favour of intervention on the side of one or other group of belligerents; the third being the head of a party which occupies an intermediate situation between the Crown parties and the extreme Left.

At the head of one of the first, the Carlists, we find Señor Vazquez Mella, who together with his followers has defended the cause of the Central Powers as vigorously as he has attacked that of the Allies since the commencement of the war. The Carlists are as anti-dynastic as ever, but it must be borne in mind that since the present conflict broke out they do not represent faithfully the views of Don Jaime de Borbon, the son of Don Carlos, who is the visible head of the party. The Austrians have 'induced' Don Jaime to 'keep within the 'precincts of his castle and grounds at Frohrsdorf,' perhaps because of the fact that they are aware that if he succeeded in reaching an Allied nation (as pretender to the throne he is exiled from Spain), he would not lose time in making his followers know his true opinions concerning the European conflict. These opinions, as well as many interesting points concerning the situation of the Carlist party, have been dealt with in an excellent pamphlet by Count Melgar, for many years private secretary to Don Carlos and to Don Jaime de Borbon.

Señor Vazquez Mella delivers violent speeches at short intervals before audiences composed of reactionaries and emotional women. He possesses an extraordinary gift of speech, and always knows which are the strings to pull in order to raise his hearers to a pitch of delirious enthusiasm. His orations generally turn on the same theme or themes: religion, the reign of Philip the Second, the high morality of the Kaiser, the perfidy of England, Gibraltar, anti-clerical France, disciplined Germany; that is to say, he looks mainly to the

past, distorts the present, and totally disregards the future. But it would be useless to deny that he succeeds in moving his audience and that he has a strong hold on a numerous portion of the people.

The extreme Radical party is led by Señor Lerroux, a constant and ardent supporter of the Entente, though always from his own point of view as affected by internal politics. In the first days of the war, Señor Lerroux proclaimed himself in favour of intervention on the side of the Allies, but this caused a violent storm of protest in all quarters, the country showing plainly that it would not allow its neutrality to be broken or its foreign policy to be dictated by the revolutionary leader. To-day Señor Lerroux demands a rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany, maintaining that the moment for intervention has passed, and that it is now too late to join the Allies. The Radical leader has lost influence of late years, and the country regards with suspicion and distrust his advice on any question, national or international.

As we said above, there is a party in Spain, the Reformist, that occupies an intermediate position between the Crown governing parties and the Left. Although Señor Melquia des Alvarez, the leader of the Reformists, has always shown a tendency towards the republican form of government, it is generally believed that he would not hesitate to accept the task of forming a Cabinet if King Alfonso were to entrust it to him. It cannot surprise anybody that a party which adheres to democratic ideals so strongly should have warmly defended the cause of the Allies throughout the war. Señor Alvarez has at the same time upheld the policy of neutrality so long as it was compatible with the dignity and honour of the nation, adding that if Spain found herself obliged to take part in the conflict, it would be with the Allies, and with them only, that she could possibly join forces. It should be noticed that he only goes a step further than Señor Dato, the Conservative leader, and it may be said that his foreign policy is in complete agreement with that advocated by Count Romanones, the head of the Liberals. He is now in favour of a rupture of relations with Germany, believing it to be demanded by the outrages of which Spanish seamen have been victims. The arguments put forward by Señor Alvarez in favour of a closer approach to the Allies cannot be disputed, because they are

based as much on reasons of morality as on those of material national interests. He is an excellent orator, and having given proof of exceptional qualities for taking part in the government of the nation, it is to be lamented that the Republican parties do not bring themselves into closer union under his leadership and together support a democratic monarchy.

As we have seen, the majority of Spanish statesmen are pro-Ally. Señor Maura's attitude was not open to doubt until a short time ago; he may turn round again at any moment, though naturally his support would have lost some of its value. The Conservative and Liberal leaders, as well as the heads of the Republican and Radical parties, are pro-Ally, and have more or less plainly stated their opinions at different times. Only the Carlist leader is on the other side, and there is sufficient evidence of his real motives to allow all responsible people to see his policy in its true light.

On one point all Spanish statesmen are unanimous: on the justice and the desirability of restoring Tangier to the Spanish zone of influence in Morocco. They all believe that internationalised Tangier is a fertile ground for discord and revolt; its possession by Spain would do away with all cause of disturbance. Tangier is necessary to Spain, if she is to continue the colonisation of Morocco.

Two of the Spanish statesmen whose position we have studied have gone further still and demanded Gibraltar for Spain. England in Gibraltar has been throughout the war one of the sharpest weapons of the German propaganda. Even the best friends of England cannot deny that the possession of Gibraltar by Great Britain was accomplished by unfair means. When they maintain that the Allies are fighting for the integrity of all nations, great and small, the answer is 'Look at Gibraltar.' It is the 'España irredenta,' and although before the war the old grudge was nearly forgotten, it has been cleverly revived by those who saw that it was one of the few weapons that they could wield with right and reason to support it. A rapprochement with Great Britain will always be hampered by the existence of this British fort on Spanish soil.

Before entering into the study of the different opinions professed by the different sections of the Press, it is well to lay stress on the important influence exercised by newspapers in Spain. In a country where the people are not too devoted

to reading, the newspaper is for many the only guide and the only intellectual food. The Spaniard, generally speaking, reads his daily paper in the morning, and knows what he has to think for the rest of the day. The newspaper is the greatest weapon of the politician ; it is the instrument that leads and guides the people into the various channels of public opinion.

' La Epoca,' the ' doyen ' of the Spanish press and the official organ of the Conservative party, observed an attitude of prudent neutrality during the months when Señor Dato was at the head of the Government. Without ever abandoning this attitude, ' La Epoca ' has always maintained that the interests of the Spanish nation are allied to those of the Entente, and that a German victory cannot be beneficial to Spain. It has always protested with energy and dignity against the acts of aggression of the Central Powers ; its authoritative influence among the aristocratic and conservative classes is unmistakable, and the campaign which it has conducted during this war has been of the greatest value to national interests as well as to the cause of the Allies.

One of the most important and widely read Spanish papers is ' A B C.' Though not affiliated to any particular political party, it has always professed Conservative ideas. Admirably edited, with able writers to fill its columns, it calls itself ' impartial ' and ' neutral,' but the pro-German sympathies of ' A B C,' although it may strive to deny them, are obvious to everyone. Because of the fact that it has always been respected and read by sound elements of opinion, and because it publishes together with pro-German articles others written by journalists of Allied sympathies, thus disguising its true feelings, ' A B C ' is one of the most dangerous enemies of the Entente.

The most ardent defender of the Central Powers and their policy is the ' Correo Español,' the organ of the Carlist party and of Señor Vazquez Mella, a paper whose opinions, like those of the party it represents, have earned the disapprobation of Don Jaime de Borbon. It attacks the Allies, above all England, furiously and constantly, and though its love of the sensational induced people to buy it readily during the first stages of the war, its sale has to-day greatly decreased, and its views are generally ignored. It owes its continued existence mainly to the gratitude of the Central Powers, but there are

many Germans in Spain and out of it who repudiate the clumsy antics of this Carlist organ.

'La Accion,' the organ of the Mauristas, is also a friend of the Central Powers. The same may be said of 'La Nacion' and 'El Dia,' and their appearance in the autumn of 1916, at a moment when paper was not only scarce but extremely dear, caused some comment, together with not ill-founded suspicion. 'La Tribuna,' a newspaper which has supported Señor Maura, is also pro-German and anti-English. 'El 'Debate,' a clerical daily, supports as incongruously as its readers the cause of Germany and her allies. 'El Universo,' also a Catholic paper, is rather in favour of the Central Powers, though not defending them with as great ardour as the dailies we have just quoted. It did not hesitate to condemn the invasion of Belgium, and we may be sure that when it follows a wrong path it is due to honest mistake and never to lack of good faith.

On the other hand, 'La Correspondencia de España' is a frank friend of the Allies, and in the early days of the war was considered to be their most ardent supporter. It has published a series of magnificent articles dealing with the military situation, and its healthy influence has been noticeable at all times.

'Diario Universal' is the organ of Count Romanones, and expresses the views of that Liberal statesman. In the 'Imparcial' have appeared articles by many of the best Spanish writers, some on the side of the Central Powers, others on the side of the Allies. The great democratic newspaper, 'Heraldo 'de Madrid,' is, of course, clearly on the side of the Entente, which owes much to its influential support. The republican 'Liberal,' like the 'Pais,' of the same political tendencies, is an excellent newspaper, which has defended the Allies throughout the war. 'España Nueva,' another republican daily, supported the Entente in the early days of the war, later changing its ideas and deserting to the enemy. This change in a paper which professes to defend democratic ideals is difficult to explain satisfactorily.

All the papers whose opinions we have examined appear in Madrid, and they are naturally the leaders of the Spanish Press. In Barcelona, nevertheless, several newspapers of considerable importance are published, such as the 'Vanguardia,'

a sound and impartial daily, also 'La Publicidad' and 'Las Noticias,' both of which are good friends to the Allies.

The majority, if not all, of the Spanish weeklies have pro-Ally sympathies. One of them deserves special notice. It is 'España,' a paper of democratic and perhaps too radical ideas, produced by a group of men of a rather academical mind, but sincere in their opinions, and keenly studious of the problems on which they write. They may be mistaken, but they are honest; when they are at fault, they are ready to recognise it. Happily there are signs of an increase in Spain of men of this class; their value to the country in the present crisis can hardly be overstated. There are too many people in Spain—perhaps in other countries also—who will accept and defend any class of idea, without stopping to consider whether it is right or wrong, and who often, through private interests of their own, ignore the interests of the nation as a whole. Such people are the chief causes of weakness in any nation. It may fairly be said of the men who collaborate in 'España,' whether they be pro-Ally or pro-German, Republicans or Conservatives, that the honesty of their convictions gives them strength in defending the truth when they are right, and the courage to confess their mistakes when they are wrong.

The principal stock-in-trade of the pro-Germans in Spain is the assertion that the Allies are constantly trying to induce the country to abandon its neutrality and step into the arena on the side of the Entente. They do not seem to realise that it is precisely Germany, with her outrages and insults, who is endangering that neutrality which they so ardently defend; they do not seem to understand that the Allies have never thought of inviting Spain to enter the war; they have only asked her to adhere strictly to her neutrality, and to take the necessary steps to prevent German agents from feeding German submarines. England only wishes to continue to import the ore, lead, and copper of which Spain possesses such ample supplies, exporting in exchange the coal needed by Spain in order to carry on her economic existence. In addition, England has consented to continue to import from Spain a considerable quantity of fruit, so that Spanish merchants should not feel too cruelly the effects of the war and of the German submarine blockade. The pressure on Spain to

abandon her neutrality does not come from the Allies; it comes from Germany, who may ultimately place her in a position incompatible with her honour and dignity, thus forcing her to forsake a policy to which she clings so closely and with such good reason.

But if Germany cannot force Spain into war against her, she is at least determined to obtain as strong a hold as possible on Spanish public opinion. If she cannot prevent Spain from helping the Allies in this war, she is at least striving to make preparation in Spain for the next war. Her efforts are chiefly devoted to a form of press propaganda, on which she has already spent well over three-quarters of a million sterling.

The ultimate purpose of German propaganda can fairly be gathered from a glance at the position of Spain on the map. As the editor of 'España,' Señor Araquistain, pointed out in an article appearing last autumn, that the situation of Spain in the west closely corresponds to that of Turkey in the east.

'Spain' [he says] 'is one of the extremities of the European Continent, and can lend valuable assistance to a Central Power like Germany. In case of war, Spain, hampering communications between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and promoting at the same time rebellions in Northern Africa, could render most uncomfortable the position of the enemies of the Central Powers, supposing those enemies to be all or some of those who are opposed to Germany to-day. In time of peace, Germany could make use of Spain as a base for her military and commercial aims in the Mediterranean, in Northern Africa, and even in America, in the same way as she makes use of Turkey for her similar aims in East Africa and Asia.'

Striking confirmation of the soundness of this view is furnished by the 'Düsseldorfer General-Anzeiger,' which published on May 2nd last an article on Spain by Freiherr von Mackay, of Munich.

'Spain' [says Freiherr von Mackay] 'has in her outlook towards El Rif another weighty aim of the future to defend, viz. the trade route of the coming age, Tangier—Morocco—St. Louis (the Senegal mouth)—Pernambuco, the shortest connection between South, but also Central, Europe and Latin America. . . . It is certain that after the war we shall not surrender, but begin to defend in earnest, the pre-eminent economic interests in Morocco which led us to Algeciras and the tedious adjustments of our policy with France. Spain would therefore gain the strong support which she

needs against France's ambition to make a block of N.W. Africa under her sovereignty.'

The sagacity and the patriotism of the leaders of one of the proudest countries in Europe are a sufficient guarantee of the failure that awaits these Teutonic ambitions, however much money Germany may spend in trying to buy Spanish opinion by means of a press propaganda. On the other hand, at no point do the ambitions of the Entente Powers conflict with the interests of Spain.

England, France, and Italy already have all the naval bases and ports they desire in the Mediterranean, on the Atlantic, and in Northern Africa ; the paths of commerce and colonisation are open to them, as they are open to Spain. But while the Allies have no motive for attacking the independence of Spain, and obviously meditate no such attack, they have a very strong motive for preserving Spain from the attack now being covertly prepared by Germany, and it is their clear interest to assist patriotic Spaniards in combating the insidious press propaganda which Germany is carrying on.

Luis A. Bolin.

## GERMANY AND AFRICA

1. **The New Map of Africa.** By HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS. New York: The Century Company. 1917.
2. **Africa and the Peace of Europe.** By E. D. MOREL. National Labour Press. 1917.
3. **The Basis of Ascendancy.** By EDGAR GARDNER MURPHY. Longmans, Green. 1909.

THE most famous contributor to this Review, in a passage which has been quoted many times, but perhaps never more appropriately than to-day, said that in order that a former King of Prussia might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America, and a whole world sprang to arms. Were Macaulay alive to-day, he would have to confess that the area of the war caused by Frederick's successor is yet more vast, its effects almost incomparably more far-reaching. Never before have so many men come from so many countries to play their part in armed conflict on the soil of Europe. They have come from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India, from British South Africa and French North Africa, from the British West Indies and the French East Indies, from the remotest districts of Asiatic Russia; more still are coming from the United States of America. Nor is it merely the accident of allegiance that brings so many men from such distant homes to risk their lives on the battle-fields of Europe. For at the back of this great struggle in Europe lies the desire of the German people to dominate not Europe only but the whole world.

We are all of us by this time sufficiently familiar with the immediate ambitions of the pan-German authors of the war—an expansion westwards through Belgium and Holland and Northern France to the English Channel, an expansion south-eastwards through the Balkans and Asiatic Turkey to the Persian Gulf. But this is only part of the pan-German project. The African ambitions of Germany are from the territorial

point of view even more extensive than her immediate designs in Asia and Northern Europe, and occupy almost as important a place in the policy of the German Government. To realise the truth of this latter statement it is only necessary to recall the intrigues between the German Government and President Kruger, the narrow avoidance of war between Germany and France over the question of Morocco, and, finally, the cynical proposal made by the German Chancellor to the British Ambassador in Berlin in the critical days of July 1914, that England should look on placidly while Germany annexed the French Colonies in Africa.

The *Mittelafrica* movement in Germany had, in fact, reached national dimensions even before the *Mitteleuropa* movement took definite shape. It has had devoted to it an enormous literature, in which two pivotal points recur again and again. One is that African Colonies are stores of raw material for the industries of the Fatherland; the other, that such colonies are the necessary bases of German 'world-policy.' Considered from this latter standpoint German Colonies in Africa were to play a vital part in destroying the strategic unity of the British Empire, and to complete the 'freedom of the 'seas' as construed in Germany. This view is still immensely popular in Germany. A typical exponent of it is Herr Kolbe, who, writing in a recent number of 'Deutsche Politik,' anticipates the time when

'the whole coast of West Africa, from the mouth of the Cross River to the mouth of the Orange, will be in German hands. Let one recall what deeds were done by the "Emden" in the Indian Ocean and by the "Karlsruhe" in the Atlantic, without any naval base, without possibility of replenishing in port their supplies of munitions and food, and it will be realised what the fortification of half the West Coast of Africa would mean for Germany and for England.'

Herr Zimmermann, an influential writer on colonial questions and himself an ex-Colonial official, is equally frank:

'German Africa will make us a world-power. It will enable us to exert decisive influence upon the world-political decisions of our enemies and of other nations; and to exercise pressure on all developments of policy in Africa, Asia Minor, and Southern Europe.'

Not all writers with official experience are so forgetful of the unwisdom of spreading the net in the sight of the bird.

Yet even Dr. Solf, Secretary of State to the Colonial Office, writing in a publication intended to stimulate interest in colonial policy, plainly indicates that one of Germany's war aims must in his opinion be the linking-up of her scattered possessions in Africa :

> 'The history of our Colonies in the world-war has shown that the German Colonial Empire . . . was no proper "empire" at all, but just a number of possessions without geographical and political connection or established communications. . . . This shows the direction our aims must take.'

Dr. Solf's ambitions for the formation of a great German colonial Empire in Central Africa were expressed early in June in a speech to the German Colonial Association. Commenting upon that speech the 'Vossische Zeitung' wrote as follows :—'We want a solid colonial empire in Central Africa, 'to include the Cameroons, the Congo, Portuguese West 'Africa, German South-West and East Africa, and portions 'of Portuguese East Africa and Rhodesia. These territories 'comprise what we need. They can form a solid colonial 'empire, which will satisfy our wishes.'

It would be easy to multiply by dozens, indeed hundreds, extracts in this sense. The purport of all is the same. They cannot be said to be the vague threatenings of people smarting under a sense of defeat, for they were written when their authors believed, as they no doubt still believe, in a German victory.

Enough has been said to show that Africa has been and is one of the most important stakes in the great European War ; it has also been itself a battlefield on the widest scale. Although Togoland was conquered from the Germans with but little fighting in the opening days of the war, many long months of strenuous fighting were needed before the Germans were ousted from the Cameroons and from South-West Africa ; they have not yet, after nearly three years of war, been completely expelled from East Africa.

Even more significant from the point of view of Germany's African and world ambitions has been the fighting on the western and eastern frontiers of Egypt. If Germany, with the aid of the Turks and the Senussi, could have effected the conquest of Egypt, she would have been a long way on the road to that world dominion at which she aims. Her control

of the Suez Canal would have cut the main route between England and India; it would have rendered possible the extension of German rail-power into Africa to counterbalance British sea-power. A victorious Germany, ending the war in control of the Balkans, in control of Asiatic Turkey, and in possession of Egypt, would have been able to reverse Cecil Rhodes's conception of a Cape to Cairo railway, and to create an African branch of the Berlin-Bagdad railway, over which German troops could be dispatched from Cairo to the Cape.

These considerations are sufficient to show that the fate of Germany's African possessions involves issues of more than local importance. But before dealing with this crucial question, it is worth while to call attention to some phases of the African problem, or rather series of problems, that the war has revealed. One of the most gratifying outstanding facts, so far as concerns the native races of Africa, is the loyalty they have shown in British, French, and even in Belgian colonies, to their European overlords. Nor has that loyalty been merely passive. Figures upon this point are not available (indeed they have changed with every week of the war), nor would it in any case be proper to give them; but it is known, and indeed obvious to all, that Africans have given aid to the Allies to an extent which a few years ago it would have been deemed impossible to obtain and dangerous to accept. This aid has not been less real and valuable because only to an extent relatively slight has it taken the shape of fighting in the lines. It must be added that the Germans have utilised to apparently an even greater relative extent the fighting and carrying power of the African natives under their control. This fact has conjured up in some minds a picture of hordes of black troops trained and equipped in tropical Africa, marching hither and thither, and threatening the future not only of Africa but of the world. Some Europeans even go so far as to object altogether to the employment of native levies. It would be as reasonable to argue that natives of India should not be employed in the Indian army. Whatever may be the case in South Africa, where there is a large European population, over the greater part of the rest of Africa it is quite impossible to provide sufficient European troops even for the maintenance of internal order, apart altogether from the question of external defence. Nor would it be permanently possible to treat

the more virile races of Africa as mere helots unworthy even to take part in the defence of their own country. Such an attempt would in any case be utterly at variance with the principles upon which British rule over non-European races has been built up and made successful. France has equally realised in her African and Asiatic colonies the necessity of enlisting native troops for the defence of the colony and to assist, if the need should arise, in the defence of the metropolis.

Both England and France have had their reward in the loyal service they have received. In his 'New Map of Africa' Mr. Gibbons tells us that, a generation after the conquest of Madagascar by the French, he went with all Paris to pass before the bier of General Galliéni in the courtyard of the Invalides. The guard of honour around the coffin were Malagasy. In another chapter he writes that he sat sipping coffee with the Sirdar in the midst of a crowd of sixty thousand Moslems, most of whom had been followers of the Mahdi. The Sirdar's guard of honour was composed of four Sudanese lancers. There were no British or Egyptian troops. The people of Omdurman, at the moment of the greatest religious exaltation of the year, had at their mercy the Governor-General and other representatives of British authority in the Sudan. As the few Europeans were leaving, one of the dervish chieftains put his hand on Mr. Gibbons' shoulder and said 'I hope you have enjoyed the feast at Omdurman 'and will come again.' Mr. Gibbons asked who the chief was. The answer was 'One of the Mahdi's sons.' Such episodes are at least as much to the point as vague prophecies based either upon local experience of limited value or upon the view held by the more ignorant type of European trader and settler that all Africans are bogey men.

Above all we must be careful not to apply to Africa generally —which includes such diverse regions as Uganda, the Sudan, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, and the Congo— the opinions and prejudices that are dominant in the South African Union. It may safely be said that the Union is almost the worst of all places in which to obtain a clear view of the larger part of the African problem. That problem relates not only to the relatively small number of natives within the Union but to well over a hundred million African natives

of numberless races in various stages of civilisation. South Africa is indeed a kind of social and political island in Africa. In most parts of the Union Europeans can live and propagate their race. At all events for the first generation after arrival, Europeans retain all the vigour they possessed in Europe. There are now in the Union something over a million Europeans building up their own civilisation after long-sustained and not seldom heroic struggles. These Europeans, whether they be of English, Scotch, or Dutch origin, have the first claim on our sympathy and our support. They have already done a magnificent work, and will yet do much more. But we have to remember that while within the Union there are only some five million natives, outside its boundaries there are at least twenty times as many, most of whom will probably never have anything whatever to do with the Union.

Moreover, there are within the Union elements of social and industrial rivalry between black and white, which do not exist in other parts of Africa, except possibly to a relatively small extent in Algeria. The situation is accurately epitomised by Mr. Gibbons as follows :

> ' The white man will not work alongside the black man. He is physically able to do as much, if not more, work than the black, but he will not do the same work. Labour leaders in South Africa have failed utterly in their efforts to demonstrate that mines could be worked by whites, for the simple reason that white labourers, even when starving, refuse to do niggers' work.'

This is written of the comparatively bracing area of the Witwatersrand. If a hundred, even a thousand, other African areas were taken, it would be found that in at least ninety per cent. of them even a long walk, at a moderate pace, during the hours from sunrise to sunset, is more than the European can do with comfort, let alone manual labour in the open. Soil and climate will have their way. For some years a small number of the least self-seeking politicians in the Union have been trying to get recognition of the principle that practically all hand labour, except that on the farms, shall be the monopoly of the European. Their awakening would be equally complete and pathetic if they were to visit such places as the railway and harbour workshops in French or British West Africa, and watch natives a few months out of ' bush ' life using great machine tools with ease. No doubt not one in a thousand of

them knows the 'why and wherefore' of the machines they use. How many workmen in Europe know these things either?

In one of the most helpful and illuminating books on African racial matters ever written,* the author, himself a Southern man, reminds those who contend that negro education and negro self-development will prove a peril to the white man's integrity of race that 'in all social groups the prime force of 'disintegration is despair.' It is perhaps more difficult to obtain acceptance of that sound doctrine in the Union, where the European in his comparatively small disproportion of roughly one to six doubtless feels that if he cannot outstrip the other race, he must at least keep it in check, than it is in areas where the disproportion can be reckoned in hundreds.

But wherever a strong race is brought into contact with weaker or less well-organised races, there is always a danger of oppression in one form or another. The history of England's dealings with coloured races in the past contains some very ugly pages. But the moral impulse which led to the movement for abolition of the slave trade has progressively expanded during the past three-quarters of a century, till now it enables us to claim that the accepted basis of British rule over weaker races is the conception of trusteeship. Subject races must be governed not for the profit of those who govern, but for the benefit of those who are compelled to obey. This principle has been formally enunciated on many occasions in connexion with British rule in India; it obviously applies with equal force to the governance of British possessions in Africa.

There has recently, however, been a striking contrast in the treatment of Indian and of African economic problems by the Home Government. In order to give effect to the principle that India must be governed for the benefit of Indians, and not of Englishmen, the Home Government recently sanctioned the imposition of a protective duty on cotton cloth imported from Lancashire. It is open to argument that this protective duty benefits no one in India, except a handful of already extremely prosperous Bombay millowners; but that it will injure the export of Lancashire goods is indisputable. Yet the Home Government deliberately incurred the wrath of Lancashire

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* The Basis of Ascendancy.

constituencies in order to free itself from the mere suspicion that it was sacrificing Indian interests to those of English manufacturers.

On the other hand, Mr. Bonar Law in dealing with an important West African industry adopted diametrically the opposite course. Before the war there was a large export of oil seeds from British West Africa to Germany. Of necessity that export, which was very profitable to the West African natives, had to cease upon the outbreak of war. Further, it is arguable that after the war, if Germany is to remain a potential enemy, it will be necessary in the general interests of the Empire to handicap her industries by depriving her of raw materials, even though in so doing some economic injury may be inflicted on subject races for whom we are trustees. Instead of acting on these principles, Mr. Bonar Law utilised the war as an excuse for taking measures for excluding not only Germany but all our Allies as well from the West African oil-seed market. Without consulting parliament, he ordered the imposition of a heavy export duty on all West African oil seeds consigned to other than British ports. In so doing, he has forgotten our French Allies, who are buyers of oil seeds, and he has placed the West African cultivators at the mercy of a comparatively small number of British buyers who can easily form a ring to the serious injury of the natives.

Happily, such an example as this is rare, but the incident serves to show how completely the moral basis of our Empire would be changed if we were to abandon the principle of the open door in our possessions abroad in order to gratify the political aspirations of tariff reformers at home. France, as a protectionist country, still to some extent maintains the theory that colonial markets must be treated as preserves for the manufacturers of the metropolis. In other respects, however, France maintains throughout her colonial possessions a policy which can fairly be described as both liberal and progressive, and which certainly contrasts favourably with the brutal drill-sergeant methods of Germany.

Testimony on this point, especially as regards Morocco, is furnished by Mr. Gibbons, who, as an American writing before his country joined in the war, is able to look at the problem of Africa from an outside point of view. The present war was begun too soon after the pacification of the tribes by France

to allow Mr. Gibbons to make detailed, definite statements of how Morocco is thriving economically under French control, 'but the beginning,' he says, 'is encouraging in every way.' It could not have been more encouraging; for General Lyautey, as is well known, was able to send a large part of his army from Morocco to France in the latter part of 1914, including contingents recruited from tribes which had been in arms against him less than two years before. This striking development was largely due to the action of General Lyautey in taking prompt measures to prevent the alienation of native lands for the benefit of European speculators. More recent information than that available when Mr. Gibbons wrote his book shows, curiously enough, that while up to the time of the outbreak of war little headway had been made in the work of development, rapid progress has been made as the war has run its course. In particular, really excellent roads have been made, linking up the coast towns with one another, and most of them with the trade centres of the interior. It is to be hoped that this programme will be continued, for, as no doubt the French as a road-making nation have realised, good roads—especially since the advent of the motor-car and motor lorry—are often even more important in a new country than railways. A road is cheaper to construct; it requires no station buildings or station staffs, and any kind of vehicle can join it or leave it at any point. The French have also marked out routes for railways, and according to report the work of construction will be begun so soon as the commission of survey has finished its inquiries, even though the war may then still be in progress. Municipal reform in the chief towns has been carried so far that it is scarcely possible to recognise the old, ramshackle places in the new settlements. Along the coast lighthouses have been erected and the ports greatly improved.

A Morocco Association, with a membership consisting largely of British merchants, has been formed in London, and discussions, it is to be hoped, will assist in bringing about an atmosphere favourable not only to perpetuating the arrangement by which, for nearly another score of years, British commerce is on a footing of equality with that of France in Morocco, but to extending this principle to the French colonies in Africa generally.

Dealing with this question, Mr. Gibbons says 'Only by

'maintaining the open door is Great Britain able to justify the 'holding of one-fourth of the world's productive territories. 'Only by maintaining—or rather, establishing fairly—the 'principle of equal advantages to all comers, can France hope 'to keep and develop properly her vast African empire.' Mr. Gibbons has a good right to say this, inasmuch as he is a warm admirer of the spirit which informs most of the French colonial administration. Exactly the same view is taken throughout British West Africa; it is almost the only criticism one hears of the French West African colonies. In a very interesting paper read before the Royal Society of Arts in May last * on the problems of French North Africa, Captain Millet of 'Le 'Temps' touches incidentally upon the same point. While giving a most gratifying account of the results achieved by his country in Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, Captain Millet refers incidentally to the protectionist policy as having been 'deplorable in many ways.'

But while pressing this point in the interests of French no less than of British possessions, it is important to add that there are other equally important reforms needed where French and British possessions are contiguous. In remote colonies, old national rivalries have a sharper edge than in the more tolerant circles of great capitals, and such rivalries often breed a quite unnecessary amount of friction. What Captain Millet says of North Africa, that British and French rule will stand or fall together, is equally true of West Africa.

Unfortunately, some of the men whose lives are spent in British or French African possessions have not yet realised this mutuality of interest. So soon as men of the calibre necessary can be spared, both Governments would perhaps be well advised to send to the West African groups of colonies one or two Special Commissioners who, speaking with authority based upon practical acquaintance with the conditions of colonial life, could advise their respective governments as to the best means of securing local co-operation between contiguous colonies. France and Great Britain have undertaken tremendous responsibilities in West Africa, and it is of the utmost importance for the efficient discharge of these trustee-

* 'Problems of French North Africa.' By Captain Philippe Millet. 'Journal of the Royal Society of Arts,' June 8 and 15, 1917.

ships that local colonial administrations should act in loyal and constant co-operation with one another.

We now pass to the question whether the Colonies which Germany held before the war should be restored to her, or not. The primary answer to that question can be stated in uncompromising terms. When one country wantonly attacks its neighbours after years of careful preparation for war, they are morally entitled, when they have defeated the aggressor, to insist upon reparation for the wrong done. Therefore, even if the German colonies in Africa were inhabited by Germans, France and Great Britain would be fully justified in retaining those colonies if they wanted them, either as part payment for the enormous damage that Germany has done, or as a strategic precaution against similar aggression in the future. It is, however, unnecessary to press this primary answer. For, with the partial exception of South-West Africa, German African colonies contain the merest handful of Germans. The same statement can be made with regard to Germany's Asiatic possessions. Altogether the German Colonial Empire before the war occupied over a million square miles. Of this total, well over 900,000 square miles were in Africa ; nearly 100,000 square miles in the South Pacific ; and about 200 square miles at Kiau-chau. The Colonies were begun in Africa, the first conquest by the Allies was made in Africa, and public discussion, with a sure instinct, is occupying itself mainly with the African territory. So far as Kiau-chau is concerned, the matter has already gone beyond discussion. The refusal of Japan and China to restore Kiau-chau to Germany is certain. This fact has a direct influence both upon the Pacific and upon the African problem. Germany's Pacific Colonies, and an important fraction of her African Colonies, were conquered, not by Imperial but by Dominion forces. Doubtless that conquest would have been impossible without the aid, immediate or in reserve, of the Imperial navy. It is also true that the then Colonial Secretary, Mr. Harcourt, in inviting the Dominions to seize the German territories, laid it down that they were to be placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government after the war. Nevertheless, if the Imperial Government should decide to hand back these colonies to Germany, while Japan declines to hand back Kiau-chau, our sister-States will assuredly conclude that membership of the Empire has served them

an ill turn, imposing costly burdens of watchful defence upon their peoples and their revenues, and depriving them of the protection for their future interests which their own arms had won. In the account as between the South African Union and what was German South-West Africa any attempt at restoration would involve a political earthquake from one end of the Union to the other. One great argument used against General Botha by his opponents in the Union, many of whom went into rebellion, was that every informed person knew that the Union was only sacrificing hundreds of lives and millions of money to take a country which would have to be handed back to Germany after the war. Restoration would not merely represent a betrayal (however unintentional) of people who stood staunchly by our cause in circumstances of almost unprecedented difficulty, though this is a great deal. It would also in all human probability mean that political power in the Union would pass, through the eclipse and discrediting of General Botha and his party, into the hands of men at once hostile to the Empire and disposed to act in complete harmony with Prussia's agents in the restored territory.

Mr. Morel, in his rhetorical plea for the reinstatement of Germany as an African Power, uses arguments which the case of German South-West Africa disposes of altogether. He invites us to consider the situation of

'a nation having no colonisable areas at its disposal overseas where it can dispose of its human surplus (and still retain that surplus within the national fold). . . . The Germans have no room for race-expansion, either in contiguity to their own borders, or in temperate areas overseas.'

Mr. Morel apparently has not visited German South-West Africa, or he would know that the Colony, which has an area of over 320,000 square miles, is like the adjacent South African Union in having a climate in which the European race thrives perfectly well. It thrives so well that Mr. Gibbons, who has visited it, found that even so far back as 1909

'German colonists increased 300 per cent., and the Government began to work hand in hand with the settlers to develop in every possible way the agricultural and mining resources of the Colony. There were 10,000 Germans, exclusive of the army, in the Colony in 1914. At the outbreak of the war, 1400 miles of railway, 2500

miles of telegraph line and over 400 miles of telephone line were the achievement of a decade.'

Such results reflect creditably upon German enterprise and initiative—backed by the German Imperial exchequer. But Mr. Gibbons forgets to mention that the native population of German South-West Africa has in a generation fallen by more than half; he forgets to mention the deliberate massacre of the Hereros, and the persistent brutality with which natives were treated by German settlers and German soldiers. British and Dutch South Africans have not a spotless record in the treatment of subject races; but their standard is immensely higher than that of the Germans, and the occupation of 'German 'South-West' by the Union forces has meant for the natives of this huge territory liberation from an atrocious and callous tyranny. On this ground alone, apart from all others, the restoration of South-West Africa to Germany must be pronounced impossible.

There remains the question of Germany's tropical colonies—Togoland, the Cameroons, and German East Africa. These tropical countries are peopled by many races, without combination and practically without possibility of united leadership. Some of the races are at the primitive stage of development, though others, particularly along the coast, are led by men of high character and attainments.

Here again Mr. Gibbons seems to be hypnotised by the material side of Germany's rule. He writes:

'Germany has outstripped all other colonising Powers in Africa in four things, all of which are strikingly illustrated in the little Colony of Togoland: road-building for co-operation with railways and transport; accommodation for travellers in the interior; scientific forestry; and supervision of public health.'

The point about rest-houses is well taken, though, as ten thousand pounds will supply a country the size of Togoland with all the rest-houses it needs, and a couple of hundred pounds a year will keep them in good order, it does not in fact signify much. The railways and the roads are indisputable facts. What Mr. Gibbons means by 'supervision of public health' is less intelligible. In 1894 the official return of the native population of Togoland was two millions and a half; in 1913 that population was returned at a million less. Is this the

result of health supervision? The truth is that German rule makes life intolerable for African natives. As regards the Cameroons, this is admitted even by Dr. Solf. Speaking in the Reichstag he openly deplored the 'melancholy' appearance of the natives, and declared that a remedy must be found. There is nothing recondite about the causes of these things. Mr. Gibbons indicates them in a later paragraph:

'In British West African Colonies, a European is fined who strikes a native. In the German Colonies, one can flog a native up to twenty-five lashes. This helps greatly in making the native work. But the method is incompatible with Anglo-Saxon ideas of the way things should be done.'

Yet, in spite of this clear recognition of the fundamental difference between the status of a native African under British and under German rule, Mr. Gibbons—writing it must be noticed before his own country had joined the Allies—pleads for the restoration of these unfortunates to German rule. His argument is that Germany ought to be allowed room for expansion, and that when once Prussian militarism has been crushed, the world will have no further quarrel with the German people. This distinction between the German government and the German people is, of course, a very popular thesis in the United States. It is difficult to discover in the sermons of German pastors, in the articles in the German press, and in the declarations of the German Socialist parties the least evidence in favour of such a distinction. At any rate it would be a monstrous act of perfidy to the natives who have now passed under French and British rule if they were traded back to Germany. They have joyfully transferred their allegiance, and they know—and Mr. Morel, the pro-German apologist, also in his heart well knows—that wholesale hangings, floggings, confiscation of property, and burning of villages await them if they are handed back. The Allies have been scrupulously loyal to one another throughout this terrific war; they owe equal loyalty to the defenceless natives of Africa, who have welcomed their protecting flags.

MALLAM.

## PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

1. **The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal: A Treatise.** By THOMAS HARE, Barrister-at-Law. 1859. Third edition, 1865.
2. **Considerations on Representative Government.** By JOHN STUART MILL. 1861.
3. **Representation.** By Sir JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M.P. Sonnenschein. 1885. New edition, 1906.
4. **Report of the Royal Commission on Systems of Election.** Cd. 5163. Wyman. 1910.
5. **Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election.** By JOHN H. HUMPHREYS. Methuen. 1911.
6. **Proportional Representation and British Politics.** By J. FISCHER WILLIAMS. Murray. 1914.

TWO long-fought causes, Woman Suffrage and Proportional Representation, have unexpectedly, as it were by 'chance of war,' come within sight of a possible speedy fruition as a result of the 'Speaker's Conference' on Franchise Reform. Concerning the first, the British public has had a sufficiency of information during the past ten years; and it might have been supposed that all politicians, at least, were familiar with the case for Proportional Representation. Yet no less a politician than the Prime Minister, on the occasion of his announcing in March last the proposed introduction of the new Reform Bill, informed the House that he had never been able to understand that particular proposal; naturally indicating, further, that he was not personally concerned to press it.

In such circumstances, it can hardly be supposed that the general public is well informed on the subject; and this might in normal times be taken as a strong practical objection to the present enactment of the proposed reform. When, however, it is remembered that the principle of Proportional Representation was actually introduced, albeit with a limited application, into the Home Rule Bill of 1912, by a Government of which the present Prime Minister was an influential

member, the Liberal party at least, to say nothing of the Prime Minister, are hardly in a position to object to this item in the Conference Proposals. When, further, it is remembered that in 1910 the mass of the Conservative party made the Referendum an election issue; and that up to the date of that departure nine-tenths of the electorate had never heard the Referendum discussed, there can hardly be a sincere objection on the Unionist side, on the score of popular unpreparedness, to the broaching of Proportional Representation at the present juncture.

As a matter of fact, however, the proposal has now a good deal of Conservative support. Lord Hugh Cecil recently avowed, in a frankly partisan speech, that he would be prepared to assent to other and less palatable enactments in the Reform Bill if Proportional Representation were certain to be included. In his opinion, it would strengthen the hands of 'conservatism' with a small *c*.' And other Conservatives with a large *C* are understood to declare that it was only on the strength of the inclusion of Proportional Representation that they assented to Woman Suffrage and to a number of the concessions made to Radicalism by the Conference. Needless to say, such arguments do not improve the chances of the proposal on the Liberal side, having regard to the fact that Proportional Representation was not one of the reforms most widely demanded by representative Liberals, and that the Prime Minister has so pointedly placed it in that light. But neither is the Conservative party at all united in support of the innovation. It is the more desirable that the merits of the scheme should be fully and dispassionately considered.

Proportional Representation has been of late years actually in operation in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Serbia, Denmark, Tasmania, and elsewhere, under a variety of forms, of which the common principle is the election of one member for each quota of votes. There are said to be 300 possible applications of the idea; but the problem is greatly simplified for the British elector in virtue of the fact that one clearly formulated and logically consistent method is now alone proposed for his acceptance—that advocated by the Proportional Representation Society as the result of two generations of discussion.

This scheme is not now competed with by any different project professing the same ends. At one time the Cumulative

Vote was actually tried, as was the three-cornered constituency with two votes to each elector; and the Second Ballot used to have many Liberal and Labour advocates. But the Second Ballot has fallen into nearly complete discredit in France, the place of its birth, as being at once hostile to minority representation in principle and apt to set up an unjust kind of minority representation by encouraging corrupt bargains among factions between first and second elections. It is among the systems which honestly avow the desire to secure the due representation at once of majorities and minorities that we must look for the electoral system of the future, because such schemes alone are fitted to endure.

All such experiments are attempts to secure that 'represen-' tation,' so called, shall be real and not illusory; that varieties of political choice in the State shall so far as possible be indicated in the legislature in the proportions that exist outside. Only thus is representation even approximately attained; and 'representative institutions,' so called, had subsisted in this country for centuries before statesmen bethought them of trying to arrange that the machinery should to some extent fulfil the theoretic aim—if theoretic aim there was. While representation in the House of Commons was a matter of capriciously distributed privilege, mainly fixed by tradition, only a few asked whether any ideal was involved; but as soon as the demand for franchise reform found prominent expression in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the need for a rational machinery was insisted on. When the third Duke of Richmond, in his Reform Bill of 1780, proposed to establish not only manhood suffrage and annual Parliaments but equal electoral areas, he was doubtless propounding the ideals of theorists outside of Parliament. On this plan, all males of twenty-one were to be registered in every parish, and returns made to the Lord Chancellor. Then

> 'the numbers to be told-up, and divided by 558 [the number of members then constituting the House of Commons], and the quotient to be the number by which one member of Parliament was to be elected. Every county to be divided into as many districts as they contain quotients of this nature, and these districts to be called boroughs.'

This, the first notable scheme to secure 'one vote one value,' was of course far too revolutionary for its time to be even

seriously discussed; and within four years the Duke had himself turned Tory, not waiting for the excuse of the French Revolution. But when the general reaction against that Revolution had spent itself, the anomalies of the single vote in arbitrary groupings moved thoughtful men to plan for better things in that regard no less than with respect to the inequities of the franchise; and in 1831–32 we find the poet Praed urging on the House of Commons the necessity of providing better for the representation of regional minorities.

'If we intend,' he argued, 'as surely we do intend, that not the majority only, but the aggregate masses of every numerous constituency, should so far as possible be seen in the persons and heard in the voices of their representatives—should be, in short, in the obvious literal sense of the word, "represented" in the House—then our present rule of election is in the theory wrong and absurd.'

Meanwhile the problem was being faced in other countries. In the 'forties the earliest movement for Proportional Representation was begun in Geneva, where party strifes had been peculiarly bitter by reason of the anomalies of the voting system. In 1855, a scheme of Proportional Representation was enacted in Denmark for the election of representatives to the Rigsraad. Adopted as it was in a time of great political tension, and applying as it did only to a part of the electoral machinery of Denmark, the system had no very favourable chance; yet when the constitution was remodelled in 1867, it was adopted for the new Landsthing, and it has ever since remained in force.

It may or may not have been under the influence of the Danish experiment that in 1857 Thomas Hare, Barrister-at-law, produced his pamphlet on 'The Machinery of Representation,' in which he set forth an application of 'the single 'transferable vote,' substantially at one with the Danish system, save that Hare proposed to treat the whole United Kingdom as one electorate. In 1859 appeared his much larger treatise on 'The Election of Representatives,' arguing out the problem in all its details and embodying a draft Law to govern them. Like Marshall's scheme of the Cumulative Vote, it was the product of reflection on the anomalous results of recent parliamentary elections, and it at once converted John Stuart Mill. Yet Hare's very able plan is nearly the most

abstract and unattractive form in which Proportional Representation has ever been advocated; and the enthusiastic support given to it in Mill's 'Considerations on Representative 'Government' probably had the effect of causing most practical politicians of his day to dismiss the entire theory as visionary. Writing when the franchise was still very imperfect, Hare addressed himself to two other anomalies in the representative system, the first being the disproportionate share of power attained from time to time by each of the leading parties as a result of the division of the electorate into a multitude of single and a few double constituencies; and the other the constantly shifting size of many of them. Hare accordingly set himself to the solution of both problems by one scheme; and his plan was to treat the entire electorate as one body, in which any voter could give his suffrage to any candidate. The total number of votes polled at a general election was to be ascertained from the declarations of the returning officers; this total was to be divided by the number of members to be elected; and the quotient was to be the number entitling any candidate who polled it to be elected.

Loyal to his principle that every citizen should have the chance of being represented, Hare at this stage complicated his scheme by proposing that 'any borough, and any parish 'or district or division of a parish or other parochial division, 'and any ward or other division of a city, town, or borough, 'and any hundred, wapentake, or other division of a county, 'and any body, college, or society incorporate,' might petition the Crown in Council 'praying that such borough, parish, 'division, or body, may be empowered to return a member 'to represent the same in Parliament.' But inasmuch as it was further provided that no member was to be returned who should not poll the prescribed quota, or a 'comparative 'majority' of votes after the first set of fully quota'd candidates had been chosen, there was to be no addition to the number of members; and there might thus be any number of 'con-'stituencies,' so called, nominally entitled to be represented in Parliament, yet unable to return a member. The actual representation was to be determined by giving all electors the right to vote for any candidate in any constituency, a list being officially compiled and published, in the London, Edinburgh and Dublin Gazettes, of all candidates throughout the

United Kingdom, in the order (1) of their respective lengths of service in Parliament; and (2) as regards new candidates, in the order of their ages. Every voter, using a ballot-paper with a number of blank spaces, in which he could write or paste the desired names, was to have one transferable vote, putting a '1' for his primary choice, and numbering his other preferences in their order. When the quota had been fixed, and all candidates found to have the quota in terms of single or '1' votes were declared elected, the remaining candidates in each constituency were to receive the alternative votes allotted to them on papers of which the '1's' had been elected, on the principle that all papers should be taken in the order of the shortness of the list of preferences. In the case of all candidates who in any one constituency failed to receive the quota, the voting papers were to be sent by the returning officers to the general registrars, who would then proceed to collect the remaining preferences from the papers of all the constituencies up to the point at which the requisite quota was not reached by any candidate. Thereafter, the results were to be determined by 'comparative majorities' up to the limit of the full complement of members.

The obvious objection to this scheme, that it credited the electors with power to select their representatives intelligently from a list of thousands of candidates, most of whom they had had no opportunity of hearing, has perhaps always been unduly stressed, as against its merit of actually giving minorities of all types the power to find a representative by combining up to the number of the required quota. Most voters would vote for men near at hand. Hare's scheme had the further merit of partly providing for bye-elections by retaining the machinery of the single 'constituency'—each elected member being allotted to that for which he stood; though, inasmuch as his quota might be mostly provided from other constituencies, the majority of his supporters would have no chance of replacing him at a 'bye.' The bye-election is, in fact, the crux of all schemes of Proportional Representation.

It was not, however, on that score that Hare's scheme failed to secure any general support. It was simply much too abstract and too far-reaching to find acceptance in any constituency at a time when the primary problem of the franchise

remained so ill-solved that the mass of political energy had to be directed to forcing it forward. The partial simplification of the scheme proposed by the young Henry Fawcett in 1860 was quite insufficient to popularise it; and it is suggestive of Mill's limitations as a practical politician that he not only pronounced it one of 'perfect feasibility' but affirmed that under it 'every member of the House would be the representative of a unanimous constituency'—a thing impossible for any length of time. Rejecting the Cumulative Vote and the Limited Vote as mere makeshifts, Mill treated the Transferable Vote as solving all problems; whereas the latter-day agitation for the Referendum, as applied in Switzerland, reveals that there would still be a Beyond of theoretic perfection.

But Mill's own ideal was so advanced that not till the 'eighties did it seem to come within the sphere of practical politics. The only reforms attempted in the interval had been the application of the Limited Vote to thirteen 'three-cornered' constituencies, returning forty members, in the Reform Bill of 1867, and the enactment of the Cumulative Vote for School Board elections in 1870. Neither expedient gave general satisfaction, though the latter alone, probably, could have reconciled the country to the School Board system. It was the flagrant anomalies of the results of the parliamentary elections of 1874 and 1880 that roused a number of thoughtful Liberals and Conservatives—but primarily Liberals—to face the need for a closer conformity between theory and practice in representation. A dispute arose among the Liberals as to the exact amount of the deflection in 1874, when the Conservatives obtained a majority of eighty-two (312 to 230) in Great Britain. In the opinion of the central agent, the Liberal voting power was really 200,000 in excess of that of their opponents. Mr. Shaw Lefevre (now Lord Eversley), an able opponent of proportionalism, reckoned that the Liberal excess was only 30,000. On either view, the result was a gross miscarriage of electoral justice. But in 1880, when in Mr. Lefevre's view the polling strength of the Conservative party was 1,022,000 against 1,119,000 on the Liberal side, the latter obtained a parliamentary majority of 127. In 1874 the Tories had 72 members in excess of their theoretically just share of

the representation; in 1880 the Liberals had 89 in excess of theirs; and in 1874 the Tories were actually in power on a minority vote.

Still no reform was attempted. On the contrary, the Liberal Redistribution Act of 1885 abolished the three-cornered constituencies set up in 1867, on the ground that the Limited Vote there applied had led to excessive caucus manipulation, or unduly favoured wealthy candidates or created political indifference; while for the ten two-seated constituencies of London there were substituted 59 single seats, the City being allowed to retain two members in place of its former four. Then in 1886, as a result of the Liberal split over Home Rule, came a *débâcle* in which, on a total poll in the contested seats of 1,423,500 Unionist against 1,333,400 Liberal votes, the Unionists secured 283 seats against 176 held by the Liberals—a figure enormously disproportionate to the real voting strength of the parties. It was in this period of complete Liberal disorganisation, when ideas of principle were in a large measure subordinated to schemes of expediency and the 'clean slate,' that Viscount (then Mr.) Buxton, who in previous editions of his valuable 'Handbook to Political Questions' had put the *pros* and *cons* of Proportional Representation as of other live political questions, eliminated it from his eighth edition (1892) as an 'obsolete' issue.

But the march of political events again forced it to the front, or permitted its being revived by a small band of principled men, among whom Lord Courtney is entitled to foremost recognition for his invincible devotion to a great political ideal. In 1892 the Liberals, still imperfectly reorganised, had a short return to power, polling on estimate a majority of 191,000 votes and obtaining a Parliamentary majority of only 44. In 1895 they had still worse fortune, polling 1,800,000 votes against 1,775,000 given to Unionists in contested seats, yet securing only 202 against the Unionists' 279. The total estimated Unionist majority in the country was only 117,000, yet the Parliamentary majority was 150. If this were sufficient to convert a large number of Liberals to proportionalism, equally persuasive to the other party was the election of 1906, in which, while the Unionists are said to have polled 44 per cent. of the total vote cast, they obtained only 28 per cent. of the members, the Liberals securing in Great Britain a

majority of 256, where the total vote entitled them to only 68. The 'swing of the pendulum' in the multitude of single constituencies had made the difference, as in the previous Conservative successes.

These very facts, as it happened, set up among 'practical' Liberals a new objection to proportionalism.

'Better,' they said, 'that parties should alternately have majorities in excess of their real electoral strength than that they should be alternately returned by majorities insufficient for effective parliamentary action. Under a strict proportional system, nothing would ever be done at all. We should never have any reforms, only revolutions.'

And this remains, perhaps, the most widely current of all the objections to proportionalism. It is necessary, therefore, to point out that its supporters really stultify themselves in putting it. On their own statement, the opposing parties represent mere inevitable swings of the pendulum, each side in turn undoing so far as may be the work of the other. In what respect then can this really be better than a medial policy which will express the will of the enduring majority of the electorate? It is difficult to understand what meaning is attached to the term 'effective' or 'effectual.' The Gladstone Government of 1880, obtaining a majority out of all proportion to its poll, introduced a Home Rule Bill which it failed to carry. The Unionist party, in turn, obtaining in 1886 a majority out of all proportion to its poll, blocked the path of Home Rule until 1902; whereafter the Liberal Government, again unable to carry its point, was again overthrown at an election in which it actually polled a majority of the votes given. If this is effective government, from a Liberal point of view, what would ineffective government be?

There is really no reason to doubt that the less controversial legislation of either party could have been accomplished with small majorities. As it was, the large majorities only stimulated reactions producing contrary majorities. Such swings of the pendulum signify either a real alteration of bias, the result of things done or proposed to be done, or the simple stress of party propaganda, which may or may not involve virtual corruption of the electorate. On either view, 'effective' government is from this standpoint a happy accident of a system which, were it to conform in practice to its con-

stitutional theory and ideal, would yield no effective legislation at all. And it is to this chapter of accidents, on the doctrine under consideration, that we are to trust for political progress.

The constructive answer to the school of Chance is, of course, that neither the voting nor the legislation which would obtain under proportionalism would be a mere mean of what happens under the method of accidental variation. First of all, the composition of the House of Commons will be largely changed ; and the change will be the realisation of a measure of equity which even the accidentalists must admit to be highly desirable—if anything is desirable in politics—and the perpetual denial of which is a serious political evil. At present, Conservatism in Wales and Scotland is under-represented to an extent that makes ' representation ' a term of no meaning in respect of the individuals concerned. And this is no real advantage to Liberalism, for the Liberalism of many southern counties in England, and in such large cities as Liverpool and Birmingham, is in the same case as Scotch and Welsh Conservatism. All round, masses of electors, amounting in the aggregate to millions, are strictly unrepresented, their interests being only accidentally looked after by men whom they have had no share in electing. For this monstrous anomaly the accidentalists have no remedy ; and no excuse beyond the familiar plea of the traditionalist : ' It comes out well in practice.'

If equity counts for anything in human affairs, the results ' in practice ' will be better when equity is made a primary political end. Equitable methods will tend to secure more equitable representation, and therefore more equitable legislation. At present, methods of claptrap, tricks of ' organisa- ' tion,' appeals to personal prejudice, advantages of local ' interest,' are all utilised to the utmost in every election, the platform and other merits of the individual candidate sometimes coinciding and sometimes clashing with the forces of local interest and prejudice. Under a system in which, say, five members are returned by constituencies grouped into aggregates, the possible attainment of the required quota will elicit candidatures which would otherwise be hopeless ; and all candidates alike will in consequence have to widen the range and heighten the persuasiveness of their appeal. Under

such circumstances the whole political life of the country will be raised; and an electorate better educated politically will elect better representatives.

Let us consider first the very simple machinery of Proportional Representation, as latterly schemed, and as it has been actually applied in a number of 'model' elections conducted by the Proportional Representation Society. The ideal constituency should have an odd number of members, to prevent a simple balance of votes which might stultify the actual predominance of one set of opinions; and it had better have more than three members, because in a three-membered constituency only a minority amounting to a full third of the electorate, or of the actual voters, can secure representation. Let us take a constituency of five as an illustration of the procedure. There being five seats, there may be ten, fifteen, or more candidates. Each elector, then, will have a voting paper on which he can give his one vote to any one candidate, with a reversion, in numbered order, to other candidates in the event of his first choice (1) having more than the quota required; or (2) being out of the running altogether. That quota is determined somewhat as under Hare's scheme. In a single-membered constituency, the minimum number *necessary* to secure election is one-half of the poll plus one. In a five-membered constituency to make an election necessary there must have been at least six candidates; if all were equal each would get one-sixth of the total poll; therefore any victorious candidate must get at least one-sixth plus one. The procedure may be most vividly illustrated by what actually took place in the model election conducted in 1908 * by the Proportional Representation Society, by means of ballot papers impartially distributed through the agency of fourteen or more leading journals,—Tory, Liberal, and Labour. The ballot papers thus received were collected and were duly counted in the Caxton Hall, Westminster,

* Several other model elections were afterwards held in Cornwall, Glasgow, Manchester, Dublin, and London, the largest being in 1912 in London, when 47,874 newspaper readers took part. In some of the elections of the National Union of Railwaymen over 14,000 members have taken part.

under model rules as to accuracy, promptitude, and supervision. Twelve well-known politicians had been selected as candidates for an imaginary five-seated constituency; and the results were found to be as follows:

FIRST COUNT.

| | |
|---|---|
| Asquith (Liberal) | 9042 |
| Balfour (Unionist) | 4478 |
| Lloyd George (Liberal) | 2751 |
| Macdonald (Labour) | 2124 |
| Henderson (Labour) | 1038 |
| Long (Unionist) | 672 |
| Hugh Cecil (Unionist Free Trader) | 460 |
| Shackleton (Labour) | 398 |
| Burt (Liberal-Labour) | 260 |
| Leif Jones (Liberal: Abstainer) | 191 |
| F. E. Smith (Unionist) | 164 |
| Joynson-Hicks (Unionist) | 94 |
| | 21,672. |

That is to say, the above were the numbers of *first choices.* The quota—one-sixth plus 1—being 3613, Asquith and Balfour had each polled many surplus votes, and were at once declared elected, and 'senior members,' in that order. Then all the 'primary' Asquith papers were re-examined for 'next 'preferences.' Mr. Balfour being already elected, any which marked him '2' were ignored as to that choice, and the 'highest available' noted instead. Thus a paper which gave Asquith as '1,' Balfour as '2,' and Long as '3' would now be used to carry a vote to Long—*after* Mr. Asquith's own quota of primary votes had been withdrawn by an impartially indiscriminate division of bundles. [In an election count, such matters can be supervised, as at present, by representatives of candidates.] All the 'available' preferences were duly tabulated, showing that such preferences were given in 9009 out of the 9042 Asquith papers. Deducting his quota, there was left a surplus of 5429 for distribution, and the allotment was made to each beneficiary in the proportion of the fraction $\frac{5429}{9009}$. Thus we get the result of the first transfer, as shown in the table on page 179. The ignoring of fractions all round accounts for the slight difference from the quota in the last total. For the same reason, the next quota reached, that

of Mr. Lloyd George, who by his 7807 transfers is elected with a large surplus, becomes 3169.

The process is now clear. Mr. Lloyd George's surplus is dealt with as was Mr. Asquith's, his quota being deducted and the available preferences passed on to Mr. Burt, Mr. Leif Jones, Mr. Henderson (who received 834), and Lord Hugh Cecil. In the same way Mr. Balfour's surplus went mainly to Mr. Long (526) and Lord Hugh Cecil (195). All the primary

| Candidates indicated as next preferences. | No. of papers for each next preference. | Votes transferred (fractions ignored). | Votes retained for Mr. Asquith's quota. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burt | 468 | 282 | 186 |
| Cecil | 132 | 79 | 53 |
| Henderson | 261 | 157 | 104 |
| Leif Jones | 176 | 106 | 70 |
| Joynson-Hicks | 17 | 10 | 7 |
| Lloyd George | 7807 | 4704 | 3103 |
| Long | 46 | 27 | 19 |
| Macdonald | 51 | 30 | 21 |
| Shackleton | 35 | 21 | 14 |
| Smith | 16 | 9 | 7 |
| Total of next preferences | 9009 | 5425 | 3584 |
| No preferences marked | 33 | — | 33 |
| Total | 9042 | 5425 | 3617 |

surplus votes being now allotted, the remaining business was very simple. For the remaining two seats there remained nine candidates, none of whom had thus far obtained the quota. The first step is to eliminate the hopeless candidatures, beginning with the two lowest, Messrs. Smith and Joynson-Hicks, whose combined votes were less than those of the next lowest, Mr. Shackleton. Their votes were accordingly transferred to the next preferences of their supporters. Still no new election was secured; and the votes of Mr. Shackleton and Lord Hugh Cecil were treated in the same way. In these cases the transferences are complete, to the full number

indicated, there being no deduction for quota in the case of an eliminated candidate. As thus :

TRANSFER OF MR. SHACKLETON'S VOTES.

| Candidates indicated as next preferences. | Number of papers for each. |
|---|---|
| Burt . . . . | 89 |
| Cecil . . . . | 18 |
| Henderson . . . | 233 |
| Jones . . . . | 57 |
| Long . . . . | 8 |
| Macdonald . . . | 252 |
| Preferences exhausted . | 45 |
| Total . . | 702 |

The 'exhausted preferences' are those which had been given on Mr. Shackleton's papers to candidates otherwise elected already. Still no fresh candidate had the quota, and Mr. Leif Jones's 1500 votes had to be distributed. Many of his supporters, however, had indicated no further preferences, and many of those who did had marked Mr. Henderson or Mr. Macdonald, so that these candidates now stood above Mr. Burt :

| | |
|---|---|
| Macdonald . . . . | 2851 |
| Henderson . . . . | 2829 |
| Burt . . . . . | 2683 |
| Long . . . . . | 2035. |

Mr. Long had now to be sacrificed ; and while most of his supporters had indicated no Labour preferences, some 370 had named Mr. Burt, and a small number Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Henderson. The unelected members now stood :

| | |
|---|---|
| Burt . . . . . | 3053 |
| Macdonald . . . . | 2938 |
| Henderson . . . . | 2910. |

Mr. Henderson being now eliminated as at the bottom of the poll, no further process of transference was needed, and the elected candidates were declared :

Asquith ; Balfour ; Lloyd George ; Burt ; Macdonald.

As may easily be inferred, the Unionists had taken much less interest in the model election than did the other parties, though at least six of the newspapers (including the 'Times' and the 'Morning Post') which printed the ballot paper were Conservative. But that was an 'accident' which would *not* occur in a real election. The critical Conservative will further note that, had the total electorate thus polled been divided among five single-membered constituencies in the proportions revealed, the Liberals would have secured *all* the seats. Their total poll being 12,244, each constituency would have had 2448 Liberals as against 1178 Unionists and 712 Labour men (taking Mr. Burt as a Labour member). Thus the Proportional System secures for each of the given minorities a representation which under the single-seat system they would miss.

Out of the 21,690 papers, only eighteen were spoiled, one by a voter determined to insert a new candidate of his own; one by marking a cross instead of a '1'; one by putting *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* instead of figures; the rest mostly by marking several candidates with a '1.' The slightness of the wastage on this account may suffice to prove the perfect workableness of the scheme as regards the electors; and the fact that the votes, once the papers were flattened out, were counted and transferred in six hours by a party of voluntary helpers, is a final answer to those who have pronounced the system too difficult for returning officers. The rules of method being once laid down, it would suffice that, as in Belgium, the rule-of-three calculations be entrusted to accountants, to secure at once rapidity and precision in the official count.

What then are the reasoned objections to Proportional Representation? It is not merely vain, it is unseemly, to repeat that the system is 'too difficult to work.' It has actually been worked, quite successfully, in many countries, and in a number of workmen's associations as regards the choice of their officials and candidates. He who says that English and Scottish electors cannot work a system which has been worked in Belgium and Tasmania, Finland and Sweden, Switzerland and Germany, and by a number of British trade unions for their own purposes, is either trifling with the question or is an incorrigible pessimist as to the capacity of his fellow-countrymen. He cannot pretend that the peoples who have

tried the system are dissatisfied with it. The people of Belgium certainly are not; and it is inconceivable that they should return to the method of the exclusive representation of majorities. It was their intolerable experience of that method, with the *scrutin de liste*, that drove them to Proportionalism. In 1882 their Ministerialists, with 29,142 votes, carried thirty-nine seats, while the Clericals, with 28,052 votes, got only eleven. In this election the Liberals carried the city of Ghent by a majority of only forty votes, thus securing the eight seats. If only twenty-one voters had changed sides the eight seats would have gone to the Clericals. In June 1884 the tables were turned in the elections for fourteen constituencies. The Ministerialists polled 22,117 votes and the Clericals 27,930; but the latter carried fifty seats and the former only two! The whole sixteen seats of Brussels and the whole eight of Antwerp went Clerical, though the total vote in the former city was only 9311 to 7924, and in the latter 6818 to 5405. In the very next month the Ministerialists turned the tables yet again in the elections for the Senate, getting nineteen seats on a vote of 28,467 as against twelve held by the Clericals on a vote of 27,186. In Brussels 9517 votes carried the whole eight seats for the Ministerialists, the Clericals getting none with a vote of 8969. Thus in June Brussels sent all its sixteen members to oppose the Government in the Chamber, and in July all its eight senators to support it in the Senate. In 1896, upon a universal suffrage with extra votes for propertied and educated voters, the Clericals, who had only 89,000 electors out of 200,000, won all the eighteen seats in Brussels; and in 1898 the Socialists were returned in blocks by constituencies where they were in a minority. A nation which has had this experience has had enough of the bare majority system, and will not return to it.

Our own experience is hardly less outrageous: it is indeed in some respects worse, for we have seen governments in power for years on a minority vote. The arguments, then, which should justify our persistence in the system of inequity and accident must be weighty. Yet when those offered are analysed they are found to be mainly speculative, and some are absolutely cancelled by consideration of the recommendations made by the Speaker's Conference. Objection might indeed be fairly taken to the fact that Proportional Representation is there proposed to be applied only to (*a*) parliamentary

boroughs which would be entitled on a basis of population to return three or more members; (*b*) the newly enfranchised Universities of England and Wales, which are to have three members elected on the system of a single transferable vote; (*c*) the four Scottish Universities, which are to form a three-membered constituency on the same footing; (*d*) the metropolis (excluding the City), which it is proposed to treat as a single area divided into constituencies returning not less than three and not more than five members. Thus the counties are wholly excluded from the experiment; and the majority of the single-seat constituencies are to be retained, as are the existing boroughs entitled to return two members. But this imperfect application of the principle has been frankly accepted by Proportionalists as one of the conditions of the concordat reached at the Speaker's Conference. Unfortunately the opponents of proportional representation have shown less respect for that concordat. By means of a wrecking amendment on the instructions to the Boundary Commissioners, ere the question of Proportional Representation had been reached in the Bill before the House of Commons, they secured a hostile vote on the principle embodied in the Speaker's scheme.* In order, apparently, to meet the demands of one or two ministers, the Government had left the matter to 'open' or free voting, without 'putting on the whips,' though the recommendation of a considerable experiment in proportionalism by the Speaker's Conference had been unanimous. Thus the very sanction under which members in general have been asked to accept a number of other compromises, and to tolerate the retention of what they regard as abuses, is repudiated by the Ministry. As a result, all members who object to those compromises and concessions will be justified in opposing them as the anti-proportionalists have resisted the reform they dislike. The entire Bill is thus seriously endangered. It will be indeed lamentable if, chiefly by reason of the prejudices of London members of both parties, backed by a selection of Liberals, Conservatives, and Labourites, a much-needed franchise reform should miscarry.

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* Since the above paragraph was passed for press by the writer, the opponents of P.R. in the House of Commons have won a further victory. The issue now rests with the House of Lords.—EDITOR.

The proposals of the Speaker's Conference were accepted unanimously as a complete scheme ; and on no other sanction could so much advance towards electoral reform have been made either now or for years to come. The Conference was a deliberation of specialists in practical politics, and represents the best results to be hoped for. It has been argued that the scheme has been put forward in advance of public opinion ; but this again is a matter of special war needs ; and a nation which has acquiesced in a hundred unprecedented measures that were never submitted to the constituencies will hardly resent the enactment of an agreed measure of electoral reform, by which alone can provision be made in advance for prompt parliamentary work under the onerous conditions that will subsist immediately after the close of the war.

Still, we have to consider carefully whatever can be said against the enactment of any one provision in the Conference proposals. Broadly speaking, the objections now current to Proportional Representation may be summarised as follows :

1. It will mean small parliamentary majorities.
2. Small minorities will be unduly represented.
3. Equal electoral districts with single members would give equally good results.
4. Proportionalism would multiply groups and break up the large parties.
5. It would greatly increase the costs of candidates in the constituencies to which it would apply.
6. It would break down in the case of bye-elections.
7. It would create jealousies among candidates of the same party running together, as each would be seeking first preferences.
8. It would lower the quality of the representation, notably in the case of London, whose representation has greatly improved under the system of single-seated constituencies.

Perhaps the really dominant objection in the minds of most objectors is that the system is ' new-fangled ' ; but it will be more respectful to them to ignore that sentiment and deal with the definite objections above enumerated. The first has been already discussed ; and to the previous rebuttal it may now suffice to add the express declaration of M. Georges Lorand, the Belgian Radical deputy, that in his country, under proportionalism, ' the government has been able to tackle problems

'of national interest which it would not have dared to touch 'when by doing so it might have offended the representatives 'of some powerful faction of its party whose interests or pre-'judices would be interfered with by the reform.' This answer meets equally the fourth objection; but on that too we have the express testimony of M. Lorand that in Belgium 'parties, 'far from splitting into fragments, have brought their ranks 'closer together,' yet with no narrowing of party creeds.

The second objection, as to small minorities, is a mere begging of the question. If a minority constituting a third or a fifth of a large constituency is not to be held entitled to representation, there is no meaning in the claim that we possess a representative system. These are properly to be described as large minorities; and they will receive justice under proportionalism without damage to the majorities or the still larger minorities which at present so often miss representation. The plea for equal electoral districts, as a professed remedy for the defects of our existing system, is a mere closing of the eyes to facts. Equal districts, with single members, would tend to intensify the evil, in that a multitude of small majorities might almost exclude nearly half the nation from being represented at all.

The fifth objection, concerning costs, is really provided against very fully in the Conference proposals. It is quite true that an increase in election costs might be a fatal obstacle to the entrance of the most desirable candidates. But proportionalists, from Hare onwards, have always pressed for limitation of election expenses; and the Conference proposes not only that returning officers' expenses should be paid by the State, and registration costs be a charge on the local rates, subject to a contribution of one-half from the State, but that candidates shall have one free postage, and that the maximum scale of expenses should be sevenpence per elector in a county, fivepence in a borough with one or two members, and fourpence * in a borough returning three or more members. When, therefore, Lord Eversley, in his letter to the 'Times' of June 1st, argues that the expenses of London candidates will be greatly increased, he is demonstrably astray. He overestimates the number of electors in proportion to popula-

* The Bill, unfortunately, raises this to fivepence for independent candidates, a regrettable departure from the Conference's recommendation.

tion, assuming that a population of 350,000 will mean about 120,000 electors, thus getting a figure of £3000 for independent candidates, when £2000 would be a just estimate of the probabilities. But on the one hand a rich independent candidate will gain nothing by going to his full limit; and a poor one need not approach it; while the candidates of the main parties, running in concert, will share the costs among them, with the result of spending considerably less than they mostly do at present.*

Lord Eversley, a most skilful advocate, and a ripely experienced politician, puts in the forefront of his case against proportionalism the plea that the 'quality' of the members for London has greatly risen since single-membered constituencies have been substituted for the double-membered constituencies that preceded them. The question of quality is a somewhat delicate one, and as against the few names given by Lord Eversley, Mr. G. E. Buckle has given a far longer list of notable men elected under the old system, including the names of Lord Goschen, Baron Lionel de Rothschild, Gladstone, Mill, Lord Bryce, Fawcett, W. H. Smith, Sir A. H. Layard, Sir Charles Dilke, Thomas Hughes, Sir Edward Clarke, and Professor Thorold Rogers. List for list, Mr. Buckle's is by far the longer and the stronger; two of Lord Eversley's chief names (Mr. Balfour and Mr. Long) being those of 'refugee' candidates. But even if Lord Eversley's claim had been as valid as it is invalid, he himself indicates the rebuttal when he mentions that the old constituencies 'were 'of enormous size' and 'entailed very great cost and labour 'on candidates contesting them.' The old constituencies had to be worked by candidates mostly running in pairs. But candidates running in groups of three or five will divide the labour among them as they divide the cost; and under the proportional system the independent candidate need not seek to cover the whole constituency, since a sixth of the poll, plus

* In this connexion it may be of interest to note that when the present writer was elected for the Tyneside division of Northumberland in the first election of 1910, that was the most cheaply fought of the county divisions, and yet his expenses worked out at 1*s.* 8*d.* per vote received, while his opponent's amounted to 4*s.* 6*d.* per vote. The costs of London Liberals and Conservatives under the system now proposed will be much below the lower of these figures.

one, will suffice to return him. He will rely mainly on the distribution of his address, for which he will have free postage. Even under present conditions the majority of the electors in most large constituencies certainly do not hear each candidate in person during a general election. And wise independent candidates will take care to address as many meetings as possible before a dissolution arrives. It might indeed be plausibly argued that county divisions with five or more members would be rather difficult for a single independent candidate to cover ; but inasmuch as the typical independent candidate is a minority candidate, he is really getting under proportionalism a chance which he would otherwise not get at all ; and his special labour is a burden which he is presumably glad to bear.

Of all the objections before us the most reasonable is unquestionably the sixth, that proportionalism partly breaks down in the case of bye-elections. That is to say, while the danger of a ' split ' in these cases is met by the provision for resort to the transferable vote in the case of there being more than two candidates, the occurrence of a vacancy through the death or resignation of a minority member will be apt to mean the loss of representation by his particular minority for the time being. If, indeed, the standard of electoral courtesy can be maintained at the level which it reached in Manchester in 1883, and at which it has stood during the present war, in such cases the minority in question might be permitted, as would be right and seemly, to fill the seat at its choice without a contest. It is perhaps not too much to hope that this will really become the practice, at least in the case of vacancies by death. If, further, there is secured the much-needed reform of abolishing the law which forces a Minister on his appointment to seek re-election, the number of bye-elections will be greatly reduced. And there is the alternative of co-optation. But even if the stress of party strife should lead to a snatching at the opportunity by the majority parties, with the result of imposing an election for one member upon the entire constituency, the relative hardship inflicted for the time being on the minority concerned will be a trifle in comparison with the perpetual hardship to which it is now subjected. A minority so treated would just have to bide its time till the next general election ; and its just resentment at the withdrawal of its representation would probably be

a consideration not without weight for candidates of other parties who might hope for some of that minority's support in general elections.

As regards grouped candidates of one party, the argument that they will be made jealous of each other by reason of their special appeals for first preferences is found in practice to be entirely beside the case. It is actually found that, instead of their bidding for first preferences, it becomes a point of honour and courtesy among them to abstain from any such appeal. A candidate who should infringe this code would lose caste by doing so. This result is perfectly in keeping with all normal human experience ; and the objection under notice may therefore be dismissed with perfect confidence. Curiously enough, it is put forward in a pamphlet issued in opposition to proportionalism by the Committee of the London Liberal Federation—a body which in 1913 passed unanimously a recommendation in favour of Proportional Representation for Borough Councils. It would seem that the notorious 'swing of the pendulum' in 1907, when the 'Progressive' majority of forty-nine in the London County Council was at one stroke changed to a 'Moderate' majority of forty-one, had the effect of converting the Federation to belief in proportionalism for Borough Councils, while the memory of 1906 still keeps its Committee averse to proportionalism for parliamentary constituencies. An argument which supports the latter attitude without explaining the former is clearly unsatisfactory ; but no explanation is offered, and no good explanation suggests itself. And yet the experience of London Liberals has not been at all favourable to the system of single-seated constituencies. Lord Eversley gives the figures for the last three elections :

| | Unionist Members. | Liberal and Labour Members. |
|---|---|---|
| 1906 . . . | 19 | 42 |
| 1910 (Jan.) . . | 33 | 28 |
| 1910 (Dec.) . . | 30 | 31 |

But he omits to mention that in the elections of 1895 and 1900 only eight Liberals were returned for London. Few London Liberals will admit that even the 1910 figures repre-

sent the real strength of London Liberalism. They rather indicate the backwash of the London reaction of 1907. Under proportionalism the results would in all likelihood be nearer the figures of 1906.

If there be no more inward explanation, the cause of the present attitude of the London Liberal Federation may probably be found in the apprehensions set up by the fact that so many Conservatives have latterly been converted to proportionalism. Such an argument would indeed be characteristic of a party caucus, but it is absolutely at variance with the principles of Liberalism. The Liberal test of the merits of a political proposal has hitherto been the question, Is it just? Half a century ago Mill, discussing Disraeli's attack on Lord John Russell for his plan of three-cornered constituencies with two votes to each elector, observed that

'it would be a great improvement if each party understood and acted upon its own principles. Well would it be for England if Conservatives voted consistently for everything conservative, and Liberals for everything liberal. We should not then have to wait long for things which, like the present and many other great measures, *are eminently both the one and the other.*'

If that appeal be not sufficient to persuade alike Liberals and Conservatives, four more may be added in conclusion. 1. It is the well-considered opinion of many thoughtful politicians in the United States that a system of proportional representation might have averted the American Civil War, by preventing the unification of political action in the Slave States, where at the outset there were many friends of the Union. (2) The system has given to the political life of Belgium a stability that has endured the earthquake shock of the present war. (3) Such a system would at this moment greatly add to the stability of the Imperial element in the South African Union, by giving effect to the vote of the Botha minority in the Orange State. (4) And such a system would healthfully modify the opposition to compromise both in Ulster and in Nationalist Ireland, where minority opinions are still more unrepresented than is Conservatism in Scotland and Wales or Liberalism in the Home counties. On all hands, by all testimonies, the method of justice promotes political stability. How can it act otherwise in the United Kingdom?

J. M. Robertson.

## THE PROBLEM OF A SECOND CHAMBER

1. **Reports from His Majesty's Representatives Abroad respecting the Composition and Functions of the Second or Upper Chamber in Foreign States.** Cd. 3824. 1907.
2. **Report on Select Committee of the House of Lords.** 234. 1908.
3. **Return to an Order of the House of Lords.** 8 March, 1910.
4. **The Reform of the House of Lords.** By W. S. McKechnie. Maclehose. 1909.
5. **Senates and Upper Chambers.** By H. W. V. Temperley. Chapman and Hall. 1910.
6. **The House of Lords during the Civil War.** By C. H. Firth. Longmans. 1910.

THE existing House of Commons was elected, nearly seven years ago, with a mandate for the reform of the Legislature. It is at present engaged upon the task of extending the electoral franchise and rearranging the electoral areas. But the branch of the Legislature to which the mandate of 1910 referred was not the House of Commons but the House of Lords. The powers of the Second Chamber were severely curtailed by the Parliament Act of 1911; the Preamble to that Act announced, with all the solemnity which can attach to a Preamble, an intention 'to substitute for the House of 'Lords as it at present exists a Second Chamber constituted 'on a popular instead of hereditary basis'; but nothing has yet been done to give effect to that intention.

So long, however, as the pledge is unredeemed we must continue to put up with a mere *torso* of a Constitution. Nor will the anomaly and danger of the situation be diminished by the passing—if it does pass—of the Representation of the People Bill. On the contrary the balance of forces within the State will be still further disturbed. The Lower House will presumably derive from an enlarged electorate an accession of authority; the Second Chamber will remain more obviously than ever in a state of suspended animation; its powers almost annihilated, its constitution unreformed. That our

political institutions will consequently be left in a state of very unstable equilibrium will be denied by no one who has given serious thought to the working of the constitutional machine.

On one point there appears to be a general agreement. No responsible person, so far as the present writer is aware, to-day suggests the possibility of recurring to the experiment of a unicameral legislature. In the heat of revolutionary fervour Frenchmen were tempted to endorse the shallow sophistry by which the Abbé Sieyès commended the unicameral system: 'If a Second Chamber dissents from the First it is mischievous; 'if it agrees with it, it is superfluous.' Thus characteristically, with an epigrammatic dilemma, did the prince of constitution-makers dismiss the teaching of experience. The first unicameral experiment in France lasted less than half a decade. The second French experiment in unicameralism was made in 1848, and its duration was less even than that of the first. Despite many changes of dynasty and constitution, in all their oscillations from Republicanism to Imperialism, from Imperialism to Legitimacy, from Legitimacy to Orleanism, from Orleanism to Buonapartism, and again from Buonapartism to Republicanism, Frenchmen have never been tempted to renew this particular experiment.

It is, however, only fair for an English writer to recall the fact that in 1789 republican France was merely following the example of republican England. One of the first acts of the Commons of England after the execution of King Charles I. was to abolish and take away the 'House of Lords in Parlia-'ment.' But the unicameral experiment inaugurated by the Commonwealth in March 1649 very quickly demonstrated its futility. The 'Humble Petition and Advice' drafted in March 1657 suggested the re-establishment of a Second Chamber. Cromwell himself highly approved of the proposal: 'by the proceedings of this Parliament you see they stand in 'need of a check or balancing power.'

But no deference to quasi-constitutional forms could for long conceal the verities of the situation. Cromwell was Lord Protector not by the suffrages of the people but by grace of the Ironsides. Real parliamentary government could only be restored along with the hereditary Monarchy. In 1660 supreme authority was once more vested, according to ancient formula, in King, Lords, and Commons.

So it remained from 1660 to 1911. Since the latter date the equipoise of the Constitution has once again been overthrown. The Parliament Act was the deathblow both to the dignity and to the efficiency of the House of Lords. To all intents and purposes we have been living, for the last six years, under a unicameral legislature.

Can this state of things endure? No one who is not either completely ignorant or blinded by partisanship will answer this question in the affirmative. Theory and experience alike point to the necessity of some kind of Second Chamber.

In John Stuart Mill's brief but authoritative treatise on 'Representative Government' there is a chapter (c. xiii.) which is as fresh and pertinent as when it was written in 1861. Mill was no fanatical believer in bicameralism, still less did he approve of a Second Chamber constituted like the House of Lords, but no one has stated the argument against an omnipotent single chamber more effectively. Elect it as you will, you cannot trust a single chamber, any more than you can trust an individual, not to develop the temper of a tyrant.

'It is important [writes Mill] that no set of persons should, in Government affairs, be able even temporarily to make their *sic volo* prevail without asking anyone else for his consent. A majority in a single assembly, when it has assumed a permanent character—when composed of the same persons habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in their own House—easily becomes despotic and overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority. The same reason which induced the Romans to have two consuls makes it desirable there should be two chambers: that neither of them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power, even for the space of a single year.'

Could not the end desired by Mill be secured, along with other advantages, by other means—the Referendum, for example, or the Recall? It is not to be denied that by the adoption of either of these expedients the electorate might be enabled to impose a veto upon unpalatable measures passed by a single chamber. It is also true that the referendal function—the power of submitting *projets de loi* to the judgment of the constituencies—was one of the most cherished and one of the most important functions performed by the House of Lords up to 1910. But it was not the only one. We say nothing, for the

moment, of the concurrent right of initiation, partly because the Lords with almost inconceivable unwisdom allowed this important right to fall into virtual desuetude; partly and much more because a similar power can be and is exercised—in Switzerland, for example—by the device of the Popular Initiative. It is not, however, enough that in a well-constituted legislature the two Chambers should enjoy equal and concurrent rights of veto and initiative. Even under primitive conditions the art of legislation is not simple. In an ancient and complicated civilisation it is extremely delicate and difficult. A Second Chamber is urgently needed for purposes of amendment and revision. This cannot be secured by the Referendum or the Recall. These devices may avert mischief; they cannot ensure benefit. They can vindicate the rights of the majority; they cannot compel consideration for the legitimate susceptibilities of the minority. This function is most effectively, though by no means perfectly, performed by a Second Chamber endowed with concurrent rights of legislation. Walter Bagehot put this point with that rough commonsense, the possession of which made him one of the most persuasive of political philosophers:

> 'If we had an ideal House of Commons perfectly representing the nation, always moderate, never passionate, abounding in men of leisure, never omitting the slow and steady forms necessary for good consideration, it is certain that we should not need a higher chamber. . . . But though beside an ideal House of Commons the Lords would be unnecessary, and therefore pernicious, beside the actual House a revising and leisured legislature is extremely useful, if not quite necessary.'

Methods in the House of Commons have not since Bagehot's day become more scientific; procedure is not more leisurely; debate is not more orderly; nerves are not less strained, nor tempers more controlled. The force of his reflections has not, therefore, been impaired, but strengthened by the efflux of time.

Nor should it be forgotten that since Bagehot's day a momentous change has taken place not merely in the personnel but in the status of the individual legislators belonging to the lower House. They are no longer financially independent of the Executive. The Cabinet can send them back to their constituents; and it must always be uncertain how many of

them will after a general election retain their seats and their salaries.

A stipendiary House of Common must become, as regards its legislative function, a mere adjunct of the Executive that can dissolve it. On this ground alone it is imperative that there should be a revising body entrusted with effective and independent authority.

Nor can the powers of Parliament be limited to legislation and taxation. Ever since the seventeenth century it has been admitted that Parliament ought also to exercise continuous vigilance over the doings of the Executive. It is not suggested that even now the House of Commons has entirely surrendered this function, but it is certain that it becomes year by year less competent to perform it. For competent criticism of the Executive, for informing debate on foreign affairs, or on Imperial problems, the thoughtful public looks, therefore, less and less to the House of Commons, more and more to the House of Lords. But criticism divorced from responsibility tends to futility, and verbal debates, unless they can eventuate in action, are apt to wear the garb of unreality. If power is concentrated in one House it is idle permanently to look for effective criticism from the other. It is, therefore, essential to vigour and continuity of administration, not less than to sanity of legislation, to secure that the Second Chamber of the future shall be both independent in composition and invested with adequate powers.

Such a Chamber is pre-eminently demanded in the interests of Democracy itself. Aristotle long ago perceived the truth that it is harder to maintain than to establish a Democracy:

> 'The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator . . . a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. . . . The legislator should guard against the destructive elements and should make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of States. . . . The demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated in the law courts to please the people; but those who have the welfare of the people at heart should counteract them. . . .'

The dangers peculiar to democracy—more particularly the liability to the pernicious influence of the demagogue—have been the commonplace of criticism from Aristotle's day to our own. The most subtle and the most insidious is the

tendency to economic legislation conceived in the supposed interests of a particular class. No State, however prosperous, could survive a long course of such treatment perseveringly pursued. Against it there is no mechanical safeguard so effective as that of a really strong Upper Chamber. It is, therefore, probable, as Mr. Lecky insisted in 'Democracy and 'Liberty' (i. 364),

'that the continuance without a great catastrophe of a democratic government depends mainly upon the possibility of organising such a Chamber, representing the great social and industrial interests of the country and sufficiently powerful to avert the evils that must sooner or later follow from the unbridled power of a purely democratic House of Commons.'

It seems, however, unnecessary to multiply theoretical arguments in favour of a bicameral legislature. After all, the most impressive argument is that derived from experience: the all but universal preference exhibited by the nations of the civilised world for this somewhat artificial device. For the device is artificial and in a sense accidental. The English Parliament might have disposed itself in three orders as did the States of Scotland and France; it might, like Sweden, have indulged in four; it might have brought all the Estates together into one Chamber. On the historical causes which led to the evolution of the bicameral system in England it is unnecessary to dwell. It suffices to say that the parliamentary systems of the modern world are, to a great extent, conscious imitations of our own; but it is important to observe that the imitation has been not merely conscious but deliberate; it has implied not only approximation to the better but rejection of the worse. Long before the general acceptance of the modern parliamentary model England herself, as we have seen, had made trial of the single-chamber system. Why did the United States of America, themselves closely adhering, in many respects, to the Cromwellian models, reject the legislative form prescribed in the 'Instrument of Government'? The trend of constitutional evolution in the democratic communities adhering to the British flag beyond the seas may be regarded as the outcome of filial piety. But why has France, after more than one experiment in unicameralism, finally found salvation in a Parliament of two chambers?

The single-chamber doctrinaire must, then, be prepared not

merely to defy the teachings of political philosophy but to reject the experience of constitutional practice.

He may hug what comfort he can derive from the superficial dilemma of the Abbé Sieyès—already referred to; he may point to the equivocal success of parliamentary government in Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. The precedent of Norway is a doubtful one, but perhaps Costa Rica and Panama, Honduras, Salvador, and San Domingo may serve his purpose, and he can count upon plenty of the individual component States of Federations—the Swiss Cantons, for example; some of the German States and six of the Canadian provinces. But all these may be regarded as exceptions which prove the rule, and it remains indisputably true that the civilised world has deliberately decided, with singular unanimity, in favour of the bicameral model. It is, of course, conceivable, despite the classical aphorism of St. Augustine, that the whole world may be mistaken. But the presumption is the other way. *Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*

It will not, however, escape observation that while the world has imitated England, as regards the general outline of her parliamentary form, not a single State has copied the details of the particular institution known as the House of Lords. Not many States had the chance of doing so. The House of Lords could not be precisely copied since it is the outcome of a process of historical evolution which is not merely curious but unique. Not that the House of Lords is alone among English institutions in this respect. Parliament as a whole—King, Lords, and Commons—is virtually unique among the legislatures of the world, in its enjoyment of uncontrolled legal sovereignty. But the Upper Chamber is absolutely unique: unique in size; unique in its predominantly hereditary character; almost unique in practical impotence. It is worth while in passing to observe that all these attributes are relatively modern. Down to the sixteenth century the House of Lords was comparable in size to most of the modern Senates or Second Chambers. At the accession of the Tudors the number of members of the Upper House was about 75, or considerably less than that of the American Senate and not greatly in excess of the German Bundesrat. And of the 75 at least 45 were Bishops or Abbots and therefore non-hereditary. The Abbots disappeared after the dissolution of the monasteries

and the Spiritual Peers dwindled to 26. At this figure they have remained constant for three and a half centuries except for the brief period (1801–1869) when four Irish Bishops reinforced their English brethren. Meanwhile, the numbers of the lay Peers waxed with great rapidity. They numbered 140 under Charles II. and nearly 200 under George II. Of these, however, 16 represented the Scottish peerage. George III. added 116 members to the hereditary peerage of the United Kingdom, and Queen Victoria added about 300. By the beginning of the present reign the Temporal Peers entitled to sit in the House of Lords numbered no less than 552 besides 10 minors and 14 Peeresses. In addition to these there are 28 Representative Peers of Ireland, 16 Representative Peers of Scotland, and 5 ' Law Lords ' enjoying a seat in the Upper House for life. Thus the House of Lords has become not only predominantly hereditary in composition but utterly unwieldy in bulk. No other Upper Chamber even approximates to it. The Prussian Herrenhaus comes nearest with about 370 members ; the Spanish Senate has 360 ; the French 300 But the American Senate has only 92 ; the Canadian 87 ; the South African 40 ; and the Australian 36.

Nor is one of these Chambers exclusively or, with one exception, predominantly hereditary in composition. The one most nearly resembling our own is the Hungarian Table of Magnates with 227 hereditary peers out of a total of about 350 members. In the Prussian Herrenhaus there are no less than 177 official and ecclesiastical representatives as against 115 hereditary and 73 nominated life members. The Hungarian Upper House is the only one of any importance whose numbers ever exceeded those of the House of Lords. At one time consisting of some 800 members it has now been reduced by more than a half. That modern Republics like France and the United States, and new countries like Canada, Australia, and South Africa, should have to rely upon the nominative or elective principle, or upon a combination of the two, is intelligible. But why has the hereditary principle been so largely discarded in the historic monarchies ? Sir Henry Maine suggests a curious and interesting reason :

' There is [he writes] much reason to believe that the British House of Lords would have been exclusively or much more extensively copied in the Constitutions of the Continent but for one remarkable

difficulty. This is not in the least any dislike or distrust of the hereditary principle, but the extreme numerousness of the nobility in most continental societies, and the consequent difficulty of selecting a portion of them to be exclusively privileged.'

The Abbé Sieyês insisted that the fatal obstacle to the engrafting of a House of Lords on to the Constitution 'made' for France in 1791 was the 'number and theoretical equality of 'the nobles.' Sieyês calculated that at the time of the Revolution France contained 110,000 noblemen, and Brittany alone 10,000. In England there has never existed a noble caste. All the children of Peers are commoners, the characteristic differentia of a 'Peer' consisting in 'the heredi-'tary right to a personal summons to Parliament.' This restriction has been of immense significance in the development of our Parliamentary institutions as a whole, and has imparted a distinctive character not only to the Upper but to the Lower House. Nowhere else could the 'Third Estate' have contained, as did the English House of Commons from the fourteenth century onwards, a large infusion of men of noble blood, the sons and brothers of the Peers who formed the nucleus of the House of Lords. To this fact more than to any other may be ascribed the permanence of parliamentary institutions in this country, as contrasted with the evanescence of the States General of France or the Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms.

We are concerned, however, less with the question of historical evolution than with the facts of the contemporary situation, and the outstanding fact on which we desire to insist is this: that while every important country in the world has, in the constitution of its Legislature, imitated the English bicameral arrangement, not one has been at once willing and able to reproduce the features which distinguish the House of Lords.

In attempting to classify the existing Second Chambers in the more important States of the modern world, one broad and primary distinction must be drawn: that between Unitary and Federal States.

Of the growth of the federal idea, in modern times, this is not the place to write, but it is pertinent to observe that, whatever may be affirmed of unitary States, bicameralism would appear to be an essential and inseparable attribute of federalism. More

than that. It is in the Senate or Upper Chamber of Federal States that the federal idea is enshrined : in that Chamber is to be found the primary and essential guarantee for the preservation of this peculiar type of Constitution. Take, for example, the Senate of the United States of America. The Senate is composed, and has from the first been composed, of two representatives from each State of the Union. Under a recent Amendment (1913) Senators will henceforth be elected by direct popular vote instead of by the legislatures of the component States. But this involves a change merely in the machinery of election. It does not touch the root principle upon which the Senate is based—the absolute equality of the States of the Union. Had this basic principle not from the outset been accepted and emphasised ; had its permanence not been guaranteed by sanctions of peculiar authority, it is safe to say that the Federal Constitution itself would never have come into existence. The jealousy of the smaller States would have been too powerful even for the genius and tact and patience of Alexander Hamilton. It was the idea of equal representation in the Senate which reconciled the smaller States to federal union with the larger, and in the Senate State rights are, and from the first have been, enshrined and guaranteed. And of all the fundamentals of the United States Constitution this is most sacred. ' No State,' so the Constitution runs (Art. V.), ' without its consent shall be deprived of its equal ' suffrage in the Senate '—a consent which would not, under any imaginable circumstances, be given. The Senate is no longer, owing to the inclusion of new States, the select body of councillors contemplated by Hamilton and his colleagues. It consists not of 26 members but of 92 ; nevertheless its essential character remains unchanged, and the eulogies of Lord Bryce are not undeserved. ' The Senate,' he writes in his *American Commonwealth*, ' has drawn the best talent of the nation, ' so far as that talent flows into politics, into its body, has ' established an intellectual supremacy, has furnished a ' vantage ground from which men of ability may speak to ' their fellow countrymen.'

The same principle as that on which the American Senate was based is to be discerned in the Ständerat of the Federal Republic of Switzerland ; in the Senate of the Australian Commonwealth, and (with a slight and possibly temporary provision) in that of

the South African Union. The Swiss Ständerat consists of 44 members, two for each of the 22 Cantons; the Australian Senate contains six Senators from each of the six States, and the South African Senate eight members from each of the four Provinces in addition to eight members nominated by the Governor-General for a period of ten years. It should, however, be noted that in regard to the last named Second Chamber, power is expressly reserved to the South African Parliament, in the Constitution (Section 25) to alter the constitution of the Senate after the expiration of the first decade. It is otherwise in the Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth. There it is specifically provided (Section 128) that 'no altera-'tion diminishing the proportionate representation of any 'State in either House of the Parliament . . . shall become 'law unless the majority of the electors voting in that State 'approve the proposed law.'

Two other federal constitutions demand brief notice. The Upper Chambers of Imperial Germany and the Dominion of Canada present interesting varieties. Neither Germany nor Canada is typically federal to the same degree as Australia and the United States. The former is too largely dominated by one of its component States to serve as a model for federalists; the latter possesses a Constitution which was framed by men with a distinct preference for the unitary principle, notably Sir John A. Macdonald. In neither case, therefore, should we expect to find the federal idea completely embodied in the Second Chamber.

The German Bundesrat is one of the most interesting Second Chambers in the world It descends historically from the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, and ought, perhaps, to be regarded rather as a Council of diplomatic plenipotentiaries than as one of two Legislative Chambers. On this account Demombynes and others prefer to classify the German Empire among the unicameral States. From that view the present writer dissents, and in any case the Bundesrat deserves study and analysis. Of its members, or rather voices, Prussia claims seventeen; Bavaria six; Saxony and Würtemberg four each; Baden and Hesse and Alsace-Lorraine three each; Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick two each; and the other States and three Cities one apiece. The delegates are appointed by the several State Executives and must vote as instructed by them. The powers of the Bundesrat are enormous, and are freely exercised.

The power of the Canadian Senate, on the contrary, is almost negligible. It now consists of 87 members nominated for life by the Crown, that is by the responsible advisers of the Governor-General. The Senators must, however, be apportioned to the several Provinces of the Dominion in accordance with a scale prescribed by Statute. Originally the idea of federal equality was observed, 24 Senators being assigned to Quebec, to Ontario, and to the Maritime Provinces (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) respectively : 72 in all. But in subsequent amendments the principle has not been maintained, and the Canadian Senate affords little encouragement to the advocate of bicameralism, from the point of view of composition, procedure or powers.

Intrinsically interesting as most of the federal Second Chambers unquestionably are, they are not perhaps of primary significance to the English politician. The British Constitution is not yet federalised. Whether it will ever assume that shape is a question which rests upon the knees of the gods or rather of King Demos. Be that as it may, His Majesty's Ministers are now presumably seeking for a new Second Chamber to replace the existing House of Lords. It has long been the view of the present writer that the Constitution of that new Chamber ought not to be determined without reference to other Constitutional problems of equal importance, notably the relations between the Imperial Government and the great self-governing Dominions. Perhaps it should not be settled without reference to the relations which subsist or ought to subsist between the component entities of the United Kingdom. But for the moment it may be argued, as indeed it has been, that federal Senates are less pregnant with meaning and instruction for the English publicist than those which exist in unitary States.

The latter, like the former, may be classified in respect of composition and of powers. Among Colonial Second Chambers, those of New South Wales, Queensland, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec consist, like the Canadian Senate, of members nominated for life ; that of New Zealand of members nominated for a term of years. Victoria, Tasmania, South and Western Australia prefer to elect the members of their Second Chambers. The Upper Chambers of the European States present great variety. France, Holland, and Sweden have adopted the principle of indirect election. In Norway

the Lagthing is, in effect, a Committee of the elected House (Storthing). Belgium includes Princes of the Blood besides some members indirectly and others directly elected. The Italian Senators—apart from the Royal Princes—are nominated by the Crown for life out of a large number of complicated categories of notables. The Turkish Senators are also nominated by the Crown. Denmark and Russia combine the nominative and elective principles; Austria, Prussia, and several of the German States combine the nominative and hereditary principles; Spain, with its Catholic tradition, combines all three. In none of these Chambers, except in the Hungarian Table of Magnates, is the hereditary element predominant.

Among the States which are, in the true sense, parliamentary, France is not only the most important, but also possesses the strongest and most effective Second Chamber. The French Senate is, as we have seen, of manageable size (300), and all its members are now, and since 1884 have been, elected by electoral colleges set up in each Department in France. The Senate is thus, to quote Mr. Temperley (p. 97), 'democratic in the full sense of the word. It is in fact, as 'Gambetta epigrammatically put it, the "Grand Council of '"the Communes of France," or, as we might say, the quint-'essence of the Parish Councils.' But it is the quintessence very highly distilled. It attracts to itself the most respectable politicians in France. M. Yves Guyot, indeed, maintains ('Contemporary Review,' No. 530) that 'the greater number 'of men who have any political reputation in Parliament—'have sought to migrate from the Palais Bourbon to the Luxem-'bourg. The result is that the Chamber of Deputies has not 'ceased to suffer from a species of unwise selection.' President Lowell differs from M. Guyot in his estimate of the relative importance of the two Chambers and insists that the Senate is decidedly the weaker of the two. Nevertheless, he admits that 'it contains at least as much political ability and experi-'ence as the other House, and, indeed, has as much dignity and 'is composed of as impressive a body of men as can be found in 'any legislative Chamber the world over.' *

The powers of the French Senate are extensive and the effectiveness with which it wields them is indisputable. It

* Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, i. 22.

joins with the Chamber of Deputies in electing the President of the Republic and, in the event of an impeachment of the President or his Ministers, it is the constituted Court of Justice. It shares with the Chamber the treaty-making function and its assent is required to a declaration of war or the conclusion of peace. In regard to ordinary legislation it possesses concurrent rights of initiation, rejection, and amendment with the Chamber. Money Bills it may reject or even amend, but not initiate. But these powers are commonly, though by no means universally, vested in Second Chambers. The French Senate possesses in addition one which is probably unique. Only on its advice can the President of the Republic dissolve the Chamber before the expiration of its legal term. It is obvious that this power gives to the Senate exceptional control over the Executive, and it is not, therefore, remarkable that on several occasions, comparatively recent, the Ministry should have striven to conciliate the support of the Senate by appealing to it for a vote of confidence. M. Yves Guyot, indeed, writing as an ex-Cabinet Minister, goes so far as to affirm: 'It is 'impossible for a Cabinet to govern in opposition to the 'Senate.'

It has been worth while to dwell in some little detail upon the position and powers of the French Senate, since there is ground for the belief that should a reconstruction of our own Second Chamber be undertaken the scheme may be framed upon the French model. In view of this contingency it may be well to ask: What practical deductions, if any, can be drawn from the above review of contemporary institutions? Does the survey suggest any essential conditions to which a Second Chamber, if it is to fulfil its appropriate functions, ought to conform?

The first essential clearly is intelligibility. Every Second Chamber ought to rest upon an intelligible basis. There must be some clear and definite principle at the root of it. The House of Lords does at least possess this advantage. The hereditary principle may be antiquated and unpopular; but it is at any rate intelligible. The custom of primogeniture may not commend itself, on scientific grounds, to the Professors of Eugenics, but it is understood, even if it is mistrusted, by the people.

Secondly, the principle upon which a Second Chamber is

based ought to be differentiating. Apart from the general agreement in favour of a bicameral system the 'man in the 'street' ought to be able to explain at once why an Upper Chamber is superimposed upon the lower. Federal Second Chambers are pre-eminently distinctive. In every case—so far as they are genuinely federal—they represent not the people in the aggregate but the several States of which the Federation is compounded. Thus the American and Australian Senates are at once historic memorials of the original federal compact and practical guarantees for the preservation of the independence of the component States. The German Bundesrat, again, is at once the organ and the symbol of those 'Princes' of the Empire who joined in the solemn act in the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles when the Imperial Crown of the German Folk was placed upon the brows of the Hohenzollern King of Prussia. Thus the Bundesrat is as clearly differentiated from the Reichstag as is the American Senate from the House of Representatives.

A Second Chamber ought, in the third place, to be independent without being irresponsible. The House of Lords, because it is technically irresponsible, is conspicuously lacking in independence. The French Senate, on the contrary, has courage to assert its independence, because it makes no claim to irresponsibility. A Senator no less than a Deputy is elected, but the process of election is clearly differentiated; the legal term of service is three times as long, and the Senate—apart from the Senators—has a continuous existence; above all, as we have seen, it has, with the assent of the President, the power of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies and of compelling the latter to take the opinion of their constituents. Which of its privileges would the House of Lords not willingly surrender, if it might enjoy the prerogative possessed and exercised by the Senate of Republican France?

Plainly, however, a Second Chamber, if it is to be entrusted with a function so delicate and so important as that of dissolution must be thoroughly representative in composition. This is not to say that it must needs be elective. There are in the House of Lords nearly all the elements of an assembly ideally representative of the varied interests of which the nation is composed. Industry, agriculture, science, literature, education—all are represented there; spiritual forces no less

than material and intellectual find a reflex in that Chamber; great jurists are there, and great soldiers and sailors; experienced proconsuls and successful administrators; except that of manual labour there is scarcely a national interest which cannot find a spokesman. And yet it would be difficult to claim for the House of Lords, in the aggregate, that it is a truly representative assembly. Nor is the reason far to seek. Side by side with a large body of men who could under no circumstances be excluded from any assembly which was genuinely representative of national interests there is a considerable if not actually a larger body of men to whom admission would indubitably be denied. The weakness of the House of Lords consists not in the absence of competent legislators, but in the potential presence of a large number of incompetents.

That any assembly charged with the task of legislative or administrative revision should be efficient for the purpose goes without saying. But to be really efficient it is almost essential that it should be manageably small. Perhaps the two most powerful Second Chambers in the world are the American Senate and the German Bundesrat. The former contains less than a hundred, the latter just over sixty, members. If federal comparisons must be excluded we may still remind ourselves that the French Senate with half the numbers of the House of Lords is at least twice as powerful.

There have been schemes in plenty for the reform of the House of Lords. In 1869 Lord Russell carried to a second reading a Life-Peerage Bill. In 1884 Lord Rosebery presided over a Select Committee which recommended certain changes in regard to the Scotch and Irish Peers. The same statesman tried to interest the Lords in larger schemes in 1884, and again in 1888, but on both occasions in vain. Lord Salisbury, in 1888, did actually embody certain definite proposals in a Bill which was twice read in the House of Lords, but he did not persevere, and thus the Tory party lost an opportunity of 'reform from within,' which will never recur. With the return of the Radical party to power in 1906 a change passed over the spirit of the scene. A determined attack was opened on the whole position of the House of Lords, an attack which culminated in the Parliament Act of 1911. Meanwhile, Lord Rosebery made one more gallant effort to obtain a general assent to certain broad principles of reform.

In 1907–8 he himself presided over a very strong Committee of the House of Lords which in December, 1908, presented its Report. The Committee endeavoured in its recommendations 'to preserve as far as possible the fabric and position of the House of Lords within the Constitution, and with 'such modifications only as the circumstances of the age and 'the needs of efficiency seem to require.' That the scheme recommended was open to criticism goes without saying, but it furnished an admirable basis for reforms at once drastic and reasonably conservative. Like much else, however, it never got a chance even of consideration, being overwhelmed in the revolutionary flood of 1909.

No scientific student of politics can regard the Parliament Act of 1911 as other than a temporary and party makeshift. It effectually clips the powers of the existing House of Lords—until the next turn of the electoral wheel brings the Tories into power. But it does less than nothing to repair or to strengthen the Constitutional fabric, or to provide the country with a Second Chamber, at once intelligible and efficient, independent and in the best sense popular, in sympathy with that great floating mass of public sentiment which has no permanent party attachments, and commanding the respect of the best men on both sides. That the erection of such a Chamber is not outside the region of possibility has been demonstrated in the foregoing pages. It is doubtful, however, whether any party in England desires a brand-new symmetrical Senate. Is it possible to combine the historic and the efficient; to reconcile the spirit of conservatism with the claims of democracy?

The Rosebery Committee started from the proposition that henceforward the possession of a Peerage should not of itself give the right to sit and vote in the House of Lords. The hereditary principle, as an exclusive and sufficient qualification, was thus, at the outset, jettisoned. The next point, upon which emphasis was laid, was a rigid curtailment of numbers. The Rosebery Committee contemplated a Chamber of 400 members; a House of 300 or even 200 would probably be both stronger and more efficient. Of these half might be elected by the Peers from among the members of their own order, just as the Scotch and Irish Peers elect their representatives at present, but with some regard to the principle of proportion, secured by the device

of the single transferable vote. In this moiety some Bishops would find a place. The other moiety should, pending the creation of a Federal Legislature, contain some direct representatives of the Dominions, some representatives of Labour, elected perhaps by the Co-operative Congress, by the Trade Union Congress, and by the 'Free' Labour Council. Elected representatives of the Roman Catholic and the 'Free' Churches should also be included; as well, perhaps, as representatives elected by the Councils of Counties and County Boroughs. The nominative element should be rigorously excluded, for experience, notably that of Canada and Italy, tends to prove that of all devices this is the one least calculated to produce the desired object—a Chamber at once efficient and independent. It may be argued that some infusion of the nominated element is necessary in order to prevent deadlocks between the two Houses. This is an important matter, but the object can be better attained in other ways: by a joint session; by a simultaneous dissolution of both Houses; or by a *referendum*.

These changes would probably have sufficed ten years ago; whether they would satisfy the country to-day is perhaps doubtful. During the last ten years the political situation has fundamentally changed; changed also is the temper of the multitude. No one who has not mingled with the working folk of Scotland or the North of England can have any conception of their set determination not to allow themselves to be 'bossed' by the Lords' in future. It has been recently pointed out that it took the middle classes—nominally admitted to political supremacy in 1832—at least a generation before they could make effective use of their power. It took the manual workers—admitted to the franchise in 1867—just thirty-nine years before they recognised the significance of the change, or were ready to take advantage of it. Down to 1688 or perhaps down to 1714 the English Constitution—despite certain checks and balances—was pre-eminently monarchical. From that time until 1906 the actual government was vested, notwithstanding the changes effected in 1832, 1867, and 1884, in rival groups of men who belonged, with insignificant exceptions, to a small and select class. In fine, England was essentially an aristocracy. During the last ten years the balance of forces has once more undergone a profound readjustment. Whether that readjustment will contribute to the stability of the Common-

wealth and to the contentment of the people it is much too soon to say.

For the moment it is obvious that the new wine of political supremacy has mounted to the heads of men who are unaccustomed to strong liquor, to whom the wisdom of the ages is the doddering imbecility of age. They have yet to learn, in the only school where they can be taught, the hard lessons of experience. The next thirty years may, therefore, prove to be the most critical in our history. No effort should be spared to give to this young Democracy all the assistance which can be derived from efficient political institutions. The vanity and folly of individuals may render of none effect the wisest and soundest Constitution in the world. No safeguards can ultimately save men from themselves. But that does not prove the inutility of all safeguards.

Among political safeguards a strong and efficient Second Chamber is without question one of the most important. The existing Second Chamber has been reduced to the verge of impotence. It has lost faith in itself. It can never in its present form be reinvested with sufficient authority and power to enable it to fulfil the functions appropriate to its position. 'The best constitution of a Second Chamber,' wrote Mill in 1861, 'is that which embodies the greatest number of elements 'exempt from the class interests and prejudices of the majority, 'but having in themselves nothing offensive to democratic 'feeling.'

To compass the creation of such a Chamber; to discover for it a basis which shall be at once intelligible and differentiating; to secure to it the power of effective revision without the power of control; to render it amenable to permanent public sentiment and yet independent of transitory phases of opinion; to erect a bulwark against revolution without interposing a barrier to reform—this is one of the most vital and immediate, as it is one of the most perplexing, problems which to-day await solution at the hands of British statesmanship.

J. A. R. Marriott.

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## INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM AND WAR

1. **L'Internationale socialiste a vécu.** Par OMER BOULANGER, conseiller Communal Belge. Paris: Ollendorf. 1915.
2. **The Future of Democracy.** By H. M. HYNDMAN. Allen and Unwin. 1915.
3. **Socialism and the Social Movement.** By WERNER SOMBART; translated by M. EPSTEIN. Dent. 1909.

AMONG the bubbles pricked by the war is the 'Red 'International,' so called to distinguish it from the 'Black-International,' the Church of Rome. The Red International was the instrument of international socialism, and it represented very large aims and lofty aspirations; but at the hard touch of reality it collapsed, revealing itself as a showy film devoid of solid contents. It may fairly be called a bubble without offence, for many of its most earnest supporters in different countries have said as much. The world at large, which had never taken it very seriously or paid much attention to it, witnessed the collapse without surprise and with little interest. But the Russian Revolution and subsequent efforts to promote peace on the basis of international socialism have brought the movement into the field of actual affairs and given it a new claim to public attention. Many who never gave international socialism a thought before are now regarding it

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with various feelings, ranging from mere curiosity to angry resentment. And in truth it does call for examination in this tremendous political and social upheaval in which we are involved, and the outcome of which no man can foresee. Is it a real force or not ? And if it is real, what part is it likely to play ? To answer these and other questions which suggest themselves at the present juncture of affairs, it is necessary to examine the movement in the light of its origin and development.

The international note was first definitely struck in socialism by the famous communist manifesto drawn up in 1847 by Marx and Engels. This document ended with the exhortation which has been much quoted of late, ' Proletarians of all lands, ' unite ! ' The idea was not altogether new. Previously the socialistic movement had been carried on, mainly in England and France, for many years, during which all the root ideas and most of the catchwords were evolved. The English and French movements were on lines broadly parallel, though different in detail, and the active minds in each took a certain interest in the other. There was some exchange of ideas, and though they had no thought of definite concerted action, internationalism was already present in germ. Saint-Simon had glimpses of it, and Mr. M. Beer, in his ' History of British ' Socialism,' * says of the National Union, formed in 1831 on a revolutionary trade union and socialistic basis, that it ' fos- ' tered international solidarity with particular ardour. It cele- ' brated the anniversaries of the French Revolution and of the ' Polish insurrection, opposed Palmerston's foreign policy, which ' it severely stigmatised as dictated by the Tsar.' This is very interesting at the present time. There is indeed a remarkable parallelism between the currents of thought in that day and in this. Many passages might be quoted from such papers as the ' Crisis,' the ' Pioneer,' and the ' Poor Man's Guardian,' which read as though they had appeared last week. The same arguments and the same phrases were then in common use.

Marx, who was a schoolboy of twelve at the time of the National Union, came into a field already strewn with the

* This scholarly and valuable work, which will supersede all others, has not yet been published. It was passing through the press when the war broke out and stopped publication. But the writer possesses a copy in proof, presented by the author.

ideas he utilised. He was an adroit and diligent gardener. He picked up one here and another there, in Germany, France, Belgium, and England, put them together, planted them out, made a flower-bed of them, and posed as their discoverer ; but they had all been sown by other men. Internationalism was one of them. It was in the air in 1847. Europe was seething with revolution, and Marx was the very man to act as a go-between. He had no nationality, having abandoned his own and adopted no other. He was a refugee in England, to which he came from Germany by way of France and Belgium. From Germany he brought Hegel's conception of history, perverted to fit Feuerbach's materialism ; in France he imbibed the revolutionary spirit ; in England he picked up the economic basis of socialism. It took him many years to work up these elements into the extraordinarily involved tangle of inconsistent theories presented in 'Das Kapital,' which owes its vogue largely to its obscurity, on the Lucretian principle :

> 'Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque,
> Inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt.'

But that was after he became 'scientific.' There was no obscurity about the communist manifesto. It urged in trumpet tones concerted violent revolution by the 'proletariate' in all countries for the overthrow of the existing order of society and the substitution of communism. It was drawn up for the Communist League, an association of continental refugees in London, and issued in Brussels in several languages early in 1848. It may have done something to fan the flames of popular excitement in that revolutionary year, but the risings which took place were primarily political, and no international action was attempted. Nevertheless the manifesto marked the beginning of a definite movement. It contained all the essential principles on which international socialism has subsequently been based. It laid down the theory of the class war between 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariate,' which characterises the present epoch in all western countries and involves the international solidarity of the proletarians, who have only to unite in order to throw off their chains.

The next step was the creation of an organisation to give effect to these principles, and the birthplace of this also was London. The year was 1864, when the International Association of Working Men was formed. This is now known as the

Old International. It had a real working-class element, at least in its origin. It arose out of a visit paid by French workmen to the London Exhibition of 1862. They forgathered with English colleagues and were no doubt entertained by others interested in trade unionism and the labour movements of that day. The visit was under Imperial auspices and it was repeated in the following year, when the Polish question was discussed. So the international interest grew, and in 1864 it evolved an organisation with defined principles and a policy. But the Association was born under the patronage of intellectual sympathisers, and the labour element, never large, was soon submerged. George Odger and Robert Applegarth, genuine labour men, were midwives and monthly nurses, but Marx was the physician in charge, and Professor Beesly stood sponsor. Trade unionism in general held rather stiffly aloof ; and if that was so in England, the labour element had still less part in the organisation on the Continent, where trade unionism was in a state of struggling infancy. In short, the Association was misnamed. It was not an organisation of workmen, but an attempt to get workmen to adopt Marx's theories and carry out his policy ; for at that time he still had a Utopian policy, though a vague one. The attitude of detachment and severely 'scientific' observation was adopted later.

The organisation consisted of a central body, called the General Council, with local branches in the affiliated countries. The council, which had its seat in London, was internationally constituted, with delegates from the national branches. It had no authority, but acted as a medium of communication and arranged congresses, which took place annually in the four years 1866–69. The main function of the Association was educational ; it was an institute for the propagation of Marx's theories. He dominated it, not personally, but mentally. 'We may observe,' says Professor Sombart, 'how at 'each congress of the International Association there showed 'itself a gradually strengthening influence of the Marxian 'spirit.' The result was strife ; for 'as soon as the Inter-'national Association showed signs of being Marxian to any 'degree, disagreements arose in all directions.' First the French socialists, then the trade unions, and then the Lassalleans in Germany, grew restless ; but the culminating dissension was the conflict between the Marxian policy and that of violent

revolution championed by Bakunin, who founded a rival 'International Alliance of Social Democracy' in 1868. This internal strife settled the fate of the loosely-built and ill-supported Association. Its seat was nominally transferred to New York in 1872, and it melted away after a feeble attempt to hold one more congress at the Hague in 1873.

Such was the 'Old International.' It made a great stir* and gave great resonance to the Marxian doctrines; but it never had any substance; and when it came close to any practical question it revealed irreconcilable differences of opinion or impotence. The most interesting thing in its history, from the standpoint of recent events, is its relation to war. By its very nature international socialism must be opposed to war, which sunders nations vertically and unites classes within nations; for its own object is precisely the contrary. It seeks to unite nations horizontally in order to carry on a class war in all of them. War is, in short, its negation. Accordingly the Old International tabulated an emphatic condemnation of the Austro-German War in 1866, and protested against the Franco-German War of 1870. But not the slightest attempt was made to prevent either beyond the passing of empty resolutions. In connexion with the Franco-German War, a very instructive episode is related by Hermann Wendel in his Memoir of Bebel, written for the German working classes. All Germany was hurrahing for the war, as in 1914, and the socialists with the rest, excepting Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, who seriously considered the position in the light of their principles. They were members of the North German Reichstag, which had been summoned to vote the war loan. Liebknecht, who was a downright man with the courage of his convictions, intended flatly to vote against it; but during an enforced wait of several hours at a railway station on their way, Bebel, who was a politician through and through, succeeded in persuading him to adopt a 'more correct attitude.' This was revealed in the debate of the 21st July 1870, when they declared that:

'they could neither vote for the loan, as that would be equivalent to a vote of confidence in the Prussian Government, *which had prepared for the present war by the proceedings of* 1866; nor could

* It alarmed Bismarck, who at one time contemplated international action against it. (Bebel.)

they by refusing the required credit appear as though they approved of the wicked and treacherous policy of Bonaparte. As opponents on principle of every dynastic war, as Socialist Republicans and members of the International Workmen's Association, which fights against all oppressors without distinction of nationality and seeks to unite all the oppressed in a great fraternal band, they could neither directly nor indirectly declare themselves in favour of the present war and would therefore abstain from voting, while expressing the confident hope that the peoples of Europe, taught by the evil events then occurring, would strain every nerve to achieve the right of determining their own fate and put an end to the existing military and class domination, as the cause of all ills in the political and social order.'

Fine words, needing some courage to utter, but feeble, negative action. The declaration, which was inscribed in the journal of the Reichstag, is typical. Bebel describes the incident in his autobiography, but he also gives an explanation of the origin of the war, which throws a curious light on the passage about Bonaparte's policy and is of great interest to-day. Liebknecht, he says, believed in the Emperor Napoleon's responsibility for the war. 'I was of a different opinion, 'being convinced that Napoleon had fallen into a trap pre-'pared for him by Bismarck.' Yet he says that if they had known all that afterwards came to light; they would have voted against the war loan. His account is so relevant to the present issue that it deserves quoting:

'To-day there can be no doubt that the war of 1870 was desired by Bismarck and that he had long laid his plans to bring it about. Although in respect of the wars of 1864 and 1866 his pose as the innocent victim and the party attacked was hardly successful, the same could not be said of the war of 1870, when the pose was effectively maintained. With the exception of a small inner circle of intimates—even the King of Prussia was not included—who knew that he had laboured strenuously to bring about the war, he duped the whole world, making everyone believe that Napoleon had provoked war and that poor peace-loving Bismarck was the aggrieved party. The historians, official and semi-official, have fostered this belief among the mass of the people—the belief that Germany acted in defence and that France was the aggressor. It is true that Napoleon declared war, but the master stroke of Bismarck's policy was that he shuffled the cards in such a way that Napoleon was forced to declare war as though of his own accord, and to play the part of peace-breaker.'

Even Marx and Engels, he adds, were deceived, although

they 'ought to have known better.' Hermann Wendel takes the same line:

'Bismarck, then, with his usual cunning knew how to manœuvre Napoleon into the rôle of treacherous aggressor while he himself played the part of loyal defender, and so actually let loose a popular agitation such as not even the year 1848 had witnessed. Not only on every hurdy-gurdy but in every heart rang out the "Wacht "am Rhein," on every hill-top blazed the beacon fires, etc. etc.'

Yet with all this before them the German socialists let themselves be led by the nose in August 1914 as in July 1870. All except Karl Liebknecht, whose memory was better or whose principles were firmer than those of his colleagues. The same comedy was played—an innocent Germany, prepared for war to the last button, defending herself against treacherous and scheming aggressors who were not prepared at all. And it was so clumsily done, too. The credulity and stupidity of German socialists must be infinite, if they really were deceived. But were they? In any case they threw over the New International, which had come into being in the interval, even more completely than their predecessors had thrown over the Old International in 1870. But this is anticipating; let us return to the course of events.

As we have seen, the Old International, undermined by internal dissensions, collapsed at the touch of war and expired of inanition in the 'seventies. The English labour contingent, which was the only solid element it ever possessed, withdrew altogether, and it became, to use Professor Sombart's terms, nothing more than a society of conspirators, a mere handful of revolutionaries. This, as he says, might suit Bakunin, but it did not suit Marx.

'It was characteristic of Bakunin that he saw the only power which should bring about the political and social future State in the International Association, with its few hundred determined members, some of whom, like Kropotkin, still dream to-day that they are strong enough to kindle the flame of revolution throughout Europe. Bakunin quite logically regarded the International Association as a society for the propagation of the revolutionary idea. . . .'

It is necessary to recall this, because it throws light on the present situation. The opposed and irreconcilable principles represented by Bakunin and Karl Marx both

still exist and wear the mantle of Internationalism to-day. The doctrine of Bakunin no more died than that of Marx. It has just achieved a great triumph in Russia, and is on its way to produce the greatest disaster that has ever befallen that country. When the Russian socialists invoke the International, what they, or most of them, have in mind is the Bakunin brand, a general revolutionary and anarchistic overthrow of the existing order. In the south of Europe, too, that idea is dominant, but elsewhere International socialism is mainly Marxian.

The 'New International' has indeed solemnly expelled the anarchists and communists from its congresses. This organisation came into existence in 1889 in connexion with the centenary of the French Revolution. It was born in a hubbub of dissentient opinions, so little tolerant of each other that two rival congresses were held in Paris. The precise differences between them do not matter much, because it struck them that this was not a very auspicious way of beginning a movement for uniting men in one brotherhood, and it was arranged that the next congress, held in Brussels in 1891, should be a joint affair. The rival groups agreed to differ without a rupture, and up to a point they succeeded, but not altogether. It was found impossible to reconcile all the shades of opinion ranging in a long ascending or descending order from trade unionism to anarchist communism. The question was where to draw the line of division, and at the third congress in 1893 the majority agreed to draw it at the anarchists and physical force people, who were accordingly expelled. The International cut off its tail in order to keep the other members together. Three years later, when the next congress was held in London, the same question was once more raised, but the previous decision was upheld. This congress revealed substantial progress made by the organisation; it was attended by over 800 delegates, of whom more than half were British. Since then, four more regular congresses have been held, either at four or at three years' interval, and one special meeting in 1912, called to discuss the Balkan war and the threatening political situation. More will be said of this meeting later on.

It will be seen from the foregoing that during the period of twenty-five years before the war the New International fared much better than its predecessor. It was gaining in numbers

and influence, and moving rather towards unity than disruption, outwardly at least. The last congress of the Old International before its break up, held at Basel in 1869, was attended by eighty delegates representing nine nations ; the last regular congress of the New International, held at Copenhagen in 1910, was attended by 887 delegates representing thirty-three nations. The two main causes of this change were—(1) The growth of trade unionism, which gave the organisation a substantial foundation; (2) the spread of socialism, especially within the ranks of organised labour.

Towards the end of the decade 1880–90, about the time when the New International was started, the trade-union movement made an extraordinarily rapid and general advance. Previously it had been no more than a struggling infant outside Great Britain, where alone it had attained stature and strength. But even there it had experienced a severe set-back during the reaction of trade which followed the extreme prosperity immediately after the Franco-German War. The fall is reflected in the record of the Trades Union Congress. The membership had risen from 280,000 in 1871, when the important Trade Union Act was passed, to nearly 1,000,000 in 1874 ; but after that it fell off and sank lower and lower, until in 1881 it only reached 378,000, or little more than one-third of the previous record. This was low-water mark. It was followed by a gradual rise until 1889, when the number shot suddenly up from 687,000 to 1,600,000. In Germany the movement, which dated only from 1865, led for several years a sickly life under the patronage of rival socialist groups, and was knocked on the head by Bismarck's repressive legislation in 1878. But it revived, and struggled into a healthier growth under the stimulus of adversity, and when the laws were repealed at the end of the decade 1880–90 it had attained considerable strength. After that its progress was rapid. In France, too, trade unionism was rapidly advancing at the same period after the enabling legislation of 1884, which was its real starting-point.

Parallel with the rising tide of trade unionism, and partly associated with it but in the main distinct, there occurred at this time a marked revival of socialism. The first socialist societies in this country since the days of Chartism were then founded. The Democratic Federation, established in 1881, was transformed into the Social Democratic Federation in

1883 ; then changed its name to Social Democratic Party, and later, in 1911, by fusion with some other bodies, to British Socialist Party, finally splitting, since the war began, into National Socialist Party (patriotic—minority) and British Socialist Party ('pacifist'—majority). The Fabian Society was founded in 1884. These two earliest societies were of the intellectual type, but they exercised considerable influence, especially the former, on labour leaders, being assisted by the widespread unemployment and distress prevailing in 1886–87 ; and they paved the way for the Independent Labour Party, founded in 1893. This third society reflected the association, mentioned above, of trade unionism and socialism. The 'new 'unionism,' which appeared about 1888, was characterised by a strong infusion of socialism, and was borne upwards by the resounding success of the famous London dock strike of 1889, in which John Burns and other 'strike kings' gained their crowns. The result was that labour-socialist organisations began to spring up in different places, and in 1893 these were brought together to form the Independent Labour Party. It is a socialist society, not to be confused with the Labour Party, and in spite of its name and origin is led by middle-class socialists ; but its membership consists very largely of trade unionists.

The origin of the three societies in the epoch to which we are referring shows the socialist ferment then actively working in this country and contributing towards the re-establishment of international socialism. It was still more active on the Continent. In Germany the Social-Democratic votes cast in Reichstag elections rose from 311,961 in 1881 to 1,427,298 in 1890. In France, at the same time, M. Guesde, who had carried on a ceaseless battle for Marxian socialism ever since his return from exile in 1876, gradually established his ascendancy over other sections, and eventually succeeded in converting M. Jaurès, with whose adhesion to the socialist cause in 1893 the whole movement in France entered on a new career of successful activity and recognised standing.

It is not necessary to trace the corresponding movement in other countries. The foregoing details will suffice to show how the International came to be re-established just when it was. The actual impulse appears to have come from within our own Trades Union Congress, which had sent delegates

to international meetings of trade unionists in 1883 and 1886, and invited one to London in 1888, in spite of a good deal of internal opposition from the more conservative elements. The fact shows the growing influence of socialism among labour leaders at that time. But the ferment was general, as we have seen, and Mr. Adolphe Smith says that the foundation was laid at an international conference in Paris in 1882 ('The Times,' Aug. 28, 1917). For some years the New International had no standing organisation and confined its activities to holding congresses at somewhat irregular intervals. It was not until 1900, more than ten years after the original meeting, that a formal organisation, with a standing executive, called the International Socialist Bureau, was established. This was at the fifth congress held in Paris. The Bureau consisted of two representatives from each national delegation to the congress, and one representative from the socialist or labour parliamentary party—whichever term is used—of each nation. In 1913 there were twenty-six affiliated and nine corresponding but unaffiliated national sections. The headquarters and office were in Brussels, and the chairman and secretary were M. Vandervelde and M. Huysmans; from which it is evident that the war has hit the International in the heart. The functions of the Bureau were to act as an intelligence centre, to keep in touch with the national committees set up in each country, arrange the congresses, and issue a periodical bulletin with reports from affiliated organisations. It met formally once a year, but held special meetings whenever the international political situation seemed to call for it.

The question of the rules governing representation and voting at the congresses has lately been raised in connexion with the proposed conference at Stockholm, which was normally called under the auspices of the International. But the whole thing is obviously irregular. Invitations to the conference were issued by the Petrograd Soviet, which had no standing at all under the rules of the International, but it appears that a Dutch-Scandinavian committee, which had no proper standing either, made the first move at the instigation of the American Socialist Party, which had announced its intention of calling a meeting of the International, if the Bureau did not. It had no right to do anything of the kind, but since it was notoriously under pro-German influence the motive

is evident. The whole chain of proceedings reveals an attempt to use the authority of the International, while defying its rules. That being so, irregularities in representation naturally follow. If anybody can call a congress, anybody can go to it. There are no longer any rules or any constitution. The question is of some interest because it will crop up again. But the episode shows how completely the International has been smashed up by the war. For it had a constitution and rules, which were respected by its members and which gave it some stability.* The broken pieces cannot be put together again by disregarding both. Nor can violated pledges to oppose war be made good by violating rules in order to promote peace in the interest of the violators, just because the war that they sanctioned is going against them.

This brings us to the attitude of the New International towards war, which is the rock on which it struck. Its attitude was that of the Old International, which has been already discussed, but more explicitly defined and emphasised. Opposition to war logically takes precedence of all other aims of the International, as we have seen above; for war automatically bars the prosecution of the rest. More than that, the war spirit and the national organisation it demands and imposes are the most effective obstacle to their realisation in peace. That has been recognised in effect by the International, though not so clearly as it might be, because the cult requires that everything shall be viewed in the obscuring mist of Marxian dogma which postulates an economic explanation of all human action and traces all existing social ills to 'capitalism.' War, as one of them, is attributed to the same cause, and socialists are called upon to oppose it on that ground. There is some revolt against the dogma among socialists who dare to think for themselves and are not content to repeat formulas laid down by the Priesthood. Mr. Hyndman is one of them. Though a professed Marxian he is not a blind disciple, and he criticises the economic dogma both on philosophical and on historical grounds. He sees that economic antagonisms cannot explain all historical situations, and in particular all wars. 'The antagonisms of

* Details are given, and the whole question discussed by Mr. Adolphe Smith in a letter to 'The Times' (September 11, 1917).

'race, of religion, of custom, and so on, have brought about 'some of the most terrible conflagrations the world has ever 'seen.' He says that socialists are divided into two camps on the subject, and M. Gustave Hervé has said the same thing. He calls them the German and the Latin schools of culture. The former hold that the present war is due entirely to capitalism; the latter, recalling the fact that there have been great wars long before the appearance of capitalist society, hold that it is a war of nationalities and of the balance of power, like others before it.

The point is not merely academic; it has a bearing on the current peace manœuvres. Mr. Hyndman calls the German camp the minority and the others the majority, and further says that the view of the former is contrary to the decisions of the international congresses, that of the latter in accordance with them. This is hardly borne out by the resolutions about war, which always begin by reciting the Marxian formula. Even the informal conference of Allied Socialists, held in February 1915 in London, adopted the same procedure. It passed a resolution which began:

'This conference cannot ignore the profound general causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous product of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society, and of the policy of colonial dependencies and aggressive imperialism, against which International Socialism has never ceased to fight, and in which every Government has its share of responsibility.'

M. Hervé, quoting this declaration, adds the expressive ejaculation 'Ouf!' He attributes it to the German culture, 'which has dominated the International for twenty-five 'years,' as it certainly has. The practical point is that the formula, by laying the responsibility for war on 'capitalist 'society' and incriminating all the governments, so far exonerates Germany as to put her on the same level as all the rest, and covers up the behaviour of the German socialists towards the war. It is being assiduously used now for that purpose.

But the German socialists cannot escape by that door. The pledges of the International are absolute whichever theory of the causation of war is maintained, and they have been solemnly repeated over and over again.

The earlier congresses, of which some account has been

given above, were largely occupied with the internal composition of the International, and though the questions of war and peace were not neglected they did not take first place until the congress of 1900 in Paris, at which the president, M. Jaurès, expressly mentioned in opening the proceedings the organisation of international peace as the most important question on the agenda. An anti-war resolution was unanimously adopted, declaring—after a preamble recalling previous resolutions which had 'condemned militarism as 'one of the most dangerous results of the capitalist social 'order'—

'(1) That it is necessary for the Labour Party in each country to oppose militarism and colonial expansion with redoubled effort and increased energy.

'(2) That it is absolutely necessary to reply to the alliance of the bourgeois classes and the governments for the perpetuation of war by an alliance of the proletarians of all lands for the perpetuation of peace—that is to say, to give up more or less platonic demonstrations of international solidarity and adopt energetic international action in the common struggle against militarism.'

The energetic action proposed in pursuance of this resolution comprised the education of the young, organised simultaneous protests and voting against military expenditure. The last took this form: 'Socialist members of Parliament shall 'always vote against any expenditure for the army, the navy 'or colonial expeditions.'

The position so defined in 1900 was reaffirmed at subsequent congresses, and notably in 1907 at Stuttgart, where it formed the chief item on the programme. A long resolution was unanimously adopted, and was thought so important that it was taken for the material of a pamphlet published by 'L'Humanité,' the socialist daily paper conducted by M. Jaurès. This resolution is quoted in full by M. Boulanger in his indictment of the German socialists set out in the volume at the head of this article. A version will also be found in Professor Sombart's book. Some salient passages may be extracted. It begins with the usual formula about capitalism:

'The congress confirms the resolutions of previous international congresses with regard to the fight against militarism and imperialism, and repeats that the campaign against militarism cannot be separated from the general campaign against capitalism. Wars between capitalist States are in general the consequence of their

competition for the markets of the world, for every State seeks not only to secure its own markets but also to capture new ones, mainly by the subjugation of foreign peoples and the seizure of their territory. . . . Wars are fostered by national prejudices which are systematically cultivated in the interest of the ruling classes in order to divert the proletarian masses from the duty they owe to their class and to international solidarity. Wars are therefore the very marrow of capitalism, and will cease only with the suppression of the capitalist system, or else when the magnitude of the sacrifice in men and money demanded by the development of military technique, and revulsion against armaments shall force the people to abandon that system. . . . For these reasons the congress deems it the duty of all workers and their parliamentary representatives to oppose naval and military armaments with all their might—thereby emphasising the class character of bourgeois society and the motives which impel it to maintain national antagonisms—and to refuse all financial support to that policy. . . . The International cannot lay down in advance fixed plans of action, which must necessarily vary for different countries according to time and circumstances ; but its duty is to intensify and co-ordinate as far as possible the efforts of the working class against militarism and war. . . . The congress declares that if a war threatens to break out it is the duty of the working classes in the countries affected, and the duty of their parliamentary representatives, with the assistance of the International, to take concerted action and do their utmost to prevent war by all the means which seem to them appropriate, and which naturally vary according to the intensity of the class war and the general political situation. In case war breaks out, nevertheless, it is their duty to intervene to bring it promptly to an end, and to utilise with all their might the economic and political crisis created by the war in order to stir up the lowest sections of the population and precipitate the overthrow of the capitalist régime.'

The last sentence has a very instructive bearing on current events, but the central fact is the studiously vague terms in which the duty of socialists is stated on the eve of war. They are to do their utmost to prevent it, and use every means which they think fit. Some members, and noticeably French members, wished to go much further and lay down definite measures, such as strikes, desertion by soldiers, and refusal of duty ; but the congress, at which the Germans preponderated, refused to adopt this course. The vague resolution, which committed them to nothing, was a German resolution, and drafted by Bebel. He was an honest man and had repeatedly suffered for his convictions. In 1870, though he did not vote against the war credit, he did not vote for it, and later

he protested vigorously against the prolongation of the war after the surrender of the Emperor Napoleon and against the annexation of Alsace, for which he went to prison. But he was a confessed opportunist. At the annual meeting of the German Socialist Party at Jena in 1905, he enthusiastically recommended the general strike as a socialist weapon. Five months later he took exactly the opposite line, and at the annual meeting at Mannheim in the same year (1906) he opposed a resolution in favour of a general strike to prevent Germany from going to war with Russia. He said that it was impracticable, and that the idea of a general strike on the eve of war was 'puerile.' He did not say this to the International at Stuttgart, and the foreign 'comrades' there probably knew nothing of what had happened at Jena. They accepted with customary docility the German lead, and adopted a resolution which gave the impression that the Germans would go any lengths to prevent war, but left them free to do as little as they pleased.

M. Vandervelde contributed an article on this congress to 'The Times' (September 12, 1907), which showed that he was hoodwinked. He admitted the disagreement between the German and French members, but minimised it and excused the vagueness of the German attitude by the difficulties of their position. He thought the terms of the resolution might have been clearer and more precise, but took an optimistic view, and fortified it with a valiant remark made by the Austrian leader, Dr. Adler:

> 'We Germans are not fond of empty threats. We prefer to go further than our promises. We cannot, and will not, say what we should do if the case arose, but you may rely upon it that we should act with as much energy as anyone else.'

Those words were prophetic. When the case arose, 'we 'Germans' did act with as much energy as anyone else—in favour of an aggressive war against Serbia, involving the deliberate destruction, without any provocation whatever, of M. Vandervelde's country.

The comedy was repeated at Copenhagen in 1910 at the next congress. Here the British section took the lead, with French support, and pressed on the congress definite action against war. They recommended a general strike, especially

in war industries. Again the German comrades, led by Herr Ledebour, opposed the proposition, and the congress obediently rejected it. In short the German socialists played the same game in the International as the German diplomats at the Hague.

In 1912 the International Bureau called a special congress in view of the Balkan War. It met at Basel towards the end of November, and in spite of the inconvenient time of year was well attended by continental members, and particularly by the French. All the Balkan States were represented, but the British contingent was very small. The congress opened with impressive ceremonies, thus described in the Socialist Year Book:

'From all parts of Switzerland socialists and trade unionists sent deputations, and led by the Young Socialist League, and accompanied by an immense procession with bands and banners, the delegates marched to the old Minster, which the authorities had granted, and amidst ringing bells filed into the cathedral. . . . Meanwhile, on the great square in front of the Minster, addresses were delivered from four platforms to an immense throng, whose cheers re-echoed inside the cathedral.'

The writer adds: 'This is the first occasion in history that 'a Christian cathedral has been made the sanctuary of inter-'national democracy and the secular advent of peace on earth.' In the light of what has since happened it sounds ironical; and indeed the delegates must have been secretly amused, being with very rare exceptions avowed atheists and open scoffers at Christianity. The congress composed a long manifesto, which was novel and interesting in that it laid specific commands on the socialists of the several countries in turn. After reciting the Stuttgart resolution quoted above, the manifesto announced the unanimity of socialist parties and trade unions of every country in the war against war. It called on the socialist parties to push their action vigorously by every means which seemed to them appropriate, and assigned to each its particular task.

The Balkan socialists were to compose old enmities, oppose the violation of the rights of others, and declare the fraternity of all the Balkan peoples, including the Albanians, Turks, and Rumanians. The Austrians were to continue their energetic opposition to any attack on Serbia, and strive to secure self-government for the Southern Slavs. The Austrians and

Italians were to oppose every attempt of their governments to draw Albania within the sphere of their influence. The Russians were to fight Tsarism and all military policies. But the most important task lay upon the Germans, French, and English. They were to insist that their governments should refuse all support to Austria and Russia, keep out of the Balkans, and maintain a strict neutrality. If Turkey's military collapse broke her power in Asia Minor, they were to oppose with all their power a policy of conquest there. The greatest danger to the peace of Europe being the artificially excited antagonism between Great Britain and Germany, it could best be allayed by a limitation of naval armaments and abolition of the right of capture at sea. The manifesto ended by reciting the inevitable formula about the capitalist world of exploitation and murder, and the proletarian world of peace and union among the nations.

M. Boulanger drily observes of the details condensed above : ' One might call it the history of actual events parodied by ' an ironist assuming a prophetic rôle.'

The International foresaw the dangers clearly enough, and if the ' proletariate,' in whose name it professed to speak, had really stood for ' peace and union among the nations,' they could have been averted. But what happened ? The Balkan peoples, for whose benefit the congress was called and who were enjoined to lay aside their national antagonism, promptly set to work to cut each other's throats—a business they are still carrying on. Yet they can hardly be called typical capitalist States. In the same year (1913) the German socialists, who had long dominated the International as the sacred caste of Levi and guardians of the true faith, were put to the test in their own country. The German government—then preparing for the present war—proposed a large increase of the standing army. The socialists issued a pamphlet, ' Sozialdemokratie und Militärvorlage,' denouncing the proposal, and declaring that as representing the German people they desired an understanding with England, friendly relations with France, pressure on Austria by the German government to secure tolerable relations with the Balkan States, and incidentally decent treatment of its own Slavs. They were in favour of a purely defensive national militia, but would grant nothing for the class army of militarism—' not a single

'uniform button.' The Bills came on in the Reichstag. The Socialist Party voted against the Army Increase Bill, but for the Finance Bill which provided the money for it. There was a division of opinion among them, but the majority were in favour of passing the Bill, on the ground that it contained democratic taxation. They were apologetic about it in their report to the annual general meeting of the Social Democratic Party at Jena in September 1913 (the jubilee of the party), but hinted that if their efforts in the Reichstag did not come up to expectation, they might have had more help from the rank and file. However, the main fact is that, after swearing they would ne'er consent to provide a single button, they consented to provide everything.

Another episode earlier in the same year must be mentioned. At Whitsuntide an inter-parliamentary conference of French and German deputies of all parties was invited to meet at Berne by some Swiss colleagues. The French responded in large numbers and in good faith; of those who attended eighty-three were non-socialist deputies. On the German side there were only six, four of them members of the People's Party and the other two Alsatians. The conference passed a unanimous resolution, declaring that the vast majority of both peoples desired peace and so forth. The socialists of course played an active part, and had a joint motion on the agenda setting forth the attitude of the 'class-conscious inter-'national proletariate' towards war. So the word-spinning went on—and the preparations for war. The German pamphlet mentioned above admitted that the new French Army Act was only the consequence of the German measure.

To pass on to 1914 and the events immediately preceding war, what of the Austrian socialists, whose country took the first decisive step? How did they fulfil the task assigned them by the Basel congress? They issued a manifesto on July 25 on the very eve of war. After pointing out the extremely critical situation and the terrible consequences of war, they went on to reproach the Serbian government with its behaviour towards Austria, and condemned the Serajevo assassination. They recognised the right of Austria to demand the prosecution of the murderer's accomplices, and to obtain guarantees for the security and tranquillity of its dominions, but were convinced that these demands would not be resisted

by Serbia, and that all Austria's requirements could be satisfied by peaceful methods. They maintained that neither political interest nor prestige compelled or authorised Austria to abandon the path of peaceful agreement, and repudiated all responsibility for war. The responsibility rested with those 'who on both sides of the frontier provoked and unchained 'it.' A weak and halting production with no suggestion of action.

And the German socialists? They issued a manifesto condemning the Austrian ultimatum and calling on the German government to put pressure on Austria to keep the peace and, if war broke out, to take no part in it.

'Comrades, we summon you to popular meetings; we bid you express in huge gatherings the unshakable will to peace of the conscious proletariate. . . . The ruling classes, who in peace enslave you, despise you, and exploit you, desire to make you food for cannon. Let your cry everywhere ring in the ears of the government—"We do not want war! Up with international reconciliation!"'

The German correspondent of 'L'Humanité,' Comrade Grumbach, writing from Essen on July 30 in the course of a tour through the great industrial centres, told his French colleagues that a profound hatred of war prevailed. He had indeed heard small knots of young men singing patriotic songs, but he had seen other things of far greater significance—formidable meetings, demonstrations of the working classes, such that he could hardly believe his eyes. That very evening he had had before him an immense and vibrant crowd, and he declared that no name was so loudly acclaimed as that of France, and no statement more warmly applauded than that of France's will to peace and the necessity of her defending herself if she were attacked. 'No one can deny,' he concluded, 'that the socialist demonstrations are truly grandiose 'and produce a great impression. Day by day the German 'Social Democracy mobilises hundreds and hundreds of 'thousands of men for the preservation of peace.' M. Boulanger observes of this communication, 'It would be difficult 'to create for oneself more illusions.'

Meanwhile the International Bureau held a meeting at Brussels on July 29, at which French, Belgian, German, Austrian, British, Italian, and Russian representatives were

present, besides those from neutral countries. The Spanish representative, by the way, was Fabra Rivas, who had lived some years in Germany and knew the German socialists intimately. He has since published a book, in which he takes the same view as M. Boulanger, and roundly accuses them of double dealing and treachery. The Bureau unanimously adopted a declaration urging more intense demonstrations against war and in favour of settling the Austro-Serbian dispute by arbitration. The German and French delegates undertook, the one to put greater pressure on their government to control Austria, the other to do the same in regard to Russia.

Herr Haase, for Germany, denounced Austria in the roundest terms. If she had been capable of good faith, he said, the Serbian reply would have assured peace ; but she willed the war. Austria counted on Germany, but the German socialists denied that the proletariate was bound by secret treaties, and the German proletariate forbade Germany to intervene, even though Russia did. 'Let our enemies take care ! It might be 'that the people, enraged by so much misery and oppression, 'would awake at last and establish the socialist society. Yes-'terday in Berlin thousands and thousands of proletarians 'protested against war with cries of Up with peace ! 'Down with war !' The Bureau, on the motion of the German delegates, decided that the forthcoming congress, which had been fixed for August 23 at Vienna, should be held in Paris on August 9 !

The French at least were not entirely deceived by all this play-acting. On July 25 the Belgian trade unions held their congress at Brussels. There were present, no doubt by invitation, M. Jouhaux, secretary of the Confédération Générale de Travail (the French trade union organisation), and Herr Legien, who occupies a corresponding position in Germany. In the presence of witnesses M. Jouhaux asked his German colleague : 'What do you intend to do to avoid war ? Are you prepared 'to take any action ? We are ready, on our side, to march at 'your call, or to march simultaneously.' Herr Legien made no reply. 'What is one to conclude ?' wrote M. Jouhaux of this incident in the 'Bataille Syndicaliste,' 'is it possible to 'draw any other conclusion than that on the other side of the 'Rhine nothing will be done to oppose the war ?'

He was right, but further attempts were made to deceive

the French socialists. On August 1 an envoy from the Executive Committee of the German Social Democratic Party arrived in Paris to discuss the situation, with a view to mutual information and common action. This was the Deputy Müller. He brought with him a Belgian socialist to guarantee his good faith, and he gave his French comrades clearly to understand that in no case would the German socialists vote for the war credit in the Reichstag, that the majority were in favour of voting against it, and if they merely abstained it would be in order to preserve unity of action with the French. The object obviously was to induce the French socialists to refuse support to their government. German troops were even then on the point of invading Luxembourg and crossing the French frontier. But the ingenious Müller endeavoured to anticipate the effect on the French by arguing that the distinction between attack and defence was obsolete, because the war was due to general causes, capitalism and all that. This is, perhaps, the most impudent argument of all.

On August 2 German troops crossed the frontier, on August 3 the Kaiser declared war, and on August 4 the German socialists voted *en bloc* for the war credit in the Reichstag. As for the German 'proletariate,' which was holding those formidable meetings and was so thoroughly mobilised against war, we have the accounts of many eye-witnesses, from Dr. Poutsma to Mr. Gerard, describing the delirious enthusiasm with which war was hailed by the populace. And their accounts are confirmed by the German newspapers of that date.

So the New International collapsed still more decisively than the Old. What conclusions can one draw from its history? The most salient fact is that the very men who most influenced it, who furnished its principles and guided its counsels, were those who destroyed it in the day of trial. They abandoned their own principles, threw international solidarity to the winds, supported war and the capitalist-imperialist interests which cause it according to their own declarations, shouted *Deutschland über alles* with the rest, and approved every deed of horror done under that motto. The most charitable interpretation is that they deceived themselves. They live on theories and formulas—old theories and empty formulas, based on a misreading of facts by a man who spun his theories

first in the study and fitted his facts to them afterwards. They have never been able to supply themselves with new ones, but have hypnotised themselves by incessant repetition of the old. There are new ones, but the German socialists and the International under its influences have refused to recognise them and have clung to their worn-out dogmas. They have certainly deceived themselves, but that does not explain and still less excuse the complete turnabout they have executed, their subservience to forces they have formerly denounced, their condonation of everything most abhorrent to their own principles. There is a remnant which has not done this and has not bowed the knee to Baal. Their separation from the majority of their party shows up the majority in a more lurid light. Their leader, Karl Liebknecht, has publicly accused the German government of having plotted and brought about the war. His action was futile, but it proved his faith. The point is not that the socialists might have prevented the war, but that when the time came they did nothing to prevent it.

And if they deceived themselves, still more did they deceive others. For years they led the International by the nose. Mr. Hyndman, who still holds by the Marxian dogmas and is a competent witness, says that for many years the New, like the Old, International had suffered from the dictation of the German Social Democrats, and their special friends from Austria, Holland, and Scandinavia. They carried things with such a high hand that once he was driven to suggest that the rest of the world should hold an independent congress of their own. 'German predominance had even then—some years 'ago—become a nuisance and a danger.' And as they tightened their grasp the trade union element, which alone had any substance and could be said to represent the 'proletariate,' fell back. Mr. Adolphe Smith, who as official interpreter throughout has watched the whole process, says: 'No sooner 'did the German ascendancy make itself felt than the trade 'union element was gradually eliminated, so that to-day 'it is reduced to a minimum' ('The Times,' September 11, 1917).

The truth is that the German socialists shared the arrogance and will to domineer of the other Germans. They despised

their foreign colleagues and freely said so in private, as the writer can testify. They despised them just as German military and scientific men despised all other military and scientific men. And they used the International to spread the German idea. It was a form of 'peaceful penetration' quite on a par with the commercial and financial manœuvres. And it found readier dupes. In its name the Germans utilised them up to the outbreak of war, as we have seen; it utilised them during the war and is still making pawns of them in the attempt to secure a peace agreeable to Germany. They began working on the neutrals, touring here and there, holding meetings and conversations, writing Pauline epistles, all in favour of Germany, not of the 'international proletariate.' No sooner had the original German campaign broken down at the Marne than socialist conferences began to be held in neutral countries in favour of peace. There was one of Swiss and Italian socialists at Lugano at the end of September 1914; a second of Dutch and Scandinavians at Copenhagen in January 1915. These meetings presented a family likeness strongly recalling the familiar features of the German International. The war was attributed to capitalism, for which 'bourgeois' society was equally to blame in all the belligerent countries, and the 'proletariate' was called upon to demand peace by negotiations. The Copenhagen conference uttered a protest against the violation of Belgian neutrality, but so feebly as to excite the scorn of Gustave Hervé, who roundly accused both conferences of merely obeying the word of command from Berlin. When the neutral socialists call for peace, he said, they are nothing but the docile echoes of Germany. Then came the London conference of February 1915, to which reference has already been made. French and Belgians were present, and a more energetic protest was made against the invasion of Belgium and France. The victory of German imperialism would be, it was declared, the defeat and ruin of democracy and liberty in Europe; compensation for Belgium was demanded, and the principles of no annexations and the freedom of nations to decide their own destiny laid down. But even here the German influence crept in and obscured the issue by referring the war to general causes and capitalist society.

In September 1915 an attempt was made, at the instance

of Italian socialists, to hold a more international meeting at Zimmerwald in Switzerland. It was not called by the International Bureau, but was rather an endeavour to replace that body. It was attended by individual socialists from a number of countries, including France and Germany, which were represented respectively by two syndicalists and two or three members of the minority section of German socialists. Only the Italian Socialist Party was officially represented; even the Swiss took no official cognisance of the meeting. Unanimous declarations were adopted demanding the complete restoration of Belgium, and binding the signatories to work for a lasting peace based on national liberty and no annexations, whether open or disguised. So far as any attention at all was paid to this harmless meeting, it was officially repudiated or adversely criticised by socialist parties in belligerent countries. The fiasco emphasised the bankruptcy of international socialism.

The only other attempt to revive it that need be mentioned was the Stockholm project, which suffered still more complete miscarriage, not through the opposition of governments or the refusal of passports, but through the resistance of trade unions and the inability of Allied socialists to come to an agreement. Whether or not this abortive proposal was inspired by pro-German sympathies, it was favoured by the German government, and the German majority socialists openly boasted of the influence they would exercise at the conference on enemy colleagues. They had good reason to believe they could twist them round their fingers, and with some, eager to be twisted, they would have succeeded. With more they would have failed; the cleft is too deep, and the conference would have come to nothing. Humpty-Dumpty has fallen from the wall and lies broken on the ground.

In conclusion, what of the future? Though the New International is as dead as the Old the idea is not, and the war may eventually provide conditions favourable to a third attempt. That will depend on the course of events which cannot yet be foreseen. But if anything is to come of it, both the spirit and the substance must be different. It must be an affair of the 'proletariate,' not of middle-class socialists. That is to say, it must be formed and run by organised labour, not in name but in fact; and there must be some real solidarity about

it. The International was a make-believe. It professed to represent the solidarity of the 'class-conscious proletariate,' but there was precious little proletariate and no solidarity. As a British delegate put it once, they brought up the heaviest artillery loaded with apple-dumplings. It was a debating society of theorists, who could never agree the moment they approached any practical question, and who did not belong to the class they professed to represent. Sir W. Gilbert created no more whimsical piece of topsy-turvydom than the solidarity of class-conscious proletarianism exhibited to the world by a company of lawyers, authors, journalists, professors, civil servants, teachers, capitalists, and employers shouting out rival theories in a babel of tongues. And their solemnity made it all the more ludicrous. Their intentions were excellent, but the performance was a farce.

A. SHADWELL.

## THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES

DESPITE the concentration of public thought and energy upon the war, certain problems, passed on from times of peace, continually thrust themselves forward, and demand solution of difficulties often augmented by the conditions which have prevailed during the last three years. One of these problems is presented by the Insurance Act. Two years pre-war experience of this measure had already shown that it was seriously defective; the medical service was unsatisfactory, and was bringing a section of the medical profession into disrepute; the administration was costly and cumbersome, and the financial position of many Approved Societies was unsound. These defects have been increased by the withdrawal of a large number of medical practitioners for service with the army, and the growth of claims for sickness benefit is causing grave anxiety to many Societies. The Government has already come to the rescue, and has partly relieved Societies of the cost of soldiers and sailors disabled in battle. But this can only be regarded as a stop-gap measure, and it is generally recognised that a sweeping reform of the entire Act cannot be long delayed.

When, however, we begin to consider what changes should be effected, we find it impossible to confine our attention to the Insurance Act alone. There is scarcely a branch of the public health services which is not connected in some way with the Insurance Act, and any effective scheme of reform which touches one branch must extend to all. The question of a national medical service must be considered, and the establishment of co-ordination among the central authorities engaged in public health administration, and still more among the local authorities, is an essential condition for the success of any scheme. The object of this article is to outline a scheme for the complete reorganisation of the public health services, and to consider what functions should be discharged by a central public health office or Ministry of Health, and what are best left to be administered by local authorities. As a

preliminary step it is necessary to examine the present system, with a view to noting the main obstacles which militate against sound public health legislation and administration.

A critical study of the steps which have been taken to improve public health during the last twenty or thirty years shows that many of them have failed to achieve their object, owing to lack of knowledge, or inadequate investigation of the problem to be dealt with, or of the suitability of the measures it was proposed to apply. The science of hygiene is complex: new discoveries are constantly widening its boundaries; research continually shows us that views which yesterday seemed established for all time must to-day be abandoned for better-founded theories, to be themselves replaced in their turn as knowledge steadily advances. But the average legislator does not realise this; he is always a stage behind the scientists, clinging to views which they have discarded. He measures the health of a people by their death-rate, with happy unconcern for the principles of 'standardisation,' and he would learn with surprise that France and Ireland, although their crude death-rates are several points above the English rate, are actually healthier countries than England.

The layman regards all reductions in disease as the result of sanitary and medical science: small-pox was killed by vaccination, typhus has disappeared because we have swept away dirt and overcrowding in our large cities (!), tuberculosis is being robbed of its terrors by better housing, schemes of notification, prevention of infection and sanatoria. That these diseases have disappeared or declined in areas and countries where none of these wise steps have been taken is conveniently ignored, and our debt to Nature for a process of immunisation, so ably described by Archdall Reid, Metchnikoff, and others, is never acknowledged. Prevention of infection is regarded as the great weapon in the attack on infectious disease, hence the disinfection of patients and houses, and the demand for notification and isolation of those affected, regardless of the fact that the isolation of patients in fever hospitals has had little appreciable effect in reducing the prevalence of scarlet fever or diphtheria.

Much of our public health legislation is the outcome of fashionable fads. Thus at the present time it is highly popular to ascribe infant mortality to maternal ignorance and neglect,

a theory very comforting to the wealthy owner of slum property where the majority of deaths occur. The drawing-rooms of Mayfair discuss this theme alternately with that of venereal disease. Hence the demand for more and more health visitors, schools for mothers, ante-natal clinics, notification of births Acts, and maternity benefits. Lord Rhondda promises to save a thousand babies a week by the establishment of a Ministry of Health, and if the drawing-rooms had their way we should enforce notification of pregnancy. But the truth is that excessive infant mortality is the result of a vicious environment. Scientific investigations show that on the average the children of all classes are born equally healthy, and it is the foul air, dirt, and overcrowding in all our large cities which causes so many of the infants of the working classes to die. The babies of the agricultural labourer thrive better than those born in the wealthiest parts of Kensington, Westminster, and Chelsea, and the badly-housed poverty-stricken peasants of the West of Ireland show a lower rate of infant mortality than is to be found in any other part of the British Isles. We can save a thousand babies a week, but we shall not do it by maternity centres, even if we make them as numerous as public-houses : we shall only do it by a policy of wholesale clearing of slums and formation of open spaces in towns, which will take many years to complete.

Popular views on public health unfortunately too often determine the trend of legislation, and it is in this direction that the absence of expert investigation, such as might be supplied by a Ministry of Health, is most severely felt. A Public Health Bill may be introduced in Parliament by a minister who has no special knowledge of the subject, and has not held any of the offices connected with public health administration. If his department has a medical adviser, he may or may not have consulted that officer, or he may have overruled his opinion. The Bill passes through a House in which there is a mere handful of medical men, most of whom have not been closely associated with public health. When it becomes an Act, its administration is entrusted to a government department in which medical opinion is strictly subordinated to that of lay civil servants and lawyers. From first to last the measure may have received no real expert criticism, and we are bound to recognise that such criticism as may be directed towards it

from outside, even by medical bodies, is more often inspired by fear of threatened vested interests than by genuine concern for the public welfare.

Many instances could be given of the way in which measures intended to improve national health have led to little but fruitless expenditure, owing to the fact that they were attacking the particular problem on the wrong lines. We may take the school medical service as the first example. A good many years ago the report of the Committee on Physical Deterioration and other investigations showed that the physical condition of a large proportion of the school children in this country was deplorable, many thousands being stunted in growth, badly nourished, or suffering from defects of the eyes, nose, throat, or ears. Accordingly in 1907 an Act was passed providing for the medical inspection of school children, the object being to detect ' incipient defects,' it apparently being assumed that as soon as a defect was noticed steps would be taken to have it corrected, although no facilities for medical treatment were provided under the Act, and the examining medical officers were debarred from undertaking treatment. The futility of these proposals would readily have been shown by competent scientific investigation. We now know that defectiveness begins in children long before they reach the school age; and when the children come up for their first examination at school, the officers, who were to detect incipient defects, find that at least fifty per cent. of the children are suffering from the effects of rickets in earlier years, malnutrition, adenoids, and other physical defects. Then when a large amount of irreparable harm has been done, a half-hearted attempt is made to correct the condition.

Equally fallacious was the belief that treatment would necessarily follow inspection. Statistics show that only about half the children who are recommended for treatment actually receive it. Here also it is customary to ascribe the failure to the neglect of parents, but, while admitting this as a factor, we learn from the reports of many school medical officers that children are not receiving adequate treatment, simply because the facilities for that treatment do not exist. About one-third of the total school population comes under medical inspection during the course of the year, and of those found defective about one-third are ultimately classed as ' remedied.' Hence it follows

that out of the total mass of defectiveness, the school medical service is only correcting one-ninth in the course of the year. It is admitted that there has been substantial improvement in cleanliness among school children, but how small has been the total effect of the school medical service upon the great mass of serious disease and defects may be judged from Sir George Newman's statement in his report for 1915–16, eight years after the passing of the Act. He says: 'Not less than a 'quarter of a million children of school age are seriously 'crippled, invalided or disabled; not less than a million 'children of school age are so physically or mentally defective 'or diseased as to be unable to derive reasonable benefit from 'the education which the State provides.' Of 1,900,000 children who were examined in 1913–14 in England and Wales, no less than 650,000 were found to be suffering from diseases or defects needing medical treatment.

The cardinal error underlying the whole scheme is the belief that medical treatment can be made to compensate for the effects of a bad environment. The fact now recognised is that a large part of the medical treatment is useless, and always will be useless, so long as the surroundings of the children in pre-school years are defective, their homes insanitary, the playgrounds inadequate, and the schools built in crowded and noisy districts. Sooner or later our legislators must learn the lesson that the sweeping away of insanitary conditions in overcrowded districts is the *only* way of combating preventable disease effectively.

The National Insurance Act provides us with still more striking instances of errors which need never have been made had its introduction been preceded by efficient investigation. Some of the mistakes could have been pointed out by any doctor with experience of general practice, as, for example, the assumption that sickness rates would be the same for men and women, or that pregnancy could be disregarded as a cause of sickness. But the worst errors could have been avoided by careful study of the experience of Germany where national insurance had been in force for many years. This was not done. It is true that Mr. Lloyd George visited Germany in 1910, and on his return he issued from the Treasury a 'Memorandum of Opinions of various Authorities in Germany,' consisting of a number of statements from German employers,

all praising the principle of national insurance. It contained no evidence that public health had been improved in Germany by national insurance, and was in no sense a scientific document. The principle of National Insurance was however adopted in this country without further investigation, though critical study of the German vital statistics would have shown that Germany was the last country to which we should have gone for lessons in public health. Although the average age of the German population is lower than that in this country, the general death-rate had for many years been considerably the higher; the infant mortality rate from 1901 to 1912 averaged the appalling figure of 184 per thousand births, as compared with 121 for the same period in the United Kingdom; the death-rate from tuberculosis after many years of sanatorium benefit, extending not only to insured persons but to their dependents, was fifty per cent. higher than that in this country where no special efforts had been made.

Perhaps the history of sanatorium benefit exemplifies more than any other part of the Insurance Act the need for careful study before a popular view can be accepted as correct. Treatment of the tuberculous in sanatoria was commenced a good many years ago, and the early results showed a considerable degree of success. In due time something in the nature of a boom arose over this form of treatment, and when speaking in the House of Commons in 1911 on sanatorium benefit, Mr. Lloyd George said:

'A good many remedies which after years of struggle have managed to secure the approval of the profession have come to stay, and the case of sanatoria is a case of that kind. It is not something which has been suggested within the last few years. It is something which was suggested a good many years ago—I forget how many; but I am not sure it is not forty or fifty years ago when an English doctor tried the experiment. It has been a long experiment, and it has gone through the same stages as every other successful experiment. It has taken very many years to convert the faculty, and it is only because the experiments extending over a good many years have been a success that doctors have been at last convinced that there is a good deal to be said for it. I do not therefore put it in the same category as a sort of fashionable craze. It is something tried and tested by the most severe test of all, the test of experience extending over something like two generations.'

Unfortunately the conclusion that because sanatorium treatment had proved useful in a limited number of selected cases,

it was applicable to a whole working class population, has proved entirely erroneous, as indeed the results in Germany—the only place where the experiment had been tried on a large scale—would have shown if they had been examined. The earlier encouraging statistics were based upon numbers too small to permit of reliable deductions; moreover, they related mainly to persons belonging to the wealthier classes, who after their period of residence in the sanatorium were in a position to modify their whole manner of life if necessary in order to maintain their health. A few warning voices were raised against the excessive optimism displayed, but they were overruled. Now we hear the same tale of failure from tuberculosis officers and medical officers of health in all parts of the country. Insured persons suffering from tuberculosis are taken away from a bad environment to a sanatorium, where they improve in health and increase in weight; after a few months' sojourn in the sanatorium they return to the smoke-polluted atmosphere of overcrowded towns, where after a longer or shorter interval the disease almost invariably recurs. Great play can be made with statistics comparing the condition of patients on admission to sanatoria with their condition on discharge described as 'cured,' 'improved,' 'disease arrested,' and so forth, but deductions from these statistics may be exceedingly fallacious. When the history of these same patients is investigated two or three years later, a large proportion of them are found to be dead.

The usual reply is that these results are due to the wrong type of case being admitted, sanatorium treatment being only beneficial in early and specially appropriate cases. This is perfectly true, but it merely shows that the extravagant anticipations which were made as to the results that sanatorium benefit would produce were illusory. We have spent many millions in making this discovery, yet the failure could have been foretold by anyone familiar with the etiology of this disease, and there can be little doubt that had the money been devoted to attacking the environmental causes of tuberculosis it would have been put to much better purpose.

We might go successively through the leading provisions of the Insurance Act, and show how each has failed to achieve its object, either because it was based upon an erroneous

conception, or because its administration has been assigned to persons unfamiliar with the science of public health. The medical service which was to provide 'adequate' treatment for all workers has proved, in fact, to be an inferior form of the club-practice, which had long been as roundly condemned by members of the medical profession as by others; the extraordinary value attached to the provision of drugs—two out of every nine shillings for medical benefit being devoted to this purpose—savoured of the quack medicine vendor; the system laid down by the Commissioners for the keeping of medical records by panel practitioners to increase our scientific knowledge of disease is unexampled for ineptness. A particularly good example of futile legislation has been afforded by section 63 of the Act, which makes factory owners, water companies, local authorities, and others liable to pay the cost of extra sickness among insured persons, when it is proved that the extra sickness has been due to their failure to comply with public health regulations or precautions. This clause has never been put into operation, and there is little likelihood that it ever will be, for the simple reason that its application depends upon the ascertaining of certain sickness rates which it is practically impossible to obtain, though want of space forbids demonstration here of the grounds for this assertion.

The foregoing examples of errors and miscalculations in Public Health Acts and in their administration have been described in some detail, in order to emphasise the supreme importance of greater investigation into the fundamental causes of disease, and into the soundness of the methods advocated for their reduction. If a Ministry of Health is created, continuous research into the problems of public health should be regarded as its most important function. An Act for improving national health, if based upon unsound premises, will infallibly add one more to the list of failures, no matter how well it may be drafted or how excellently administered. The establishment of a department for research in public health should be the means of widely extending knowledge, and should prevent further unsound legislation which is certain to end in disappointment.

To anticipate likely criticisms, it is desirable to particularise more fully the type of research which it is proposed should be undertaken by the department. Speaking broadly, there are

two lines of research in medical and public health science. One of these is by observations at the bedside and by experiments in the laboratory; the other is by the collection and study of large masses of statistics. The first type of research is generally directed towards discovering the immediate pathological cause of a single disease or symptom, or the effects of a particular line of treatment, and is often best performed by a single independent observer or group of co-workers. The Research Committee, the Universities, various learned societies and other organisations are already doing much valuable work of this kind, or are disbursing grants for the purpose, and nothing is to be gained by interfering with this work, or placing it in any way under the control of a government office.

The second form of research can only be carried out adequately by a central department, which has power to prescribe returns from local authorities and to determine the form in which statistics must be compiled. It is the type of research most seriously deficient in this country. At the present time ten or a dozen annual reports are issued by government offices dealing with various branches of public health, and scarcely any two of them, even when issued by the same office, agree in their scientific nomenclature, or in the period of time covered by the return, or in the geographical unit, or in the age periods into which the classes of persons are divided. The result is that often they cannot be used together, and their value both individually and collectively is seriously diminished. To give but one instance: deaths from infectious diseases are tabulated in one volume, the annual report of the Registrar-General; cases of infectious disease in another report, issued by the Local Government Board, and if we wish to use the two reports together in order to determine the *case* mortality in any district, we cannot do so for a large number of areas, because the geographical units do not coincide.

The most complete and reliable statistical work in public health at present conducted in this country is that carried out by the Registrar-General for births, deaths, and marriages for England and Wales. The report on the distribution and causes of death issued annually by his office is probably the best of the kind published in any country, and it provides the foundation of a large part of the statistical work issued by

other government offices. The comments on the trend of diseases, which form the first part of the volume, are distinguished by a lucidity and freedom from bias refreshing to find in a government publication. It is suggested, therefore, that the office of the Registrar-General should be enlarged, so as to form the one central statistical office for all matters relating to public health, whether it be called a Ministry of Health or not. The office should take over the whole of the scientific and statistical work in public health at present performed by the Local Government Board, the Insurance Commissioners, the Home Office, and the Board of Education. It should receive reports and returns on public health from medical officers of health, school doctors, factory inspectors, etc., all over the country. Staffed by experts in every branch of medical science and hygiene, it would form in effect a permanent Royal Commission on public health, and its great function would be to study continuously the causes and distribution of disease, and to issue monographs from time to time on the best methods of reducing these evils.

No other government department has so good a claim to undertake these duties as the office of the Registrar-General. The Research Committee could not do it, for it is not a ministry, and has no power to prescribe returns in order to secure that uniformity which is essential for the collation of statistics. The Insurance Commissioners have displayed singularly little concern for the interests of public health; among the many hundreds of circulars, orders, and other documents which they have issued, there has not been one dealing directly with the causes and prevention of sickness. The record of the Local Government Board is almost as discouraging. The Poor Law branch of this office, with the control it can exercise over the Poor Law Infirmaries throughout the country, might have supplied us with statistics relating to sickness and disease which would have been of much assistance when the Insurance Act was under consideration, and would probably have prevented some of the worst mistakes in that measure. But except for a brief return of births in infirmaries, it issues no medical or scientific report. An argument against making any of these departments a critical investigating authority arises from the fact that they are responsible for the administration, and often for the initiation and success,

of the measures about which they report. The result is that few of the government Blue books are unbiased: nearly all of them exhibit a tendency to gloss over deficiencies for which the department might be held responsible, and to exaggerate the value of their work in improving public health. The Registrar-General is the only authority who does not risk condemnation of his own department by adverse criticism, and his cold hard facts alone give us an accurate picture of the real state of public health.

The scheme outlined above for the functions of a Ministry of Health differs from that generally proposed, which provides for uniting all the public health activities of the various government departments; either under an enlarged Local Government Board or the Insurance Commission, or in a new department altogether. But it is doubtful whether this would result in the improvement of administration which is claimed for it. Probably the ministry would fall into a number of separate branches, among which there would be as much friction and lack of co-ordination as there is among the present government departments, though it would be less obvious to the public eye. We have an example of such a development in the Local Government Board, which was formed in 1871 to take over the medical staffs and duties of the old Poor Law Board, the General Register Office, and most of the medical duties of the Privy Council. This union proved to be little more than one in name, for the Poor Law and Public Health branches of the Local Government Board have always remained separate and distinct, and the Registrar-General seems to have no other relation to the board than the fact that he addresses his annual report to its president. Incoordination among the government offices is worst in the matter of statistics, and if these were unified by transference to a single department, as proposed above, the most serious element of discord would be removed; and if, as will be suggested later, the powers of local authorities be increased, the Local Government Board, Home Office, Insurance Commission, and other authorities might be left to discharge their remaining duties undisturbed. In any case we must have separate staffs dealing with matters so distinct as: health of school children, conditions in factories, water supply etc., and the mere bringing of these separate staffs under one roof

would at the best be no more than a simplification and economy in internal administration.

We will now examine the question of local administration in public health, which presents very different problems. Here we can find strong reasons for advocating fusion of the different services engaged in preventive and curative measures. We are dealing now with the actual problem, i.e. the persons who require medical treatment, and it is no longer a question whether a number of clerks and officials who issue regulations shall be housed under one roof or several, but whether a number of sick people living in the same district and more or less subject to the same conditions shall be divided up into distinct classes, such as paupers, insured persons, school children, factory operatives etc., and their medical needs provided for by different systems and institutions, with the result that there is wasteful overlapping in some directions and big gaps in others. At the present time the following local bodies are engaged in some form or other of public health work. The Local Sanitary Authority in county boroughs is responsible for general sanitation, and has duties in connexion with infectious diseases, tuberculosis, venereal disease, infant mortality etc., which are carried out by the medical officer of health assisted by a staff of inspectors and health visitors. In urban and rural districts these functions are divided between the District Council and the County Council. The Boards of Guardians maintain infirmaries for sick paupers; provide outdoor medical relief through a staff of poor law medical officers; and undertake public vaccination. The Insurance Committee administers medical benefit under the Insurance Act, but must consult or act in conjunction with a number of other bodies, such as the Local Medical Committee, the Panel Committee, and the Pharmaceutical Committee. Sanatorium benefit is administered by a combination of the Insurance Committee and Local Sanitary Authority, which has led to endless confusion and delay. The Local Education Authority provides for the medical inspection, and to some extent for the treatment of school children, and has duties in connexion with schools for mothers. Besides these statutory authorities, there are numerous non-official bodies engaged locally in important public health work, such as the voluntary hospitals, pro-

vident dispensaries, care committees, nursing associations, maternity charities, and other philanthropic organisations. In London the confusion is increased by the division of power between the London County Council and the twenty-eight metropolitan boroughs, while additional authorities are the Metropolitan Asylums Board and the Port of London Sanitary Authority. The effect of all these separate bodies working without co-ordination, each as it were in a water-tight compartment, is to produce confusion and delay in administration, which is demoralising to the official, wasteful of public money, and harmful to the best interests of the public. Reform of the local medical and sanitary services is in fact a far more pressing need than alteration in the central departments or the establishment of a Ministry of Health, and the urgency is all the greater since the war will leave us with many thousands of totally and partially disabled soldiers who will still require medical treatment.

We may now consider the form which a reorganised local service should take. In the first place, we must clearly have a single unified medical service available to all classes in each district, and this involves the future of the panel system and the question of a national medical service. The panel system has undoubtedly proved disappointing. In many districts, particularly poor-class urban areas, practices have been allowed to attain an excessive size, and the medical attendance is often of an inferior character. No facilities are provided for obtaining the opinion of a consultant or services of a specialist, nursing is not available, and the opportunities for X-ray examination or pathological investigations are seriously inadequate. It is agreed that the system must be substantially modified, and the proposal which finds most favour is that of establishing a national medical service, administered either by the Insurance Commission or by a Ministry of Health. The great argument against a centralised medical service, however, is that it takes no notice of variations in local conditions and needs. It applies uniformity where diversity exists. The causes of disease, the type of disease, the amount of disease, and the methods required to cure or prevent it, vary widely from locality to locality. The general death-rate in the county boroughs of the North of England is nearly double that in the rural districts of the South ; the

infant mortality rate in 1914 was 158 in Burnley and 57 in rural Oxfordshire ; tuberculosis is essentially a disease of overcrowded urban areas ; syphilis is primarily a disease of large seaports and after these of industrial towns, many country practitioners not seeing a case from one year's end to another. The extent to which the incidence of sickness varies in different localities may be judged from the fees earned per attendance by panel doctors. The system of payment is by capitation fee for each person on a doctor's list, and so much does the demand for medical treatment vary, that in the denser parts of crowded towns the average fee per attendance often works out at only 1*s.* 6*d.* or 2*s.*, whereas in healthy rural districts the doctor may receive as much as £20 an attendance, and in one case a doctor was actually paid £76 although he only attended one patient.

The proposal of the writer then is, that we should abandon the idea of a rigid, uniform, medical service run from Whitehall, in favour of local medical services varying in character from district to district, according to the needs of each locality. The local service should be administered by a single authority, or ' Local Health Council,' as we may term it for the sake of clearness, in each county and county borough, which should replace all existing official authorities engaged in providing medical treatment, and should take over from them their institutions and medical staffs. The County or Borough Council would transfer its sanatoria and hospitals for infectious disease to the new Council. The Poor Law authority would hand over its infirmaries, its medical staffs for outdoor medical relief, and its duties in connexion with public vaccination, the Boards of Guardians ceasing to have anything to do with the treatment of the sick, and restricting their attention simply to the problem of able-bodied pauperism. The Local Education Authority would transfer its school clinics, maternity centres etc., and its duties in connexion with the medical inspection of school children. The Insurance Committee as such would disappear, being merged into the new Local Health Council. Thus the Council would start already partially equipped with a variety of institutions, and it should have power to add whatever was necessary in order to establish a complete clinical service, and to combine, where desirable, with neighbouring Councils in the joint use of hospitals, sanatoria, and convalescent homes.

Local autonomy in the medical service provides a degree of elasticity which cannot exist in a centralised system. This would be particularly advantageous in the non-institutional part of the scheme, which could be varied indefinitely. In a crowded poor-class neighbourhood a salaried whole time service, including both general practitioners and consultants, would probably be found equally satisfactory to patients and doctors. Such a service has been in operation at Swindon for many years among the 43,000 or so employees of the Great Western Railway and their families, and has been highly successful. In another type of district it would only be necessary to supplement private practice by appointing a certain number of salaried medical officers ; in scattered areas arrangements could be made with private practitioners to attend outlying hamlets ; and in yet others the doctor might be guaranteed a minimum income, or provided with a motor or a house on the lines adopted by the Highlands and Islands Medical Board. Different systems of payment would be available, and would enable the remuneration of a doctor to be adjusted broadly to the time and services he gives. Besides doctors and hospitals, the Local Health Council should be empowered to provide nursing and midwifery services with lying-in homes, and facilities for X-ray examinations, pathological diagnosis, and other refinements of scientific medicine.

The position of the voluntary hospitals in this scheme remains to be considered. There is one school of social reformers which has long advocated the taking over of the voluntary hospitals by the State. But the arguments for this course are not convincing. Hospital administration has attained so high a level of excellence in this country that we should be very chary of interfering with it. Management of a large hospital in which the interests and wishes of patients, doctors, nurses, and subscribers have all to be kept in view is no easy matter, as anyone familiar with hospital organisation knows. Yet considering the number, size, and variety of the hospitals scattered all over the British Isles, it is remarkable how few and far between are instances of inefficient treatment, malversation or waste of funds, and nepotism in the making of appointments. From the administrative point of view there is no reason to place the hospitals either under Whitehall or under municipal authorities.

Nevertheless the voluntary hospitals, while preserving their

independence, must form an integral part of the scheme for a local medical service, and it is suggested that the Local Health Council should have power to contribute to the funds of the hospitals in return for the Managers agreeing to provide a certain number of beds for the Council, or to treat certain classes of diseases. The objection usually made to subsidising the hospitals is that public money is spent without public control. But as a matter of fact this is a purely theoretical objection, for the large hospitals are for all practical purposes already public institutions. Their accounts are strictly audited, and if the Local Health Council had power to inspect the books and satisfy itself that the money allocated was actually spent for the purpose agreed, it would have discharged all its obligations to ratepayers. The principle of subsidising the hospitals is already to some extent in operation in the arrangements made by local authorities for the hospital treatment of school children or cases of venereal disease, but the authority has nowhere stipulated for a voice in the internal administration of the hospital. If the Local Health Council included representatives of the managers of the voluntary hospitals, the making of arrangements between the two bodies would be much facilitated.

The scheme for a local medical service outlined above entails considerable alterations in the Insurance Act. All forms of medical treatment being provided by the Local Health Council, medical and sanatorium benefits would no longer be necessary, and they could be completely taken out of the Act, contributions of insured persons being correspondingly reduced. Maternity, sickness, and disablement benefits would then remain to be administered by Approved Societies as means of assisting sick or incapacitated persons during a period of stress. Such assistance is exceedingly useful, but has little direct relation to the prevention or cure of sickness. These steps alone would substantially simplify both the local and central administration of the Insurance Act. The local medical service should be open to all classes of the community, the distinctions between insured and non-insured persons, school children, and children below the school age, disappearing. Difficulties with the doctors over interference with private practice would be reduced to the minimum through the variations permitted in the local arrangements. It must be remem-

bered that the poorer the district and the greater the need for medical services, the less likely are these difficulties to arise. In the better class districts automatic adjustment would probably occur, persons who could afford to pay continuing to seek the advice of private practitioners, just as they send their children to private schools, though the national system of education is open to all.

So far we have been considering a scheme exclusively for the treatment of sickness, but the writer would go a step further, and in the county boroughs at all events place the whole of the local sanitary service in the hands of the Local Health Council, the Local Sanitary Authority disappearing, and the medical officer of health becoming the chief adviser to the council in public health matters. Thus we should have in every county borough two local authorities—the Local Health Council, concerned with the whole domain of public health, both preventive and curative, and the Borough Council, responsible for all other municipal activities. In most directions the division of functions between the two authorities would be sharply defined, particularly in regard to the medical services; but there are certain matters, such as housing and town-planning schemes, which, while closely pertaining to public health, demand also consideration from other points of view, as they may involve heavy expenditure, interference with vested interests and rights, and questions of compensation. To avoid overlapping, these matters should be referred to a standing Joint Committee, one half appointed by the Borough Council and the other by the Local Health Council. As regards finance, since it would obviously be inconvenient to have two authorities levying rates, it is suggested that the Local Health Council should prepare its annual budget and present it to the Borough Council with a statement of reasons for the proposed expenditure. If the Borough Council approved, it would impose the necessary rates; if it did not approve, the question should be submitted to the standing Joint Committee, and then failing agreement, it should be referred for decision to the Ministry of Health, acting in conjunction with the Local Government Board.

In the counties it might be desirable to leave certain public health duties to the Urban and Rural District Councils, acting in conjunction with the Local Health Council for the county,

but the question here is not nearly so pressing as in the county boroughs, which are the great centres of preventable disease.

In the earlier part of this article we considered a scheme for simplifying central public health administration by transferring the whole of the scientific and statistical work of the different departments to a Ministry of Health, leaving, however, certain administrative functions still to be performed by the Local Government Board and other offices. We are now in a position to see how central administration could be still further simplified, by transferring some of the remaining functions to the unified Local Health Council which it is proposed to create. It would demand too much space to consider in detail the distribution of these functions between local and central authorities, but broadly speaking the principle should be that what is uniform over the whole country should be administered by a central department, and what varies from district to district by a local authority. Thus while we take medical and sanatorium benefit away from the Insurance Commission, we find no reason against leaving that body as the ultimate authority over Approved Societies in regard to regulations governing sickness benefit, since there is but one criterion for the payment of this benefit in the Shetland Islands or Shoreditch, viz. incapacity to work. For similar reasons it is unnecessary to interfere in any way with the work of the Central Midwives Board, which examines and registers midwives, and lays down regulations for their conduct of cases; or the General Medical Council, which exercises disciplinary control over the medical profession and keeps the medical register; or the duties of the Home Office in prescribing sanitary conditions in factories and regulations for dangerous trades. On the other hand, the medical functions of the Board of Education, and of the Poor Law branch of the Local Government Board, would be transferred to local authorities.

The determination of what infectious diseases should be notified, and the prescribing of regulations to control any epidemic, must still be centralised, for it is clear that with any threatened epidemic it might be necessary to enforce special precautions simultaneously over a wide area. These duties might with advantage be assigned to the Ministry of Health. Regulations intended to ensure the purity of milk and to prevent adulteration of food and the sale of unsound

meat must be made by a central authority, and our laws for these purposes require both strengthening and simplifying. At present adulteration of food is widespread, and the penalties inflicted upon dishonest vendors are often far too light. Failure to repress undesirable practices results partly from the complexity of the law, and partly from the existence of different standards in different localities, and variations in magisterial opinion as to what constitutes unfitness of food for human consumption. Again and again the Local Government Board has called attention to the fact that an emaciated beast, which would not be allowed to be sold for food in one area, is driven into a contiguous district, where vigilance is less strict, and there disposed of. Control of the sale and advertisement of patent and proprietary medicines was advocated by the Select Committee on Patent Medicines, which issued its report in 1914. Such control if established should be exercised by the Ministry of Health.

One effect of the above proposals should be noticed. They would increase the responsibility of each locality for the cost of its own sickness, a principle to be encouraged, since it tends to stimulate local activity in the prevention of disease. At the present time healthy localities are paying part of the cost of sickness in unhealthy districts both through taxation and through contributions under the Insurance Act; and since death-rates are higher and practically all forms of disease are more prevalent in urban areas, particularly industrial towns, than in rural districts, the ultimate effect of grants from imperial funds is to impose a tax upon rural industries for the benefit of towns, and this though agriculture is the worst paid form of labour, and rural industries those which of all others we ought most to encourage. A good instance is afforded by the recent arrangements for the treatment of venereal disease, 75 per cent. of the cost of which is to be borne by the Treasury. These diseases, as we have seen, are most prevalent in seaports and industrial towns; nevertheless rural districts, which are almost free from them, are compelled through taxation to pay part of the cost of their treatment. Treasury grants for the erection and part maintenance of sanatoria, and the special parliamentary grant of $1\frac{3}{4}$ millions for medical benefit, afford other examples.

Again, Approved Societies find that sickness rates are very

considerably lower in rural than in urban districts. Hence the flat rate of contribution invalidates the whole principle of insurance, which demands equality of payment for reasonable equality of risk. Rural dwellers pay an unfair share both directly through their own contributions and indirectly through the Government additions to the contributions which are derived from taxation. Broadly speaking, it may be said that in England the rural south is paying for excessive sickness in the industrial north. The fact that most large Societies consist of both rural and urban members does not affect the argument, for it is the gain on the rural members which compensates for the loss on town members and helps to keep the Society solvent. By taking medical and sanatorium benefit out of the Insurance Act, and making each locality pay the cost of its medical service, we should do much to correct this unfairness, and we should give ratepayers a direct interest in securing healthy conditions in their locality in order to reduce the cost of the medical service.

The objection most frequently urged against increasing the powers of local authorities is that these bodies are apt to be neglectful of public welfare, and unduly mindful of vested interests. As a general charge this cannot be substantiated. Most of the larger local authorities are now fully alive to their responsibilities, and in many county boroughs are displaying marked zeal and energy in attacking the causes of disease and improving the conditions of health. The necessity they are under of having to obtain approval from a central authority before they can initiate various schemes of reform often hinders rather than assists their progress. It is true that some local authorities—more frequently the smaller ones—are supine in public health matters, but we most emphatically do not avoid this evil by centralising the services, for a central authority may display neglect and incompetence as great as that of any rural district council, and its influence is far more widespread. If the provision of medical treatment under the Insurance Act had been assigned to local authorities, we should have had good services in some areas and bad in others. As it is, with the administration subject to central control, we have an inadequate service all over the country.

To sum up then: we picture in the future a Ministry of Health—preferably to be formed by enlargement of the Registrar-General's office—constituting a great public health

statistical department, continually investigating the causes and distribution of disease, and subjecting to expert criticism all public health measures before they are introduced in Parliament. Centrally administered also—preferably by the Ministry of Health, but possibly by the Local Government Board and other departments—we have Acts for the prevention of food adulteration, for notification of infectious diseases, regulation of sanitary conditions in factories, and other matters which should be uniform over the whole country. Locally, we have in each county borough a single health authority responsible for maintaining sanitary conditions within its area, and charged with the duty of providing for all classes of the communitya medical service, including hospitals, sanatoria, treatment by general practitioners, lying-in homes, midwives, nurses, pathological laboratories, and other adjuncts necessary to secure treatment consonant with the present high level of medical science.

It has not been possible to give more than an outline of the above proposals, and the writer is well aware that they are open to adverse criticism in various directions, but no scheme can be suggested which is free from difficulties. The proposals here made seem to the writer those most calculated to reduce bureaucratic control to the minimum, and to give the people themselves a direct interest in improving local conditions. Sweeping reform of the public health services cannot be long delayed, for the paramount importance of securing a healthy population is now realised by all. But whatever scheme be adopted, let us beware of anticipating too much from mere administrative changes. The best medical service possible is but a palliative, and permanent improvement in the nation's health will only be achieved by destroying the great environmental causes of disease. We do not need a Royal Commission or Ministry of Health to tell us what these are. By far the most malign influence is overcrowding and bad housing in London and the large industrial towns. By all means let us have an improved system of public health services, but do not let us forget that no number of volumes of statistics or of hospitals and health visitors will compensate for lack of sunshine and fresh air in slums. A healthy people can only be bred in a healthy environment.

WILLIAM A. BREND.

# THE WAR AND THE NAVAL OFFENSIVE

**La Guerre Navale et L'Offensive.** By CONTRE-AMIRAL DEGOUY. Paris: Librairie Chapelot. 1917.

AFTER more than three years of war at sea we are in a position to estimate the amount of the success, or the depth of the failure, which has been the reward, or the punishment, of the use we have made of our naval resources. For a reason to be shortly stated in its proper place I do not say only 'the use we have made of our Fleet.' Yet the fleet goes in the forefront of the war. We see it plainly before us. We know that without it there can be no safety, and will be no victory. The question whether we have employed it to the best purpose stands as a preliminary in any attempt to make a survey of the war at sea so far. It is notorious from newspaper comment, parliamentary debate, and the freedom of private discussion that there are many who answer the question in the negative. Mr. Kennedy Jones spoke for no inconsiderable body of opinion when he asked a certain question and made a certain statement in the House of Commons during the debate on the adjournment for the Autumn Recess on August 16th last.

'Assuming Germany's determination to continue, do you believe, in the face of the submarine menace, that the passive pressure your Fleet now exerts is the best help it can give to achieve victory in a reasonable time? Is not some change in your present scheme of naval operations desirable? . . . Let me make my first question perfectly clear. At present the submarine has broken down our traditional naval strategy. The Fleet existed, as I conceive it, not merely to win battles. The ultimate purpose of the Fleet was to make blockade possible for us and impossible for the enemy. All that has gone. To-day we are in the position of a Power with overwhelming naval strength, unable to obtain that command of the sea which our preponderance ought to give us.'

Though there is no necessity to show that Mr. Kennedy Jones does not speak for himself alone, his statement of the case may be supported by a reference to a noteworthy article contributed to the 'Revue des Deux Mondes' of July 15th by

the eminent French naval critic, Contre-amiral Degouy. He named it 'Les Opérations Conjuguées.' The French admiral's purpose was to show that the 'passive pressure' now applied by the allied naval forces could not be relied on to reduce Germany by cutting off food and other necessaries soon enough to save the Allies themselves from being crippled by 'l'épuisement matériel' and 'l'abatement moral.' The British member of Parliament was content to pose the question, and wait for the answer which was not given. The French admiral pointed out what, in his opinion, would be a more excellent way, but did so in terms so vague that only a very indistinct impression of what it is he wished to see done was left on the reader's mind. A great ox treads on the tongues of British members of Parliament and French naval critics alike. Yet they make their meanings sufficiently clear. In their opinions enough has not been done with our fleet, and more remains to do. When such a belief prevails, and is avowed by responsible and competent voices, it is surely not superfluous to look behind us, and around us, for such evidence as we can find for our guidance before we make up our own minds.

Nothing in the conduct of discussion is more commendable, not even good humour and fair play, than to make the meaning of your questions and your statements clear. Indeed, there is no fair play when you fail to comply with that condition. The best security that you will succeed is to be very careful in using your terms in a definite sense, and always in the same sense. We shall clear the ground if we can decide what is meant by our 'traditional naval strategy,' which it seems has broken down. The much-employed word strategy, which, as it is now commonly used, came late from the land 'which 'produced one Kant with a K and the many cants with a C,' is not so true a term of art that it can be safely assumed to bear a definite meaning, and the same definite meaning, to all. I will predicate that it means—the use of our naval resources so as to develop their power to the utmost for the purpose of defeating that part of the enemy's power which it is most profitable for us to overthrow; so that it shall, either directly or incidentally, protect what must be safeguarded in the whole body of our national activity and possessions under penalty of crippling loss; so that victory shall give its full harvest; so that defeat in any particular operation shall not

of need amount to more than a check or temporary set back, and shall not entail disaster as its inevitable consequence. Since it is said that there has been failure, it is not irrelevant to try to show, in the fewest possible words, what has been done in former ages. When we have done that we shall be in a better position to gauge how far there has been a break-down of our 'traditional strategy' in this war.

Well, to begin with, Englishmen have always understood that the most effectual way to prevent an enemy from damaging us by invasion, or otherwise, was to attack and destroy him wherever he could be found. The tendency, natural to human nature, to seize upon some particular man and deck him with the glory of creative wisdom—the tendency which made our fathers credit Alfred the Great with the foundation of the University of Oxford and the invention of the English jury—has misled some among us into seeing wonderful originality in the advice which Drake gave in the years before the Armada. Drake saw nothing which had not been as clear as the light of an unclouded sun to those Englishmen who in the reign of King John sailed with William Longsword to prevent Philippe Augustus from invading England by assailing and destroying his ships at Damme. The men of the Cinque Ports who, by the guidance of their mother-wit, saw instinctively that the most effectual way of making sure that Eustace the Monk should do no harm in their country was to fall on him and make an end of him before he got there, knew in 1217 the essentials of all that was known to Drake, to Hawke, or to Nelson. They manœuvred to gain the weather gauge so that their arrows and the lime they threw in front of them should fly with the wind. They, in fact, made a rational estimate of the conditions in which they had to work, and having first calculated, they then bore down on the enemy with 'Upright Will and Downright Action.'

Individual officers and particular governments have failed, but the prevailing spirit has ever been that of William Longsword, of Hubert de Burgh, and of the men of the Cinque Ports. To destroy the enemy's forces wherever they could be reached was, save in stupid intervals, known to be the great point which carried the little points with it. How the work was to be carried out, with what wealth or lack of means, with what measure of continuity, and with what approach to

completeness, those were details which depended on the nature of the ship and the resources of the nation. The ship developed slowly through the centuries, and the nation grew from generation to generation and by degrees. But the principle was always the same, though the seamen of later times have been provided with instruments which allowed them to make an incomparably better application thereof than was possible in earlier ages. When the enemy could not be found and beaten at sea, or when though defeated he was not destroyed and might still be dangerous, then he must be watched and kept in port as closely as the sea-keeping powers of the ship of each age allowed.

Given that the great point has been achieved, then the little points have been incidentally gained. The free movement of our commerce is in itself a very great matter, but the task of giving it direct protection was a subordinate part of the Navy's work. The great fleets made it possible that the main streams of commerce should continue to flow, because by driving the adversary into port they prevented him from cutting a trade route permanently. At the same time, and incidentally, they blocked the road to the main streams of the enemy's commerce. It might creep along the coast from the protection of one battery to another, but it was suspended on the ocean save for some scattered and fortunate adventurers. Voltaire says in his 'History of Louis 'XV.' that French privateers were far more successful in taking English and Dutch vessels than their privateers were in taking the French—but then he goes on, there were far more English and Dutch merchant ships at sea than French to be taken. That is the whole Iliad in a nutshell. We drove French commerce off the sea. They vexed and injured ours, but without stopping its flow.

It is very necessary to bear this in mind when we are told that the successes of German submarines demonstrate the breakdown of our 'traditional strategy.' The implication is that in former times we escaped all such loss. Nothing is less true. We can put aside for a moment the question of the degree of our present loss and the reasons why it is greater than was the case in past times. The immediate point is that we always did lose in that way even when our 'traditional strategy' was most successful. If command of

the sea means that you can prevent any single ship from reaching the open sea and doing harm, we never had it save in the very exceptional case of the Crimean War.

Our command was never more complete than in the closing years of the Seven Years War, and after Hawke had destroyed the Maréchal de Conflans' fleet in Quiberon Bay on the 20th of November 1759. Yet in 1762 a vigorous French naval officer, the Chevalier de Tiernay, passed the blockade of Brest in a fog with a small squadron, escaped pursuit, reached St. John's in Newfoundland in June, and landed a detachment of French troops, commanded by the Comte D'Haussonville. He took the town, burnt fishing stations, and did much damage. If he had been content to reship his soldiers and be off quickly, it is possible that he would have got back without loss. But the French Government probably wished to hold the place for the purpose of having something to exchange when peace should be made. D'Haussonville was left at St. John's till British forces collected, and he was compelled to lay down his arms. Yet in September Tiernay eluded the watch of the British ships which had collected to pin him in—again in a fog—and returned safe. He claimed that coming, staying, and returning, he destroyed 460 British merchant ships, and one corvette he caught at St. John's. The total was swollen by including a fritter of fishing boats, but he undoubtedly did considerable harm.

If we had not other matter to attend to it would be easy to quote a score of similar commerce-destroying cruises carried out in spite of our command of the sea to the fall of Napoleon. Before we conclude that our ' traditional strategy ' has broken down, we have to prove that the undeniably large, and to us painful, measure of success attained by the German submarines has been due to some misuse of, or some failure to make full use of, our fleet. If such failure as there has been can be accounted for (as I propose to endeavour to show that it can) by another cause, then there has been no ' breakdown ' in that sense.

It is common property that certain combined operations undertaken in the present war have ended in defeat. The Antwerp gamble and the Dardanelles failure are notorious. But can anyone lay the blame for the first on the Navy? As for the second, may we not say that it was a repetition of

many passages in our history: of the failure of the Duke of York in the Low Countries; of Nelson's useless attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife, which was useless because he was not allowed the co-operation of the troops he well knew to be necessary; of the loss of General Fraser's soldiers in Egypt; of the successive surrenders of Beresford and Whitelocke at Buenos Ayres; of the idle parade of Duckworth at Constantinople? All these undertakings were of the same kind as the Gallipoli expedition, though none were on the same scale. We need not go into these examples of ill-thought-out and ill-adapted tries for successes, and that for a very simple reason. The failure of twenty combined operations in which the function of the Navy is to carry troops to a coast, land them, supply them, and if retreat becomes necessary, then to bring them away, does not in the least affect our command of the sea. Antwerp and Gallipoli had no more effect in that way than had the surrenders of Fraser, Beresford, and Whitelocke. And we are here concerned only with the command of the sea. Have we fallen short of maintaining it? If so, to what extent? And for what reason? These are the questions.

The answer to the first is easily given. We have maintained that command, not indeed to the unprecedented degree of fullness that we have prevented our enemy from getting to sea at all, but in the only rational sense the term has ever borne. There has never been an interval in which we have not been able to transport troops oversea, supply them, and where we believed withdrawal to be necessary, then to bring them away. That the sending was ill-advised, and the retreat not justified, may or may not be the fact. It is relevant when we are to discuss the general conduct of the war. It is irrelevant when we are considering the command of the sea. The most silly of combined operations is impossible without that command. Meanwhile the main streams of our commerce have never been dammed, while the oversea trade of Germany on the great oceans is at an end.

Yet command is not an absolute term. Or to put the case in another and perhaps more accurate way, command and the use made of command are distinct. A power may be timidly employed, and therefore not operative to the full possible extent. It is open to anyone to maintain that our handling of our undeniable superiority has not been so energetic, so

searching, as it might have been. There are undoubtedly many who are of that opinion. None of them, I take it, none at least who need be considered, will quote the cruise of the 'Emden,' or the operations of the German Pacific Squadron as proofs of failure on our part. German naval forces which were in distant seas when war broke out had as a matter of course a certain interval of freedom to act allowed them. It could not be otherwise. Captain von Müller and Admiral von Spee made a vigorous, even a brilliant, use of their opportunities. Yet the time allowed them was but short, and other German cruisers had no better fortune. The complaint, which may conceivably have a foundation of truth—which at least is not absurd on the face of it—is that here in these seas of Britain, and especially in one of them, the North Sea, and in the Baltic, full use has not been made of our naval forces. Now, as the four seas of Britain are the very foundations of our dominion of the sea, failure in them means failure more or less complete everywhere. It must surely be obvious to everybody, indeed a mere platitude, that if we can so use our fleet as to destroy all the ships the Germans have in their ports, and deprive them of the use of those ports, then let the war on land rage as it may, there will be for us and our Allies peace and security on all seas. But can we ?

It is a problem one has to approach with modesty and caution. Both are imposed on us by weighty considerations. An unprofessional critic must needs, unless he belongs to the race of the Greek pedant who lectured Hannibal on the art of war, offer an opinion with diffidence. Even so there are other reasons for reserve. Many facts necessary for the formation of a secure judgment are very properly hidden while the war lasts. Many are but partially reported. Free interpretation, even of what we know, is not always lawful. We have to go feeling the wall as in blindness or fog, and unsure whether we are free to name what we think we detect by touch. Yet professional men state their views and give their reasons. The rational mind of man can weigh, and deduct. Certain great truths stand out and we may estimate them.

We betray no secrets, we run no kind of risk, if we begin by laying it down that all depends on two preliminary questions. Is it humanly possible to follow the German ships into the recesses of their 'strengths,' their fortified places, and to destroy

them there? or give them the alternative of perishing like rats in a hole or coming out and making a bold bid for victory, or, if victory be hopeless, still of selling their defeat dear? We hear of a 'school' which answers in the affirmative, and of another which replies in the negative. As usual, names are found for both. Sir Reginald Custance is named as the *capo di scuola* of those who say Yes, and Sir John Jellicoe we are told instructs those who say No. We do not know with what authority either assertion is made. Sir John Jellicoe, to the best of our knowledge, has never expounded his views. Sir Reginald Custance has written frankly, and it would be in every sense of the word impertinent in a lay critic to say with what knowledge and insight. But nothing in his writing goes to show that he would always approve of the decision to 'go at 'them,' regardless of the circumstances. Speaking generally, we hardly understand how there could be a school of men of sense which is always for going ahead and another which is for always going softly.

Was Wellington wrong when he would not give battle to Massena in order to save Ciudad Rodrigo, because he held that victory would be useless to him since he could not replace losses, and his enemy could be instantly and copiously reinforced? Was Hawke wrong when he followed Conflans into the frightful dangers of the Breton coast at Quiberon? Would he have been wrong if his fleet had perished in the act of destroying the enemy, as it well might? Both surely did well. Wellington with his small, costly, and irreplaceable British army, his still raw Portuguese regiments, and his uncertain Spanish allies, could not afford to be a general at ten thousand men a week. Sir Edward Hawke knew that the fleet he saw retreating before him was the only fleet France had. If it could be destroyed her naval power would be withered to the roots, and a menace taken away from his country. Behind him and his fleet were other British admirals and other British squadrons. Therefore he could be sure that even if he perished and every ship which obeyed his signals was to be shattered on the reefs, so long as he also destroyed the enemy the victory would not be too dearly bought. He turned inside the Cardinals late on a November afternoon, in a rising westerly storm, and took all the hazards of the night and the rocks, prepared if need be to die with his enemy. Wellington and Hawke did not

act differently. Each did the same thing. Each reasoned and acted on the facts before him. And is it not idle to suppose that in the diverse and wavering conditions of war there can be any universally applicable rule of conduct, except that you must estimate the facts with care, and conform your conduct to them?

Now the dominating fact in the North Sea when war began was that to rush at the German fleet and naval stations would have been a venture in which nothing would have been sure, except that the loss of the attacking side must needs be very heavy. We have been privileged to hear much in the way of inquiry and speculative solution as to 'what Nelson would 'have done.' There is one thing we may be quite sure of, he would not have 'taken the bull by the horns.' He positively refused to take that 'offensive' course when he led the attack on Copenhagen. A front assault on the enemy's position in the German Bay between Heligoland and the mainland would have been a more hazardous taking of the bull by the horns than an attempt to force an entrance into the King's Deep past the Trekroner Battery.

It is manifest that the Germans were taken by surprise when they found that the British Empire did intend to act the part of a principal in the war. But they had long decided on the course they must take in case the British Navy assailed them. That course was stated in the most convincing manner by the German Admiral Breusing, in the speech he delivered to the large colony of his countrymen in and around Bâle in April 1914. The admiral may have taken a very fond and flattering view of the superiority of German guns and gunnery. We think he did. Yet his main contention that a direct attack on a carefully prepared German position guarded by forts, naval guns afloat and ashore, mines and submarines, must needs be exceeding costly was sound. Unless it achieved the entire destruction of the Germans, which was contrary to probability, it could hardly fail to weaken the British fleet and lay it open to a weighty counter-stroke. As things stood in the autumn of 1914 we could not afford to incur a degree of loss, which, even if it did not entail disaster in the North Sea, must weaken our power all the world over. The bull was not taken by the horns, and he would be a rash man who should assert that it ought to have been.

There are better ways of throwing a bull than by laying hands on its horns. The mounted Spanish herdsman will throw it off its legs by planting the point of his goad at the root of its tail and pressing to the side. Was there a practicable way of so using the British naval goad as to throw the German bull? When we look at an ordinary map it would seem that there was such a way, and that it was obvious. Germany has a coast in the Baltic. The Baltic can be entered by the Sound and the Belts. A British fleet stationed in that inland sea would have cut German communications with Sweden—a notable advantage, since it would have shut the enemy off from invaluable sources of supply. Moreover, our naval forces could then have covered an invasion of German soil, and that at points not more than sixty miles or so distant from Berlin. That Germany could have found troops to meet such an inroad is clear, but only by not employing them on the Eastern and Western fronts, or on more distant scenes in Serbia or Turkey. And to tie them down in Pomerania would have been a momentous gain for all of us—British, French, Russian, and Italian. The operation would have been a splendid example of a legitimate naval offensive, and a truly profitable combined expedition.

The desirable is not always the feasible, and a map is a fallacious guide when naval war is the theme. There were substantial reasons why an extension of naval operations to the Baltic was not possible in the first stage of the war. In order to act at once in the inner and outer waters we must have divided our fleet. We will assume for the moment that one-half of our ships could have made their way through the Sound and the Belts, and could have come out in a body at the inner ends of the passages—though these are very large assumptions. Even so, the British fleet would have been divided by such a distance that one-half could not come to the help of the other at need. But because of its possession of the command of the Kiel Canal the German navy can concentrate in either sea. Our numerical superiority, though considerable, was not then so great that we could be equal, far less superior, in numbers on both seas. It would have been a pure folly to assume that the Germans would not concentrate and would not strike where the blow would have been most effective—which beyond

all peradventure would have been in the North Sea. It would have availed us little that one-half of our fleet was triumphantly clearing the way for a combined British and Russian invasion of Pomerania, if the other half had fought a losing, or even only a most costly and dubious, battle with the Germans anywhere in the space contained in a line drawn from the Firth of Forth to the Skaw, and another drawn from the Wash to Terschelling. The thumbs of Germany would have been crossed on our windpipe while our fists were pommelling her well-padded sides, and you cannot pommel to any purpose while you are being subjected to strangulation. A division of forces before a capable enemy who could operate on internal lines was not to be thought of.

Yet what was not feasible in the autumn of 1914 with the forces then available, might have answered later when other resources had been provided. If we throw the, for our purpose, useless map aside and take to the only safe guides—charts, and the commentary on them as written in Admiralty 'Pilots' and 'Sailing Directions'—the least seamanlike of students can see for himself what those other resources must have been. The Baltic can be reached only through narrow, often devious, and in themselves shallow passages, bounded by positive shallows—with the exception of the Kiel Canal, which was and is in German hands. Vessels of light draught, and that in great numbers, would have been needed to overcome the difficulties of navigation and to carry an adequate force. Given the resources of British dockyards, mechanical ingenuity, a reasonable time, and a resolute will, would not all that was needful have been supplied in the early summer of 1915?

One can do little more than state the problem. Knowledge for its solution is lacking. We feel our way in a fog, and we walk on treacherous ashes. The gates of free interpretation are not yet open—and when opened, as they will be in time, it is highly probable that they will never be closed. Historians will be discoursing probabilities, and discussing might-have-beens. There is no end to debate on those terms. We know that an offensive on these lines was advocated in France by so good a critic as Admiral Degouy long ago, and the Russians have made no concealment of their wish that one might be undertaken, if for no other reason than because a powerful allied naval force dominating the Baltic would have covered

the vulnerable right flank of their long line. We have the Dardanelles Report to tell us that a scheme for a naval offensive, very different from the Gallipoli adventure, was prepared, worked for, ardently advocated among us, and was not brought to action. We may safely assume that it aimed at such a ' naval offensive ' as the French and the Russians desired, and then no more need be said. There is futility in debating when knowledge is lacking. We can foresee that while this war is studied and discussed, and it will be when we who are now alive have long been dead, there will always be some who will maintain, and on plausible grounds too, that the failure to carry the war into the Baltic was the real cause of the prolongation beyond the second year. They will assert, and it will not be possible to charge them with absurdity, that this failure to ' take the offensive ' where one would have been decisive was an example of our too feeble use of our command of the sea. They will be opposed by others who will give plausible reasons why success would not have been attainable. There would be no difficulty in stating those same reasons ; but why argue the possibilities of a plan, a hope, a scheme, which was born dead, or strangled at the moment of birth—accidentally and innocently strangled, let us hope, but strangled.

Apart from the greater and more far-reaching offensive to the Baltic, there may have been other and effective attacks to be made in the North Sea. The bull can be struck dead by a blow between the horns if it fall on the right place with adequate vigour. Is there such a point in the German front ? Here again we feel our way in the fog. Questions can be put in strings. Did we do enough at an early hour while we had the opportunity to prevent the Germans from fixing their hold on the Flemish coast ? Was it not in our power to seize some (even one might have been enough) of the islands on the Frisian coast, and thereby give ourselves at least a starting-point for our airships near our enemy ? These are two only of the possibilities which are discussed, and will be. A critic who is on his guard against the common error of taking his own wishes and convictions for evidence will be content with indicating them.

In the meantime we know this much—our command of the North Sea, whether the best use has been made of it or not, has never been shaken by the German battleships, cruisers,

or destroyers. A naval action ought no more to be taken out of its context than a sentence in a paragraph. Anything can be made out of anything by selecting parts and putting them into an arbitrary and what the French call *tendancieux* arrangement. We shall be no further advanced by merely taking the cruiser affair near Heligoland, the other cruiser affair on the Dogger Bank, and the battle of May 31 off Jutland out of their context—that is to say, apart from antecedent movements and conditions, and their consequences. Even the actions themselves are insufficiently known, and the surrounding circumstances are not known at all outside of limited circles. Yet we can affirm without hesitation that even if the German version of these encounters is accepted as sound, if our enemy lost no more than he said he lost, even if, just to abound in concession, we allow that our admirals broke off sooner than was necessary, the fact remains that, after the fighting was over, the enemy went back to port and we kept the sea. Command of the sea is shown when the fleet brings away the wreck of a defeated army, as much as when it took the soldiers to the enemy's shore in the first flush of their hopes and their confidence. The use made of it may have been insufficient or positively foolish, but it remained.

Whether our command of the sea was fully used to intercept German supplies is a question which could not be discussed without going into matters alien to this article, international relations, and the probable effect on neutrals of certain lines of action. The entry of the United States has made a huge difference, and that is now possible which was not advisable when America was neutral, and its neutrality might conceivably have grown unfriendly under provocation. But the full consequences of America's intervention are to come, and we are concerned here with the past.

Those who will have it that there has been a breakdown in our use of the Navy do indeed appear to have a case when they quote the persistent successes of the German submarines. It would be rash to assert that they only seem to be right. Yet there are good reasons for maintaining that there is more appearance than reality of accuracy in their words. One need not make too much of the undeniable fact that in times when our traditional strategy is understood to have worked without check we were sometimes forced to withdraw our fleets, and

our trading ships too, from great spaces of sea. Twice in our history—first throughout the American War (1776–1783), and again in the interval between the retreat of Sir John Jervis in 1796 and the re-entry of Nelson's squadron in 1798—we were compelled to evacuate the Mediterranean. We have been forced to do no more with the Baltic and the Black Sea in this war. Again only a complete and most inexcusable ignorance of our naval history could mislead anyone into assuming that our merchant ships were not liable to capture all through our former struggles. Hostile frigates, sloops, and privateers continued to take prizes from us to the very end. They could be kept down, and the loss they inflicted could be limited so that it did not become intolerable. But their activity never quite ceased so long as they had ports to sail from. When the French lost their islands in the West Indies and the Indian Ocean, and when Java was taken from the Dutch late in the Napoleonic War, commerce destroying was stopped in distant seas. It was never ended in European waters, because the raiders had still ports in which they could fit and refit, from which they could sail, and to which they could return with their booty.

Except that they secure no booty there is no novelty in kind about the submarine commerce-destroying operations of the Germans. Whether there is not in degree is another matter. There is, and to our hurt. Yet here again a sound criticism must make use of the *distinguo*. Has our naval strategy been carried out since 1914 in the same conditions as of old? In past ages we relied on our fleet, our wealth, the product of our commerce, and small armies. Our armaments were subordinated to the predominant obligation not to weaken our commerce or our industry. The very press for the fleet was restricted to seafaring men and vagabonds. Some seamen were exempted from the obligation to serve in the fleet. Masters, mates, a few sailors per ship, some fishermen, all crews of whalers were protected, and so were apprentices during three years of their servitude. There would be no difficulty in finding cases in which naval officers were sued and cast in damages for exceeding their lawful power when they were serving press warrants. Individual ports might complain, and did, that too many of their ships had been taken as transports. But there never was a time when one-half of our whole

merchant shipping was taken from commerce at a blow and devoted to the service of the army.

All parts of a national life act and react on one another. Shipping works for and in co-operation with all other forms of industry—whether for production or for transport. In the past our small armies were in part raised by the press till after the middle of the eighteenth century. Then we had recourse to indirect means of compulsion. But the press was used only to a limited extent for the army, and the indirect compulsion was restricted by so many exemptions, some intended to guard the comfort of the directing classes, others designed to protect industry, that the burden fell almost wholly on the agricultural labourers, then a much larger proportion of the whole people than they are to-day. That there was much in all this that was inequitable, much which was unwise, much which was not truly profitable—all these are tenable propositions. Yet it amounted to a consistent national policy, and one which consciously aimed at keeping our shipping and our industry so safeguarded that they would not only escape being diminished, but could grow. Our merchant shipping doubled during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in spite of a never-ending loss inflicted by French or American cruisers and privateers.

It would be an impertinence to our readers to waste words in asking whether these are the conditions in which the present war has been conducted. We all know, and even boast that they are not. Half our merchant shipping, if not more, has been taken from trade for the service of the many armies in the field, from Mesopotamia to Flanders. Therefore it has been as effectually taken from commerce as if every ship composing it had been sent to the bottom by German cruisers or submarines. On shore, partly by voluntary enlistment and partly by conscription, we have swept men away by the million from all industries, including the two which most directly touch our maritime life, shipbuilding and the transport of goods of every description to and from our ports. Let it be allowed that we had no choice; that we were bound in honour to do as we have done; and that we have wisely incurred present loss in order to secure the permanent good of the State. But these considerations in defence of the course we took do not alter the consequences of that course. When

we are asked to believe that there has been a 'breakdown' in the use of our fleet, we answer that such breakdown as there has been can be quite sufficiently accounted for by the entire change which has been made in a traditional national policy, of which the use we make of our Navy is, and always must be, only a part.

Was it then inevitable that we should have suffered all we have suffered, and should be subject to the suffering which is perhaps to come? We are not compelled to answer in the affirmative. On the contrary, it can be proved that the worst might well have been avoided by a very moderate exercise of foresight and firmness on the part of those who have been responsible for the government of this country. They knew from the first that a large part of our merchant shipping must be taken away from trade for the supply of armies. If they did not know that the portion so taken would be exposed to great risks, must be worn, damaged, deteriorated, and must be replaced, any competent authority would have enlightened them. They must have known that German submarines would be used as commerce destroyers, for they were so used early. They may be excused for not having foreseen the great extension which the Germans would give to the power, and consequently to the range of action, of these craft. Yet after the loss of the 'Cressy' and her consorts in September 1914, it was unpardonable not to realise what a horrible danger submarines were to be. After the sinking of the 'Lusitania' in May 1915, there was no shadow of an apology to be made for those who could not realise that our enemy would be restrained only by lack of means from fulfilling all the prophecies made by Sir Percy Scott just before the war began. Our ministers were informed; they were warned. They had all the experience of the past to guide them. They could not be ignorant that Germany had immense shipbuilding resources, and was well qualified to avail herself of them. They ought to have foreseen that there was no more pressing obligation imposed upon them than to take care that our shipbuilding industry should be left free, and in case of need should be helped, to construct such an amount of tonnage as could replace, or better still exceed, our losses.

What they did we know. It is easily stated. The word

Nothing is enough. In the breezy speech with which he favoured the House of Commons, on the 16th of August last, Mr. Lloyd George (it would be interesting to know whether he was equally cheerful when speaking at meetings when no reporters were present) could yet not help stating certain damning facts. Our output of tonnage, which was just over 1,900,000 in 1913, fell to 688,000 in 1915, and to 538,000 in 1916. In September of that year Mr. Balfour paid his visit to the Clyde yards. There, after confessing in his graceful way that he really knew nothing about matters which ought to be known to any man who comes forward to govern a great maritime State, he allowed, in a burst of confidence, that the Clyde yards ought really to be set to work not only for the Navy, but for the merchant shipping which the Navy has to protect. The old Spanish epigram puts the result neatly :

'Vino su alteza
Y sacó su espada
Y no hizo nada.'

The minister came, made a speech, and nothing happened. In the first six months of this year we built 484,000 tons. What we lost any man can find out for himself, though the Admiralty will not allow the tonnage to be named, by taking the number of ships confessedly sunk and multiplying by the known average tonnage of British merchant ships—an easy thing to discover. Add the loss of neutrals (the Norwegians alone lost twenty-one vessels of over 43,000 tons taken together in August), and we can see why a whole harvest is being eaten by mice in Australia, and imports are diminishing till the Commonwealth and the States composing it, which draw so large a part of their revenues from customs dues, are threatened with deficits. But the causing cause has not been a breakdown of a traditional naval strategy. There has been a neglect of a traditional national policy. The submarines would have failed to diminish our merchant shipping as completely as did cruisers and privateers between 1793 and 1815 if we had built abreast, and better still ahead, of their destructions. We could have done so, and a heavy burden of responsibility lies on those who, having the power to act, failed to make sure that we did.

DAVID HANNAY.

# THE ORDER OF THE HOSPITAL OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM

1. **The Knights of Malta.** By Col. WHITWORTH PORTER. 1858.
2. **The Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem.** By H. W. FINCHAM. Collingridge. 1915.
3. **Malta and the Knights Hospitallers.** By Rev. W. K. R. BEDFORD. 1894.
4. **Rhodes of the Knights.** By BARON DE BELABRE. Oxford. 1908.

IT is singular that even at this moment, when the eight-pointed White Cross of St. John on its black ground is seen everywhere beside the Red Cross of Geneva, few among the general public appear to realise that the Order of St. John of Jerusalem is the most ancient of nursing Orders; and that the St. John Ambulance Association of 1877, and the St. John Ambulance Brigade of 1887, which taught 'First Aid' to the wounded in times of peace, and have done such magnificent work since in times of war, are but the children of an Order older than the Crusades. For the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, commonly known as Knights Hospitallers, formed the first of those Orders of Chivalry founded in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, to be followed by the Knights Templars, the Teutonic Knights and others. These all disappeared in course of time. But the ancient Order of St. John of Jerusalem has lived on through many vicissitudes; until at this day its beneficent work for suffering humanity is on a scale far beyond all that could have been dreamt of, even ten years ago.

From the time that the Empress Helena founded the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, in the third century, pilgrimages to the Holy Land became more and more frequent. And as long as the Christian Emperors of Constantinople maintained their rule over Palestine, pilgrims were encouraged, and it is evident that some sort of hospital existed in Jerusalem for their benefit. Moreover when the power of Islam swept over the Holy Land, and the Byzantine Empire in Asia

crumbled before it, the hospital and the pilgrimages were still tolerated, for the pilgrims brought considerable gain to the country. It must, however, be acknowledged that, during the many contests between the Caliphs of Bagdad and the Caliphs of Egypt for the sovereignty of the Holy Land, the unfortunate pilgrims were constantly plundered, and often murdered, by one or other faction of their so-called protectors.

A very considerable trade has always existed between Western Europe and the Levant. And 'some of these pilgrims 'combined the profits of commerce with their holier object, 'and those who were thus able to establish business relations 'with the rulers of the neighbouring provinces had it often in 'their power to befriend their less fortunate brethren.' (Porter, p. 8.) Among these pilgrim traders, the merchants of Amalfi obtained permission to build a hospital in Jerusalem for the use of sick and poor Latin pilgrims. The Mahommedan Governor of the city, under the orders of the Caliph Montaser Billah, assigned a site to these good men close to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre ; and here they erected a church dedicated to the Virgin, called Santa Maria ad Latinos, to distinguish it from the other existing Greek churches—the church being served by Benedictine monks. This work was finished between A.D. 1014–1023, according to a charter given for the re-endowment of the church and monastery by Melek Muzaffer in 1023.* Furthermore, between this time and the capture of Jerusalem by the crusaders in 1099, two hospitals were built for pilgrims, one for men, the other for women. That for women was dedicated to St. Mary Magdalene. The other to St. John Eleemon or the Almoner. This name was changed later—the date is uncertain—to St. John the Baptist. And as the establishment of the pious merchants of Amalfi grew and prospered, many pilgrims stayed on in Jerusalem, and without any religious profession they devoted themselves to the work of the hospitals.

'Grateful pilgrims on their return spread far and wide the reputation of the Jerusalem hospitals, so that contributions flowed in from every quarter, and their utility was greatly extended.

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* This charter and date were certified by Captain Conder, R.E., of the Palestine Exploration Fund. The usual date being given as A.D. 1048.

Such was the establishment from which the Order of St. John eventually sprang.' (Porter, p. 8.)

This fraternity called themselves the Brothers of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. The first head of the brotherhood, known as the Rector, was Brother Gerard, who is described in Vertot's 'Knights of Malta' as 'Fondateur de l'Ordre de 'St. Jean de Jérusalem, 1090.' And so important had the Brotherhood become, that they now constituted themselves an Order of Military Knights for the protection of the pilgrims, founding hospitals and building castles along the various Pilgrims' ways to the Holy City. The chief hospital of the Order in Jerusalem covered a large space of ground, close, as we have said, to the Holy Sepulchre. A plan of the building, made under the Palestine Exploration Fund, shows that it contained three churches, and that the halls were so large as to need three and four rows of columns to support the roofs.

But after the Mahommedan caliphs had ruled for four centuries, they were in their turn overpowered by a fierce horde of barbarians, the Turcomans from the wild regions beyond the Caspian Sea; and the Holy Land soon fell into these savage hands. If the Christian pilgrims had endured much under Mahommedan tyranny their fate was far worse now. The tribute they had always been bound to pay for the privilege of visiting Jerusalem was enormously increased, while they suffered every kind of atrocity. A journey to Jerusalem was one of the greatest possible peril; and those who escaped brought back such tales of terror, that a strong sense of horror and indignation was gradually aroused throughout Europe.

The climax was reached in 1093, when Peter the Hermit, returning from a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, determined to devote himself to the suppression of the cruelties he had witnessed. Armed with letters from the Greek Patriarch Simeon, and Gerard, Rector of the Hospital of St. John, he went to Rome and pleaded his cause in person with Urban II. 'The religious enthusiasm of Europe was aroused to a pitch 'of frenzy, and vast armaments assembled from all quarters 'and poured eastwards.' Thus began that wonderful movement of the Crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

When Godefroi de Bouillon captured Jerusalem on July 15, 1099, the Hospital of St. John was already in full working order. Many of the Crusaders and rich pilgrims bestowed

upon it their possessions in the various countries from which they came. And when, in 1118, Raymond de Puy succeeded Brother Gerard, he took the title of Grand-Master, and with the sanction of Pope Pascal II. compiled rules for the Order.

It must be remembered that the Knight of those days was the representative of the highest attainable civilisation, sanctioned at the same time by the Church. When he came to man's estate and received the dignity of Knighthood, he fasted and prayed, confessed his sins, received Holy Communion, and in the church itself was girded with his sword, his spurs buckled on, while some noble Knight giving him the accolade admitted him to the rank of Knight, after he had solemnly sworn to be the champion of his God and of women, to speak the truth, to succour the distressed, to maintain the right, to be courteous and brave.

The Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem very early became one of extreme importance and popularity in its threefold character, tending the sick, succouring pious pilgrims, and defending the Holy City against the infidel. By the rules of the Order, the Knights were divided into seven *langues* or divisions, representing the various countries to which they belonged and in which their lands and revenues lay. These were Italy, Aragon, Provence, Auvergne, France, England and Germany. To these an eighth *langue*, Castile, was added when the kingdom of Aragon was divided.

The banner of the Order was a plain white cross on a red ground. A black robe, with a white eight-pointed cross on the left breast, was the conventual habit of the Knight. But when fighting, as they usually were—for the Knights were a warlike body,—they wore a red tunic over their armour with a large plain white cross on the front, like that on the banner. Both these costumes are seen in the two portraits by Pinturicchio, in Siena Cathedral, of the Italian knight Alberto Arringhieri, which Mr. Fincham, sub-librarian of the Order, has included in the excellent illustrations of his book.

The nursing sisters of the Order wore a red dress, with a black robe over it bearing the eight-pointed white cross : but as a sign of mourning after the loss of Rhodes in 1522, they gave up the red dress for black. In the Chapter Hall of St. John's Gate, an old and charming picture may be seen of St. Ubaldesca, a sister of the Order of St. John, in her black habit over white,

her black veil edged with a neatly pinched white border, and the eight-pointed white cross on her breast; she holds a red book and a little chafing dish in her hand. She died at Pisa in 1206, and was canonised for her works of charity and famed for her miracles.

The eight-pointed white cross on the black ground, which is now seen all over London beside the red cross of Geneva, bears deep meanings under its simple form. And the meanings of these outward forms are commemorated in a prayer, now in use in the Order for those who wear it.

'May we ever remember in our lives that its four arms symbolize the Christian virtues,—Prudence, Temperance, Justice and Fortitude; that its points represent the eight Beatitudes which spring from the practice of those Virtues; and that its whiteness is the emblem of that purity of life required in those who fight for the defence of the Christian Faith and live for the service of the poor and suffering.'

It was in 1187 that Saladin eventually defeated the second Crusade, and drove the Crusaders out of Jerusalem. But although the Knights Hospitallers had proved themselves the most determined of his foes, he so respected their work that he allowed them twelve months to settle the affairs of their hospital before they left. Though driven from Jerusalem, the Knights of St. John played so important a part in the famous siege of Acre, which Richard Cœur de Lion captured after twenty-three months, that the town became known as St. Jean d'Acre, as it is to this day. And the great hospital of the Order, in the centre of the city, was even larger than the one they had abandoned in Jerusalem.

For over a hundred years St. Jean d'Acre was the headquarters of the Order. But when the Saracens took Acre and finally swept the Christians out of Syria in 1291, the Knights Hospitallers moved to Cyprus. Their chief house there was the castle of Kolossi. This castle is still in good condition and closely resembles a solid Norman keep of the usual type. 'The 'castle has recently (1915) been acquired by the English Order, 'not as an outpost of aggression but as a memento of the time 'when the whole work of the Knights lay at the eastern end 'of the Mediterranean.' (Fincham, p. 4.)

In 1310 the Knights moved to the island of Rhodes, where they remained for nearly 200 years. Here they built a great

and noble city, one of the most strongly fortified in Europe at that time. Its splendid walls and many towers still testify to what its strength must have been in those days. For though at last the Turks broke through them in one place, they have on the whole respected the work of the Knights. The great harbour was guarded by two lofty lighthouse towers which commanded the entrance, Nailhac's and the Windmill tower.

Each *langue* had its own division of the walls with its tower and gate built according to the tastes of each country. England was sixth among the nations ; St. John's tower dividing it from the division of Provence. And among the finest of the remains is the magnificent St. Catherine's double gate. The Street of the Knights still exists, where each *langue* had its *auberge*. 'The best of these,' says Mr. Fincham, 'is the 'Auberge de France, which has been recently (1915) acquired 'by France, and restored as a monument to the French Knights 'of the Order.' Much also of the hospital still remains—a fine building, with a beautifully vaulted and pillared cloister round the central court ; while the main gates of carved cypress wood, carried off by the French in 1836, are now in the Galerie des Croisades at Versailles.

Firmly settled in Rhodes, the work of the Order became more definitely warlike, and of the utmost importance to the whole of Christian Europe. For the Knights of St. John were, in deed as well as in word, 'Defenders of the Faith' against the growing power of Islam. With their great war fleet and their complete military organisation, the Knights of Rhodes—as they were now called—constituted a formidable barrier against the Turks after the capture of Constantinople (1453), in their intention to conquer the whole of Western Europe. The Turks therefore, fully alive to the constant danger the Knights Hospitallers offered to their schemes of domination, determined to rid themselves of these powerful neighbours. In 1480 they attacked the island of Rhodes with an enormous fleet and army. But the Knights, under the Grand-Master Pierre d'Aubusson, withstood them victoriously in a long siege of many months ; and at length drove off their final attack. Had they been defeated—had they lost Rhodes at that moment—the whole Mediterranean would have been at the mercy of the Turks, and the history of Europe might have been strangely altered. Instead of this, the Turks and the

Knights remained at peace for forty years. It was during this period that the Order received from their quondam foe their most precious treasure, the hand of St. John Baptist, sent by Sultan Bajazet to Pierre d'Aubusson to curry favour with him in some dispute.

The peace, however, was at last broken in 1522 while De l'Isle Adam was Grand-Master, when Suleiman the Magnificent, who two years later captured Bagdad, attacked Rhodes once more. In spite of an heroic defence, the Knights were forced to surrender after a siege of six months. The terms of capitulation showed in what honour Suleiman held his adversaries; for they were allowed twelve days in which to leave the island in their own galleys, with arms and properties, and if needful they were to be supplied with Turkish transport. Furthermore, the Turks 'refrained from defacing their armorial 'bearings and inscriptions on the buildings,' so that to this day their escutcheons remain in the city on many of the old buildings.

For seven long years the Knights wandered homeless, from Candia to Cività Vecchia, Viterbo and Messina, while their Grand-Master, De l'Isle Adam, visited all the rulers of Western Europe in the endeavour to win their help in recovering his lost island. Among other courts he came to England, and stayed in the Priory of the Order at Clerkenwell for some days, until Henry VIII. invited him to St. James's Palace. But apparently the King's assistance to the homeless knights —save for a personal gift to the Grand-Master of a golden ewer and basin set with precious stones—was limited to a present of 'nineteen great cannon and 1023 balls.' One of these guns stands to-day on the terrace of Government House, Nicosia, as a memento of England's assistance to the Order.

At length, however, help came to the Knights from Spain, when De l'Isle Adam persuaded the Emperor Charles V. to grant them the island of Malta. And on October 26, 1530, their fleet arrived in the harbour, headed by the great ship 'Santa Anna,' commanded by the English Knight, Sir Thomas Weston. This ship is worthy of special notice, as she was the first armour-plated ship known.

'Built at Nice, of about 1700 tons, she had six decks, and was entirely sheathed with lead bolted with brass, and although she received much cannonading, was never pierced below the bulwarks;

her mainmast, so great that six men could not embrace it, carried three fighting tops mounted with small pieces of artillery, and on her decks were fifty large cannon and many smaller pieces.' (Fincham, p. 9.)

With their arrival in the island began the period of greatest magnificence of the Knights of Malta, as they were now called. Their first business, naturally, on taking possession of their new home, was to render it secure against attack, and to cultivate the barren land—a great contrast to the fertility of Rhodes. It was indeed well that in the early years of their sojourn these precautions were taken, for in 1565 the Turks determined to make another bid for supremacy in the Mediterranean. Suleiman the Magnificent, who was still alive, attacked Malta with 180 ships ; and on May 20 he landed 20,000 troops and opened fire on St. Elmo. Thus began the famous siege of Malta, which stirred all the kingdoms of Europe, who watched its course with such intense interest that even Queen Elizabeth, who had scant kindness for the knights, (having dispossessed them of their property in England on her accession,) ordered prayers to be said in all English churches ' for the defenders ' of Christendom.'

St. Elmo held out bravely : but cut off as it was from the main body of the Knights, who were in St. Angelo, it fell after a month of savage fighting. On the Eve of St. Elmo's Day, the defenders, who were now reduced to sixty men, went down to the chapel in the base of the fort and heard Mass. Then returning to the walls—even the wounded seated in chairs helping—they fought for six hours until the last man was killed. The Turks burst in ; and their general, Mustapha, nailed the bodies of the dead Knights on planks, which were in the form of a cross to add to the insult, and floated them up the harbour to the fortress of St. Angelo. The Grand-Master, Jean de la Valette, replied in even more brutal fashion ; for he promptly beheaded his chief Turkish prisoners and fired their heads from his cannon into the Turkish camp.

After many appeals for help from the Grand-Master, a relief force of 11,000 men was sent by the Viceroy of Sicily, and the Turks took to their ships and fled. It was indeed time. For from first to last the Turks lost 30,000 men ; while the losses of the Order were 260 Knights, and 8000 men at arms, for

whom a Requiem Mass is still sung in Malta, the people saying when they hear the bells, 'It is for the deliverance of the 'Knights.'

Never again, though they often threatened it, did the Turks venture to attack Malta. For they had scarcely disappeared when the dauntless Grand-Master set about re-fortifying the island, and decided to build a new town on Mount Sceberras, which was named Valetta after him. On March 28, 1566, the first stone was laid, and the work progressed rapidly. And the fortifications erected by La Valette and strengthened by succeeding Grand-Masters are still the wonder and admiration of military engineers.

The Church of St. John, built towards the end of the sixteenth century, is well known to every visitor to Malta, standing in the very heart of Valetta. The whole interior is gorgeous in decoration—not an inch of space but glows with paintings, gildings and carvings. While the tombs of over 400 Knights form the pavement, each slab bearing their arms in elaborate mosaic.

Hard by the church is the Palace of the Grand-Master La Cassière, built between 1572 and 1581. It is now the Governor's Palace, its many rooms decorated with pictures of the various Grand-Masters, including the valiant La Valette himself. Its great armoury, which in the eighteenth century contained arms for 25,000 men, is now a treasure house of medieval arms and armour of every description. A portion of the collection was brought to England in the early nineteenth century. It was bought by the Government, and is now in the Museum of the Rotunda, Woolwich.

The hospital of the Knights is still used as the British Military Hospital; and although the 'Barrack and Hospital Commission' of 1863 wrote: 'This hospital is one of the most 'complicated and unsuitable places for the sick of a garrison 'in existence,' it is now possible to use the words of Lord Dunraven in the House of Lords, July 11, 1917, who described the hospital arrangements for our troops in Malta as being 'as perfect, humanly speaking, as they well could be.' Besides the great ward, which is 500 feet long, there are eleven other wards, a chapel, dispensaries, library and quarters for officers. A curious print from an ancient German work on

the Order (Augsburg, 1650) shows the great ward with the beds of the sick, and their mosquito nets like small tents at the head of the square frames, ready to throw over them.

According to an old book printed in Rome and translated by the Rev. W. K. R. Bedford, each of the wards had its distinct use. One ward was devoted to members of the Order, 'ch'è la più commoda'; two were set apart for the wounded; a larger ward was for feverish and other slight ailments; a small one for serious cases and the dying. There was 'a very large' ward for galley-slaves'; also a room for mad people and their warder. It is remarked that:

'The beds of the sick are changed from time to time for requisite cleanliness, and they are re-made every evening by the warders, whose duty is to keep them clean. Sheets are even changed daily in case of need.'

'It contributes greatly to the dignity of the Infirmary and to the cleanliness of the sick, their being served night and morning with covers, bowls and plates of silver, even the small boilers from which the soup is served, and the large dishes holding meat and other things are of silver.' *

The Regulations show that in 1725 the silver plate consisted of 1140 articles, weighing 1215 pounds. But notwithstanding silver plate, and sheets of finer quality for the brothers of the Habit, the hospital seemed to be anything but a paradise from Howard's ghastly report on the Lazarettos of Europe in 1798.

The last 200 years of the Knights' tenure of Malta was the period of their greatest worldly magnificence; it was also, unhappily, that of their decadence. With the declining power of their ancient enemies the Turks, came the decline of their own military efficiency. Although their large fleet still guarded the Mediterranean against the corsairs and pirates of Northern Africa, and had many hot fights with them and the Turks, as may be seen on the walls of the Chancery at St. John's Gate, the Knights gradually lost those soldierly qualities which had so greatly distinguished them. Absence of work and enormous wealth fostered luxury and licentiousness. Although laws were passed by successive Grand-Masters to

* 'Regulations of the Old Hospital of the Knights of St. John at Valetta.'

restrain them, the Knights sank deeper and deeper into idleness and self-indulgence. Therefore when the French Revolution swept Europe with its refining fire of destruction and the new birth of the modern world, the Knights of Malta were unable to stand before it.

In June 1798 Napoleon arrived in the harbour of Valetta with the French Fleet, and found that a very different Grand-Master from the splendid De l'Isle Adam or La Valette was in their place—a German, Hompesch by name. After a feeble resistance of a few days, Napoleon, aided by sympathisers in the ranks of the Order itself, took possession of the island. Seizing the treasures of the Church and the Palace, he carried them off on his flagship 'L'Orient.'

The greatest of all the treasures was the hand of St. John Baptist, sent by Sultan Bajazet to d'Aubusson. It was 'enclosed in a splendid gauntlet-shaped monstrance of solid gold, 'bedecked with costly gems—in front of this lay a gold ring 'set with a large diamond (or sapphire), which Napoleon put 'on his own finger, and ordered the case to be sent on board 'the "Orient."' * He left 'the dead hand,' as he called it, to Hompesch.

As the 'Orient' was sunk a few months later by Nelson in the battle of the Nile, it is generally supposed that most of the treasure of the Knights of Malta lies to this day at the bottom of the sea in Aboukir Bay.

This final disaster broke up the rule of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem in the Mediterranean—the scene of their magnificent work in the defence of Christendom for so many hundred years. Many of the Knights abandoned their profession and returned to their various countries. A remnant, flying to Russia with the Grand-Master Hompesch, placed themselves under the protection of the Tzar, carrying with them their precious relic, the hand of St. John Baptist, which is still in Petrograd.

That English Knights Hospitallers existed from the earliest days of the Order, is shown by the English *langue* when the rules of the Order were first drawn up at the end of the eleventh century. But it was the gift of Jean de Brisset, in 1130, of

* 'Malta and the Knights Hospitallers.' Rev. W. K. R. Bedford.

ten acres of land *juxta fontem clericorum*—near the Well of the Clerks of the City of London—which enabled the English Knights to build their chief house, the great Priory of Clerkenwell. This well was close to St. John's Gate, flowing from a steep bank into the Fleet below. For Clerkenwell stands much higher above the City than one would at first suppose.

Many other gifts of property rapidly added to the great wealth of the community in England. In London alone, besides Clerkenwell, the Knights Hospitallers owned land at Hackney, Lincoln's Inn Fields, St. John's Wood, Highbury, Lisson Grove, with houses adjoining the Great Turnstile, and the 'Ship Inn' in the Strand, now the site of the Law Courts. In the country, the Manor of Hampton belonged to them. Buildings of the Order still exist in Derbyshire at Yearsley, in Essex at Maplestead, in Herefordshire at Dinmore, in Kent at Swingfield and Sutton-in-Hone; Poling in Sussex, Eagle and Temple Bruer in Lincolnshire, Chibburn in Northumberland, and Moor Hall in Middlesex, about four miles from Uxbridge, a most picturesque and attractive building. In Scotland their chief house was Torphichen, and in Ireland Kilmainham. Besides these more important properties, there were many lesser possessions of the Knights, some of which are now merely to be traced by their names. A return in 1338 by the English Grand Prior, Philip de Thame, to the Grand-Master of the Order, Elyan de Villanova, shows that the Knights then possessed more than ninety manors in England, including the property of the Templars transferred to them in 1315 at the dissolution of the latter Order.

The first houses of Sisters of the Order were the Commanderies of Swingfield, Hampton, Standon in Hertfordshire, and Gosford in Oxon. 'But in the year 1180 King Henry II. 'ordered their removal to the Commandery of Buckland, in 'Somerset, which remained the only home of the English 'sisters till the dissolution of the Order in England.' In the window on the Chancery landing at St. John's Gate, there is a portrait of Fina, the first English Prioress at Buckland Sororum.

The head of the English Knights was entitled the Grand Prior. He was not necessarily a Church dignitary, although some of the Grand Priors were in Holy Orders. His position was recognised as one of great importance; for he was Chief

Baron of England and took precedence of all other lay barons in the House of Lords ; while he frequently filled great offices of State, such as Lord Admiral and Lord High Treasurer. The Grand Prior was responsible to the Grand-Master of the Order. In addition, Clerkenwell was governed, as were all the larger properties of the Hospitallers, by a Commander, who in the absence of the Grand Prior had complete authority.

It must be remembered that the chief business of the Knights Hospitallers, in their double character of fighting men and servants of the sick and oppressed, was centred in the Mediterranean. Therefore the great priory of Clerkenwell, though it possessed a fine hospital, was mainly used as a house of entertainment. It was at Clerkenwell that Henry II., in 1185, summoned his Barons in Council to consider the proposal of Heraclius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, that Henry should accompany him to Palestine in the new Crusade he had come to preach in England. While staying at the priory, Heraclius consecrated the Church of St. John as well as the Temple Church in the Strand. King John stayed here for a month in 1212. Prince Edward and Eleanor of Castile were guests in 1265. Henry IV. spent a fortnight at the priory before his coronation. Three years later, when the Emperor Constantine came to England, 'he was lodged atte the hous of Saynt John 'in Smithfield.'

Rich in lands and moneys as were the Prior and Brethren of St. John in England, they illustrated the truth that to those who have shall more be given. They enjoyed extraordinary privileges, and many were the charters given to them. The Letters Patent of Henry VII. dated November 4, 1486,—recently published in facsimile at St. John's Gate—confirm the Letters Patent of Edward IV., which in their turn confirm the charters of Richard II., Edward III., Edward II., Edward I., and that of Henry III. of 1253. Among other privileges it is set forth

'that the Brothers of the Hospital and all their men be free and exempt from all toll in every market and in all fairs, and in the passage of all bridges, ways and of all the seas, through all our realms and all our lands. . . Moreover we grant that animals which are called waif found in the fee of the hospitallers belong to the brothers, unless some one should pursue them who is willing and able to prove they are his property, and unless he take them within reasonable time and has sought after and pursued his property in the customary manner.'

The great priory of St. John of Jerusalem at Clerkenwell must have been very extensive even from the earliest days, judging by traces of foundations and walls of that period which have been discovered by excavations. Unhappily, nothing remains of the twelfth-century work save the crypt beneath the present church of St. John. When first built, between 1130 and 1185, the church had a round nave even larger than the Temple Church. But this was destroyed during the Wat Tyler rebellion, 1381; as Froissart tells us, the rebels 'went to the house of the Knights-Hospitallers of Rhodes, 'dedicated to St. John of Mount-Carmel, which they burnt, 'together with their church and hospital.' They also destroyed the Prior's house, 'built like another Paradise.' And—even more important—they captured the unfortunate Lord Prior, Sir Richard Hales, whom with Simon of Sudbury, Archbishop of Canterbury, they beheaded on that spot of sinister memories, Tower Hill.

But when one enters the crypt, all regrets for what is lost vanish in thankfulness that so much remains intact. For the noble Norman work of the crypt is virtually untouched—the mouldings of the arches and ribs as clean cut as they were nearly 800 years ago. Yet the whole of this crypt was buried to a depth of two or three feet, reaching half-way up the shafts, with earth, rubbish, bones and broken coffins until twenty-nine years ago, when, thanks to the devotion of Mr. Fincham, and to his personal labour, the clearance was gradually made. Indeed, to reach the base of the first shaft he had to dig through a broken coffin.

Notwithstanding the disasters of Wat Tyler's rebellion, the wealthy Order of St. John in England must have rapidly restored their buildings; and it is evident that the Knights were at the height of their prosperity at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In 1502 Henry VII. was elected Protector of the Knights of Rhodes, and frequently visited the priory; while the Lord Prior, Sir Thomas Docwra (1501-1527), spent large sums in rebuilding and beautifying it. It was he who built the beautiful Gate House, now the most important building belonging to the priory which remains intact, and of special interest apart from its history, as the only gate-house in London which spans a street. He also rebuilt the tower of the church, and inserted the Perpendicular windows which

still remain. In the earlier days of the reign of Henry VIII.—of unblessed memory—Prior Docwra was in high favour, 'sitting as Premier Baron of the Realm in his first Parliament, 'and being employed on various embassies and commissions.' (Fincham, p. 18.) He received the valiant Philip Villiers de l'Isle Adam, Grand-Master of the Order, when he came to England during his journey to the Courts of Europe to beseech help to regain the Island of Rhodes. King Henry came to visit him at the priory, when he promised the guns already mentioned.

But now began Henry VIII.'s disputes with the Pope; and the King endeavoured to win away the allegiance of the English Knights from the Grand-Master and head of their Order, tempting 'them to become his Knights, with the defence 'of Calais as their particular mission.' In 1527, at Docwra's death, Henry further tried to force a favourite of his own upon the Knights, and also to exact from them a yearly tribute of £4000. But he met with no success from this high-spirited and powerful body, and was at last obliged to accept their nominee, Sir William Weston, as Lord Prior.

No wonder is it therefore, that when Henry VIII. had dissolved the religious houses of England, he should make short work of the English Knights Hospitallers who had dared to withstand his will, and whose vast possessions were so tempting a prize. Therefore in 1540 it was enacted that 'The Kinge's 'Majestie, his heirs and successors, shall have and enjoy all 'that Hospitall, Mansion-house, Churche, and all other houses, 'edificeons, buyldinges and gardienes of the same belonging, 'being nere unto the citie of London, in the Countie of Midd., 'called the house of St. John of Jerlm. in England.'

The members of the Order might not use any of its titles or wear the dress. Sir William Weston, however, was granted a pension of £1000 a year. But the Royal funds were not long diminished by this concession, for, as it is quaintly put:

'It fortuned on the 7th. day of May, 1540, being Ascension Day, and the same day of the dissolution of his house, he was dissolved by death, which strooke him to the heart at the first time when he heard of the dissolution of his Order. Soul smitten with sorrow, gold, though a great cordial, being not able to cure a broken heart.'*

*Weever's 'Funeral Monuments.'

But though the Order was dissolved, the buildings were for a time preserved. Stowe relates that :

'The Priory, church and house of St. John was preserved from spoil and down-pulling so long as Henry VIII. reigned, and was employed as a store house for the King's toils and tents for hunting, and for the wars, etc. But in the 3rd. year of King Edward VI., the church for the most part, to wit the body and side aisles, with the great bell tower, a most curious piece of workmanship, graven, gilt, and enamelled, to the great beautifying of the city, and passing all others I have ever seen, was undermined and blown up with gunpowder. The stone thereof was employed in building of the Lord Protector's house in the Strand.'

The 'faire stone porch' was removed to the Church of Allhallows, Lombard Street.

On the accession of Queen Mary, the exiled Knights were invited to return to England. They found the nave and tower of their church destroyed, while the choir lay roofless and open to the weather. Sir Thomas Tresham was appointed Grand Prior ; and he it was who rebuilt the walls of the church as it stands to-day. The Order was re-incorporated by Royal Letters Patent, April 2, 1557.

This revival was, however, short-lived ; lasting only until the reign of Queen Elizabeth, when the Crown once more seized their properties and the Knights fled again to Malta. There the English *langue* continued to exist, and English Knights and Grand Priors were admitted, until Napoleon scattered the Order. But Queen Mary's Letters Patent *have never been revoked.* This is a matter of deep interest and importance to the Order in England as it exists to-day. The original document may be seen in the public library at Malta ; and attested copies are kept in the library at St. John's Gate.

During Elizabeth's reign, Edmund Tylney, Master of the Revels, lived at the priory. It was then used as headquarters of the drama, and as Tylney licensed no fewer than thirty of Shakespeare's plays from here, it is certain that the poet must often have visited the Gate House.

Many were the vicissitudes of the beautiful Gate House, before it once more came into its own as headquarters of the Order in England. To quote Mr. Fincham's admirable account (p. 44) :

'In 1731 the Gate House was inhabited by a printer, Edward Cave, and here he printed and issued "The Gentleman's Magazine."

Dr. Samuel Johnson was for a long time its chief writer, contributing amongst many other items the reports on the debates of the Houses of Parliament. Cave does not appear to have paid large salaries, for Johnson was so shabbily dressed that he took his meals behind a screen in the corner of Cave's dining-room when guests were present. At this period Johnson brought to the Gate a young friend with a taste for acting, and it was in the large room over the arch * that David Garrick gave his first performance in Fielding's farce of "The Mad Doctor," founded upon Molière's "Malade Imaginaire," to Cave's workmen and friends. In 1781 "The Gentleman's Magazine" was removed to Fleet Street, and the Gate became the Parish Watch House; and later it became an inn with the name of "The Old Jerusalem Tavern."'

In 1845 the Gate House narrowly escaped destruction. It had grown so ruinous that the authorities ordered its destruction or its repair. Happily a resident architect, Mr. W. P. Griffith, took up the matter, raised a public subscription and restored the building to a condition of safety. In 1874 the freehold of the Gate House being for sale, the late Sir Edmund Lechmere, who as a boy at Charterhouse had subscribed 5s. pocket money to the restoration fund, bought it and transferred it to the Order: but it was not until 1887 that the leases expired and the Order obtained full possession.

The great Gate House, formerly the principal approach to the priory through the wall which enclosed the precincts, consists of two large towers four storeys high, joined by a fine archway spanning St. John's Lane and bearing a large room above it. The whole is built of red brick encased in Kentish ragstone, except in the flat walls of the archway, where the beautiful small bricks—five to the foot instead of four—give a special charm to the building.

On the ground floor a door under the archway opens into what was formerly the Guard Room—now the admirable library of the Order. This contains, besides the fine collection of books, prints and manuscripts relating to the history of the Order, coins, vestments, crosses and orders, plate, weapons, and other treasures of great value. The seventeenth-century staircase, entered by a low door on the north of the Gate, leads up to the Chancery on the second floor of the east tower, where are many very interesting water-colour drawings of Malta in the eighteenth century, and others depicting sea fights of

* Now the Council Chamber.

the Order with the Turks and corsairs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

On the same level as the Chancery we reach the large room over the archway—now the Council Chamber—which was in all probability the Guest Hall, and therefore the scene of Henry VIII.'s meeting with Grand-Master de l'Isle Adam. From its south window one gets a delightful vision of the dome of St. Paul's beyond the ugly houses of St. John's Lane, and realises how much higher the priory stood than the City. In the west tower the chief room is that of the Secretary-General on the third floor; while the other rooms in both towers are used by the various departments of the Order.

But in 1903 the work of the Order had outgrown the accommodation found in the Gate House, and a large building was erected on the south side. The ground floor of this new building is used as a store for ambulance material, and the first floor as offices and lecture room or drill hall, while the Chapter Hall on the second floor covers the whole of the new building, and its principal entrance is through the charming old Chancery.

After the dispersal of the Order in Malta by Napoleon in 1798, the European War seems to have prevented any action on the part of the scattered Knights for some twenty years. But the massacre of the Christians of Scio during the war between Turkey and Greece, which led eventually to the liberation of Greece, moved European feeling so profoundly that 'the French Knights resident in Paris determined to 'see if it was not possible to re-constitute the Order as a militant 'body to fight in aid of the Christians.' They proposed to have a mercantile branch to help in wars against the Turks, thus imitating the original founders of the Order—the Merchant Knights of Amalfi. They invoked the help of the English; and the Venerable Ordinary Council then in Paris 're-estab-'lished the English branch of the Order, prescribing that the 'members of the Order might be members of the Anglican 'Church.' *

Steps were at once taken by the remaining English Knights under Queen Mary's charter, which, as has been shown, had never been revoked, to revive the Order in England as a

* Dr. E. Freshfield, Receiver-General of the Order, 1909.

voluntary body, and proceedings took place in the English Law Courts with that intent.

All legal difficulties were finally set at rest, as far as the English Order is concerned, by Queen Victoria, who in 1878 granted a fresh charter to the Order, giving the voluntary body formed by the Knights a status and constitution founded upon the charter of Queen Mary. The continuity of handing down the accolade of the Order was preserved through its Honorary Bailiff, the late Sir Edward G. L. Perrott, Bart., who died in 1886—he having received the accolade from Sir J. C. Meredyth, Bart., G.C.J.J., who had received it from the last Grand-Master of the Order, Ferdinand von Hompesch, who fled to Russia from Malta when Napoleon seized that island.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71—which brought the Geneva Red Cross movement prominently before the civilised world—inspired the Order with fresh energy, and numbers of its members joined the newly-formed British National Aid Society for Red Cross work. But experience showed that no society could be really efficient in war if it were not thoroughly organised in time of peace. And this conviction led to the institution of a work wholly due to the Order of St. John, a work whose value to all classes of the community, in peace as well as in war, has proved inestimable. This was the inauguration in 1877 of the St. John Ambulance Association.

The object of this Association was to train men and women—nay, even boys and girls—in First Aid to the wounded. We can look back to the jeers and laughter with which such an idea was greeted. We have also seen, with profound satisfaction, how prejudice and contemptuous jokes have given place to gratitude on the part of millions of sufferers who have been succoured by the contemptible 'First Aider.' For, from the outset, it should be remembered that the Association insisted on the principle that the duty of the First Aid pupil was not to *cure* an injury, but to use his intelligence in acting rapidly, and improvising any means at hand to prevent the injury becoming worse, *until the doctor arrived.*

Woolwich had the honour of forming the first centre of the St. John Ambulance Association in 1877. This good example was quickly followed by other centres in London and the

provinces. In the next year the collieries, especially those in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, recognised the immense value of such a movement, and took it up with enthusiasm. The police of course received special attention in training, with what admirable results every one knows. While the importance of the work of First Aid on Railways led to a class for railway servants being opened in the same year.

A further development soon took place. The First Aid students quickly saw the value of co-operation among themselves, and formed Ambulance Corps in many parts of the country. These scattered corps became a nucleus, which in 1887 developed into the St. John Ambulance Brigade. Among the Colonies New Zealand was the first to form Brigade units in 1892. The Association has spread rapidly in Australia, New Zealand, India and Ceylon, Canada, Newfoundland, Malta and South Africa, numbering 5000 members of all ranks in 1915.

The Voluntary Aid Detachments, commonly known now by the kindly and affectionate name of V.A.D.'s, were originally founded in 1909, to provide bodies of men and women to supplement the personnel of the Territorial forces. The St. John Ambulance Brigade joined this movement, large numbers of its members joining the detachments as recruits. And on the outbreak of war in 1914, the Voluntary Aid Detachments were at once called upon to augment the medical units of the regular forces, in the vast number of hospitals and convalescent homes which sprang up to meet the overwhelming demands. At the end of July 1915, there were 198 men's detachments with a strength of 8107, and 505 detachments of women, numbering 14,572. These numbers have increased up to the present time—July 1917—so that 33,295 men and women are now engaged. And noble work they have done at home and abroad, whether they wear the white cross of St. John on its black ground, or the red cross of Geneva.

It is indeed difficult to over-estimate the magnificent work that the St. John Ambulance Brigade has done and is doing. It is open to all men who hold the First Aid certificate, and to women who hold the First Aid and Home Nursing certificates. Its headquarters is at St. John's Gate. At the beginning of the century it had so developed that, according to Mr. Edwards, the devoted secretary of the Order, 'it was able to

'send 2000 members on active service as Hospital Orderlies 'attached to the R.A.M.C. in the South African and Chinese 'Wars.' While in the present war the St. John Ambulance Brigade numbered, in September 1916, 43,277 men and 19,574 women.

Mr. Edwards gives an interesting example of the preparedness of the brigade:

'Late on the Saturday night of August 1st, 1914, when war seemed imminent, the Admiralty asked for Naval Sick Berth Orderlies, and on Sunday morning over 100 marched off fully equipped to take up their duties, and by Tuesday 4000 men were at their posts on board ship and in Naval and Military Hospitals.'

Further:

'An officer reported how a train of wounded arrived in Boulogne with 240 cases, of which 170 were on stretchers, and many others unable to walk. There was a squad of 40 Brigade men from Newcastle in attendance, who a few days before had been working in coal-mines. These men removed the whole 240 cases from the train to the hospital ship, and in forty minutes they were on their way to England.'

When war fell upon the world in 1914, the Order of St. John was not only ready with active help in nursing and ambulance work, but prepared to utilise the services of those who from age or other reasons were unable to give themselves up to such employments. And among its many activities, the West End Depot of the St. John Ambulance Association was started at 35 Park Lane. A record of its work from July 1915 to July 1917 (as no list was kept till then) will give some idea of the results, with some twenty-five to thirty ladies working every day.

Made bandages, 70,255; miscellaneous articles, 16,153; garments, 6467; woollen garments, 3210; swabs and dressings, 129,593.

This merely represents the work of one small depot and its correspondents in the country. Over 2000 certificated 'working centres' and 'home workers' are now affiliated to the Order, supplying the Gate with every description of work.

'The Gate' itself is a busy place from morning to night in these days of storm and stress. And each visit there fills one with fresh and yet deeper admiration of its many activities

In the large store on the ground floor, close to the door where the big ambulances stand ever ready, men are packing the canvas-covered wicker-cases with every requisite from splints, lint, bandages, special tourniquets etc. to the neat bottles of boracic acid, sal volatile etc. needful for the surgeon's emergency work; or the smaller First Aid cases. While splints of every description, Furley stretchers and light wheeled litters from the Order's woodwork shops at Ashford, and a hundred other comforts are prepared there for despatch.

Across St. John's Square, the 'warehouse' is piled high with thousands of articles, which the devoted ladies, who give their whole time to the work, are putting up in bundles of five. For here decimal counting is the order of the day, everything made up in parts of a hundred. One floor is devoted to mountains of shirts of all sorts and pyjamas. Another to woollen garments to meet every need. Higher up the steep old stairs are blankets, sheets, towels, pillows. Yet higher, soap, writing materials, etc. Among other things one sees numbers of beautifully carpentered bed-tables, made by a set of boys in Jersey, who asked for a pattern so that they might help. While for the countless numbers and variety of bandages, swabs and dressings, a whole room has been acquired in the next building. And as soon as the required numbers of each demand are made up, the Brigade men below pack and despatch them to our home hospitals, or those overseas, whether in France or Greece, in Malta the home of the Order, in Palestine, Mesopotamia, or India.

One of the chief works of the Order since the outbreak of war in 1914—a work of which all its members are justly proud—is the great hut hospital at Étaples, known as the St. John Ambulance Brigade Hospital, for whose equipment and maintenance the Order raised a fund of £75,000. All travellers to Paris know that line of sand dunes lying between Boulogne and the great estuary, where the Conche slides into the Channel at Étaples. Here, overlooking the broad stretches of the tide river, the little town of huts for nearly 600 suffering men has been built, under the most perfect sanitary conditions of sandy soil, healing freshness of pine trees, and pure sea air. And those who have helped in this noble work have the satisfaction of knowing, from the highest authority, that the St. John

Ambulance Brigade Hospital is considered to be possibly the best in France.

In admirably built huts, equipped with the very latest appliances, are beds for between five and six hundred patients. The staff consists of 19 officers under Lieutenant-Colonel Trimble, C.M.G., L.R.C.P.Ed., a matron, an assistant matron, 53 trained sisters, and 24 V.A.D.'s; assisted by a Provisional Company of R.A.M.C., composed of St. John Ambulance men, enlisted for the duration of the war, with a strength of 141 of all ranks. There are pathological, X-ray, dental, and electro-cardiograph departments; two finely equipped operating theatres; dispensary; and ice and soda water making machinery. While the entire hospital, including the Provisional Company of R.A.M.C. men, is fed from one large kitchen.

One has only to look at photographs of the gay flower garden in the spacious quadrangle; of scores of sick and wounded men sitting or lying in the shady galleries and the covered ways that connect the wards, while the Australian band plays in the hot sunshine; or those long white wards with the white eight-pointed cross on its black ground upon the coverlid of each bed, to see what a haven of mercy has been prepared for our soldiers.

It is a token that the ancient Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem continues its beneficent work of tending sick and wounded soldiers, aided by the wonders of every appliance that modern science can give, as did its Knights Hospitallers over 700 years ago.

Rose G. Kingsley.

## SOME SOLDIER POETS

1. **1914 and other Poems.** By RUPERT BROOKE. Sidgwick and Jackson. 1915.
2. **Pages from a Family Journal.** [Edited by Lord DESBOROUGH.] Eton. Privately printed. 1916.
3. **In Memoriam: Auberon Herbert.** By MAURICE BARING. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. 1917.
4. **Worple Flat and other Poems.** By E. WYNDHAM TENNANT. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. 1916.
5. **Ardours and Endurances.** By ROBERT NICHOLS. Chatto and Windus. 1917.
6. **Over the Brazier.** By ROBERT GRAVES. The Poetry Bookshop. 1916.
7. **The Old Huntsman and other Poems.** By SIEGFRIED SASSOON. W. Heinemann. 1917.

THE two years which preceded the outbreak of the war were marked in this country by a revival of public interest in the art of poetry. To this movement coherence was given and organisation introduced by Mr. Edward Marsh's now-famous volume entitled 'Georgian Poetry.' The effect of this collection—for it is hardly correct to call it an anthology—of the best poems written by the youngest poets since 1911 was two-fold: it acquainted readers with work few had 'the 'leisure or the zeal to investigate,' and it brought the writers themselves together in a corporate and selected relation. I do not recollect that this had been done—except prematurely and partially by 'The Germ' of 1850—since the 'England's 'Parnassus' and 'England's Helicon' of 1600. In point of fact the only real precursor of Mr. Marsh's venture in our whole literature is the 'Songs and Sonnettes' of 1557, commonly known as 'Tottel's Miscellany.' Tottel brought together, for the first time, the lyrics of Wyatt, Surrey, Churchyard, Vaux, and Bryan, exactly as Mr. Marsh called public attention to Rupert Brooke, James Elroy Flecker and the rest of the Georgians, and he thereby fixed the names of those poets, as Mr. Marsh has fixed those of our youngest fledglings, on the roll of English literature.

The general tone of the latest poetry, up to the moment of the outbreak of hostilities, was pensive, instinct with natural piety, given somewhat in excess to description of landscape, tender in feeling, essentially unaggressive except towards the clergy and towards other versifiers of an earlier generation. There was absolutely not a trace in any one of the young poets of that arrogance and vociferous defiance which marked German verse during the same years. These English shepherds might hit at their elders with their staves, but they had turned their swords into pruning-hooks and had no scabbards to rattle. This is a point which might have attracted notice, if we had not all been too drowsy in the lap of our imperial prosperity to observe the signs of the times in Berlin. Why did no one call our attention to the beating of the big drum which was going on so briskly on the Teutonic Parnassus? At all events, there was no echo of such a noise in the 'chambers of 'imagery' which contained Mr. Gordon Bottomley, or in Mr. W. H. Davies' wandering 'songs of joy,' or on 'the great 'hills and solemn chanting seas' where Mr. John Drinkwater waited for the advent of beauty. And the guns of August 1914 found Mr. W. W. Gibson encompassed by 'one dim, blue 'infinity of starry peace.' There is a sort of German 'Georgian 'Poets' in existence; in time to come a comparison of its pages with those of Mr. Marsh may throw a side-light on the question, Who prepared the War?

The youngest poets were more completely taken by surprise in August 1914 than their elders. The earliest expressions of lyric military feeling came from veteran voices. It was only proper that the earliest of all should be the Poet Laureate's address to England, ending with the prophecy:

'Much suffering shall cleanse thee!
But thou through the flood
Shalt win to Salvation,
To Beauty through blood.'

As sensation, however, followed sensation in those first terrific and bewildering weeks, much was happening that called forth with the utmost exuberance the primal emotions of mankind; there was full occasion for

'exultations, agonies,
And love, and man's unconquerable mind.'

By September a full chorus was vocal, led by our national veteran, Mr. Thomas Hardy, with his ' Song of the Soldiers ' :

' What of the faith and fire within us,
Men who march away
Ere the barn-cocks say
Night is growing gray,
To hazards whence no tears can win us;
What of the faith and fire within us,
Men who march away ? '

Already, before the close of the autumn of 1914, four or five anthologies of war-poems were in the press, and the desire of the general public to be fed with patriotic and emotional verse was manifested in unmistakable ways. We had been accustomed for some time past to the issue of a multitude of little pamphlets of verse, often very carefully written, and these the critics had treated with an indulgence which would have whitened the hair of the stern reviewers of forty years ago. The youthful poets, almost a trade-union in themselves, protected one another by their sedulous generosity. It was very unusual to see anything criticised, much less ' slated ' ; the balms of praise were poured over every rising head, and immortalities were predicted by the dozen. Yet, as a rule, the sale of these little poetic pamphlets had been small, and they had been read only by those who had a definite object in doing so.

The immediate success of the anthologies, however, proved that the war had aroused in a new public an ear for contemporary verse, an attention anxious to be stirred or soothed by the assiduous company of poets who had been ripening their talents in a little clan. These had now an eager world ready to listen to them. The result has been surprising; we may even, without exaggeration, call it unparalleled. There has never before, in the world's history, been an epoch which has tolerated and even welcomed such a flood of verse as has been poured forth over Great Britain during the last three years. These years have seen the publication, as I am credibly informed, of more than five hundred volumes of new and original poetry. It would be the silliest complaisance to pretend that all of this, or much of it, or any but a very little of it, has been of permanent value. Much of it

is windy and superficial, striving in wild vague terms to express great agitations which are obscurely felt by the poet. There was too much of the bathos of rhetoric, especially at first ; too much addressing the German as ' thou fell, bloody 'brute,' and the like, which broke no bones and took no trenches.

When once it was understood that, as a cancelled line in Tennyson's ' Maud ' has it,

' The long, long canker of peace was over and done,'

the sentiments of indignation and horror made themselves felt with considerable vivacity. In this direction, however, none of the youngest poets approached Sir Owen Seaman in the vigour of their invective. Most of them seemed to be overpowered by the political situation, and few could free themselves from their inured pacific habit of speech. Even when they wrote of Belgium, the Muse seemed rather to weep than to curse. Looking back to the winter of 1914, it is almost pathetic to observe how difficult it was for our easy-going British bards to hate the Germans. There was a good deal of ineffective violence, and considerable misuse of technical terms, caused, in many cases, by a too hasty reference to newspaper reports of gallantry under danger, in the course of which the more or less obscure verbiage of military science was picturesquely and inaccurately employed. As the slightly censorious reader looks back upon these poems of the beginning of the war, he cannot resist a certain impatience. In the first place, there is a family likeness which makes it impossible to distinguish one writer from another, and there is a tendency to a smug approval of British prejudice, and to a horrible confidence in England's power of ' muddling through,' which look rather ghastly in the light of the autumn of 1917.

There was, however, a new spirit presently apparent, and a much healthier one. The bards became soldiers, and in crossing over to France and Flanders, each had packed his flute in his kit. They began to send home verses in which they translated into music their actual experiences and their authentic emotions. We found ourselves listening to young men who had something new, and what was better, something noble to say to us, and we returned to the national spirit which inspired the Chansons de Geste in the eleventh century. To the

spirit—but not in the least to the form, since it is curious that the war-poetry of 1914–17 is, even in the most skilful hands, poetry on a small scale. The two greatest of the primal species of verse, the Epic and the Ode, have been entirely neglected, except, as will later be observed, in one notable instance by Major Maurice Baring. As a rule, the poets have constrained themselves to observe the discipline of a rather confined lyrical analysis in forms of the simplest character. Although particular examples have shown a rare felicity of touch, and although the sincerity of the reflection has in many cases hit upon very happy forms of expression, it is impossible to overlook the general monotony. There used to be a story that the Japanese Government sent a committee of its best art-critics to study the relative merits of the modern European painters, and that they returned with the bewildered statement that they could make no report, because all European pictures were exactly alike. A student from Patagonia might conceivably argue that he could discover no difference whatever between our various poets of the war.

This would be unjust, but it is perhaps not unfair to suggest that the determined resistance to all restraint, which has marked the latest school, is not really favourable to individuality. There has been a very general, almost a universal tendency to throw off the shackles of poetic form. It has been supposed that by abandoning the normal restraints, or artificialities, of metre and rhyme, a greater directness and fidelity would be secured. Of course, if an intensified journalistic impression is all that is desired, 'prose cut up 'into lengths' is the readiest by-way to effect. But if the poets desire—and they all do desire—to speak to ages yet unborn, they should not forget that all the experience of history goes to prove discipline not unfavourable to poetic sincerity, while, on the other hand, the absence of all restraint is fatal to it. Inspiration does not willingly attend upon flagging metre and discordant rhyme, and never in the whole choral progress from Pindar down to Swinburne has a great master been found who did not exult in the stubbornness of 'dancing words and speaking strings,' or who did not find his joy in reducing them to harmony. The artist who avoids all difficulties may be pleased with the rapidity of his effect, but he will have the vexation of finding his success an ephemeral

one. The old advice to the poet, in preparing the rich chariot of the Muse, still holds good :

> 'Let the postillion, Nature, mount, but let
> The coachman, Art, be set.'

Too many of our recent rebellious bards fancy that the coach will drive itself, if only the post-boy sticks his heels hard into Pegasus.

It is not, however, the object of this essay to review all the poetry which has been written about the war, not even that part of it which has owed its existence to the strong feeling of non-combatants at home. We rather propose to fix our attention on what has been written by the young soldiers themselves in their beautiful gallantry, verse which comes to us hallowed by the glorious effort of battle, and in too many poignant cases by the ultimate sacrifice of life itself. The poet achieves his highest meed of contemporary glory, if

> 'some brave young man's untimely fate
> In words worth dying for he celebrate,'

and when he is himself a young man striving for the same deathless honour on the same field of blood it is difficult to conceive of circumstances more poignant than those which surround his effort. On many of these poets a death of the highest nobility has set the seal of eternal life. They were simple and passionate, radiant and calm, they fought for their country, and they have entered into glory. This alone might be enough to say in their praise, but star differeth from star in brightness, and from the constellation we propose to select half a dozen of the clearest luminaries. What is said in honest praise of these may be said, with due modification, of many others who miss merely the polish of their accomplishment. It is perhaps worth noticing, in passing, that most of the poets are men of university training, and that certain literary strains are common to the rank and file of them. The influence of Tennyson, Browning, Swinburne, and Rossetti is almost entirely absent. The only one of the great Victorians whom they seem to have read is Matthew Arnold, but it is impossible to help observing that the 'Shropshire Lad' of Mr. A. E. Housman has been in the tunic-pocket of every one of them. Among the English poets of the past,

it is mainly the so-called ' metaphysical ' writers in the seventeenth century whom they have studied ; Donne seems to have been a favourite with them all, and Vaughan and Treherne are not far behind.

The spontaneous instinct of readers has taken the name of Rupert Brooke to illustrate the poetic spirit of the great war in a superlative degree. His posthumous volume, brought out in May 1915, a few weeks after his death, has enjoyed a success which is greater, perhaps, than that of all the other poems of the war put together. He has become a sort of symbol, even a sort of fetish, and he is to English sentiment what Charles Péguy is to France, an oriflamme of the chivalry of his country. It is curious, in this connexion, that neither Péguy nor Brooke had the opportunity of fighting much in the cause ; they fell, as it seemed for the moment, obscurely. Rupert Brooke was a pawn in the dark and dolorous flight from Antwerp. An officer at last, he died in the Aegean, between Egypt and Gallipoli, having never seen a Turkish enemy. So Péguy faded out of sight on the very opening day of the battle of the Marne, yet each of these young men was immediately perceived to have embodied the gallantry of his country. The extraordinary popularity of Rupert Brooke is due to the excellence of his verse, to the tact with which it was presented to the public, but also to a vague perception of his representative nature. He was the finest specimen of a certain type produced at the universities, and then sacrificed to our national necessity.

It is needless to describe the verses of Rupert Brooke, which have attained a circulation which any poet might envy. They are comprised in two slender volumes, that above mentioned, and one of 1911, published while he was still at Cambridge. He was born in 1887, and when he died off Skyros, in circumstances of the most romantic pathos, he had not completed his twenty-eighth year. He was, unlike the majority of his contemporaries, a meticulous and reserved writer, little inclined to be pleased with his work, and cautious to avoid the snare of improvisation. Hence, though he lived to be older than did Keats or Fergusson, he left a very slender garland of verse behind him, in which there is scarcely a petal which is not of some permanent value. For instance, in the volume of 1911 we found not a few pieces which then seemed crude

in taste and petulant in temper ; but even these now illustrate a most interesting character of which time has rounded the angles, and we would not have otherwise what illustrates so luminously—and so divertingly—that precious object, the mind of Rupert Brooke.

Yet there is a danger that this mind and character may be misinterpreted, even by those who contemplate the poet's memory with idolatry. There is some evidence of a Rupert Brooke legend in the process of formation, which deserves to be guarded against not less jealously than the R. L. Stevenson legend of a few years ago. We know that for some people gold and lilies are not properly honoured until they are gilded and painted. Rupert Brooke was far from being either a plaster saint or a vivid public witness. He was neither a trumpet nor a torch. He lives in the memory of those who knew him as a smiling and attentive spectator, eager to watch every flourish of the pageantry of life. Existence was a wonderful harmony to Rupert Brooke, who was determined to lose no tone of it by making too much noise himself. In company he was not a great talker, but loved to listen, with sparkling deference, to people less gifted than himself if only they had experience to impart. He lived in a fascinated state, bewitched with wonder and appreciation. His very fine appearance, which seemed to glow with dormant vitality, his beautiful manners, the quickness of his intelligence, his humour, were combined under the spell of a curious magnetism, difficult to analyse. When he entered a room, he seemed to bring sunshine with him, although he was usually rather silent, and pointedly immobile. I do not think it would be easy to recollect any utterance of his which was very remarkable, but all he said and did added to the harmonious, ardent, and simple effect.

There is very little of the poetry of Rupert Brooke which can be definitely identified with the war. The last six months of his life, spent in conditions for which nothing in his previous existence in Cambridge or Berlin, in Grantchester or Tahiti, had in the least prepared him, were devoted—for we must not say wasted—to breaking up the *cliché* of civilised habits. But of this harassed time there remain to us the five immortal Sonnets, which form the crown of Rupert Brooke's verse, and his principal legacy to English literature. Our

record would be imperfect without the citation of one, perhaps the least hackneyed of these :

'Blow out, you bugles, over the rich Dead!
There's none of these so lonely and poor of old,
But, dying, has made us rarer gifts than gold.
These laid the world away; poured out the red
Sweet wine of youth; gave up the years to be
Of work and joy, and that unhoped serene,
That men call age; and those who would have been,
Their sons, they gave, their immortality.

Blow, bugles, blow! They brought us, for our dearth,
Holiness, lacked so long, and Love and Pain.
Honour has come back, as a king, to earth,
And paid his subjects with a royal wage;
And Nobleness walks in our ways again;
And we have come into our heritage.'

If the fortune of his country had not disturbed his plans, it is more than probable that Rupert Brooke would have become an enlightened and enthusiastic professor. Of the poet who detains us next it may be said that there was hardly any walk of life, except precisely this, which he could not have adorned. Julian Grenfell, who was a poet almost by accident, resembled the most enlightened of the young Italian noblemen of the Renaissance, who gave themselves with violence to a surfeit of knowledge and a riot of action. He was a humanist of the type of the fifteenth century, soldier, scholar, and man of pleasure, such as we read of in Vespasiano's famous book. Everything he did was done in the service of St. Epicurus, it was done to *darsi buon tempo*, as the Tuscans used to say. But this was only the superficial direction taken by his energy; if he was imperious in his pleasures, he was earnest in his pursuit of learning; there was a singular harmony in the exercise of the physical, intellectual, and emotional faculties at his disposal. Julian Grenfell was a master of the body and of the mind, an unrivalled boxer, a pertinacious hunter, skilled in swimming and polo, a splendid shot, a swift runner, and an unwearying student. That an athlete so accomplished should have had time left for intellectual endowments is amazing, but his natural pugnacity led him to fight lexicons as he fought the wild boar, and with as complete success.

The record of the brief and shining life of Julian Grenfell has been told in an anonymous record of family life which is destined to reverberate far beyond the discreet circle of friends to which it is provisionally addressed. It is a document of extraordinary candour, tact, and fidelity, and it is difficult to say whether humour or courage is the quality which illuminates it most. It will be referred to by future historians of our race as the most vivid record which has been preserved of the red-blooded activity of a spirited patrician family at the opening of the twentieth century. It is partly through his place at the centre of this record that, as one of the most gifted of his elder friends has said, the name of Julian Grenfell will be linked 'with all that is swift and chivalrous, lovely 'and courageous,' but it is also through his rare and careless verses.

Julian Grenfell, who was born to excel with an enviable ease, was not a poet by determination. In a family where everything has been preserved, no verses of his that are not the merest boyish exercises are known to exist previous to the war. He was born in 1888, and he became a professio na soldier in India in 1911. He was on his way home from South Africa when hostilities broke out, and he was already fighting in Flanders in October 1914. After a very brilliant campaign, in the course of which he won the D.S.O. and was twice mentioned in despatches, he was shot in the head near Ypres and died of his wounds at Boulogne on the 26th of May 1915. During these months in France, by the testimony of all who saw him and of all to whom he wrote, his character received its final touch of ripeness. Among his other attainments he abruptly discovered the gift of noble gnomic verse. On receiving news of the death of Rupert Brooke, and a month before his own death, Julian Grenfell wrote the verses called 'Into Battle,' which contain the unforgettable stanzas:

'The fighting man shall from the sun
Take warmth, and life from the glowing earth;
Speed with the light-foot winds to run,
And with the trees to newer birth. . . .

The woodland trees that stand together,
They stand to him each one a friend;
They gently speak in the windy weather;
They guide to valley and ridge's end.

The kestrel hovering by day,
And the little owls that call by night,
Bid him be swift and keen as they,
As keen of ear, as swift of sight.

The blackbird sings to him "Brother, brother,
If this be the last song you shall sing,
Sing well, for you may not sing another,
Brother, sing."'

The whole of this poem is memorable, down to its final prophetic quatrain:

'The thundering line of battle stands,
And in the air Death moans and sings;
But Day shall clasp him with strong hands,
And Night shall fold him in soft wings.'

'Could any other man in the British Army have knocked out a heavy-weight champion one week and written that poem the next?' a brother officer asked. 'Into Battle' remains, and will probably continue to remain, the clearest lyrical expression of the fighting spirit of England in which the war has found words. It is a poem for soldiers, and it gives noble form to their most splendid aspirations. Julian Grenfell wrote, as he boxed and rode, as he fought in the mud of Flanders, as the ideal sporting Englishman of our old, heroic type.

The ancient mystery of verse is so deeply based on tradition that it is not surprising that all the strange contrivances of twentieth-century warfare have been found too crabbed for our poets to use. When great Marlborough, as Addison puts it, 'examin'd all the dreadful scenes of war' at Blenheim, he was really in closer touch with Marathon than with the tanks and gas of Ypres. But there is one military implement so beautiful in itself, and so magical in the nature of its service, that it is bound to conquer a place in poetry. The air-machine, to quote *The Campaign* once more, 'rides in the whirlwind and directs the storm.' But the poets are still shy of it. In French it has, we believe, inspired but one good poem, the 'Plus haut toujours!' of Jean Allard-Méeus, a hymn of real aerial majesty. In English Major Maurice Baring's ode 'In Memoriam: A. H.' is equally unique, and, in its complete diversity from Allard-Méeus' rhapsody, suggests that the aeroplane

has a wide field before it in the realms of imaginative writing. Major Baring's subject is the death of Auberon Herbert, Lord Lucas, who was killed on the 3rd of November 1916. This distinguished young statesman and soldier had just been promoted, after a career of prolonged gallantry in the air, and would have flown no more, if he had returned in safety to our front on that fatal day.

Major Baring has long been known as an excellent composer of sonnets and other short pieces. But 'In Memoriam : A. H.' lifts him to a position among our living poets to which he had hardly a pretension. In a long irregular threnody or funeral ode, the great technical difficulty is to support lyrical emotion throughout. No form of verse is more liable to lapses of dignity, to dull and flagging passages. Even Dryden in 'Anne Killigrew,' even Coleridge in the 'Departing Year,' have not been able to avoid those languors. Many poets attempt to escape them by a use of swollen and pompous language. We will not say that Major Baring has been universally successful, where the success of the great masters is only relative, but he has produced a poem of great beauty and originality, which interprets an emotion and illustrates an incident the poignancy of which could scarcely be exaggerated. We have no hesitation in saying that 'A. H.' is one of the few durable contributions to the literature of the present war.

It is difficult to quote effectively from a poem which is constructed with great care on a complicated plan, but a fragment of Major Baring's elegy may lead readers to the original :

> 'God, Who had made you valiant, strong and swift,
> And maimed you with a bullet long ago,
> And cleft your riotous ardour with a rift,
> And checked your youth's tumultuous overflow,
> Gave back your youth to you,
> And packed in moments rare and few
> Achievements manifold
> And happiness untold,
> And bade you spring to Death as to a bride,
> In manhood's ripeness, power and pride,
> And on your sandals the strong wings of youth.'

There is no rhetoric here, no empty piling up of fine words ; it is a closely followed study in poetical biography.

The water has its marvels like the air, but they also have

hardly yet secured the attention of the poets. In 'A Naval 'Motley,' by Lieut. N. M. F. Corbett, published in June 1916, we encounter the submarine:

'Not yours to know delight
In the keen hard-fought fight,
The shock of battle and the battle's thunder;
But suddenly to feel
Deep, deep beneath the keel
The vital blow that rives the ship asunder!'

A section of the new war-poetry which is particularly pathetic is that which is inspired by the nostalgia of home, by the longing in the midst of the guns and the dust and the lice for the silent woodlands and cool waters of England. When this is combined with the sense of extreme youth, and of a certain brave and beautiful innocence, the poignancy of it is almost more than can be borne. The judgment is hampered, and one doubts whether one's critical feeling can be trusted. This particular species of emotion is awakened by no volume more than by the slender 'Worple Flat' of E. Wyndham Tennant, who died on the Somme in September 1916. He was only nineteen when he fell, at an age when, on the one hand, more precocious verse than his has been written, and when yet, on the other, some of the greatest poets had not achieved a mastery of words equal to that already possessed by this young Wykehamist. The voice is faltering, and there is a want of sureness in the touch; the metrical hammer does not always tap the centre of the nail's head. But what pathos in the sentiment, what tenderness in the devotion to beauty! Tennant had, we may suppose, read Flecker before he wrote 'How shall I tell you of the roads that stretch away?'; or was it merely the family likeness in the generation? But I know not what but his own genius can have inspired the 'Home Thoughts in Laventie,' a poem about a little garden left unravished among the rubble of the wrecked village, a poem which ends thus:

'I saw green banks of daffodil,
Slim poplars in the breeze,
Great tan-brown hares in gusty March
A-courting on the leas.
And meadows, with their glittering streams—and silver-scurrying dace—
Home, what a perfect place.'

Among these boy-poets, so cruelly and prematurely snatched from the paternal earth, Tennant suggests to us the possibility that a talent of very high order was quenched by death, because in few of them do we find so much evidence of that 'perception and awe of Beauty' which Plotinus held to be the upward path to God.

So lately as June of the present year there was published a volume which is in several ways the most puzzling and the most interesting of all that lie upon our table to-day. This is the 'Ardours and Endurances' of Lieut. Robert Nichols. We know nothing of the author save what we learn from his writings, that he is very young, that he went out from Oxford early in the war, that he was fighting in Flanders before the end of 1914, that he was wounded, perhaps at Loos, in 1915, and that he has been long in hospital. We add the hope, which nothing which we have seen printed belies, that he is still alive and on the road to recovery. Before 'Ardours and Endurances' reached us, we had met with 'Invocation,' a smaller volume published by Lieut. Nichols in December 1915. There has rarely been a more radical change in the character of an artist than is displayed by a comparison of these two collections. 'Invocation,' in which the war takes a small and unconvincing place, is creditable, though rather uncertain, in workmanship, and displays a tendency towards experiment in rich fancy and vague ornament. In 'Ardours and Endurances' the same accents are scarcely to be detected; the pleasant boy has grown into a war-worn man; while the mastery over the material of poetic art has become so remarkable as to make the epithet 'promising' otiose. There is no 'promise' here; there is high performance.

Alone among the poets before us, Lieut. Nichols has set down a reasoned sequence of war impressions. The opening Third of his book, and by far its most interesting section, consists of a cycle of pieces in which the personal experience of fighting is minutely reported, stage by stage. We have 'The Summons,' the reluctant but unhesitating answer to the call in England, the break-up of plans; then the farewell to home, 'the place of comfort.' 'The Approach,' in three successive lyrics, describes the arrival at the Front. 'Battle,' in eleven sections, reproduces the mental and physical pheno-

mena of the attack. 'The Dead,' in four instalments, tells the tale of grief. 'The Aftermath,' with extraordinary skill, records in eight stages the gradual recovery of nerve-power after the shattering emotions of the fight. The first section of 'Battle,' as being shorter than the rest, may be quoted in full as an example of Lieut. Nichols's method:

'It is mid-day: the deep trench glares—
A buzz and blaze of flies—
The hot wind puffs the giddy airs,
The great sun rakes the skies,

No sound in all the stagnant trench
Where forty standing men
Endure the sweat and grit and stench,
Like cattle in a pen.

Sometimes a sniper's bullet whirs
Or twangs the whining wire;
Sometimes a soldier sighs and stirs
As in hell's forging fire.

From out a high cool cloud descends
An aeroplane's far moan;
The sun strikes down, the thin cloud rends,
The black speck travels on.

And sweating, dizzied, isolate
In the hot trench beneath,
We bide the next shrewd move of fate
Be it of life or death.'

This is painfully vivid, but it is far exceeded in poignancy by what follows. Indeed it would be difficult to find in all literature, from the wail of David over Jonathan downward, such an expression of the hopeless longing for an irrecoverable presence as informs the broken melodies, the stanzas which are like sobs, of the fifth section of 'Ardours and Endurances':

'In a far field, away from England, lies
A Boy I friended with a care like love;
All day the wide earth aches, the cold wind cries,
The melancholy clouds drive on above.

There, separate from him by a little span,
Two eagle cousins, generous, reckless, free,
Two Grenfells, lie, and my Boy is made man,
One with these elder knights of chivalry.'

It is difficult to qualify, it seems almost indelicate to intrude upon, such passionate grief. These poems form a revelation of the agony of a spirit of superabundant refinement and native sensuousness suddenly stunned, and as it were momentarily petrified, by horrible spiritual anguish. If the strain were not relieved by the final numbers of 'Aftermath,' where the pain of the soul is abated, and where the poet, scarred and shattered, but 'free at last,' snaps the chain of despair, these poems would be positively intolerable.

In the closeness of his analysis and in the accurate heaping up of exact and pregnant observations, Lieut. Nichols comes closer than any other of these English poets to the best of the French paladins, of whom we wrote in the last number of this REVIEW. One peculiarity which he shares with them is his seriousness: there is no trace in him of the English cheerfulness and levity. Most of our war-writers are incorrigible Mark Tapleys. But Lieut. Nichols, even when he uses colloquial phrases—and he introduces them with great effect—never smiles. He is most unlike the French, on the other hand, in his general attitude towards the war. He has no military enthusiasm, no aspiration after *gloire*. Indeed, the most curious feature of his poetry is that its range is concentrated on the few yards about the trench in which he stands. He seems to have no national view of the purpose of the war, no enthusiasm for the cause, no anger against the enemy. There is no mention of the Germans from beginning to end; the poet does not seem to know of their existence. His experiences, his agonies, his despair, are what a purely natural phenomenon, such as the eruption of a volcano or the chaos of an earthquake, might cause. We might read his poems over and over again without forming the slightest idea of what all the distress was about, or who was guilty, or what was being defended. This is a mark of great artistic sincerity; but it also points to a certain moral narrowness. Lieut. Robert Nichols' 'endurances' are magnificently described, but we are left in the dark regarding his 'ardours.' We are sure of one thing, however, that none of us may guess what such a talent, in one still so young, may have in store for us; and we may hope for broader views expressed in no less burning accents.

There could hardly be a more vivid contrast than exists

between the melancholy passion of Lieut. Nichols and the fantastic high spirits of Captain Robert Graves. He again is evidently a very young man, who was but yesteryear a jolly boy at the Charterhouse. He has always meant to be a poet; he is not one of those who have been driven into verse by the strenuous emotion of the war. In some diverting prefatory lines to 'Over the Brazier' he gives us a picture of the nursery-scene when a bright green-covered book bewitched him by its 'metre twisting like a chain of daisies, with great big splendid 'words.' He has still a wholesome hunger for splendid words; he has kept more deliberately than most of his compeers a poetical vocation steadily before him. He has his moments of dejection when the first battle faces him:

'Here's an end to my art!
I must die and I know it,
With battle-murder at my heart—
Sad death for a poet!

Oh, my songs never sung,
And my plays to darkness blown!
I am still so young, so young,
And life was my own.'

But this mood soon passes, and is merged in the humoristic and fantastic elation characteristic of this buoyant writer, whose whim it is to meet the tragedy not mournfully but boisterously. Where by most of the soldier-bards the subjective manner is a little over-done, it is impossible not to welcome so objective a writer as Captain Graves, from whose observations of the battle of La Bassée we quote an episode:

THE DEAD FOX HUNTER.

'We found the little captain at the head;
His men lay well aligned.
We touched his hand, stone-cold, and he was dead,
And they, all dead behind,
Had never reached their goal, but they died well;
They charged in line, and in the same line fell.

The well-known rosy colours of his face
Were almost lost in grey.
We saw that, dying and in hopeless case,
For others' sake that day
He'd smothered all rebellious groans: in death
His fingers were tight clenched between his teeth.

For those who live uprightly and die true
Heaven has no bars or locks,
And serves all taste . . . Or what's for him to do
Up there, but hunt the fox?
Angelic choirs? No, Justice must provide
For one who rode straight and at hunting died.

So if Heaven had no Hunt before he came,
Why, it must find one now:
If any shirk and doubt they know the game,
There's one to teach them how:
And the whole host of Seraphim complete
Must joy in scarlet to his opening Meet.'

We have an idea that this is a gallant poem which Englishmen will not allow to be forgotten. The great quality of Captain Graves' verse at present is its elated vivacity, which neither fire, nor pain, nor grief can long subdue. Acutely sensitive to all these depressing elements, his animal spirits lift him like an aeroplane, and he is above us in a moment, soaring through clouds of nonsense under a sky of unmuffled gaiety. In our old literature, of which he is plainly a student, he has found a neglected author who is wholly to his taste. This is Skelton, Henry VIII.'s Rabelaisian laureate. Captain Graves imitates, with a great deal of bravado, those breathless absurdities, 'The Tunning of Elinore Rummyng' and 'Colin Clout.' He likes rough metre, bad rhymes and squalid images: we suspect him of an inclination to be rude to his immediate predecessors. But his extreme modernness—'Life is a *cliché*—'I would find a gesture of my own'—is, in the case of so lively a songster, an evidence of vitality. He promises a new volume, to be called 'Fairies and Fusiliers,' and it will be looked forward to with anticipation.

All these poets seem to be drawn into relation to one another. Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon are both Fusiliers, and they publish a *στιχομυθία* 'on Nonsense,' just as Cowley and Crashaw did 'on Hope' two centuries and a half ago. Lieut. Sassoon's own volume is later than those which we have hitherto examined, and bears a somewhat different character. The gallantry of 1915 and the optimism of 1916 have passed away, and in Lieut. Sassoon's poems their place is taken by a sense of intolerable weariness and impatience: 'How long, O Lord, how long?' The name-piece

of the volume, and perhaps its first in execution, is a monologue by an ignorant and shrewd old huntsman, who looks back over his life with philosophy and regret. Like Captain Graves, he is haunted with the idea that there must be fox-hounds in Heaven. All Lieut. Sassoon's poems about horses and hunting and country life generally betray his tastes and habits. This particular poem hardly touches on the war, but those which follow are absorbed by the ugliness, lassitude, and horror of fighting. Lieut. Sassoon's verse has not yet secured the quality of the first work; he is not sufficiently alive to the importance of always hitting upon the best and only word. He is essentially a satirist, and sometimes a very bold one, as in 'The Hero,' where the death of a soldier is announced home in 'gallant lies,' so that his mother brags to her neighbours of the courage of her dead son. At the close of all this pious make-believe, the Colonel

> 'thought how "Jack," cold-footed, useless swine,
> Had panicked down the trench that night the mine
> Went up at Wicked Corner; how he'd tried
> To get sent home; and how, at last, he died,
> Blown to small bits';

or, again, as in 'Blighters,' where the sentimentality of London is contrasted with the reality in Flanders:

> 'The House is crammed: tier beyond tier they grin
> And cackle at the Show, while prancing ranks
> Of harlots shrill the chorus, drunk with din;
> "We're sure the Kaiser loves the dear old Tanks!"
>
> I'd like to see a Tank come down the stalls,
> Lurching to rag-time tunes, or "Home, sweet Home!"—
> And there'd be no more jokes in Music-halls
> To mock the riddled corpses round Bapaume.'

It is this note of bitter anger, miles away from the serenity of Rupert Brooke, the lion-heart of Julian Grenfell, the mournful passion of Robert Nichols, which differentiates Lieut. Sassoon from his fellows. They accept the war, with gallantry or with resignation; he detests it with wrathful impatience. He has much to learn as an artist, for his diction is often hard, and he does not always remember that Horace, 'when he writ on 'vulgar subjects, yet writ not vulgarly.' But he has force, sincerity, and a line of his own in thought and fancy. A con-

siderable section of his poetry is occupied with studies of men he has observed at the Front, a subaltern, a private of the Lancashires, conscripts, the dress of a battle-field, the one-legged man ('Thank God, they had to amputate!'), the sniper who goes crazy—savage, disconcerting silhouettes drawn roughly against a lurid background.

The bitterness of Lieut. Sassoon is not cynical, it is the rage of disenchantment, the violence of a young man eager to pursue other aims, who, finding the age out of joint, resents being called upon to help to mend it. His temper is not altogether to be applauded, for such sentiments must tend to relax the effort of the struggle, yet they can hardly be reproved when conducted with so much honesty and courage. Lieut. Sassoon, who, as we learn, has twice been severely wounded and has been in the very furnace of the fighting, has reflected, more perhaps than his fellow-singers, about the causes and conditions of the war. He may not always have thought correctly, nor have recorded his impressions with proper circumspection, but his honesty must be respectfully acknowledged.

We have now called attention to those soldier-writers of verse who, in our judgment, have expressed themselves with most originality during the present war. There is a temptation to continue the inquiry, and to expatiate on others of only less merit and promise. Much could be said of Charles Hamilton Sorley, who gave evidence of precocious literary talent, though less, we think, in verse, since the unmistakable singing faculty is absent in 'Marlborough' (Cambridge University Press, 1916), than in prose, a form in which he already excelled. Sorley must have shown military gifts as well as a fine courage, for when he was killed in action in October 1915, although he was but twenty years of age, he had been promoted captain. In the universal sorrow, few figures awaken more regret than his. Something, too, had we space, should be said about the minstrels who have been less concerned with the delicacies of workmanship than with stirring the pulses of their auditors. In this kind the lyric 'A Leaping Wind from England' will long keep fresh the name of W. N. Hodgson, who was killed in the battle of the Somme. His verses were collected in November 1916. The strange, rough drum-taps of Mr. Henry Lawson, published in Sydney at the close of 1915, and those of Mr. Lawrence Rentoul,

testify to Australian enthusiasm. Most of the soldier-poets were quite youthful; an exception was R. E. Vernède, whose 'War Poems' (W. Heinemann, 1917) show the vigour of moral experience. He was killed in the attack on Harrincourt, in April 1917, having nearly closed his forty-second year. To pursue the list would only be to make our omissions more invidious.

There can be no healthy criticism where the principle of selection is neglected, and we regret that patriotism or indulgence tempts so many of those who speak of the war-poets of the day to plaster them with indiscriminate praise. We have spoken here of a few, in whose honour even a little excess of laudation may not be out of place. But these are the exceptions, in a mass of standardised poetry made to pattern, loosely versified, excellent in sentiment, uniformly meditative, and entirely without individual character. The reviewers who applaud all these ephemeral efforts with a like acclaim, and who say that there are hundreds of poets now writing who equal if they do not excel the great masters of the past, talk nonsense; they talk nonsense, and they know it. They lavish their flatteries in order to widen the circle of their audience. They are like the prophets of Samaria, who declared good unto the King of Israel with one mouth; and we need a Micaiah to clear the scene of all such flatulent Zedekiahs. It is not true that the poets of the youngest generation are a myriad Shelleys and Burnses and Bérangers rolled into one. But it is true that they carry on the great tradition of poetry with enthusiasm, and a few of them with high accomplishment.

EDMUND GOSSE.

# THE VITAL ELEMENT IN POETRY

BUT for the barbarity of the title, this essay might have been called 'Vitamines in Poetry.' The word is a new one but expressive. Not very long after the chemists had anatomised our food and shown—to their own satisfaction, at any rate—what are the elements upon which we live, some strange facts—tiresome to the men of science because they tended to upset their theories, but of the greatest importance to hungering, thirsting man—were discovered. Science had proclaimed with trumpet voice that man cannot live without so many grams of protein, carbohydrates, and fats, and had shown what foods possessed these constituent parts, and what did not. But in spite of this scientific dogmatism it was apparent that there were large numbers of people in different parts of the globe who were contentedly living and thriving on foods which ought to have proved entirely insufficient for human sustenance, and that there were other people failing to live upon what ought to have been fully sufficient.

At first the food experts were perplexed and inclined to take the view that if people could not or would not live according to the table of food values, the sooner the world was relieved of their presence the better. This, however, was an unsatisfactory way of getting out of the difficulty; and ultimately a German professor, with the engaging name of Casimir Funk, found a solution of the problem. He called in a new element to redress the balance. A student of the great Funk has described the situation with a mixture of candour and ingenuity which is distinctly entertaining.

'With the lapse of time the importance of "quality" as well as quantity has gradually dawned upon us, and we now know that food must contain not only proteins, carbohydrates, and fats, but certain definite kinds of these principles, together with small quantities of mineral salts, if it is to be considered satisfactory from the maintenance-of-health point of view. If the protein element, for instance, is deficient in certain amino-acids, especially in aromatic amino-acids, such as tyrosine and tryptophane, no super-abundance of other amino-acid constituents will compensate for the deficiency, and the food is unable to maintain the integrity of the living tissues.'

Then comes the heroic confession :

'The essential factors of a complete diet are therefore more numerous than was formerly suspected, and the recognition of the limitation of the synthetic powers of the living organism has suggested the possibility that other substances may be present in the food—occurring, it may be, in only small quantities—which are nevertheless absolutely indispensable, whose withdrawal from the diet would be attended with eventually fatal results.'

For these 'absolutely indispensable' but unanalysable substances the name 'vitamines' was suggested. They save the situation, by enabling us to live and to die according to scientific principles, and to borrow a phrase from Pope if we starve to starve by rules of art!

It may be suggested that there is a close analogy between the food values of the body and the food values of the mind, and that this analogy specially holds good in regard to poetry. Hitherto, like the men of science of the past generation, we have been content with an imperfect analysis of poetry. We have ignored the existence of 'vitamines' in verse. In our analysis we have declared that certain poems must be good, because they conformed to certain literary standards by which the critics have ordained that poetic excellence shall be measured, although we have known all the time that they were hopelessly bad owing to lack of some indefinable quality. On the other hand we have condemned on technical literary grounds poems which were in reality alive and life-giving, thanks to this element which we cannot define or analyse. Until we recognise that there are 'vitamines' in poetry as there are in food, and until we draw the necessary conclusions, we cannot hope to understand why certain poetry which appears to be trivial may move us deeply, while certain other poetry, which on the most careful and minute analysis is in every technical respect good, 'flaunts and goes down an unregarded thing.'

Doubtless in a sense there is very little that is new in this statement. We have known the fact all along without having given it so scientific a name. All lovers of poetry have always felt in their bones, if they have not expressed it in set terms, that the poetry which has one or two atoms of the true gold in it is infinitely more valuable than all the silver verse in the world. Men have sought the true gold high and low, putting up with a great amount of copper and other alloys

and even baser admixtures, but fully satisfied if they could find some trace of the authentic treasure. If once that were discovered, the genuine lovers of true poetry have been willing to leave to the exacter critics all the ponderous excellencies of verse that lacked the vital element. 'Better is a dinner of herbs ' where love is, than a stalled ox and hatred therewith.' Better a rough song in which there is life, than the most stately and correct epic that suggests the stillness of death. Blessed are they who can combine with the vital element the glories of rhetoric and ornament, the felicity of phrase, and all the splendid pageantries of sound and rhythm, who can eliminate every vulgarity of thought and language, every solecism and every imperfection born of hurry and ignorance, who can be noble of mood and yet retain life and energy!

To illustrate these general propositions I propose to give in the first place examples of poetry where the subject is apparently unfitted for poetic treatment, or where the manner is tiresome or even actually bad, but where the situation is triumphantly saved by the presence of the undefinable element which gives life. Next, illustration must be given of poetry that apparently obeys all the reasonable rules of the critics as to what is good and what is bad, but remains worthless as poetry because the vital element has been left out—or, in some cases, has been polished out of existence. Of this last mentioned defect we have an exact food analogy in the case of rice. Unpolished rice is a thing upon which human beings can live and thrive ; polished rice, which has so fair an appearance, has been devitalised by the polishing to such an extent that the attempt to live upon it sends people to their graves. It has thus been discovered that the vital element in rice is stored in the dull-looking outer skin, and if that skin is removed, the rice no longer suffices as a human food.

As a first example take the case of verse applied to an apparently impossible subject, and yet remaining poetry because it possesses the vital element. Imagine a politician ' orating ' on Reconstruction after the War, and arguing that it will be absolutely necessary, if we are to produce sound economic conditions, to reform our road system, to rebuild our piers, to deepen our harbours, to dredge out our rivers, to remodel our bridges, protect our coasts from erosion, and reclaim land on our foreshores. Such a list of public improvements, ending

with a peroration on the felicity of Peace and the true Imperialism, would be excellent material for a speech by the Chairman of the Development Commission; but no one would venture to suggest that it was a fit subject for poetry, or could be rendered into even tolerable verse. Yet Pope has performed this miracle, though Pope is the poet who is supposed to live because he is 'correct.' He really lives because he has that touch of vitality which makes up for his many otherwise fatal defects in taste, grammar, and humanity. Writing in a period of war, closed by Peace, and of necessary Reconstruction, he fires with the true poetic passion the dreary catalogue of the practical politician:

'Bid Harbours open, public Ways extend,
Bid Temples, worthier of the God, ascend;
Bid the broad Arch the dang'rous Flood contain,
The Mole projected break the roaring Main;
Back to his bounds their subject Sea command,
And roll obedient Rivers thro' the Land;
These Honours, Peace to happy Britain brings,
These are Imperial Works, and worthy Kings.'

Equally unlikely to satisfy those desires which we want satisfied when hungering for verse would seem a poem dealing with the technicalities of garden architecture. And yet so full of 'vitamines' is Pope's work that he makes even this technical subject vibrate with life and passion:

'To build, to plant, whatever you intend,
To rear the Column, or the Arch to bend,
To swell the Terrace, or to sink the Grot;
In all, let Nature never be forgot.
But treat the Goddess like a modest Fair,
Nor overdress, nor leave her wholly bare;
Let not each beauty ev'ry where be spy'd,
Where half the skill is decently to hide.
He gains all points, who pleasingly confounds,
Surprizes, varies, and conceals the Bounds.
Consult the Genius of the Place in all;
That tells the Waters or to rise, or fall;
Or helps th' ambitious Hill the heav'ns to scale,
Or scoops in circling theatres the Vale;
Calls in the Country, catches op'ning glades,
Joins willing woods, and varies shades from shades;
Now breaks or now directs th' intending Lines;
Paints as you plant, and, as you work, designs.'

One more example from Pope to show again how out of a subject of the dullest, dryest, least inspiring kind, and moreover one which he was peculiarly unfitted to handle, real poetry can be produced. Pope fancied himself as a theologian and philosopher, but the world has long ago decided that in neither sphere was his opinion worth having. And who can doubt that the world was right? Yet, in spite of his want of true religious feeling and want of learning, his verse is alive. Take the famous passage towards the end of 'The Dunciad,' where—with little or no excuse from the scheme of his poem and at the cost of doing violence to his own views—he turns with something approaching savagery upon the latitudinarians of his day and belabours them and the opponents of mysticism as they have never been belaboured before or since:

> 'Be that my task (replies a gloomy Clerk,
> Sworn foe to Myst'ry, yet divinely dark;
> Whose pious hope aspires to see the day
> When Moral Evidence shall quite decay,
> And damns implicit faith, and holy lies,
> Prompt to impose, and fond to dogmatize):
> Let others creep by timid steps, and slow,
> On plain Experience lay foundations low,
> By common sense to common knowledge bred,
> And last, to Nature's Cause thro' Nature led.
> All-seeing in thy mists, we want no guide,
> Mother of Arrogance, and Source of Pride!
> We nobly take the high Priori Road,
> And reason downward, till we doubt of God:
> Make Nature still encroach upon his plan;
> And shove him off as far as e'er we can:
> Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his place;
> Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space.
> Or, at one bound o'er-leaping all his laws,
> Make God Man's Image, Man the final Cause,
> Find Virtue local, all Relation scorn,
> See all in Self, and but for Self be born:
> Of nought so certain as our Reason still,
> Of nought so doubtful as of Soul and Will.
> Oh, hide the God still more! and make us see
> Such as Lucretius drew, a God like Thee:
> Wrapt up in Self, a God without a Thought,
> Regardless of our merit or default.'

If anyone will take the trouble to analyse this passage, in the sort of way that Dr. Johnson on the one hand, and Matthew

Arnold on the other, are wont to analyse poems, he will find it full of the most glaring faults—not merely of grammar, as to which Pope was the greatest of sinners—but of taste and sense. And yet, because of the element of vitality, it lives and breathes, and nourishes and sustains those who read it.

But perhaps it will be said that Pope was here touching great themes, themes the highest that the human mind can conceive, that he was a master in words, and that therefore it was no wonder if he could make his theological satire glow and burn with the fire within him. Let me then break fresh ground with a poem which cannot claim any of these aids, in which the subject and the method of attack seem equally unpromising, namely Lindsay Gordon's 'How we beat the Favourite.' A horse race is not necessarily an unpoetic subject, as Pindar proves; Lindsay Gordon, however, was not singing of the Olympian games, but merely 'A Lay of the Loamshire Hunt 'Cup.' He did not treat his subject from the heroic standpoint, but from that of the local trainer, the gentleman Jock, and the rural Bookie. Yet because he could bring the vital element to his work, the result is fully satisfying. We forgive him his jigging metre, his ramshackle epithets, his go-as-you-please grammar, and his Mid-Victorian journalese. It is all cancelled by the effects of the unanalysable, life-giving element.

'"A gentleman rider—well, I'm an outsider,
But if he's a gent, who the mischief's a jock?
You swells mostly blunder, Dick rides for the plunder,
He rides, too, like thunder—he sits like a rock.

"He calls 'hunted fairly' a horse that has barely
Been stripp'd for a trot within sight of the hounds,
A horse that at Warwick beat Birdlime and Yorick,
And gave Abdelkader at Aintree nine pounds.

* * * * *

"Dark brown with tan muzzle, just stripp'd for the tussle,
Stood Iseult, arching her neck to the curb,
A lean head and fiery, strong quarters and wiry,
A loin rather light, but a shoulder superb.

"Some parting injunction, bestowed with great unction,
I tried to recall, but forgot like a dunce,
When Reginald Murray, full tilt on White Surrey,
Came down in a hurry to start us at once.

'"Keep back in the yellow! Come up on Othello!
Hold hard on the chestnut! Turn round on The Drag!
Keep back there on Spartan! Back you, sir, in tartan!
So, steady there, easy," and down went the flag.

* * * * *

A hum of hoarse cheering, a dense crowd careering,
All sights seen obscurely, all shouts vaguely heard;
"The green wins!" "The crimson!" The multitude swims on,
And figures are blended and features are blurred.

"The horse is her master!" "The green forges past her!"
"The Clown will outlast her!" "The Clown wins." "The Clown!"
The white railing races with all the white faces,
The chestnut outpaces, outstretches the brown.

On still past the gateway she strains in the straightway,
Still struggles, "The Clown by a short neck at most,"
He swerves, the green scourges, the stand rocks and surges,
And flashes, and verges, and flits the white post.

Aye! so ends the tussle,—I knew the tan muzzle
Was first, though the ring-men were yelling "Dead heat!"
A nose I could swear by, but Clarke said "The mare by
A short head." And that's how the favourite was beat.'

Let me take one more example of a poem which must be judged bad on all accounts except that of vital power. The poem is Bishop Heber's funeral hymn, 'Thou art gone to the 'grave.' It has all the faults to be expected in the work of a theological rhetorician of the Regency. It reminds one of the architecture of old Brighton and of Brunswick Square—if not, indeed, of the Pavilion. And yet, in spite of its tumid language and barrel-organ prosody, there is something present which reveals the poet's nobility of feeling, and brings satisfaction to the reader's mind:

'Thou art gone to the grave: we no longer behold thee,
Nor tread the rough path of the world by thy side;
But the wide arms of Mercy are spread to enfold thee,
And sinners may die, for the Sinless has died!

Thou art gone to the grave: and, its mansion forsaking,
Perhaps thy weak spirit in fear linger'd long;
But the mild rays of Paradise beam'd on thy waking,
And the sound which thou heard'st was the Seraphim's song!'

Another example of bad verse which, owing to the presence of the life-giving hitherto unanalysed element, has become fit diet for the most fastidious appetite is Glover's inimitable

Ballad of Admiral Hozier's Ghost—the ballad which helped to blow Walpole from office. It has every literary fault except the absence of the vital quality : but having that, it lives, and will continue to live, in our literature. It is through the same quality that most of Macaulay's verse endures. The critic can easily demolish the ' Lays of Ancient Rome,' and yet there will never be a time when men's pulses will not be made to beat more quickly by the story of the dauntless three, by the glorious geographical catalogue of ' The Armada,' or by the contrast of the Arno and the Tees in ' A Jacobite's Epitaph.'

Crabbe's poems offer specially good examples of the same point. Indeed, one might almost call shameless some of his intrusions of poetic vitamines into his dullest—or rather, apparently dullest—poems, for in reality Crabbe is never dull. For example, in one of his Tales he wishes to describe the high Tory views of a gentleman farmer. The man expects implicit obedience from those below him in the social scale, and yields a similar respect to those above him. His scheme of life is a strictly ordered hierarchy. That is rather a dull thing to put into verse, and this is how the audacious Crabbe handles it :

> ' And as fair virgins dancing in a round,
> Each binds the other and herself is bound.'

There rises before us a canvas of Albano's delicate craft, or one of the exquisite plaques that Flaxman designed for Wedgwood in grey-green and white. Surely the Muse of Politics was never invoked so strangely as here ! And all to tell us how a boor was also a snob !

Some of the most vital poetry in existence is to be found in the snatches of popular song which have escaped oblivion, as for example the verse which contracted Medieval Socialism into a single couplet :

> ' When Adam delved and Eve span,
> Who was then the gentleman ? '

Or take a later example, the Chartists' invocation of the Passion, to illustrate the daily martyrdom of Labour :

> ' Crucified, crucified, every morn,
> Scourged, and spat on, and crowned with thorn ;
> Mocked with hyssop, and drenched with gall,
> Brothers, how long will you bear this thrall ?
> Mary, Magdalene, Peter, and John,
> Answer the question, and pass it on.'

It is such short, sharp poems, winged with ' vitamines,' that, in Bacon's words, ' fly abroad like darts,' and stir men's hearts to deeds of dread. With the aid of this vital element Barnes, like the glorious pedant that he was, took an elaborate, unrhymed Persian metre—' The Pearl '—set it in the broadest of Dorsetshire dialect, and so achieved a literary miracle. Dryden again could make an Epilogue or a Prologue to some filthy, leering drama (his own or another's) blaze like a beacon, by the same hidden power. Take next Thomas Moore. In spite of his blowzy, slipshod vulgarisms and Regent's Park anacreontics, Moore can never be ignored by lovers of poetry, because of his compelling vitality. It is only necessary to recall the fascinating lines that describe the English girl who personifies ' Country Dance ' :

> ' Let her but run that threefold race
> She calls a set, not Dian e'er
> Came rosier from the woodland chace.'

Next let us turn to those poets who have left nought but the shadow of a name because, however great their technical perfection, they possessed no vital force. Johnson's Lives of the Poets afford dozens of examples of poets who in their own day gained, and in many ways deserved, some fame, but upon whom if a man now tried to nourish himself he must soon die of inanition. Thomson is the capital example of the poet who has perished, or lives only a pale life, partly on borrowed glory and partly because he brought back nature and blank verse to elegiac literature. As far as readers are concerned, in wanting vitality he wants everything. He had the wit or the good fortune to see that blank verse could and ought to be restored to its place in our literature, and that the couplet —king too long—could be easily dethroned, or converted from a tyrant into a constitutional monarch. Again, to use Pope's phrase, he ' called in the Country,' and dared to bring us face to face with the real landscape, and not with one which, to quote Pope again, had been treated like a ' modest Fair,' not overdressed nor yet left wholly without draperies. But though our debt to Thomson is so great, and though he gave so much inspiration first to Cowper and then to Wordsworth, no man could call his poems alive or find in them the source of life. If we were to try to live upon him, we could but meet the fate

of those who try to live upon cereals that have proteins but no vitamines.

To revert once more to the analogy of polished rice. It is quite clear that in verse, as in food, the vitamines may be polished away. A good example of the bad results of over-polishing may be found in 'The Rape of the Lock,' when Pope, to improve his poem and make it more polished, added the machinery of the Sylphs. He lavished on the verses dedicated to the Sylphs all the magic of his art, but he failed utterly in his undertaking, because for some reason or other he could not give them the vital element. Consequently all wise men read the poem, either consciously or unconsciously, with the Sylphs omitted. Take, for instance, the glorious climax of the Third Canto, and note how completely the famous lines are devitalised by the introduction of the Sylph. Here they are as Pope originally wrote them:

> 'The peer now spreads the glittering forfex wide,
> To enclose the lock; now joins it to divide.
> The meeting points the sacred hair dissever
> From the fair head, for ever, and for ever!'

Now see them polished and deprived of vitality:

> 'The peer now spreads the glittering forfex wide,
> To enclose the lock; now joins it to divide.
> E'en then, before the fatal engine closed,
> A wretched sylph too fondly interpos'd:
> Fate urged the shears, and cut the sylph in twain
> (But airy substance soon unites again);
> The meeting points the sacred hair dissever
> From the fair head, for ever and for ever!'

Yet one dare not dogmatise, for in some cases this elusive vital element which did not exist in a poem before may have been introduced in the process of polishing. That exquisite lyric, as curiously felicitous as any Ode in Horace, Congreve's 'Fair Amoret has gone astray,' gains its vital qualities not from the thought of the poem, but purely from the amazing accomplishment of the verse.

Perhaps the best proof of the importance of the vital element in poetry is to be found in the dullness of almost all poetic translations. In very few cases is the translator able to transfer this essential element from the original to his own page. In the process of translation this minute but precious substance

is dissipated. Verse translations are in the main a gallery of failures. Incidentally it may be noticed, that the best and most successful translations we possess are what may be called accidental translations, translations which were undertaken not for the purpose of letting English readers enjoy a Greek or Latin author, but for some purpose of the translator's own. 'Why,' it may be asked, 'are such accidental translations living things, 'when the ordinary translation is a corpse, or at best a mummy?' As an illustration take the famous passage in 'Wordsworth's 'Grave,' in which Matthew Arnold annexes for his own purpose the greatest purple patch in the Georgics:

> 'And he was happy, if to know
> Causes of things, and far below
> His feet to see the lurid flow
> Of terror, and insane distress,
> And headlong fate, be happiness.'

That is certainly live poetry. If any one wants to see what Dryden made of it, let him turn to the translation of the Georgics. He will find that though the words and sense are there, all the life has been lost in the process of translation. Take, as another example, the ordinary translations—even Munro's—of the famous Invocation of the Second Book of Lucretius. Unless a man has some acquaintance with the Latin, such translations, however correct, will never set him on fire. Then turn to the accidental translation in Bacon's Essay on Truth:

> 'It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tost upon the sea; A pleasure to stand in the window of a Castle, and to see a Battaile, and the Adventures thereof, below; But no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground of Truth (A hill not to be commanded, and where the Ayre is alwaies cleare and serene,) and to see the Errours, and Wandrings and Mists, and Tempests, in the vale below.'

Yet one more example, the passage in 'Tristram Shandy' in which Sterne translates Servius Sulpicius's letter to Cicero on the death of his son:

> 'Returning out of Asia, when I sailed from Aegina towards Megara, I began to view the country round about. Aegina was behind me, Megara was before, Piraeus on the right hand, Corinth on the left. What flourishing towns now prostrate upon the earth! Alas! alas! said I to myself, that man should disturb his soul

for the loss of a child, when so much as this lies awfully buried in his presence. Remember, said I to myself again, remember thou art a man.'

Compare these noble words, which must have come home to many hearts in the days that rock and reel beneath us, with the dreary and accurate dulness of the ordinary translator.

Another striking example of successful accidental translation is the exquisite rendering, by Sir Henry Newbolt, of Martial's Epigram on Felix Antonius. It may fairly be described as one of the most living pieces of translation in our language.

'To-day, my friend is seventy-five;
He tells his tale with no regret;
His brave old eyes are steadfast yet,
His heart the lightest heart alive.

He sees behind him green and wide
The pathway of his pilgrim years;
He sees the shore, and dreadless hears
The whisper of the creeping tide.

For out of all his days, not one
Has passed and left its unlaid ghost
To seek a light for ever lost,
Or wail a deed for ever done.

So for reward of life-long truth
He lives again, as good men can,
Redoubling his allotted span
With memories of a stainless youth.'

It is interesting to contrast this deeply moving version with a translation of the same epigram made by Pope. Curiously enough the translation has never been included in Pope's Poetical Works, but remains interned among his letters. It appears in a letter to Pope from Turnbull, who reminds the poet of the translation, and then quotes it.

'At length my friend (while time with still career
Wafts on his gentle wing his eightieth year)
Sees his past days safe out of Fortune's pow'r,
Nor dreads approaching Fate's uncertain hour;
Reviews his life, and in the strict survey
Finds not one moment he could wish away,
Pleased with the series of each happy day.
Such, such a man extends his life's short space,
And from the goal again renews the race:
For he lives twice who can at once employ
The present well, and ev'n the past enjoy.'

After this insistence upon the necessity for the vital element in poetry it remains to ask what is that element. Alas! it is as difficult for the critic to answer that question as for the chemist to define vitamines. Probably no man will ever be able to give a precise answer. It will remain one of the secrets of existence. But that is no reason why we should not try to fathom the mystery. If we do not succeed, the search will be sure to justify itself in our discoveries by the way. In seeking the Philosopher's Stone men became chemists. It was through the study of astrology that astronomy was born. Those scholars of the starry Heavens were like the poet who 'catched at Love and filled his hands with bays.' They never found and their successors will not find to what goal or along what road the astral universe is rushing. All the astronomer knows is that each heavenly body moves, and that they also move all together as a universe, within something greater than a universe; he does not know whence that movement comes or whither it tends. But this awe-inspiring, this dreadful, limitation of the astronomer's knowledge does not prevent him from predicting a comet or an eclipse, from measuring how far we are from our planetary neighbours, or from telling us their weight and their dimensions. In the same way, though we may never be able to define precisely the vital element in poetry, may not the search lead us to a fuller mastery of the benign mysteries of verse?

J. St. Loe Strachey.

# FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS?

1. **Herbert Spencer.** By HUGH ELLIOT. Constable. 1917.
2. **The Decline of Liberty in England.** By E. S. P. HAYNES. Grant Richards. 1916.
3. **Ancient Law.** By Sir H. S. MAINE. With Introduction and Notes by Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK. Murray. 1906.
4. **The New Democracy and the Constitution.** By W. S. MCKECHNIE. Murray. 1912.
5. **Peers and Bureaucrats.** By RAMSAY MUIR. Constable. 1910.

THE problems, political and social, that will require to be solved when peace returns are many and intricate. The fabric of society has been shattered, and the plan of reconstruction will undoubtedly be much affected by the recent rapid development of democratic feeling in this country.

Democracy has a natural tendency towards State control; and of all the perplexing questions of the future one of the most difficult will be how to reconcile a democratic régime with the traditional liberty of our people. That liberty will be attacked after the war is certain, and the object of this article is to call attention to a menace to personal liberty which has attracted but little notice hitherto. The nature of this danger is—as is suggested by the title—that our social policy, which from time immemorial has steadily progressed from Status to Contract, is now showing a tendency to move in the opposite direction.

Status, according to the New English Dictionary, means 'the legal standing or position of a person as determined by 'his membership of some class of persons legally enjoying 'certain rights or subject to certain conditions.' In this article the word is used in antithesis to Contract, as a convenient way of describing the tendency of social policy as affecting personal liberty and freedom of contract.

In his work on ancient law, Sir Henry Maine traces the history of Status from its first appearance in the form of 'family 'dependency'; he shows how, as humanity advanced, Status

was gradually superseded by Contract, and he came to the conclusion that 'the march of progressive societies has always 'been from Status to Contract.' Slavery was formerly the most complete form of Status; but since slavery has practically disappeared, State servitude—such, for instance, as that which for many generations has existed in Prussia—represents its fullest development in modern times. Sir Frederick Pollock says of Maine's dictum that 'it is certainly just, and has not 'ceased to be significant.' * In this country the supersession of Status by Contract was carried so far that, by the middle of the nineteenth century, it could be asserted with truth that 'a degree of individual liberty has been reached greater than 'ever before existed since nations began to be formed: men 'could move about as they pleased, work at what they pleased, 'trade with whom they pleased.' † It seems incredible that the English people, in whom the love of freedom is so deeply rooted, could be induced to adopt a policy which implies a progressive encroachment upon their liberties; and there can be no doubt that if the effect of such a policy were understood it would be indignantly rejected. The danger lies in the fact that the knowledge does not exist. At first the interference of this policy with personal liberty is slight: only small sections of the population are affected by it, and the tendency is unnoticed by the general public. Such a policy is, however, capable of indefinite extension, and there are many parties in this country by whom its continuous development is ardently desired.

It is probable that the bodies, who under various names and for different reasons advocate State control of private activities, may think that the difficulties of the political and industrial situation when peace returns will offer a good opportunity for attaining their common object, and may agree to sink their differences for the nonce, and combine their forces in the hope of securing it. A few years ago such an attack upon liberty would have been obviously futile, but it is doubtful whether this can be said with equal confidence now.

The fact that the British Constitution is unwritten has great advantages, but the last few years have made its corre-

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* Maine's 'Ancient Law,' p. 183.
† Elliot's 'Herbert Spencer,' p. 180.

lative weakness conspicuous. The great merit of an unchartered system is the facility with which it can be modified and adapted to meet new requirements. As De Tocqueville said, 'En 'Angleterre la constitution peut changer sans cesse'; but he showed his perception of the fact that this facility was due to the absence of safeguards, and was therefore a danger, by adding 'Ou plutôt elle n'existe pas.' Recent events have only too fully justified his prevision, and since 1911 it may be said that the British Constitution, as an integral system, has been in abeyance.

Up to the time of the passing of the Parliament Act it was generally believed that adequate protection against hasty constitutional innovations was secured by the procedure always followed when Bills were introduced in either House. No measure could be placed upon the Statute Book until it had received the assent of both Houses of Parliament and of the Crown. The 'veto' of the Crown has for many years been only nominal; but with this modification the procedure described has been followed for more than two hundred years without any untoward result caused by the absence of written safeguards; and the practical working of the British Constitution was so successful that it became the admiration of the world. Sir Henry Maine attributed this success to the fact that by a series of undesigned changes it had arrived at a condition under which satisfaction and impatience, the two great sources of political conduct, were both reasonably gratified; but he added the warning that 'the nice balance of attractions 'which caused the British Constitution to move evenly on its 'stately path is perhaps destined to be disturbed: one of the 'forces governing it may gain dangerously at the expense 'of the other.' * It has for long been obvious that the unrepresentative character of the House of Lords constitutes an element of discord which, although dormant for so many years, would eventually become unendurable as democratic feeling increased. Even so long ago as 1885 there were political symptoms which led Sir Henry to anticipate a conflict between the two Houses. 'We are drifting,' he then wrote, 'towards a state of government associated 'with terrible events—a single assembly, armed with full

* 'Popular Government,' by Sir H. S. Maine, 5th ed., p. 54.

'powers over the Constitution, which it may exercise at 'pleasure.'* By the beginning of the twentieth century the relations between the two Houses had become much strained; in 1910 a crisis was reached which was ended by the passing of the Parliament Act in 1911, and Sir Henry Maine's anticipation was to a great extent realised.

Nations who have shown their admiration for the British Constitution by imitating it, have almost without exception perceived, and endeavoured to protect themselves against, the danger incurred by the absence of written safeguards. In the case of the United States these precautions are so elaborate and so complete that it is said to be practically impossible to make any alteration in the Constitution, however expedient it may be and however general may be the desire for it.

On the other hand it may be said that the Parliament Act, so far from being an illustration of the disadvantages of an unwritten constitution, is strong evidence in its favour. It was inevitable that, as has been said, the authority over legislation exercised by an unrepresentative assembly would lead to conflict; and if, when the crisis arrived, our constitution, like that of the United States, had been so hedged about with safeguards as to make a prompt solution of the difficulty impossible, there might have been danger of revolution. But although it is true that the existence of a safety-valve saved the situation on this occasion it does not follow that so violent a remedy, the effect of which was to place the country under the practically supreme authority of a single chamber, was necessary; and although in this country the terrible events Sir Henry Maine had in his mind need not be feared (whatever might be the legislative vagaries of the single authority), yet the vital interests of a community may be quite as seriously and more permanently injured by unwise laws as by revolution. Impulsive and ill-considered legislation is far more to be feared under single-chamber government than when Bills have to be subjected to revision and scrutiny by a second chamber before they can become law. There does not appear to have been any reason why the country should have been exposed to this danger at all—still less why it should have been allowed to continue for six years. With some goodwill and patriotism

* Popular Government, p. 126.

on both sides, it would surely have been possible to have agreed upon such a change in the constitution of the House of Lords as would bring it into harmony with democracy without resorting to so revolutionary a measure as the Parliament Act. But, even granting the necessity for that measure, what possible excuse can be given by the House of Commons for so long a delay in redeeming their pledge to reconstitute the House of Lords? If even now, in the midst of war, it has been found possible to take steps to carry out their promise, why should a proceeding of such vital importance to the nation have been neglected during the three years 1911 to 1914 whilst the country was still at peace? No one can say when the war will end—but the conference that has at last been appointed is not to meet until 'towards the end of the Parliamentary recess,' so that a considerable time must yet elapse before the reformed second chamber can be constituted; and it seems only too probable that, at a time when the future of the British Empire will depend on the wisdom with which our legislators deal with the work of political and social reconstruction, the nation will still be at the mercy of a single chamber. To people who are outside political life the only explanation of this long continued failure to redeem the pledge given by the House of Commons seems to be that men once in possession of power are extremely reluctant to part with it. But the public who, whether from ignorance or indifference, have allowed so dangerous a political situation to continue without effective remonstrance must share the blame for the delay.

No doubt there are many persons in whose eyes a second chamber, however it may be constituted, is obnoxious, and who agree with Sieyès' well-known epigram: 'If it dissents from the first, it is mischievous; if it agrees, it is superfluous.' Sir Henry Maine suggests that this epigram is a parody, conscious or unconscious, of the reply of the Caliph Omar which caused the Alexandrian library to be burnt, 'If the books differ from the books of the Prophet, they are impious: if they agree, they are useless,' and points out that the reasoning is precisely the same in both cases. 'If the Koran is the inspired and exclusive word of God, Omar was right: if "Vox populi Vox Dei" expresses a truth, Sieyès was right.' * But, so far as

* Popular Government, p. 178.

can be judged, the House of Commons is fully convinced upon the subject, and the delay in reconstituting the House of Lords is not due to any doubt as to the necessity for re-establishing a second chamber. What is more doubtful is whether the House of Commons will consent to surrender so much of the power it now possesses as to make the reformed House of Lords effective as a second chamber. It is difficult to feel confident that this concession will be made; but there is no doubt that if, when reconstruction is in progress, an effective second chamber is in existence the danger of legislation hostile to liberty will be greatly lessened and the tendency towards a policy of Contract to Status may be checked.

It is noticeable that although the greatest activity is shown in the production of schemes for reconstruction and in the appointment of commissions to inquire into the position and prospects of trade and industry, yet the constitutional question —the fact that the country is now and for some time yet is likely to be living under single-chamber Government—is almost entirely unnoticed. How is this disregard of what is certainly the predominant factor in the situation to be accounted for? It cannot be that the nation is indifferent about the future of its ancient constitution. It is more probably due to absorption in the multitudinous details of social life, which will require rearrangement after the war, and to a confidence in the inherent stability of the constitution so complete as to exclude any idea that the principle of personal liberty on which it is based can be seriously threatened. Under existing circumstances this confidence that liberty is safe is itself a source of danger: it is possibly attributable to the fact that the possession of personal freedom has been enjoyed by our people for so many generations that it has come to be looked upon as an inalienable birthright, and so it attracts no more attention than the air we breathe. If this supposition is correct it explains not only the existing neglect of the present critical position of the constitution, but also the unconcern with which legislative encroachments upon liberty in the years before the war were received.

In one of the few books recently published, in which the position of personal liberty in this country is discussed, the author, Mr. Haynes, quotes a curious sentence from 'L'Esprit 'des lois,' in which Montesquieu, after analysing the causes

of the freedom enjoyed by the English people, says: 'Ils ont 'bien raison de conserver cette liberté: s'ils venoient à la 'perdre, ils seroient un des peuples les plus esclaves de la 'terre'—a sentence which Mr. Haynes says is 'remarkably 'to the point'! Considering the history of this country in Montesquieu's time, it is difficult to understand what possible ground he could have had for making such a statement; nor does our subsequent history, until quite recently, give the smallest support to the idea that the English people are at all likely to submit to the loss of their liberties. With regard to recent events the probable explanation is not, as Mr. Haynes appears to think, a growing readiness to abandon liberty, but a generous anxiety to improve social conditions and a blind confidence that the danger of any serious attack upon liberty is so remote as to be negligible.

Possibly Montesquieu's remark may have been prompted by a perception of the fundamental difference of temperament between the English and the French, which may have led him to think that the temperament which leads the English people to accept and make the best of accomplished facts would induce them to submit to the loss of personal liberty if by some political cataclysm they should be deprived of it. In this case the remark shows a very imperfect appreciation of Anglo-Saxon character, and, it may be added, of the history of the British Constitution.

As has been said, the particular cause of danger to personal liberty to which it is desired to direct attention in this article is the possible development of a policy the effect of which is to substitute Status for Contract. In the years before the war many Acts which illustrate this tendency were passed under the question-begging name of Social Reform. It is not intended to suggest that the Government, in adopting this legislation, had any definite intention of initiating a new social policy hostile to liberty, and probably they were no more alive to its effect in this direction than were the general public. It might, however, have occurred to our legislators that since this legislation was in fact a reversal of the social policy followed for many years, it deserved a good deal more consideration than was apparently bestowed upon it. It may be said that legislation must respond to public sentiment, and that these Acts were passed in obedience to a public demand: it is true

that they were welcomed, and the fact shows how great a change of opinion on social questions has taken place in recent years. In the middle of last century the country was convinced that the freedom of the individual and the restriction of the functions of the State within narrow limits were essential conditions of social progress; but by 1880 the events which had helped to create this conviction had been forgotten, and the pendulum of public opinion was swinging in the opposite direction. Just before the outbreak of the war, however, there were some signs that the pendulum had reached the limit of its beat, and that its downward movement was about to begin. A change in public opinion is at first slow, and momentum is only acquired very gradually, so that even if the reaction has actually begun it cannot gain much force before the work of reconstruction has to be undertaken.

Public opinion upon the question of State control will certainly be much influenced by the novel experience of its action during war time. Whether the effect will be in favour of or against State control it is difficult to say, but, on the whole, it seems likely to be adverse to its continuance. If this proves to be the case the reversed movement in public opinion on social questions will be accelerated, and the tendency to substitute Status for Contract will be checked.

The great change in public opinion upon social questions that gathered force in the later decades of the nineteenth century was to be expected. A social advance, whether in the world as a whole or in individual nations, is never continuous: periods of advance are always followed by periods of retrogression; the progress of man as a social being appears to be subject to the system of 'trial and error' under which animals have developed. In obedience to an instinctive desire for progress, social experiments are made and advance is dependent upon the success of the result. Civilised man has the advantage over the rest of the animal world in his ability to record and refer to the result of his experiments; but when embarking upon new schemes for social improvement he is unfortunately apt to forget to utilise these records of former efforts. When an error is made and the inevitable punishment follows, the lesson seems at the time to be deeply impressed upon the public mind; but, as new generations grow up, the lesson is forgotten and the records are disregarded: the error is repeated, and

progress is again checked or converted into retrogression. A striking instance of this forgetfulness is given by the history of our Poor Law during the nineteenth century. Errors in the administration of poor relief brought the country to the verge of ruin during the earlier years of the century. It was saved from disaster by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, and the reports in which the events are recorded and which show the cause of the trouble, the extent of the misery due to it, and the means by which its recurrence might be averted, are exceptionally full and complete. But within fifty years from the passing of the Act referred to, the lesson was forgotten, the records were ignored, and a policy of public relief similar to that which brought about the disaster was again in operation. The severity with which the lesson was enforced may be measured by the fact that, in despite of the public sentiment of the day, and under the most unfavourable political conditions, it was found possible to carry an Act in which the principle of self-help as the duty of able-bodied individuals was distinctly recognised, and which directed that relief was only to be given to those capable of self-help in case of destitution, and then only under such conditions as made strenuous efforts at self-maintenance preferable to its acceptance. In spite of the apparent harshness of these conditions the public were at the time so thoroughly alarmed at the result of making public relief a temptation to relinquish efforts at self-support that the Act was received with general consent. And, although the scheme of its authors was modified—much to its detriment—in its passage through Parliament, the Poor Law records of the years succeeding its enactment abundantly prove the soundness of the principle on which it was based.

The narrow escape from disaster in 1834 not only effected a radical change in opinion on the subject of relief, but it also directed attention to social conditions generally. But although the true cause of the trouble, due to maladministration of relief, was at the time more or less clearly recognised by the public, its bearing upon the problems of social organisation does not appear to have been adequately grasped. Social problems—seeing the infinite variety of human temperaments and conditions—must always be perplexing; and to a bewildered public seeking their solution, and still smarting from the severe punishment received in the earlier years of the

century, the social philosophy of Herbert Spencer came as a revelation.

No writer on social questions has exerted a greater influence upon the thought of his time than Spencer; and, as his doctrines became widely known, they were received with enthusiasm not only in this, but in all civilised countries. His reputation was at its zenith in the seventh and eighth decades of the nineteenth century, and although, as the reaction in public opinion which began in the latter part of that time gained in force, his influence gradually waned, he still remains the most eminent exponent of the reasons why individual liberty and independence are, and must always be, essential conditions of human progress. This fundamental truth cannot be ignored with safety; and now that there seems again to be a danger of its being forgotten it is of the utmost importance that the public should be reminded of its existence. By the publication of Mr. Hugh Elliot's book, 'Herbert Spencer,' the editor of 'Makers of the Nineteenth Century' has therefore done good service to the country.

Mr. Elliot's treatment of his subject is interesting and stimulating. Although a staunch believer in the truth of the main principles by which Spencer's work was inspired, he is alive to its shortcomings and to the drawback to its influence caused by the dogmatic way in which the conclusions arrived at are stated. Few people have the leisure and the perseverance required to read and assimilate the many volumes in which Spencer's work is contained; and Mr. Elliot, who, as he says, has 'twice read through the whole of them at an interval 'of fifteen years,' has made an excellent use of the intimate knowledge he thus gained by giving an admirable summary of their contents, and so making it possible for readers with little leisure to make themselves acquainted with the purport of Spencer's doctrine and with the reasoning by which it is supported.

Not many people nowadays would be prepared to accept Spencer's teaching in its entirety; but of those who have followed his arguments very few would question the validity of the fundamental principles on which it is based. Spencer's reasoning has been criticised as being almost entirely *a priori*, and Mr. Elliot admits that 'it cannot be seriously denied 'that in the main Spencer formed his theories *first* and estab-

'lished them by induction *afterwards*' (p. 86); but he quotes the following passage from Galton as evidence that it was from no lack of practical knowledge that Spencer generally adopted the 'deductive' rather than the 'inductive' method in arriving at his conclusions.

> 'The power of Spencer's mind that I most admired, was that of widely founded generalisations. Whenever doubt was hinted as to the sufficiency of his grounds for making them, he was always ready to pour out a string of examples that seemed to have been, if not in his theatre of consciousness when he spoke, at all events in an ante-chamber of it, whence they could be summoned at will.'

General agreement as to the conclusions to be drawn from the records of social experiments will probably never be reached; but so far as Spencer's principal deductions from theory have been tested by practical experience, dispassionate students of sociology will admit that in the main they have proved correct.

It is very necessary that when so thorny a question as that of social organisation is discussed (upon which opinion varies so widely), all points of view should receive full consideration; and since the tide of public opinion of late has been running so strongly in an anti-Spencerian direction it is much to be hoped that Mr. Elliot's book will be widely read, and that it will help to revive public interest in a great writer whose views on social questions were not long since universally accepted, but whose works have of late been so unfortunately neglected.

The social theorists, to whose projects 'liberty' is a fatal obstacle, are numerous and well organised, and, as has been said above, there is much in the present political and social situation which favours their propaganda. It must be remembered also that, however strong the individualistic instinct in our people may be, their attitude towards proposals for the extension of Government interference with personal liberty will undoubtedly be influenced by the tendency of democracy to rely upon State action, especially when people think that the proposals for further control do not directly affect either their own liberty or that of their class. As regards their resistance to attacks upon liberty the classes which make up the community are like the proverbial bundle of sticks, collectively strong but individually weak; and so long as there

is no perception of a common danger to bind them together, the liberty of one class may be encroached upon without exciting the alarm of the others who are not interfered with. In view of the great additions to be made to the number of voters and of uncertainty as to the effect of the enfranchisement of women, it is futile to speculate upon the probable attitude of the electorate towards measures involving an increase of State control after the war; but it may be safely predicted that many such proposals will be brought foward and energetically supported by socialists and collectivists of all denominations. Besides these declared opponents of liberty there are many people who would regard such proposals with indifference, due to ignorance of social history, or who would accept them with resignation under the idea that State control is an inevitable incident of democratic rule. There is also the syndicalist faction, whose object is the forcible seizure of the means of production—mines, factories etc.—not, as socialists propose, in the interest of the nation as a whole, but for the special benefit of one class alone—namely, the manual labourers. This faction, although numerically insignificant, carries on an extremely active and skilfully conducted propaganda, and will form an element in the approaching crisis by no means to be neglected. Whatever may be the extent of their influence we may be sure that it will be fully exerted in opposition to all efforts to restore the integrity of the constitution or to establish harmonious relations between capital and labour. The success of syndicalism would mean the destruction of society and the advent of anarchy and civil war, and the possibility of such a catastrophe is to most people in this land of ancient peace unthinkable; but there are eminent thinkers, e.g. Lord Sydenham, who seem to be of opinion that it is a menace not to be disregarded.

Behind the declared advocates of complete State control or of revolution, there are many people who cannot be said to be actually on the side of Status as against Contract, but who are not likely to take an active part in the defence of liberty. In this class may be included a considerable proportion of the excellent persons who devote themselves to the improvement of the condition of the poor. In former years when people were deeply impressed by the existence of a social evil and determined to make an effort to remedy it, they organised

their forces, raised the necessary funds from private sources, and proceeded to do the work themselves, and our social history records many instances of the success with which they carried out their intentions. Nowadays reliance upon independent action seems to have weakened, and when people want to remedy some social ill their first impulse seems to be to invoke the assistance of the State. In extenuation of this change it is urged that in these days social work is on so large a scale that private enterprise cannot cope with it successfully, that the authority necessary to enforce obedience to remedial measures can only be exercised by the State, and that sufficient funds cannot be obtained from private sources. It is also argued that more effective action may be secured by co-operation between officials and voluntary workers than by either alone. Such arguments appeal forcibly to people whose minds are concentrated upon the removal of some particular evil, and they are apt to forget that the private worker who acts in co-operation with the State will be compelled to conform to regulations which in effect destroy that elasticity of voluntary work which made it possible for him to adapt the treatment to the special circumstances of the individual case. Again, the danger of interference with personal liberty is likely to be disregarded by people to whom, in the course of their work amongst the poor, liberty too often appears to be licence—licence to the individual to act in a way prejudicial to himself and to his fellow-citizens—and it is intelligible that to these social workers arbitrary restriction of this misused liberty should appear desirable in the public interest. Abstract questions of social philosophy do not generally appeal to social workers actively engaged in practical work, and it does not occur to them that State regulations and State assistance may prove injurious to the character and independence of the people, and that the remedy may therefore be ultimately more injurious to the community than the disease itself.

State control of the poorer classes involves inspection, and there is now such a multitude of inspectors visiting on behalf of so many different public departments that their visits have become a serious nuisance to housewives. It might be expected that measures which would involve the continuance and probable increase of this nuisance would be strenuously resisted by the classes affected: but the Status which makes them

liable to inspection often confers a right to receive material assistance of some kind, and so they set the benefit against the nuisance and put up with the inspection as a necessary evil. The women are the chief sufferers, and whether their submission to continual inspection will endure when they have a vote remains to be seen. At present, at any rate, resistance to the extension of State control cannot be expected from this quarter.

Another body of people who are not likely to oppose the continuance of control are the officials who have been appointed in such large numbers since 1914. If, when peace returns, the direction of private enterprises assumed by the State under the exigencies of war is, as it ought to be, relinquished as speedily as possible, their occupation will be gone. The official Status conferred by Government employment gratifies the love of authority innate in most people, and has many other attractions and advantages: the prospect of being suddenly deprived of this position is therefore unlikely to be regarded with indifference by its possessors. It will be difficult for many of these officials to find equally satisfactory employment after the war, and it is probable that many of them would welcome a continuance of State control upon so large a scale as to make the retention of their services necessary.

It is impossible to enumerate all the sources from which assistance, active or passive, conscious or unconscious, to a movement from Contract to Status may be expected: it is certain that they are many and important; but the extent of the control advocated varies so widely, from the universal State servitude proposed by Socialists down to modest suggestions for State assistance in furthering schemes for social improvement, that it is not probable the extreme party will succeed in uniting all the social forces more or less favourable to State control in support of their propaganda. On the other hand the defenders of personal liberty cannot count upon assistance from persons who—while not prepared to support extreme measures—are yet for their own reasons anxious for some extension of State control.

The character of the Status imposed by legislation may vary in numberless ways. It may, as in the case of the Poor Law, confer a statutory right to public assistance subject to regulations affecting the freedom of the recipients, or as in

recent eleemosynary legislation (which practically ignores the existence of the Poor Law), it may confer a right to receive public money free from any conditions; or it may exempt one class from a legal liability to which all the rest of the community is subject, as in the Trades Disputes Act. Again, there are the various kinds of Status created by Acts—such as those for securing a minimum wage, for old age pensions, for National Health Insurance, etc.—all of which encroach directly or indirectly upon personal liberty and freedom of contract.

During the war all considerations must give way to the paramount need for waging it with effect, and it has been found necessary for the Government to assume the control of our great industries and even to undertake the manufacture of certain commodities. With the end of the war this necessity will cease to exist; but already there is a clamour for converting this temporary control into permanent State ownership and for the continuance of Government production in competition with private traders. There seems, indeed, to be a probability that, as in the case of social reform legislation, the fatal mistake of ignoring the experience of the past may be repeated. It might be thought that the history of the telegraphs and the telephones—to mention only two of the many failures of State ventures in business—would be enough to destroy any confidence in the State as a trader *; but delusions die hard, and—notwithstanding the innumerable instances of Government incapacity to conduct industrial undertakings with success—confidence in the State as a trader seems to continue undiminished. Thus Mr. Sidney Webb and the Fabian Society have published a book with the attractive title 'How to pay for the War': the method proposed being to hand over the great industries of the country to the Government in the confident expectation that the superior excellence of State over private management would materially lighten the task of paying for the cost of the war! Such a proposal is what might be expected from the Fabian Society, but suggestions of a similar nature come from the most unexpected quarters: for instance, there is the manifesto of the Empire Resources Development Committee, in which the development of our overseas resources by State enterprise

* Cf. Editorial article, EDINBURGH REVIEW for April 1917.

is strongly urged, and which is signed by eminent men who cannot be suspected of a leaning towards collectivism. Their action may be caused by a doubt whether private enterprise is capable of dealing successfully with the immense possibilities that lie before the nation; but in view of our history it is difficult to see what reason there can be for such a doubt. It is to private energy and enterprise that the British Empire owes its position in the world of trade, and this success was achieved not only without the active assistance of the Government, but in spite of its indifference and neglect. What ground can there be for the fear that the spirit which has served the country so well in the past will fail to inspire our people in the great future that now lies before the Empire?

Another reason for a tendency to advocate State control by persons who are not Socialists is the success with which the Government has organised the production of munitions and the provision of military requirements. But this success was only made possible by the self-sacrifice and energy of individuals inspired by patriotism, and forms no criterion by which to judge of the prospects of State enterprise in peace time. To assume that the same energy shown in the service of the State during the war will continue when peace returns, and to act upon this assumption by continuing State control of industries and State trading after the war, would be to adopt the same fallacy that makes Socialism an unattainable ideal. No doubt there are many people (and the fact is of happy augury for the future) who would work with as much energy and goodwill for the good of the community as for themselves, but as yet they are only an insignificant minority, even in this country. As the world now is, there is in normal times no effective substitute for self-interest as a spur to exertion, except the lash.

In these days when social conditions have become so complex, and when as the result of increasing civilisation the feeling of collective responsibility has grown so active, it is futile to think that the functions of the State can be restricted within the narrow limits only possible in an ideal community, in which indeed all government would be superfluous. Utopia is not yet in sight, and as things now are there are many ways in which social progress may be safely assisted by the State, but only so long as it is recognised that an indispensable condition

of real advance is individual liberty. But whilst it is essential that the liberty of the individual should be jealously safeguarded by the State, it is equally necessary that individuals should fulfil their duty to the State and to their fellow-citizens, and should so use their liberty of action as to further the progress and the well-being of the community.

At present, democracy is fully occupied with its fight for existence, and it will not be until the conflict is over, and the external danger at an end, that the test of democracy as a possible system of government will begin. Existing circumstances are perhaps more favourable for popular rule than have ever before existed, and there is good ground for the hope that democracy may falsify the predictions of failure so frequently made, and prove to be a practical success. If this hope should be realised, humanity will have made a great step forward. The principal reason for feeling doubtful about the realisation of this hope is the fear that the belief of democracy in the omnipotence of the State may lead to the gradual establishment of an all-powerful bureaucracy and a consequent gradual destruction of liberty. If this should happen, the fate of democracy as a stable form of government at the present time would be sealed.

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to show that this danger exists, and to indicate the form it is likely to assume. Freedom once lost is very difficult to regain—far more so under a democratic than under an autocratic government—and it would indeed be a lamentable result of the war if after all our huge sacrifices of life and treasure in the cause of liberty we should end by following the example of the enemy, and should substitute Status for Contract—the thraldom of the State for the liberty of the individual—as the basis of our constitution.

ARTHUR CLAY.

## THE LETTS

1. Russland, Polen und Livland bis ins 17. Jhrdt. Von Theodor Schiemann. Berlin. 1886–1887.
2. Gutsherr und Bauer in Livland im 17. u. 18. Jhrdt. Von A. v. Transche-Roseneck. Strassburg. 1890.
3. Latvju Dainas. Edited by Kr. Barons and H. Wissendorff. Mitau and Petrograd. 1894, *in progress*. (In Lettish.)
4. Livländische Geschichte. Von Ernst Seraphim. Reval. 1897–1904.
5. Die Lettische Revolution. Berlin. 1906–1907.
6. Baltische Landeskunde. Von K. R. Kupffer. Riga. 1911.
7. Die Agrargesetzgebung Livlands im 19. Jhrdt. Von A. Tobien. Riga. 1899–1911.
8. Die Baltenländer u. Litauen. Von Otto Kessler. Berlin. 1916.
9. Esthonians and Letts. Edited by M. Reussner. Moscow. 1916. (In Russian.)

VERY little had been heard in England about the Letts before 1915. It was towards the end of that year that they began to be mentioned frequently in dispatches. The splendid Lettish Rifle Battalions, recruited and officered exclusively from the race whose name they bear, have brought into prominence a people who have too often been confounded with the Lithuanians. These volunteer battalions have recalled by their prowess and deeds of valour the legendary heroism of their ancestors, and have deservedly been praised by the Russian General Staff. It is important that the western public of Europe, when reading of the achievements of these descendants of generations of fighters, should learn to distinguish between them and the Lithuanians.

The Letts are Aryans. Their language is Indo-European, and constitutes, with the Lithuanian and Old Prussian, the Baltic family. Only two living languages belonging to this family have been handed down—the Lithuanian and the Lettish. The Old Prussians are ' Germanised ' in their language, and the Germans have robbed them of all, even of their name,

and have covered it with shame before mankind. However, the memory of the glory of the Old Prussians has not died in the hearts of the sons of the Old Prussian stock, and many manifestations show that the soul of this race is still alive, that their consciousness has awakened, and that they have nothing in common with the Germans. In 1837 Pott demonstrated that the Letto-Lithuanic languages form an independent group—the Baltic family—which should be placed next to the Slavonic and Germanic families in regard to independence, and in front of them in regard to antiquity. Later philologists, without exception, have confirmed this view. A. Meillet, for instance, confirms the simple truth that no Slav could understand a word of Lettish or Lithuanian. Nevertheless, certain politicians have not hesitated to proclaim the Letts and the Lithuanians to be Slavs.

The Letts inhabit at present the southern part of Livonia (Vidzeme-Midland) : for instance, the districts of Riga, Wenden (Cēsis), Wolmar (Valmeera) and Walk (Valka), all Courland (Kurzeme), a small border in the provinces of Pskov and Kovno, and three districts of the province of Vitebsk (Daugavpils, Ludze, Rēzekne), and also the Baltic coast-land Prussia. The Letts are, moreover, scattered throughout in Russia. They are found in the provinces of Novgorod, Moghilev, Kuban, as well as in the two capitals, Moscow and Petrograd. Large numbers of Letts live in foreign countries, principally in the United States and in Brazil. In normal times Lettish emigration has always been considerable, but the Revolution of 1905 gave it an additional impetus.

It is very difficult to give an approximately accurate estimate of Lettish population, because official statistics frequently reckon Letts as Russians, Poles, or Germans, and because very many live abroad. The most moderate estimate gives their number at a little over 2,000,000, of whom some 1,500,000 are Protestants, nearly 500,000 Roman Catholics, and about 150,000 Greek Catholics. In Livonia there are, according to the official estimates of 1907, 624,000 Letts ; in Courland 560,000 ; in the province of Vitebsk 320,000 ; in the province of Pskov 13,000 ; in the province of Kovno 30,000 ; in Petrograd and Moscow about 20,000 each.

Several types are found in the Lettish nation ; but the fundamental difference between the Letts on the one side, and

Russians or Germans on the other, is clearly defined. The fair race of the North holds the most prominent place, and is represented by 30 per cent. of the population ; whilst in Russia proper this fair race is represented by but 7 per cent., and in Northern Germany by 20 per cent., Southern Germany possessing no more than 3 per cent. We could also cite passages from the well-known ethnologists, Vacher de Lapouge and Latham, in corroboration of this statement. Latham shows that the Letts, Scandinavians, and English are the most Aryan of the races of Europe. The great fair dolichocephalic race, alluded to above, is closely followed by cross-breeds of various degrees and in a rapidly diminishing progression—the pure brachycephalic being extremely rare. Generally, the pure dolichocephalic type is also the oldest and the most Lettish. Of this type Latham (1854) wrote :

'The extent to which the Letts and Lithuanians are, at the present moment, fragments of larger populations, is seen from the history of the Prussians and the Yatwings ; for the Prussians and the Yatwings were populations of comparative importance. I hold, however, as the result of a considerable amount of neither impatient nor one-sided investigation, that all the acts of all the Old Prussians, and all the acts of all the Yatwings, put together are as nothing to the prehistoric actions of certain earlier members of this important and interesting stock.'

Latham further maintained that they were the first conquerors in the East, and the first seafarers in the North.

History finds the Letts in their present country, namely, Livonia, Courland, and Latgale (the Lettish part of the province of Vitebsk), in the sixth to the eighth centuries, in developed organisations. The German Knights, who conquered the country in the twelfth century, fell upon the Letts when peacefully engaged in agriculture, cattle-breeding, bee-keeping, etc. They did not live in villages, but on separate farms. They were nevertheless keen soldiers and versed in the military arts, traded with other countries and had their own fleet. Their political institutions were as far advanced as those of any of their neighbours, and they had lords and rulers of their own.

After the conquest of the country by the Germans, many of the Lettish nobility were 'Germanised,' and a great number were received into the German aristocracy ; but the majority

of the Letts were little by little ground down to a peasant class, and for many centuries 'peasant' and 'Lett' were identical terms. Bishop Albert, the founder of the Brotherhood of the Sword, introduced the feudal system, by bestowing land on his vassals. In the thirteenth century the Lettish peasants were still free and owners of their land, but in the fourteenth century they had already become the serfs of the feudal lords. The country was described, in the sixteenth century, by Russov as 'a Heaven for the priests, a paradise 'for the lords, a gold-mine for the traders, and a hell for the 'peasants.'

Under the Lithuanian Polish rule, the condition of the serfs was not improved. In 1562 King Sigismund Augustus issued his edict conferring privileges on the Baltic nobility and making the peasants the absolute property of their lords.

The conversion of the Letts to Christianity took place towards the end of the twelfth century. A Papal Bull, declaring the urgency of a crusade against the Baltic pagans, was borne from town to town throughout Friesland by a priest named Meinhardt, who journeyed to Livonia and founded a Christian colony on the banks of the Dvina. The severity of the Lettish winter drove the colonists southward, but in 1202 a permanent settlement was effected. In that year, Albert, a young priest of Bremen, and nephew of the Archbishop of that city, set sail from Lübeck, accompanied by twenty-three other vessels. Having landed at the mouth of the Dvina, he established his following on the site of the early colony, and became the Bishop and also the Governor of Riga. Bishop Albert was a man of strong character. His city grew rapidly rich and important, and with the consent of the Pope he founded the Brotherhood of the Sword. It seems that the Christian faith was not entirely unknown to the Letts even before this crusade, having been previously introduced by the Russians. Many Russian words for religious ceremonies still exist in Lettish. Efforts had also been made as early as 870 by the Swedes and in 1048 by the Danes, but no real success had been achieved until the Germans came.

The establishment of the Catholic Church was consolidated by Bishop Albert, the country being dedicated by him to the Virgin Mary, and ever after the Papacy strove to create a distinct papal power in Riga. It was never strong enough

fully to carry out this purpose, but it succeeded in limiting the authority of the Empire and in preventing Lübeck and Bremen from laying hands on this northern port. In 1221 Riga received its own constitution. In 1245 it became the seat of the Archbishop of the Baltic lands, and in 1282 joined the Hanseatic League, and was everywhere recognised as a powerful city.

Down to the period of the Reformation the history of Livonia and Courland is a long succession of struggles between the Teutonic Knights allied with the Brotherhood of the Sword on the one hand, and the ruling bishops or the Hanseatic League on the other. In 1523 Luther wrote his letter to the Christians in Livonia. The towns and the nobility (vassals of the Teutonic Order and the Church) received the Reformation with enthusiasm, seeing in it a means for their political betterment. At that time the Teutonic Order was ruled by a famous opponent of the Reformation, Count Plettenberg; but the power of the Order was already on the wane. Count Plettenberg was compelled to recognise the rights of protestant Riga, and, shortly after his death in 1561, the Order was abolished.

Then for a brief period Courland was an independent duchy under the protection of Lithuania-Poland. The most remarkable of its dukes was James, an adventurous spirit whose fame spread to England in the reign of Charles II. He made commercial treaties with England; he even agreed to assist the King with his fleet, and lent him money, which was never repaid. His ships sailed to Africa and the West Indies, where his sailors founded colonies. The island of Tobago was formally granted to the Duke of Courland, his heirs and successors, on certain conditions: 'one of which was that he 'suffered none but his own or the King's subjects to settle 'on the island.' The sole trace of the Lettish occupation of Tobago is to be found in the nomenclature of the Bay of Courland. There is sufficient evidence to show that the Letts were no mean seamen during the seventeenth century.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia took possession of the provinces of Esthonia and Livonia, and at the end of that century she acquired Courland, appointing a Governor of Riga. The ancient fortress of the Livonian Sword-Brotherhood is now restored as a palace; side by side with the

picturesque buildings of the old Hansa town are modern colleges, churches, breweries, saw-mills, and machine works.

While Riga is the great commercial city of the Letts, the more northerly city of Yurjev (Dorpat), though in fact Esthonian, was, and is, the principal seat of learning for both Letts and Esthonians. In 1632 Gustavus Adolphus founded a university there, which still has a high reputation for scholarship. Among its treasures are the manuscript works of the great philosopher, Kant. The name of Herder is also connected with Livonia. Kant wrote a preface to the Lithuanian Grammar compiled by Mielcke, and Herder collected and published a large number of Lettish songs. It was Herder who, when writing to his wife, expressed himself in these words: 'In Livonia I have lived, studied, and acted 'with such perfect freedom as I can never again hope to 'enjoy.' Livonia, the battle-ground of Northern Europe, had at least attained to a measure of liberty of thought—a liberty which she has never lost.

The wonderful survival of the Lettish language, in spite of repression in the past, is in part a tribute to the sturdy resistance of the Letts to moral persecution; in part it is due to the advent of the Jesuit fathers in 1583. They first began their activities during the Lithuanian-Polish rule, and set to work to counteract the effects of the Reformation. Realising that the peasantry could be reached most easily through their own language, they founded schools and seminaries, and co-operated with the Dominicans in teaching peasant mothers to read, that they in turn might instruct their children. The methods of the Jesuits received the full approval of the Pope. With the Jesuits as leaders of education, it is not surprising to learn that the oldest known monument of Lettish literature is their translation of the Catechism of Peter Canisius, published in 1586, in Vilna. This work shows clearly that the Lettish language has not changed much in its forms and sounds. In the seventeenth century, when Livonia fell into the hands of the Swedes, intellectual life developed rapidly. Gustavus Adolphus encouraged the priesthood to pay attention to popular education. With the assistance of Charles X. and following kings, and at their expense, a complete translation of the Bible by Glück was published in 1689.

In passing, it is interesting to note that there has never

been any persecution for religious faith among the Letts, and even now it is no uncommon thing to find clergy of all denominations meeting together to discuss important economic questions.

The Swedes also greatly ameliorated the condition of the Lettish peasantry. Sweden had never known serfdom, and the Swedish Government took immediate steps in the direction of liberating the peasants in the newly acquired Lettish provinces. It opened schools for the peasantry and made the lords give up estates the ownership of which they could not prove. But the wars of the beginning of the eighteenth century interrupted these measures and resulted in the acquisition of Livonia by Russia. Peter the Great restored the alienated estates to the nobles, and confirmed the privileges given by Sigismund Augustus. The administration of the country—the Church, the schools, police, justice—all the functions of government, the promulgation of new laws, etc., were restored to the German lords. A religious revival, then at its height, was inflaming the minds of the Letts and seemed to threaten disorder, but the nobles, misunderstanding the real nature of the agitation, suppressed it with the aid of the Government. The result was disastrous ; the peasants were made *adscripti glebae,* whom their lord could buy or sell or give away. The lord had also a right to all the peasants' property, and the right of life and death without appeal, though this right had already been exercised in Courland when it was a duchy.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Russian Government began to direct its attention to the condition of the peasants in the Baltic Provinces, and several reforms were undertaken. The nobility, however, did all they could to render the measures null and void and defeat any plan for improvement. In 1804 a law was enacted granting to the peasantry rights of property and land, and regulating the rights of the landlords. This celebrated law was repealed after the Napoleonic wars when there was a period of reaction. Serfdom was, however, finally abolished in Courland in 1817, and in Livonia in 1819, and personal freedom was given to the peasantry, but the landlords retained the land. In order to live, the peasantry were obliged to take farms at a rental which was tantamount to submitting to the will and caprice of the landlords. The ' free ' contract which regulated the relations between the peasants and the landlords was very

one-sided. The condition of the peasants grew worse and there was some rioting, until the Government took measures to limit the power of the nobility.

But the Germans, who had succeeded in securing the foremost positions in the Russian Government, were all-powerful in the Baltic Provinces, and the good intentions of the Russians were ineffectual. The German lords held the peasants in complete subjection. For example, in 1863, the nobles of Courland ordered all peasants to be flogged who had sent an appeal to the Government against the cruelties and arbitrary conduct of Prince Lieven. This punishment, the people were told, was sanctioned by the Tsar and his ministers.

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century an unmistakable movement towards national awakening began. The Letts, who had been educated in the higher schools, energetically undertook to enlighten the people, and agitated for their rights. In 1861 a newspaper, 'Peterburgas Avizes,' which became the organ of the national movement, was published by leading Letts; but the nobility conducted a resolute campaign against it, and in 1865 it was suppressed and many of the contributors exiled. Still, some progress was achieved. The law of 1863 gave the peasants freedom of movement, and the law of 1866 gave local self-government in country districts and freed the peasants from the overlordship of the nobles and their police. The ancient urban laws were abolished and the peasants were permitted to settle in the towns. Thus the Letts gradually assumed the semblance of a nation, and were no longer merely serfs of the soil. This comparative freedom enabled them to develop their inherent abilities, and in recent years their progress has been remarkable in every field of activity. But their struggle against the Germans never for a moment relaxed: indeed, it grew more intense as they acquired the means of asserting their independence. The Germans, though baffled, still continued to preserve their privileges and to keep the Letts without political rights, for they regarded, and regard, the Lettish countries as German territory, eventually to be annexed by Germany, although the German element does not represent even 5 per cent. of the population. In the various publications issued in Germany, the desire to 'Germanise' the Letts finds frequent expression. For example, a German writer, formerly

an official in Courland, recommended the expropriation of one-third of the land held by Letts in order to give it to German peasant colonists. Before the war he and his supporters represented in Russia with considerable success that the Letts were separatists, and, in contrast with the ever loyal Germans, a danger to the Russian State. The Russians are beginning to understand the meaning of German loyalty.

The Letts have many achievements to point to in every branch of human effort. They have accomplished much within the last fifty or sixty years. Their traditional literature, handed down from antiquity, and the archaeological remains still to be found in the country, prove that the Lettish people had attained a very high degree of culture and civilisation before the German invasion. During the last 700 years the Germans have arrested the progress of this people, and only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have they been able to resume the work of development interrupted since the days of the Teutonic crusade.

The Letts call their national traditions their 'spiritual 'treasures,' among which the popular songs very naturally hold a prominent place. These have now been collected, and exceed 200,000 in number. They have been carefully arranged by Barons, who may be described as the patriarch of the Lettish national awakening, and are published, in seven large volumes, by the Imperial Academy of Sciences of Petrograd, under the title 'Latvju Dainas.' The most ancient of these songs are mythological. They sing of their ancient god (Deevs), of Laima, of the sons of Deevs, of the daughters of the Sun, and the sons of Thunder. Under the influence of the Christian faith the pagan Laima was converted into Māra (Marie); but in all these songs Deevs is the one and all-pervading deity, whilst the other divinities are in most cases but the manifestations or attributes of Deevs.

The mythological songs are succeeded by songs of the seasons, songs of the festivals of the solstice (which later developed into the festival of St. John), songs for ceremonies, songs of work, of childhood, youth, and manhood. Special mention should be made of the songs in honour of St. John, which are sung on the 24th of June. They are particularly characteristic, and are chanted in praise of Jānis (St. John), the bringer of prosperity to the fields and to the homes. The

choruses contend against each other in a kind of strife for supremacy. They are rich in form and sound.

The first popular songs published with a German translation attracted the attention of Sir Walter Scott, who lent this collection to Dr. Bowring, by whom it was described in the 'Foreign Quarterly Review' in 1831.

The best treatise on Lett popular songs is the treatise of Barons, which ought to be translated into English. It is a work of considerable ethnological value and would be welcomed by scholars.

Next to the popular songs come the riddles, the most complete collection of which was published in 1881 by Fr. Brīvzemneeks, with a Russian translation.

The proverbs and adages are very curious. The following from the period of serfdom may be cited in illustration. 'It 'is better to see God every day than the lord once a year; 'work for the lords will not cease until there are no devils in 'Hell.' Spells and incantations were also largely used. They were used against sickness, and in order to bring good luck; to catch horse-stealers, to stop fires.

Popular fairy tales and legends have also been collected and have been published by Ansis Lerchis-Puškaitis, in seven volumes.

This folklore goes back, in part, to the distant times of national independence, although some was produced in serfdom. By its means the evolution of the Lettish race and its aspirations towards freedom and human dignity can be traced.

Lettish literature is divided into three epochs: the first, from 1530 to 1750, being religious. During this period were published the Catechism alluded to already, translations of the Bible, psalmody, and prayer-books. The second epoch, from 1750 to 1850, was secular. The works of Stenders and his followers, and of many others, belong to this period. The first periodical publication was started in 1797, but had an ephemeral existence. The first Lettish newspaper, 'Latveešu 'Avizes,' was founded in 1822 by C.F. Watson, a Courland clergyman of Scottish extraction. In the third epoch we come to Lettish literature proper. It is an epoch of progress and marked by originality and by the publication of some excellent translations. Many of the works of Lettish writers have also been found worthy of translation into German, Russian, and other

languages. Among the leading modern Lettish authors may be mentioned the dramatist, R. Blaumanis; the poets, J. Poruks, J. Rainis, and Áspazija; the novelists Ápsišu Jekabs, and A. Needra. Some idea of Lettish modern literary taste will perhaps be obtained by enumerating the authors translated into that language: Shakespeare, Byron, Shelley, Scott, Dickens, Thackeray, and even Wilde, are household names. Lettish newspapers and reviews are in the habit of translating the works of contemporary English authors.

Lettish music may conveniently be divided into two sections, popular and classical. The popular music of the Letts abounds in songs, dances, and recitations. The last are peculiar, and have a range of from three to five tones; the airs to popular songs range from five to eight tones and are much more melodious. The recitatives are always sung as part-songs: the air is begun by a woman (*teiceja*), who is then joined by a choir (*locitaji*), and then by another choir (*vilceji*). The airs are produced in unison or in octaves, solo or in chorus.

These popular melodies belong to three epochs and offer many interesting features to the student. The ancient, prehistoric melodies are quatrains; the airs of the second period have a range of from five to eight tones, whilst modern airs follow the Italian model.

Among the representatives of the Lettish national music, A. Jurjans, J. Vitols, A. Kalninš, E. Melngailis, E. Darzinš, are deserving of mention. Their compositions can be understood in all countries, and are frequently performed in Russia.

In art the Letts can show several names of reputation. The academician K. Hūns (1830–1877) has painted 'Before the 'Night of St. Bartholomew,' and also the allegorical paintings for the ceiling in the Anichkov Palace. Professor J. Fedders has painted Livonian landscapes. Among the younger artists there are the painters J. Rozentāls, V. Purvits, the academician, R. Zarrinš; among the sculptors are G. Škilters, R. Dzenis, J. Grinbergs. These artists are well known in Russia, and have attracted attention by their works at the art exhibitions of other countries.

It would not be right from an historical point of view to pass over in entire silence the great crises in Lettish affairs since the occupation by Russia.

The real crisis began in 1883 when the Russian Government

began to try to 'russify' the country. The popular schools, which were supported entirely by Lett money, were taken over by the Minister of Education, and a law was introduced in 1887 making Russian the only language of the teacher. When the masters in the schools protested, the answer they received was that the order must be obeyed—even if whole generations of Letts went to ruin—with the result that a great number of schools were closed. The best teachers left and were replaced by others of a more subservient character, and consequently education suffered. A little later, in 1888, the Russian police system was introduced, and Russian bureaucrats appeared on the scene. Courts of justice lost their reputation for impartiality, local laws were ignored, and revolution, fostered by Germany, appeared imminent. The rising, such as it was, was suppressed with considerable severity by regiments led by German barons, who wreaked vengeance on their personal enemies. A bitter hostility between the barons and the people was the aftermath of this revolution. The Russian Government then made some concessions to the Letts; but the people, irritated by their non-success, initiated an economic struggle against the Germans with a determination so stern that the latter began to lose the ground they had gained. To help the German landlords, the Russian Government inadvisedly allowed about 20,000 colonists to settle in Courland. The Lett population was regarded as the disloyal element in the country, and when the War broke out, their patriotic manifestations were looked upon with suspicion. Events have, however, proved that the Letts were sincere, and that in spite of the misunderstanding of their intentions by the Russian Government, they are loyal subjects and willing to throw in their lot with Russia. The Lett ideal is that their country should form part of the Russian Empire, in which they may preserve their language, ancient customs, and traditions. They look forward to the day, which they now hope is not far distant, when Russia will feel that she may treat them with generosity and accept them as an integral portion of the Empire without interfering with their legitimate claims as Letts.

Of all the people under the Russian Crown, it may be claimed that the Letts are the most educated and highly developed. In the Baltic Provinces elementary education is compulsory and the schools are maintained by the peasants,

without any aid from State or local taxation. This is why illiterate people are rarely met with.

The Letts have not been backward in adopting scientific methods in agriculture, and are credited with having invented several implements. Enthusiastic imitators of English farming methods, they were among the first to buy English machines on the continent of Europe, and to make use of every modern device for manuring land. As cattle-breeders they have also gained a high reputation. A large number of societies for the encouragement of agriculture, horticulture etc. are united in two big central societies: the Central Society of Agriculture, in Riga, for Livonia, and the Society of Lettish Farmers, in Mitau, for Courland. Equally important are the credit societies scattered throughout the country. All these societies have played the rôle of institutions of local self-government and have assisted the Letts in their economical progress, which is so considerable that the French Professor, Paul Boyer, has described it as 'the biggest historical 'phenomenon in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.' But this phenomenal progress received a severe check when the present war broke out.

After the declaration of war, the whole Lettish nation united against Germany. The determination, endurance, and industry of the farmer and workman, which produced such good results in peace, have redoubled now that he is led against the German who daringly claims these provinces as his own. All differences of party and class vanished not only among the Letts in Russia, but also among those living in foreign countries. For the duration of the War the Letts have forgotten their old grievances. The Lettish representatives in the Russian Duma have emphasised this unity of aim in the Lettish nation. The Letts, depicted by the Russian-Germans as traitors to the State, have resolutely taken their stand as a bulwark between the Russians and the Germans. From that position they have no intention of moving. They are anti-German partly because they consider Germany the oppressor of small nationalities, and partly because they know the humiliating treatment they themselves have received from the Germans for centuries. They are determined to struggle to the bitter end, and rather to die in the field than in landless exile.

In the summer of 1915 the Germans overran Courland. The Letts fled before the Germans, where this was possible, and were obliged to leave their property behind, because time did not permit of its removal. Relatively, not one of the nationalities of Russia has suffered more from the War, two-thirds of the inhabitants of Courland being at present refugees; the same also applies to the inhabitants of the boundary districts in Livonia. Words fail to describe the hardships which the people have had to endure. The route of the refugees towards the interior was strewn with every kind of property, and with the dead bodies of domestic animals, men, women, and children. Terror and suffering dogged the steps of the refugees. The Germans, as might be expected, give a different story of the cause of this terrible flight. In their publications they state that the Russian army in its retreat forced the Letts to abandon their goods and chattels. This is, however, not the case. The Letts fled from the Germans because they had every reason to mistrust their civilisation.

From the first the Letts have desired to take an active part in the defence of their country. A group of Lettish leaders discussed the desirability of forming special Lettish volunteer battalions. The consent of the General Staff was obtained as soon as the preparatory work of organisation had been completed. Meanwhile Lettish and Russian newspapers published an appeal to the Lettish nation, signed by the two Lettish deputies in the Duma, M. Zalits and M. Goldmans. The appeal was received with enthusiasm, and young Letts flocked to the colours from every part of the world. One battalion after the other was formed. After a short training they were sent to the trenches, where they have proved very useful and brave soldiers. The General Staff has invariably expressed its appreciation of the services rendered by the Lettish volunteers and acknowledged them in dispatches; their success was, and is, largely due to their excellent knowledge of the country, of the German language, and to their ardent desire to rid Lettonia (a general name comprehending Courland, Livonia, and the adjoining districts inhabited by Letts) of the invader. The battalions are working in the old spirit which animated their ancestors.

The formation of Lettish battalions was followed by the organisation of relief for Lettish refugees. In Petrograd a

central committee was founded, and branches have sprung up all over the country. Their number now exceeds 200, the majority being in Livonia, where so many refugees have found asylum. These committees have done, and are doing, a great deal of work, but they will be called upon to do still more in the future. The Germans will, we hope, eventually be driven out of Courland, when the committees will have to bring back the Lettish refugees and assist them in the reconstruction of their homes. The Letts are industrious : they know how to work, and are persevering, patient, and dogged. The Lettish peasant has a favourite saying to the effect that ' Before I can be ' deterred from gaining my ends the devil himself will be ' changed into a pillar of stone.'

It must be left to the historians of the Russian Revolution to say how far the apparent willingness on the part of the house of Romanoff to surrender Courland to Germany was one of the causes of its downfall. The very suspicion of such an act of treason produced indescribable excitement among the Letts. It must also be left to history to elucidate the part played in the revolution by the Guards regiments in which the Lettish element has always been strongly represented.

The news of the success of the revolution in Petrograd was received by the Letts with mixed feelings—with the fear that the revolution would end in anarchy or in a violent counter-revolution, and with intense relief that the danger of a partition of Lettonia between Germany and Russia had been averted. Nowhere was the crisis faced with greater fearlessness and confidence. Faith in the final victory of common sense was not even shaken by the soldiers' and workmen's proclamation of ' no indemnities, no annexations.' Without an indemnity, the Lettish farmers in Courland would not have the faintest chance of recovery. Their lands would have to be sold and the numerous cosmopolitan concerns lying in wait in Petrograd would step in to snap up vacant land. Nothing but complete ruin would stare the Lettish peasant in the face.

The attitude of the Lettish army and of Lettish public opinion has not been sufficiently appreciated in England, while the extent of the influence of German agents in the Baltic Provinces has been misjudged. General Radko Dmitriev, the

commander in charge of the 'Lettish eagles,' issued an army order with the general approval of Lettish officers and soldiers, in which he said: 'Our country expects victory from us. 'Without discipline victory cannot be won and is never won; 'offences against discipline will be punished severely, but in 'accordance with the law, and courts-martial will continue to 'be held.' This order produced good results. In spite of the mistakes of the Provisional Government no serious disorganisation occurred in the Lettish regiments. Even the disappearance of discipline in Petrograd had not a disintegrating effect on the Lettish army, while the relations between the officers and soldiers continued good. Strong measures were, however, necessary in a few instances to counteract the restlessness of aggressive spirits and to damp their rising ardour for revolt. Frequent raids on German trenches were undertaken, which put a stop to attempts on the part of the Germans to fraternise with the Letts.

The first protests against the activities of Lenin and the pacifists came from Riga. The Press inveighed against this activity which 'troubled the mind and destroyed organisation.' The Army wrote entreating Petrograd not to tolerate demonstrations, which were destructive of the unity and power of Russia. As for liberty of speech, the message declared that the public expression of political opinions should be confined to political meetings, and should not be tolerated in the market-places and streets. Violent resentment of attacks against the prestige and greatness of Russia was a feature on the Lettish front.

This protest reveals two tendencies in the Lett—a fanatical devotion to Lettish nationality and a loyalty to the Russian State difficult to equal in any other part of Russia. The interests of Lettonia are in the opinion of the Lett more bound up with a free Russia than with a despotic Germany.

On the Riga front the struggle against German agitators was very active. Any soldier who ventured to express himself in a disrespectful manner about his superior officer was at once excluded from the Army and handed over to the courts-martial; the pacifist organs were severely boycotted, while the high command, after overcoming certain difficulties created by the Central Government, felt itself strong enough to deal with deserters. No humanitarian idealism marked the pro-

ceedings of these courts-martial, as was the case in Petrograd. Meanwhile, the conduct of the Lettish army met with the approval of the whole Lettish population, who are persuaded that until they are freed from the Germanophile and German agents they will not be able to develop unhindered. Some of their projects may be called irrational and unconsidered, but the cool, critical mind of the Lett will, in the end, correct what is exaggerated and mistaken.

The unanimous desire of the people is, naturally, to have a large share of autonomy. Divergence of opinion, however, does exist about the relations of Lettonia with the Central Power of the Empire, and also as regards the best form of internal government. But the wish for an understanding with the other nationalities of the Empire, and the anxiety not to create difficulties for the Provisional Government during the War, are dominant factors. The addresses presented to the Prime Minister express an absolute loyalty, a generous faith in the political honesty of new Russia, and willingness to forget the bitter experiences of the past.

C. HAGBERG WRIGHT.

# WHAT IS AUSTRIA?

AT the end of November the Emperor Charles will complete the first year of his reign. His accession brought into the Austrian problem—that crazy puzzle of countervailing instabilities—a factor of unknown quantity and quality but, at all events, different from the jaded cynicism of Francis Joseph. To ignore this new factor would be impolitic; to predict its influence would be foolish. It is a factor to be studied and analysed—always remembering that the injunction, 'Put not your trust in princes,' applies especially to the Hapsburgs. Nothing has yet shown the Emperor Charles to be an exception to the general rule laid down by the shrewd Austrian critic, Hermann Bahr, who wrote in his booklet 'Wien,' eleven years ago (pp. 18–19): 'Among Hapsburg 'Princes there have been simpletons and geniuses, men tur-'bulent and tranquil, jolly fellows and curmudgeons, victors 'and vanquished, companionable souls and recluses, men of 'all sorts, but one trait is common to them all—they have 'lacked the sense of reality.' This does not mean that their personal action, however heedless of facts, may not, at a given moment, set the whole mechanism of the State working in a direction unforeseen. It means only that those who deal with them will be wise not to base plans or forecasts upon the Hapsburg 'personal equation.'

With every month of war it grows plainer that peace must bring a drastic change in the position of the Hapsburg dominions. This is recognised in Germany and Austria even more clearly than by some of the Allies. The Emperor Charles is certainly convinced of it. The controversy in Allied countries upon the 'dismemberment' of Austria is in itself a sign that the Austrian question is forcing itself upon public attention. The difficulty is to determine what changes would connote a German victory and what the Allies require as a guarantee that there shall in future be in Central Europe itself such a grouping of ethnic, economic, and political forces as to preclude German mastery over the Continnt.

This weighty matter cannot be judged offhand or settled

by likes and dislikes. It is in part a question of facts already known, and in part a question of facts and tendencies in the making, and therefore open to varying interpretations. In the EDINBURGH REVIEW for January 1917, I attempted to show how the gradual rise of the Slav nationalities in the Dual Monarchy had become a potential menace to the twin bases of the State laid down in 1867—the preponderance of the German minority in Austria and of the Magyar minority in Hungary—with the result that the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary, under the guidance of the German Empire, had driven the Hapsburgs into an anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav policy, so as to preclude such a solution of the Southern Slav question as might have made the Hapsburgs masters in their own house, and have enabled them once more to play an independent part in Europe. The turning point in this process was the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908. Aehrenthal, who carried it out, thought he was pursuing an independent Hapsburg policy. He presently saw his error and sought, too late, to retrieve it. Then Germany hounded him to death. With his death, as was pointed out last January, disappeared the only potential obstacle to a continuance of the policy which the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had originally been intended by the partisans of Germany to promote—the overthrow of Serbia, as a preliminary to the opening of the German road to the East. I added that:

'Having secured for Austria (in 1878) the fatal gift of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and having shrewdly limited her title to an "occupation" so that eventual annexation might always be held as a bait before her, Germany could be quite sure that Austria would never turn her attention again to Europe, at least so long as her internal affairs were controlled, under the Dual System, by the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary. This was long the somewhat negative aim of Prussian diplomacy in regard to Austria. But, with the growth of the pan-German spirit and the strengthening of the German influence in Turkey, Austria wandered, or was driven more and more in the direction marked out by German ambitions—that of being a pioneer of Germanism in the Balkans.'

From the moment when Austria picked her quarrel with Serbia at the instance of Germany, it was evident to those familiar with the elements of Hapsburg politics that the Dual Monarchy was signing its own death-warrant. In the event of

victory, it was condemning itself in advance to be the vassal of Germany; in the event of defeat, it was giving the signal for its own disruption.

The exact degree of German responsibility for the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia has not yet been proved by documentary evidence. Both the German and the Austro-Hungarian Governments have carefully withheld from publication whatever correspondence passed between them during the first three weeks of July 1914. If the revelation in 'The 'Times' of July 28th last, that a decisive Austro-German conference was held at Potsdam on the 5th of July 1914, be accepted as substantially accurate, it is clear that the decisions then taken would have obviated the need for detailed despatches. All the evidence available points to the conclusion that during the first half of July 1914 the Austro-Hungarian Government and General Staff received explicit assurances of German support in case the Dual Monarchy should make up its mind to settle accounts with Serbia. On this score, the force of corroborative testimony is overwhelming. The well-known fact that, on the 15th of July 1914, the late Baron von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Constantinople, informed his Italian colleague, the Marquis Garroni, to this effect, is but one link in the chain of evidence. It is known, for instance, that on the same day a prominent Austro-Hungarian ex-ambassador told the representative of a Great Power in Vienna that, on the previous day (July 14th), the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office was already in possession of such assurances of support in all directions from Germany, that it had decided to 'go ahead.' Further, there is in this country a communication written by a well-informed German to a British sympathiser on the 16th of July 1914, to the effect that the Austrian Emperor was about to sign the ultimatum to Serbia after having received from the German Emperor an encouraging letter which a well-known friend of the writer and of the recipient of the communication had been allowed to read. Since the importance of establishing beyond question the responsibility of Germany for the war makes it incumbent upon those who have any direct or indirect knowledge of the facts to say what they know, I venture to add some account of my own experience to the common stock of information.

I returned to England in October 1913, after having worked

for nearly eleven years in Austria-Hungary. I was in Vienna throughout the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908–1909, and the Balkan wars of 1912–13. During those crises I repeatedly discussed with prominent Austrians, and with members of the Austro-Hungarian Staff, the likelihood of a general European war. From them I gained the impression that war was probable, if not certain, in a comparatively near future, that the pretext chosen would be some Austro-Serbian dispute and that, while the Austro-Hungarian forces engaged Serbia and withstood or invaded Russia, the German army would attack France swiftly through Belgium. This plan of campaign was by no means new. It had been discussed by the French Premier, M. Clémenceau, with Sir Edward Grey in London after the funeral of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in April 1908, and, as I have reason to know, was again mentioned by M. Clémenceau during his interview with King Edward at Marienbad in August of the same year. In the autumn of 1912, when the peace of Europe depended upon the action or inaction of Austria-Hungary in regard to the advance of the Serbian forces towards the Adriatic, the events of August 1914 were within an ace of being antedated by more than eighteen months. This was clearly understood in Vienna, though prominent Englishmen in London then expressed horror at the idea that England might be compelled to fight a continental war at a moment's notice 'on account of an Austro-'Serbian quarrel.' Therefore, when I returned to England in the following autumn (1913), it was with a keen sense of the danger which any Austro-Serbian complication must involve for the peace of Europe. As far as I could discover, my apprehensions were not shared in any responsible British quarter. At the Foreign Office firm trust prevailed in the peaceful intentions of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The influence of Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, and of Count Albert Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, was at least as strong as that of the Entente ambassadors, M. Paul Cambon and Count Benckendorff; while the ubiquitous and indefatigable Herr von Kühlmann had established confidential relations with many permanent officials, just as he had succeeded in hypnotising the majority of London editors. If the Austro-Hungarian Embassy was less active, its influence was equally potent in the official world. Count Albert Mens-

dorff I had known since September 1904, but had never sought to cultivate his acquaintance. Between October 1913 and July 1914 I met him by chance once or twice, but I had never called at, or had any relations with, the Austro-Hungarian Embassy. In the spring of 1914, moreover, the Austrian authorities had confiscated my book, 'The Hapsburg Monarchy,' for 'the crime of insult to Majesty,' the charge being founded upon the following passage torn from its context:

'While personally unselfish, generous and just, ever ready 'to redress a private injury or to alleviate public distress, 'Francis Joseph, as a ruler, has often seemed callous to the 'point of cynicism, and "constitutional" to the point of 'injustice.' It was manifestly difficult for an English writer thus accused of *Majestätsbeleidigung* to maintain intimate relations with the representative of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty at the Court of St. James's.

On Friday, the 16th of July 1914, I was suddenly, but very pressingly, invited by an old Viennese acquaintance, Herr Max Goldscheider, the correspondent in London of the 'Neues 'Wiener Tagblatt,' to supper, or as he called it, a *gemütlichen Herrenabend,* at his house.' There I found Count Dubsky and several other members of the staff of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, besides the Consul-General, Count Sizzo-Noris. The only other non-Austrians present were Mr. Sidney Low and the President of the Foreign Press Association, M. Coudurier de Chassaigne. The chief topic of conversation was naturally the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg at Sarayevo on the previous June 28th, in regard to which the Austro-Hungarian diplomatists began by expressing orthodox official views. From these, as an 'expert Austrian,' I dissented vigorously, and asked pointedly for an explanation of the strange failure of the Bosnian authorities to make any arrangements for the protection of their heir-presumptive and his consort; and also for some plausible reason why none of the authorities guilty of such neglect had been punished or even reprimanded. I did more than hint that there had been deliberate negligence to protect the Archduke and his wife.

Next morning (Saturday, July 17th), to my astonishment, Count Dubsky telephoned from the Austro-Hungarian Embassy to ask me to lunch with the Ambassador. I declined.

The invitation was immediately renewed for the Sunday. Again I declined. Thereupon Count Mensdorff expressed the hope that I would come on Monday. Once more I refused. But, nothing abashed, he pressed me, through Count Dubsky, to come on the Tuesday (July 20th). Feeling that there must be some imperative reason for this insistence, I accepted, and on Tuesday lunched with Count Albert Mensdorff and Baron von Frankenstein, the Commercial Attaché.

After luncheon the Ambassador said: 'I wish to appeal 'to you, as a friend of Austria, to use your influence in the 'British press in order that the position of Austria-Hungary 'in this crisis may be rightly understood. It is impossible 'for us longer to tolerate Serbian provocation. Serbia must 'be punished; but if the press will give the lead, British public 'opinion will remain friendly to us, and the conflict may be 'localised.'

I answered that I was too good a friend of Austria to help her to commit suicide.

The Ambassador seemed shocked by the word 'suicide,' and asked whether I thought Austria-Hungary so weak as not to be able to deal with a little people of three or four millions.

'You can certainly crush Serbia,' I replied, 'if you are 'left alone to do it; but even in that case you will be committing 'suicide. You must reckon on a war of eight or nine months, 'you will be obliged to mobilise at least 600,000 men, you will 'lose some 200,000 killed and wounded, and will spend not 'less than £120,000,000. That will complete the ruin of your 'finances. You are not unaware that Austria alone has, on the 'confession of your Finance Minister, been making debts at 'the rate of £40,000 a day for the last ten years. Taxation 'is already so high that it cannot be increased. When you 'have conquered Serbia, you will be confronted with the 'problem of a costly military occupation, which will require 'an army of 200,000 men: and should you annex the country, 'you will create a solid block of 12,000,000 Southern Slavs, 'whose weight will so upset the Dual System that, in order 'to keep her hold on you, Germany will demand and obtain 'such military, political, and economic pledges of control over 'you that your independence will vanish.'

'But that,' I continued, 'is not what will happen. At the 'first shot you fire across the Save, Russia will cry "Hands

'"off!" Germany will summon Russia not to intervene, and 'Russia will refuse, because compliance would cost the Tsar his 'throne. Germany will then mobilise, and will bolt through 'Belgium into France; and when England sees German troops 'in Belgium, she will intervene against Germany and against 'you.'

'You will never intervene!' cried the Ambassador.

'We shall certainly intervene,' I returned.

'I have the assurance that you will not intervene,' replied Count Mensdorff.

'I care nothing for your assurance,' I answered; 'you do 'not know the strength of English public feeling.'

'Then you will not help us?' said Count Mensdorff.

'On no account whatever,' I answered; and took leave of the Ambassador immediately.

The behaviour and language of Count Mensdorff seemed so significant that I informed the Foreign Office at once.

I said that Count Mensdorff's attitude proved to me that Austria-Hungary was bent on war and that Germany was supporting her, since the Ambassador would never have acted and spoken as he had done had he not received urgent instructions from his Government. These instructions could never have been given—in view of the intimate relationship between Berlin and Vienna—were not Austrian policy concerted with Germany. The decision to provoke war, I added, must be several days old, since, had I not refused to lunch with Count Mensdorff on Saturday the 17th, he would probably have spoken then as he had spoken on the 20th. I urged that, in my opinion, the only way to avert a European war in which England would be obliged to intervene would be for Sir Edward Grey immediately to explain in public the peril to which peace was exposed, and to declare that, if Germany and Austria attempted to make the Sarayevo murders a pretext for war, England would stand by France and Russia from the outset. Otherwise the Government would find themselves in ten days or a fortnight with a terrible crisis on their hands and would not know which way to turn, because they would not be sure of the support of a public opinion that would be utterly ignorant of the vital issues at stake.

My suggestions were thought extravagant. The Foreign Office, it appeared, had reason to believe German policy to

be pacific, and to expect Germany to exercise a restraining influence upon Austria. Any alarmist action would 'spoil 'the diplomatic atmosphere' and bring on the very crisis which Sir Edward Grey and the Government desired to avert.

During the fortnight between July 20th and the outbreak of war the Austro-Hungarian and German Embassies strained every nerve to influence the British Press in their favour, and achieved an astonishing degree of success. Thus Austria-Hungary followed the fatal course from which a courageous British Government and an informed public might perhaps have saved her. Now, after more than three years of war, it is dawning upon wide circles of opinion in this and Allied countries that there can be no lasting peace in Europe unless the subject Hapsburg peoples be liberated and the Hapsburg dominions radically transformed.

Against this dawning conviction there is, indeed, a noticeable and not altogether spontaneous reaction. The cry 'no dis-'memberment of Austria' has been echoed in the strangest quarters. Roman Catholic 'Clericals' and the Russian Soviet, the Italian 'official' (or Germanophil) Socialists and British and French Conservatives have vied with British Pacifists, sundry Radicals, and the organs of international finance in repeating it. Little experience of the workings of the parallel and often mysteriously correlated intrigues of international finance and international clericalism is required to detect the sources of this pro-Austrian agitation. With those who are its conscious tools, argument is useless; but to the great majority of actual or potential Austrophils, who act and speak in uninformed good faith, some questions may usefully be put. When they speak of 'Austria' what do they mean? Have they in mind merely the Emperor Charles and his government or governments, or do they mean the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy? Do they desire the continuance of the Monarchy in its present dual form, or do they contemplate some federalist rearrangement of the Hapsburg dominions? If so, by what means is the rearrangement to be brought about? On the supposition that it might be possible to induce the Germans of Austria to accept, for the Austrian half of the Monarchy, the federalist programme against which they have always desperately fought, how is it intended to carry through the 'federalisation' of Hungary? And, without the

federalisation of Hungary, how can any internal reform of the Monarchy be other than a sorry farce?

These questions are not put in a carping spirit. No man who has learned by wearisome study the catalogue of the Hapsburg peoples, and has pondered vainly over the problem which their reorganisation would present, can feel aught but sympathy with new-comers striving sincerely to penetrate, under stress of war, the mysteries which proved baffling, even in peace time, to the most acute and patient observers. At the conclusion of his famous work, 'Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois,' the eminent French authority, Professor Louis Eisenmann, suggested some twelve years ago that the evolution of Austria-Hungary towards the form of a 'monarchical Switzerland' would be at once the safest and most profitable line of development for the Hapsburg peoples and for Europe. In making this suggestion he expressly excluded the hypothesis of a 'violent disturbance' in Europe. Quite recently in 'La Nation Tchèque,' he reconsidered the position in the light of the 'violent disturbance' of the last three years, and reached conclusions that deserve reproduction at some length.

'There exists' [he wrote] 'neither an Austrian nation nor a Hungarian nation. As to an Austro-Hungarian nation, the very expression implies the grossest contradiction in terms and the absurdest nonsense. . . . All who have eyes to see and ears to hear, are convinced by this time that Austro-Hungarian Dualism is the organisation of German-Magyar oppression of the Slavs and Rumanes of Austria and of Hungary. Does then Austria-Hungary consist of the Germans and the Magyars? Of the Magyars, perhaps. In order to deal with the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary, the Magyars require that the Austrian Germans should control the Austrian Slavs. But then, there is nothing Austrian about Magyar attachment to Austria-Hungary; it is pure Magyar selfishness. Can it be admitted that "Austria" should be or can be solely Magyar?

'The Germans of Austria are attached to Austria not for her own sake, but for the sake of Germany. They are Germans first, Austrians afterwards. There was doubtless a time when things were otherwise, but that time passed away fifty, or, maybe, seventy-five years ago. The only Austria-Hungary that the Austrian Germans conceive and desire to-day is an Austria-Hungary allied to Germany—allied, that is to say, vassal, colony, appendage, a German bridge towards the Near and Farther East, the gangway of *Mitteleuropa*. . . . No. The Austria-Hungary which people want to save is the dynastic Austria-Hungary. It is a question

of preserving an Empire for the House of Hapsburg. It is to the interest of a reigning family that people would sacrifice—unwittingly and certainly without wishing it—thirty million souls, whose ardent sympathy goes out to the Entente, and would sacrifice with them the whole fruit of this terrible war, the future of Europe and of the world. "Austria is a diplomacy and an army"—a celebrated formula, to which should be added "the dynasty" which, by its diplomacy, created its Monarchy in Europe, and by its army has sustained it against its peoples. The dynasty is German and will remain German. The young Emperor Charles may have the purest intentions; the young Empress may be pacific, anti-Prussian and Ententophil. What power have they against geography and history, against the German mass that presses upon the frontiers of Austria, against the Germanic traditions of six or seven centuries of Hapsburg history, against the rooted prejudice of Vienna towards the Slavs, the obtuse infatuation of the Austrian Germans or the imperious, overweening spirit of the Magyars? . . . There are in Austria oppressed peoples forming at least three-fifths of the population who desire the destruction of the Monarchy and their own liberation. There are two oppressor peoples, Germans and Magyars, who desire the maintenance of the Monarchy because they wish to conserve their own domination over the other peoples, the preservation of the German Alliance and the realisation of *Mitteleuropa* which would guarantee German hegemony in the Old World.

'And there is a young couple, without great intelligence, without merit, who have not made great mistakes or committed great crimes but who are overwhelmed by a heavy inheritance of crime and error. Around them stand twenty, fifty or a hundred families without nationality, without a real fatherland, cosmopolitan as people were two or three centuries ago, a last refuge of a tradition which elsewhere has yielded to the new spirit of the modern world. . . . It is this group, this group alone, dynasty and aristocracy, that makes up Austria-Hungary. And we are asked to make peace with *that*, and, for its sake, to give up our ideals, sacrifice our friends and prepare our own undoing.'

Compare this answer to the question, 'What is Austria?' by the *savant* who has studied the Hapsburg problem most profoundly, with the definition of the Austrian 'nation' given by the most discerning of contemporary Austrian writers, Hermann Bahr:

'Rudolph II. was the first to see whence he could fetch those adaptable beings, devoid of will, out of whom the Hapsburg spirit would create its own men. He sought them among peoples for whom there was no room in the traditional orders and castes; people who were nothing in and by themselves; who could become something only under the Emperor's hand; people without a real

life of their own and whom Imperial favour must first turn into men. They were people of the kind that have sometimes founded colonies and who, in Austria, formed a colony—the colony of the Imperial House. They formed a new race, the race of men whom the Emperor Francis was afterwards to call "patriots for me." Thus arose the "nation of Court counsellors," a nation artificially begotten by order, at Court, in the Imperial service and in the chanceries—artificial in thought and feeling, nay, even in language, since the Austrian spoken even to-day in our government offices and by Jews who desire not to be Jews, is an invention. These men, fashioned from above, have now been for two hundred years the pillars of our State and Society. I have called them the nation of Court counsellors! They are also called "the Families." They are not a nobility. There are nobles among them and burghers among them; one can gain admittance to them from all quarters—on one condition: those who would enter must break with their class, deny their race, denationalise themselves. They must be unloosed from every tie, torn up by the roots and thus prepared for the mysterious Austrian transfiguration, which consists in taking on the form of the ruling spirit.' *

The growth of these 'families' dates from the period that followed the counter-Reformation. When Ferdinand II., at the instance of the Jesuits, had laid waste his realms in order to make them Catholic, when the peasantry was reduced to silence, the townsmen made to bend their heads, the recalcitrant exiled or executed and the zealots rewarded, when distrust and hatred had filled the land, there came from outside and inside the Holy Roman Empire a swarm of adventurers who sought fortune through imperial favour. A century and a half later, when the 'Era of Enlightenment' had dawned and Josephinism cast its shadows before, many of 'the families' caught the new spirit and worshipped the Goddess of Reason as their fathers had worshipped the Virgin. They remained true to their principle to have no principle save the favour of the Imperial House. Under Francis and Metternich they once more became reactionary and politically devout. Under Francis Joseph they accepted the Concordat of 1855 as willingly as the anti-clerical reforms of the 'seventies. Had Francis Ferdinand lived, they would have taken on his colour, just as they will strive to take on the colour of the Emperor Charles as soon as they know definitely what it is to be. They lend no strength to the Sovereign, but are at once

* 'Wien,' pp. 38–40.

a passive medium for the transmission of his will and an insulating medium that cuts him off from contact with reality.

But during the last sixty or seventy years there has arisen in Austria a new reality, something stronger than 'the families' and stronger than the imperial will—the growth or the revival of the sense of nationality among the Hapsburg peoples and their desire for self-determination. Like the movements that led to the formation of united Germany and united Italy, the rise of 'national'—that is to say, racial—feeling among the Hapsburg peoples can be traced directly and indirectly to the influence of the French Revolution. In Bohemia, among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, nay, even among the Rumanes of Transylvania, the fire of nationalism was first kindled in a few leading spirits by the sparks from the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic smithy. The Hapsburgs instinctively resisted all these movements, and believed that under the Metternichian 'system' they had been crushed. But the revolution of 1848 showed the futility of attempting to smother nationalist enthusiasm by mere repression; while Sadowa and Solferino proved, or should have proved, the danger of allowing a unitary ferment to grow until it becomes a solvent which hostile Powers can turn to their own account.

By a wiser policy the Hapsburgs might have settled the German unitary question in their own favour. They might, by insight and foresight, have put another complexion upon the Italian Risorgimento. They might in 1867 have solved the Bohemian problem in such manner as to have saved themselves from the yoke of the Dual System, and have maintained, in the autonomy of Transylvania, a valuable safeguard against Magyar dictation. Later on, they could have united the Southern Slavs, including Serbia, under their own leadership. All these opportunities they missed out of sheer incapacity to understand that peoples are not merely the raw material of a dynastic industry, but, in the long run, lend strength to a dynasty exactly in proportion as the dynasty identifies itself with their aspirations and fosters their development.

If it be argued that the Hapsburgs could not identify themselves with the aspirations of all their peoples, inasmuch as those aspirations were mutually conflicting, if not irreconcilable, the answer is that even in a composite State like Austria-Hungary there are negative and positive methods of govern-

ment, and that the Hapsburgs have almost invariably chosen the negative method. They have aimed at securing dynastic stability by means of an equilibrium of discontent instead of ensuring dynastic stability by equilibrium in progress. Their first instinct has always been to repress nascent movements, however healthy those movements might be in themselves. When repression at length became impossible, they have, on the one hand, made concessions to the movement and have, on the other, sought to corrupt its leaders. The extent of the concession has usually been determined by their estimate of the power of the movement to do them harm. They have never tried to settle a question on its merits, but have invariably judged it either as an inconvenient manifestation to be got rid of or as a means of creating a counterpoise to some rival and equally inconvenient manifestation. Thus no race or party in their dominions has ever been wholly satisfied; each has been taught to consider the woes of its rivals as a partial satisfaction for itself, and all have gradually learned the lesson that the only argument to which the Hapsburgs are really accessible is the argument of blackmail.

A dynasty imbued with these traditions and a bureaucracy schooled to apply them cannot change overnight, however clearly a new Sovereign may perceive the peril of continuing to tread the ancient path. In some quarters the Emperor Charles is alleged—possibly not without reason—to cherish ideas as to the reorganisation of Central and South-Eastern Europe that go far beyond anything yet conceived, or at least publicly expressed, by the broadest-minded of his ministers. He is stated fully to understand that the chief obstacle to any fruitful transformation of his realms lies in the obstructive power of the reactionary Magyar oligarchy; but neither he nor any Austrian can see how the power of that oligarchy is to be broken without the overthrow of Germany and her allies. It may be doubted if he and his advisers have thought out the question whether any useful sphere of activity would remain for the Hapsburgs after the overthrow of Germany and the liberation of the Hapsburg peoples. Possibly they conceive the Hapsburg future as an imperial presidency over a confederation of minor sovereign States. On one essential matter there is, however, no clue to their ideas—the future status of the Austrian Germans.

Unless it be understood that the nine or ten million Germans of Austria have not maintained their Hapsburg allegiance for the sake of Austria but for the sake of Germany, there can be no fruitful discussion of the Hapsburg problem. A generation ago it was fashionable among the pan-German youth of Austria to make pilgrimages to Varzin or Friedrichsruh in order to attest their veneration for Bismarck and their fidelity to the 'German idea.' The pilgrims were invariably urged by Bismarck to return home and be loyal to the Hapsburgs, since they would thus be of far greater service to Germany than by harbouring thoughts of political union with the German Empire. He meant that the influence of the Germans of Austria over the Austrian State and dynasty, in conjunction with that of the Magyars, would keep the Monarchy subservient to German imperial purposes, whereas any separatist tendency on the part of the Austrian Germans would only make of them and of the German Empire objects of suspicion to the Hapsburgs, who might be driven into a Slavophil policy and seek alliances outside Germany. The conservation of the Dual Monarchy was therefore, as it still is, a principal interest of the German Empire. Its dual form, and the control which that form has enabled Germany to exercise over Hapsburg policy, has made of the Monarchy far more than an ally of Germany, and has reduced it to the position of a branch establishment containing a reserve of more than fifty million souls upon whom Germany could draw for all her needs.

In the January issue of the EDINBURGH REVIEW, I outlined the scheme evolved last autumn by Germany and her Austrian partisans for the complete Germanisation of Austria. The scheme contemplated the bestowal of a 'separate status' upon Galicia, so as to remove from the Reichsrath the 106 Galician Slav (Polish and Ruthene) representatives; the redistribution of the administrative and electoral districts of Bohemia, so as to place the Bohemian Slav (Czech) majority under the control of the Bohemian German minority; the establishment of German as the language of State throughout Austria in place of the eight Austrian languages hitherto recognised as official; and the removal from the Reichsrath of the eleven Dalmatian deputies (Croat and Serb) by the transfer of Dalmatia from Austria to an 'autonomous' Haps-

burg Southern Slav province. In this manner the Austrian Germans hoped to obtain absolute numerical preponderance in the Vienna Parliament and to crush all Slav opposition by a drastic pro-German reform of the Parliamentary Standing Orders. The late Emperor Francis Joseph in his dotage had sanctioned the scheme, but its application was prevented by the accession of the Emperor Charles and by his appointment of Counts Clam-Martinitz and Czernin to be Austrian Premier and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister respectively. Both of these noblemen had belonged to the circle of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and were credited with Slav sympathies. In reality they were neither Slav nor German, but simply Hapsburgian and Clerical. At first their appointment caused a flutter in pan-German quarters; but as early as the 30th of December 1916, the press of Germany had so far recovered from its real or affected fright as to declare the choice of Count Clam-Martinitz 'very opportune,' since 'his 'influence with the Czechs might enable him to render precious 'services.'

Clam-Martinitz and Czernin lost, indeed, little time in making overtures to the Czech Conservatives. Their appeals went unheeded. Czechs of all parties refused to make any declaration of loyalty to the Hapsburgs, or to disavow the policy of the Bohemian national leaders, Professor Masaryk and Dr. Kramarzh, of whom the former was in exile and the latter still in prison. (More recently, at Stockholm, Czech Socialists of the tamer sort have confessed that 95 per cent. of the Czech people support Masaryk with his programme of Czecho-Slovak unity and national independence; and a manifesto in the same sense launched last spring by 150 Czech writers speedily became a charter of the Bohemian national movement.) Disappointed, the Austrian premier turned towards the Austrian German parties and offered seats in the cabinet to their representatives, Drs. Urban and Baernreither, who accepted them on condition that the scheme for the Germanisation of Austria should be revived and enforced by imperial decree before the convocation of the Reichsrath. The Austrian minister for Galicia, Dr. de Bobrzynski, similarly received and gave to the Austrian Poles assurances that, under the Germanising scheme, Galicia would be given a separate autonomous status.

At this juncture the Russian Revolution broke out. At a moment when Russia was throwing off the yoke of Tsardom it was seen to be inopportune to enforce plans for the permanent oppression of the Austrian Slavs. For a few days Vienna was bewildered. The official press wept, at first, bitter tears over the fall of the 'pacifist Tsar,' but was quickly ordered to celebrate the 'magnificent Slav Revolution.' On March 31st the 'Fremdenblatt' published Count Czernin's first open peace offer to Revolutionary Russia, and on April 15th supplemented it by an invitation still more precise. His manœuvre was, however, sadly deranged by the action of the Czech Parliamentary Union, which on April 14th had greeted with enthusiasm the Russian Revolution, demanded the reorganisation of Austria in accordance with the right of peoples to determine their own fate, and declared that if the Germanising scheme were enforced by imperial decree the Czech members of parliament would resign in a body. On April 16th an Austrian cabinet council was hastily summoned. It decided to abandon the Germanising scheme and to convoke the Reichsrath without more ado. Consequently the German ministers, Drs. Urban and Baernreither, resigned, the press of the German Empire and the German press of Austria grew alarmed, and the Austrian German parties turned upon the Emperor with an unmistakable growl. The Emperor summoned the German party leaders to a special audience, declared that he reckoned upon his German subjects 'as sure supporters of the unity of the State,' and expressed the 'confident expectation' that 'the conviction 'of the necessity of harmonious co-operation between the 'representatives of all the peoples of Austria' would prevail in the impending Reichsrath debates. Under imperial pressure, the German ministers withdrew their resignations, but the proceedings in the Reichsrath speedily dashed the Emperor's pious hopes.

So far from joining in 'harmonious co-operation,' the non-German members of parliament joined in venting their indignation at the treatment to which they had been subjected, and began an unprecedented series of nationalist manifestations. So complete was the failure of the Government to secure any appearance of unity, or even the support of a majority, in the Reichsrath, that Clam-Martinitz gave place —after some days of frantic and fruitless negotiation with

the Czechs, Poles, and Southern Slavs—to a purely bureaucratic cabinet under a comparatively unknown official, Dr. von Seidler, whose colourless administration barely serves to cover the nakedness of Austria's plight.

The Austrian Germans, for their part, were at no pains to hide their feelings. Writing from Vienna towards the middle of June to the 'Frankfurter Zeitung,' Dr. Hugo Ganz, who is one of the best-informed exponents of their views in the German press, said:

'Everybody who desires to prevent the formation of a *Germania Irredenta*—and this must be the desire of every good Austrian as much as of every good German—must see to it that the ten millions of Austrian Germans . . . shall lose their feeling of being under a perpetual national menace within the Austrian League of States. The German cannot be, on the other side of the Austrian frontier, a member of the mightiest and most victorious people, and, inside the Austrian frontier, a member of a minority living only at the mercy of its enemies, without remembering that he has only some day to commit the same *sabotage* of the State which considerable sections of the now triumphant majorities have committed during the war, in order to escape from his misery.'

This particular piece of frankness had reference to the refusal of the Emperor, in his speech from the throne at the opening of the Reichsrath, to take the oath upon the Austrian constitution—the Fundamental Statute of 1867 which created the Dual System—and thus left open the door for any constitutional changes that he might think advisable. He said:

'Mindful of my obligations to take the oath to the Constitution and adhering to my intention, expressed immediately after my accession, truly to fulfil this obligation, I must at the same time keep in mind the provision of the Fundamental Statute which places in my hands alone the decisions to be taken at the great moment of the conclusion of peace. I am, however, convinced that the happy development of constitutional life, after the unfruitfulness of past years and after the exceptional political conditions of war time—apart from the solution of the Galician question to which my illustrious predecessor pointed the way—is not possible without expanding the Constitution and the administrative foundations of the whole of our public life, both in the State and in the separate kingdoms and countries, especially Bohemia. . . . For these reasons I have decided to postpone the taking of the Constitutional oath until the time, which I hope is not far distant, when the foundations of a new, strong and happy Austria will again, for generations to come, be firmly consolidated, internally and externally.'

The short sense of these involved passages is that the Emperor Charles meant, and means, to reserve his freedom of action, although the references to the Galician question on the one hand, and to the position of Bohemia on the other, were intended to encourage both the Germans and the Slavs to hope that the promised 'expansion of the constitution' would take place according to their desires. Lest, however, the 'expansion' should be unfavourable to Germanism, Dr. Hugo Ganz, the correspondent of the 'Frankfurter Zeitung' above quoted, registered for the edification of the Emperor and his advisers the following explicit threat:

'The only meaning of the postponement of the Emperor's oath to the constitution must be that the supreme advisers of the Crown themselves consider it necessary to oppose the Slav nationalism which has once more been disclosed in its ruthless aggressiveness, and by preserving the Austrian Germans from thoughts of *sabotage*, to preserve the State itself from the most disastrous disruption.'

The threat thus uttered was repeated even more plainly by various accredited spokesmen of the Austrian Germans, who declared openly that unless the Germans were able to rule in Austria they would shake the dust of Austria off their feet. The truth is that, for the Germans, the loss of predominance in Austria would mean the total loss of their political position and the end of their usefulness to Germany as a lever for German control of Austria. There would then be no object in their remaining in Austria. What Austria would be like after the elimination of the Germans—that is to say, the inhabitants of Upper and most of Lower Austria, the Salzkammergut, Northern Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, Styria, and the greater part of Carinthia—passes the wit even of 'expert Austrians' to understand. There would remain Bohemia and Moravia, part of Austrian Silesia, and the north-western counties of Hungary, which are preponderatingly Czecho-Slovak; Galicia, the Bukovina, and Transylvania could not be disposed of without regard to the solution of the Polish, Ukraine, and Rumanian questions; Carniola, the southern part of Carinthia, the eastern half of Istria, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the greater part of the Banat, are entirely or overwhelmingly Southern Slav in race and aspiration; the Trentino or Southern Tyrol, Trieste, and the Littoral, with the western half of Istria, are rightfully Italian.

The Magyars, shorn of their power to oppress the non-Magyar half of Hungary and devoid of value to Germany as instruments of control over the Hapsburgs, would find their true level as a small agricultural people on the Central Hungarian plain, destined perhaps to link up with surrounding States in some form of Danubian Confederation. Whether, in these conditions, the Magyars would remain faithful to the Hapsburgs is a very open question. Save through the Magyar oligarchy, whose power the liberation of the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary would destroy, the Hapsburgs have little real hold upon the Magyar people. The survival of effective loyalty to the Hapsburgs among the Czechs, Slovaks, Southern Slavs and Rumanes, whom the Hapsburgs have deliberately sacrificed to the Germans and the Magyars, is even more doubtful. What, then, is the value of the Hapsburg factor in any Central European resettlement such as the Allies must desire?

At best it is problematic; at worst it is a snare for uninformed Allied statesmen. There is only one safe principle for the Allies to pursue in regard to the Hapsburgs and their realms. It is to remember that, quite apart from ideal considerations, peoples tend constantly to become stronger than dynasties, and that to base plans upon the power of dynasties may be to build on sand. The test of the political victory or defeat of the Allies in this war will be the extent to which they are able to create in Central and South-eastern Europe a chain of independent or federated national States whose vital interest it would be to resist German political and economic hegemony. The Hapsburgs, who are a German dynasty with German traditions, and whose habit of mind is not constructive, could not be trusted to create this non-Germanic Confederation, even were their interests and those of the 'families' who surround them bound up with the total defeat of the Hohenzollerns. In point of fact, Hapsburg interests require a moderate defeat of the Hohenzollerns so that Hapsburg prestige may be relatively enhanced; while Hohenzollern interests require the maintenance of the Hapsburgs as nominal rulers over lands and peoples in which the effective control will be in German hands. The outward form of this control matters little to Germany.

From the moment when the plan for the complete Germanisation of Austria had to be shelved or abandoned, and the

influence of the Russian Revolution made it necessary to cease drastic persecution of the Austrian Slavs, a new German plan was put forward to secure the important German interest of preserving Austria. The plan was to 'federalise' her by instituting wider provincial autonomies and separating, if necessary, Galicia and the Italian regions from the monarchy. The plan was a *pis aller*, designed to check the centrifugal movement of Hapsburg peoples and to dupe the Allies by preserving Austria in some form as a Germanic bridge to the East until Germany herself should have recovered her strength and be able to make good her immediate rule along the Middle Danube. The Austrian Slavs, and especially the Czechs, will do their utmost to defeat this federalising scheme, since they know it to be far more difficult to federalise Austria in a Slav sense than to liberate the Slavs by resolving the Empire into its constituent elements.

The cardinal fact to be borne in mind by all Allied statesmen is that however much they might prefer, in theory, to retain some Hapsburg polity in a federalist transformation, and however sincere may be the Emperor Charles in desiring such a transformation, neither he nor his subjects have the power to effect it, in any but a pro-German direction, until Germany has been thoroughly defeated. Diplomatists naturally tend to hope for the continued existence of a State organisation which, to their minds, represents a comparatively known quantity. They fear to see it replaced by a series of new or resuscitated national States, each of which would be a minor unknown quantity, and which, taken together, would form an incalculable complex of action and reaction. The course of the Russian Revolution has increased rather than decreased Conservative predilections for the maintenance, wherever possible, of some remnant of the old order of things. We cannot yet know whether Russia will emerge from her ordeal as an organised united State, or, if she emerge, whether her recovery will be swift enough to make of her a mainstay of order and equilibrium in Eastern Europe. But it is, in any case, clear that the Western Allies will be deeply interested in procuring such a European settlement as shall neutralise the danger of German preponderance. To this end, the formation of a strong united Poland, an independent and united Bohemia, or, rather, Czecho-Slovakia, a united and inde-

pendent Southern Slav kingdom of Serbia-Croatia-Slavonia, and a united Rumania, are primary requisites. None of the Allies can afford to pursue, *à outrance*, their own special aims or fancies without regard to the general object of establishing the equilibrium of Europe upon sure foundations.

In particular this is true of Italy. Notwithstanding the welcome change recently noticeable in leading Italian organs towards the question of Southern Slav unity, and their advocacy of a close Adriatic agreement between Italy, Serbia, and the Southern Slavs, there is still room for doubt whether the degree in which Italy is interested in a satisfactory European settlement has yet been adequately appreciated by the Italian people or even by the Italian Government. Constant references are made to the necessity that the Allies should scrupulously observe the terms of the Convention signed by England, France, and Russia with Italy on the 27th of April 1915. The implication is that the integral execution of that Convention would firmly establish Italian security in the Adriatic and in Europe. Though its exact text has not been published in this country, the main features of the Convention, as divulged in the Italian press, suggest serious doubt whether it is not far too narrow a basis for that security to which Italy is more than ever entitled after the superb conduct of her armies in this war. It is known, for instance, that the Convention assigns to Italy the principal and most valuable part of Dalmatia which is overwhelmingly Southern Slav by race and in political sympathy. But it does not assign to Italy, nor do the most extreme Italian Nationalists claim, the whole of the Eastern Adriatic coast. Yet without the possession not only of the whole coast but of its *Hinterländer*, the Italian tenure of Dalmatia would at best be precarious, and the Italian position in the Adriatic far from safe. Italy would constantly have to reckon with the enmity of the Southern Slavs, whom she would have deprived of a considerable portion of their ethnological territory, and with the support which they would inevitably receive from all quarters interested in disputing the Italian title to supremacy in the Adriatic.

On a basis of *Machtpolitik* or a 'policy of power' alone, Italy cannot hope to close the Adriatic against Germanism and German intrigue. She can establish her security only by a policy of large-hearted sympathy and alliance with the

Slavs of the Adriatic and with their natural supporters in Bohemia and Poland. For her, the dismemberment of Austria is an essential aim; but it is an aim not to be achieved solely by negative methods. In the Pact concluded at Corfu on the 20th of July 1917 between the Serbian Government and the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs, the door was left open for a just agreement with Italy. Article 9 of the Pact declares that 'the territory of the kingdom of the 'Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will include all the territory '*inhabited compactly and in territorial continuity* by our nation.' It would be difficult to say more pointedly that in regard to all territories not inhabited by compact masses of their race, the Southern Slavs are ready for compromise; and those territories include precisely the districts of greatest importance to Italy. No feature of the necessary European settlement is weightier than a sincere and just agreement between the Italian and the Southern Slav peoples, for none is more intimately connected with the question of the survival of Austria. While the Southern Slavs will need foresight, moderation, and prudence in the precise definition of their national claims, Italy should have a care lest, in placing too narrow an interpretation upon the requirements of her security, she estrange the foes and encourage the partisans of the Hapsburgs only to find even the integral execution of her bond unavailing to assure her a tranquil future.

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

## THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BAGHDAD

THE Report of the 'Commission Appointed by Act of 'Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War 'in Mesopotamia' aroused so much passionate anger in Great Britain that it has not received the calm and impartial consideration it deserves. By speech and by pen, its findings have been alternately distorted and obscured. Its publication produced bitter controversies and personal attacks. It brought about the resignation of Mr. Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, who was personally the most blameless of all the prominent people involved. It imperilled for a week the stability of the Second Coalition Ministry. It was the subject of violent misrepresentation and of many unfair accusations. The Cabinet made the storm worse by its provocative indecision regarding the Report, and in the end it took the only course possible by practically dropping the subject altogether. The sequel was astonishing, even in a period so crowded with stirring events. Within a week the Mesopotamia Report seemed to have passed from the public mind, which soon afterwards turned with somewhat vain expectancy to the new British offensive on the Ypres front. Yet, if the Report has temporarily receded from view, it is most assuredly not destined to lie for ever unregarded on dusty shelves. It raises issues of the gravest moment, both for Great Britain and for India. It requires the most careful study and reflection. Parliament was entirely right in ordering the Mesopotamian inquiry, and the Government were equally right in directing that the Report should be published. The country is entitled to know the truth about these momentous matters. Even though the publication caused heated quarrels and much perversion of the true aims of the investigation, the principle involved is not affected. No one can tell how long the war will last, and the Administration have no right to resort incessantly to the facile process of postponing every awkward issue until the war is over. If the Report and the subsequent public discussions shattered some reputations and

gravely compromised others, the net result was undoubtedly good. The British public, already greatly enlightened by the Dardanelles Report, received further knowledge regarding the way in which its rulers have waged war. It is gradually accumulating materials for passing a considered judgment upon the conduct of the war and upon the administrative problems which lie ahead.

The Mesopotamia Expedition was the outcome of Turkey's appearance as a combatant. Notwithstanding the statements made in Berlin in August 1914, it is abundantly clear that the participation of Turkey in the war was at first by no means certain. Hostilities were only precipitated when, under German instigation, Turkish torpedo-boats shelled Odessa on October 29, 1914, and sank a Russian warship. By this act the efforts of the peace party in Turkey were rendered useless, and Enver Pasha and his associates secured undisputed control with Germans as their guides and masters. Two steps should have been taken by Great Britain the moment war with Turkey began. The first was to force the passage of the Dardanelles and seize Constantinople under the guns of a British squadron. The operation was expected by the Turks, who made preparations to transfer the capital to Konia in Asia Minor. A Franco-British squadron had already established a blockade of the Dardanelles. The Cabinet were at that time engrossed by the German attempt to reach Calais and Boulogne, which reached its culminating point on October 31. Nothing was done concerning the Dardanelles for many weeks, though on November 3 some of the blockading warships bombarded the forts at the entrance for ten minutes, in order to verify the range and to test the defences. The later story of the Gallipoli enterprise and of its attendant disasters is familiar to the whole world. The attempt to force the Dardanelles was begun on February 19, 1915, more than three months too late, and its failure was inevitable, though it is perhaps not clear that a combined land and sea attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula was inevitably doomed.

The second obvious step imposed upon Great Britain was the seizure of the Turkish port of Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, and of the deltaic region traversed by the Shatt-al-Arab, the name given to the navigable channel formed by the junction of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. The primary

objects of this move were to cut off the Turks from access to the Persian Gulf, where British influence is paramount, and to encourage the Arab communities to throw in their lot with the Allied cause. The secondary object was to protect the oil refinery on Abadan Island, in the Shatt-al-Arab, and the oil-pipe line which traversed Persian territory to Maidan-i-Naphtun, about 150 miles inland. Two months before the war began, the Admiralty had acquired a controlling interest in the oil-fields, pipe-line, and refinery, without much regard to the question of protecting these scattered properties. The Government of India are believed to have opposed the Admiralty's oil scheme, because they foresaw quite accurately that in the event of trouble the defence of the pipe-line would be thrust upon the Army of India. The Admiralty proposed to leave the defence of the pipe-line to the wild Bakhtiari tribesmen, who even at that time were holding some of the cities of Persia to ransom. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, plumbing unwonted depths of strategy, said that a couple of brigades could protect the property if hostilities developed. Within a few weeks these views were put to the test.

Although the protection of the Abadan refinery was a very secondary object from the military point of view, there is absolutely no doubt that the Mesopotamia Expedition originated in the anxiety of the Admiralty to protect Abadan. The point is made clear in the telegram from Lord Crewe, then Secretary of State, to the Government of India, dated October 5, 1914. It is also clear, and not denied, that at the outset the Government of India were not very eager to go to Mesopotamia at all, because they had already sent a large proportion of their forces to England, France, and East Africa, and were preparing to send other forces to Egypt. The orders came from the Home Government through the India Office, and they were instigated by the Admiralty. At the same time, it should be noted that General Sir Edmund Barrow, the distinguished soldier who held the post of Military Secretary at the India Office, had prepared a minute in September advocating the seizure of Basra in the event of Turkey entering the war. It is also important to note that both the Home and Indian Governments had become aware of the intention of Enver Pasha and a number of German agents to stir up strife in Persia, in the hope of stimulating movements through Afghanistan against

India. No one at this stage seems to have seriously contemplated an advance above Basra, although there was an allusion to Baghdad in an unofficial letter written by Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, to Lord Crewe early in October. So little did the Home Government realise the possible magnitude of the operation they were initiating, that they thought a single division would suffice. The authorities do not seem to have foreseen that both Germany and Turkey were certain to make desperate efforts to retain their route to the Middle East, the development of which was almost the greatest of the war aims of Berlin.

War with Turkey began on October 31, 1914, and Basra was occupied on November 22, the refinery on Abadan island having been previously relieved from menace. At first the Expedition consisted solely of the 6th Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett, and the casualties in the successful actions which preceded the fall of Basra numbered about eight hundred in all. On November 23 Colonel Sir Percy Cox, the very experienced and prudent political officer who accompanied the Expedition, submitted in a telegram to the Viceroy the first serious suggestion for an advance to Baghdad, which he considered practicable. Sir Percy Cox has almost unrivalled knowledge of Persia and Mesopotamia, and he has kept a British peace in the Persian Gulf for many years by the exercise of a wise and cautious diplomacy. He is to-day in charge of our political interests in the occupied *vilayets*, and deservedly enjoys full confidence ; but the suggestion he submitted the day after Basra fell was an error of judgment. His proposal was uniformly rejected by Lord Crewe, Lord Hardinge, and by General Sir Beauchamp Duff, the Commander-in-Chief in India. Lord Crewe said that the Home Government ' were not ' disposed to authorise an advance to Baghdad at present.' Lord Hardinge's telegram on the subject is instructive. He said he had consulted General Duff, and had come to the conclusion that the proposal ' would be impossible to execute at ' present.' He added that in General Duff's opinion it would be necessary to have a whole division in Baghdad and another on the line of communications ; and in view of the large forces already sent overseas, and the very reduced garrison left in India, the scheme could not be carried out ' with reasonable ' safety.' Had this sound view, which was telegraphed on

December 2, 1914, been rigidly maintained, there might have been no reverse in Mesopotamia. Ten months later Lord Hardinge and General Duff assented to an attempt to take Baghdad with a single depleted and war-worn division, very slenderly supported by other troops on the lines of communication. Their eventual acquiescence was their cardinal error.

Meanwhile General Barrow had submitted to Lord Crewe on November 27 a proposal that the expedition should advance to Kurna, a town at the junction of the old channel of the Euphrates with the Tigris, 49 miles above Basra. The advice was accepted and was perfectly justified, for Kurna is an important strategical position. It marks the limit of navigation for sea-going vessels, beyond which the British forces should never have gone, in view of the military commitments of the Allies elsewhere. Up to Kurna the problem of transport never really became serious. Kurna was taken on December 8, and again Lord Crewe expressed the view that there should be no further advance 'for the present.' Unfortunately these little expeditions generally expand beyond the original calculations. In January 1915 the Turks and their Arab auxiliaries were found to be concentrating at Shaiba, a dozen miles from Basra, while another Turkish force was entrenched a few miles above Kurna. At the same time roving bands of tribesmen in Persian territory were threatening the pipe-line. The Government of India reluctantly sent another brigade, which arrived on February 7, 1915, by which date the pipe-line had been cut.

Then followed a period of recrimination between the Home Government, whose views were frequently expressed through Lord Kitchener, and the Government of India. The Home Government repeatedly pressed the Government of India to send further reinforcements to Mesopotamia. Lord Hardinge and General Duff objected, on the ground that internal conditions and the position on the frontier of India did not justify them in taking further risks. Because their fears were not in all respects realised, it has since been suggested that they were wrong in declining to send more troops to Mesopotamia. A careful examination of the whole situation early in 1915 shows, however, that their reluctance was reasonable and prudent. Minor tribal outbreaks occurred on the frontier, and it was not then clear that the Amir of Afghanistan would

be able to restrain the hostile elements within his dominions. There was grave unrest in the Punjab, murders and outrages became rife, a general rising was found to have been planned in the province for the third week in February, an attack on the arsenal at Ferozepore was attempted, and in one week the authorities were compelled to arrest 3500 revolutionaries. No one who knows how a spark may set the frontier aflame, or how a single riot may produce widespread consequences in any Indian province, can doubt that the Government of India had ample ground for their apprehensions. They had then sent out of India 80,000 British officers and men, and 210,000 Indian officers and men, and were in process of receiving in exchange 29 Territorial batteries and 34 Territorial battalions, most of which were imperfectly equipped and trained. The largest expedition previously sent from India numbered 18,000 men.

Eventually the Home Government somewhat peremptorily ordered the Government of India to send another brigade to Mesopotamia, and specifically relieved them from blame if evil results followed in India. The brigade was sent, and simultaneously the War Office so far relented as to order to Basra one of the brigades in Egypt. The 12th Division was thus constituted, and with the addition of the 6th Cavalry Brigade from India, the Mesopotamia Expedition had grown by April into an Army Corps. For reasons which still seem inadequate, but were evidently partly based on the rule of seniority, General Sir John Eccles Nixon was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia, and arrived at Basra on April 9, 1915. General Nixon was a cavalryman who had seen much frontier fighting, had led a cavalry brigade in South Africa, and was then in command of the Southern Army of India. It was said of him that he ' revelled in responsibility,' and he told the Commission that he believed he was sent out to assume the offensive, which was clearly the case. He had an hereditary association with Baghdad. His father, the late Major-General J. P. Nixon, who fought at the battle of Miani in 1843, had been Political Resident at Baghdad many years earlier. General Nixon's written instructions, handed to him by General Duff, were to submit plans for the effective occupation of the *vilayet* of Basra (which extended as far as Kut-el-Amara), and for ' a subsequent advance to Baghdad.'

Lord Hardinge afterwards said that he could not remember having seen these instructions, and the home authorities only learned of their existence in May, a fact which gives a curious glimpse of the haphazard manner in which the invasion of Mesopotamia was actually undertaken. The Report points out that the instructions 'revolutionised the whole foundation 'and organisation of an expedition initiated and founded for 'much more limited objects, and this was neither recognised 'by Sir J. Nixon nor those who so instructed him.' As the instructions admittedly came from General Duff, the criticism might have been more specific.

Within a week of General Nixon's arrival, Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., fought the battle of Shaiba, which ended the menace to Basra, and drove the Turks headlong up the Euphrates. The Admiralty then began to worry about their broken pipe-line, and Lord Crewe urged the Government of India to order an attack on the swarm of Arabs, supported by eight battalions of Turks, who were threatening the oil-fields in Persian territory. One of the extraordinary features of the story of Mesopotamia is that every high authority concerned alternately wanted to go forward and to hold back. The published documents are full of strategical contradictions, of messages which urged an advance one day and cautious restraint the next. The single exception was General Nixon, whose determination to advance never varied. On April 19 he asked for another cavalry brigade, and Lord Hardinge refused. On April 24 Lord Crewe concurred in the decision not to send more cavalry, said the Government would sanction no advance 'beyond the present theatre of operations,' declared that 'our present position is strategically a sound one,' and wound up with the wise statement that 'in Mesopotamia a 'safe game must be played.' Yet in the midst of these admirable sentiments, and in the very same telegram, Lord Crewe suggested an advance to Amara, 87 miles higher up the Tigris, in order to add to 'the security of the pipe-line.' This was certainly not 'a safe game,' especially as it instantly transformed the problem of transport, of which no one seemed to be thinking.

Major-General G. F. Gorringe, with two brigades of the 12th Division and the 6th Cavalry Brigade, went to Ahwaz on the Karun River, and during May and June completely

routed the Turks and Arabs who had been threatening the oil-fields. The pipe-line was restored, though the urgent anxiety of the Admiralty is difficult to understand in view of Mr. Winston Churchill's statement, on June 17, 1914, that the Royal Navy had 'in peace and war the shield and buffer 'of the great oil fuel reserve, in itself sufficient to carry us 'through a long period of war.' Meanwhile, about the end of the third week in May, General Nixon somewhat suddenly intimated that he proposed to send Major-General Charles Townshend and the 6th Division up the Tigris to take Amara. Lord Hardinge seems to have approved, but Lord Crewe was strangely, though quite rightly, chill. He concurred, but remarked with asperity that 'arrangements for the move in 'question must have been made some days back, and I am of 'opinion that General Nixon should have submitted his pro-'posals before the last moment.' He also declared: 'We 'can send him no more troops.' Apparently Lord Crewe overlooked the fact that he had been the first to suggest the limited advance to Amara. Lord Crewe closed a distinctly cold telegram by observing that 'only the Cabinet should 'decide questions jointly affecting civil and military policy.' The remark is important, for it is quite clear that the true responsibility for the subsequent unsuccessful attempt to take Baghdad rested upon the Cabinet.

General Townshend occupied Amara on June 3, 1915, and at once General Nixon proposed a fresh advance westward from Kurna along the old channel of the Euphrates to Nasiriyeh, 85 miles away. Everybody appears to have approved of this move, and the Commission pronounced it to be 'sound.' Major-General Gorringe and troops of the 12th Division entered Nasiriyeh on July 25, after an advance in the hottest season of the year by a very difficult route. It will be observed that by this time the expedition was spread out like a huge fan, with Amara at the centre of the rim, Nasiriyeh and Ahwaz as the sides, and Kurna-Basra as the handle. The Turks had not offered a very fierce resistance anywhere, and earlier anxieties became obscured. On July 27 Lord Hardinge proposed yet another move up the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara, 143 miles above the town of Amara. He telegraphed to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, who had succeeded Lord Crewe as Secretary of State, that 'now that Nasiriyeh has been occupied the occupation of

'Kut-el-Amara is considered by us to be a strategic necessity.' From an abstract strategical point of view the recommendation was justified. Kut and Nasiriyeh (and therefore the Tigris and Euphrates) are connected by a large channel known as the Shatt-al-Hai, about 135 miles long, dry in summer, but navigable for shallow craft in the winter months. From a practical military point of view the recommendation was not warrantable, because river transport was extremely deficient, the expedition had been warned that no more troops could be sent, the two divisions and the cavalry brigade had already been diminished by field casualties and sickness, and it was quite certain that the Turks would not tolerate an indefinite advance. It must be added that Kut is 346 miles from the sea by the winding river route. The original suggestion for the advance to Kut came from General Nixon, and it was sanctioned without much demur in any quarter. General Townshend, with the 6th Division and the 6th Cavalry Brigade, fought a skilful and somewhat daring battle near Kut on September 28, 1915, and his cavalry entered the town next day. By October 4 the cavalry had pursued the flying Turks as far as Azizieh, 50 miles beyond Kut, 117 miles from Baghdad by water, and a shorter distance by land. The moment of supreme temptation had arrived.

On August 30 General Nixon, in accordance with his instructions, had submitted a plan for an advance to Baghdad in the event of a defeat of the Turks near Kut. General Duff's comment, written on September 9, was that 'unless we 'can get back troops from France, Egypt, or elsewhere, I fear 'that Baghdad, invaluable as its capture would be, is out of 'the question.' On October 3 General Nixon telegraphed direct to Mr. Chamberlain: 'I consider I am strong enough 'to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention I propose 'to concentrate at Azizieh.' There was no good ground for this confident assertion. General Townshend's own account was that he only had 11,000 combatants and 28 guns, and General Gorringe's forces were very thin in view of the length of the communications. On October 4 Mr. Chamberlain sent two telegrams to Lord Hardinge. In one of them he said that it seemed 'imperative to stop the further advance of General 'Nixon's force,' in view of a private letter he had received from Lord Hardinge, which has not been published. In the other

telegram, which was official, he asked what General Nixon's intentions were, and suggested that as the retreating enemy could not be caught, there was 'no object in the pursuit being 'continued.' On October 5 General Nixon telegraphed to India asking whether he could have another division from France, in order to maintain his position at Baghdad if he got there. On the same day the Government of India telegraphed to General Nixon deprecating any further advance in strength beyond Kut, and the next day they told the Secretary of State that they had sent orders 'to stop further 'advance.' It is perfectly clear that the Expedition understood that it was stopped, for on October 11 General Townshend informed his troops that 'our present orders are not to advance 'to Baghdad,' and he said that these orders had come 'from 'Government in England.'

But in the meantime the issue had been reopened, not by the Government of India but by the Cabinet. The crucial date in the whole Baghdad controversy is October 4, 1915. After Mr. Chamberlain had telegraphed to Lord Hardinge stopping the advance, he attended a Cabinet meeting. In the debate on July 13 last in the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith, without in the least wishing to disclaim responsibility, laid stress upon the fact that from October 18 to 27, 1915, during which period the actual decision to advance to Baghdad was made, he was absent from his post through illness. The point is merely technical, for it is plain that the fatal date was October 4, when Mr. Asquith was present. Mr. Chamberlain says he reported to the Cabinet that he had stopped General Nixon's advance upon his own responsibility. Presumably he also submitted the views contained in Lord Hardinge's private letter. The Cabinet did not accept Mr. Chamberlain's most prudent judgment. They decided to appoint a committee to consider the possibilities of an advance to Baghdad, and it was from this decision that the subsequent disasters flowed. On that day the Cabinet had nothing before them, on their own showing, but General Nixon's unsupported view. They must have learned from Mr. Chamberlain that the Government of India were not then favourable. What were the reasons which impelled the Cabinet to take this extraordinary step? In notifying to Lord Hardinge the attitude of the Cabinet, Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed: 'If forces available are sufficient

'to take and hold the place, political reasons are thought to 'make occupation desirable because it would isolate the Ger- 'mans in Persia.' These reasons were unsound and unwarrantable. The fall of Baghdad would not have prevented the Germans in Persia from receiving help from the Turks. To accomplish that end it would have been necessary to go to Kirkuk, to Mosul, and even to Bitlis and Lake Van. The easiest pass from Baghdad into Persia is by way of Khanikin and Kasr-i-Shirin, but there are other practicable passes farther north, especially the pass by Rowanduz. Had General Townshend taken Baghdad the Germans in Persia would not have been isolated. The remarkable thing about this decision is that the Cabinet then included among its members two almost unrivalled experts upon the question at issue, Lord Curzon and Lord Kitchener. Lord Curzon was familiar with the whole region and its possibilities, Lord Kitchener had made a special study of the military problems of Mesopotamia long before the war. The wholesome tradition of collective Cabinet responsibility makes it impossible to inquire whether there were differences of opinion. Lord Curzon has fully associated himself with the decision. As to Lord Kitchener's attitude there is no clue, save the statement in Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of October 5: 'Kitchener can hold out no hope of reinforce- 'ments from Europe or Egypt.'

Later in the month, in a telegram sent on October 21 to the Viceroy by Mr. Chamberlain, which is accepted as expressing the views of the Cabinet, other reasons were also advanced. The full text of the salient passage is paraphrased as follows:

'At present moment it seems the German attempt to break through to Constantinople will succeed, and our position and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. It would seem that Persia is drifting into war on the side of our enemies. The Arabs are wavering and will probably join the Turks unless we can offer them a great inducement. We are therefore in great need of a striking success in the East, both to prevent Persia being carried away and to secure the support of the Arabs. It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leaders that we favour creation of Arab state independent of Turks. . . . Unless you consider possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable, and we are prepared to order it.'

The general military situation at the time this telegram was

sent requires consideration. The battle of Loos had just been fought, and its failure to fulfil the high hopes built upon it had produced depression. The repulse at Suvla Bay and Sari Bair had become generally known, and Sir Ian Hamilton had been recalled six days earlier. The final attack on Serbia had begun, Bulgaria had declared war, and Belgrade had fallen. The great Russian retreat had nearly reached its limit. Governments stand or fall at such times by their success in war, and it is manifest that larger considerations than the movements of a comparative handful of Germans in Persia were at work. In the Mesopotamia debate Mr. Asquith passionately resented the imputation that the Cabinet were 'animated by some 'regard for our political fortunes at home.' Upon that point the public may be left to judge for themselves. It is admitted that the unfortunate position at Gallipoli was present in the minds of Ministers, and the possibility of the abandonment of the Dardanelles Expedition was looming ahead. We need not go beyond the undisputed facts. Though to the end Persia was placed with evident sincerity in the forefront of the Government's reasons, they were also thinking of Gallipoli. It is difficult to understand why Ministers and ex-Ministers have expressed themselves with so much heat upon this point. If a blow at Baghdad was sound from the military point of view, it would have been an excellent and praiseworthy counter to the defeat at Gallipoli.

The Government took considerable pains to explore the situation before finally ordering the advance. They summoned an Inter-Departmental Committee, composed of representatives of the India Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office, who were instructed to consider 'whether 'in all the circumstances, including the local situation in India 'and Persia, an advance upon Baghdad is strategically and 'politically expedient.' The terms of reference were peculiar, for the true point to be determined was whether General Nixon could take Baghdad with the forces at his disposal. The only members of the Committee competent to express an opinion on this point were the naval and military experts. There were three soldiers, General Sir Edmund Barrow, from the India Office, and two others of considerably lower rank, Colonel Talbot and Captain Paddon, from the War Office. Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble represented the Admiralty, and

might have been expected to take special interest in the question of river transport, on which the success of the enterprise largely depended. The subject of transport was not, however, considered with any care, because a telegram from General Nixon, in which he was erroneously thought to have declared that the difficulties of navigation had been 'overcome,' led the Committee to believe that the transport difficulty was not serious. Eventually the Committee reported that 'on both political 'and military grounds, the occupation of Baghdad was most 'desirable if the necessary reinforcements could be assured. 'Failing these, General Nixon was not to attempt it.' The judgment of the Committee cannot be approved, for it should have been obvious that reinforcements from France or Egypt could not have reached Mesopotamia for a considerable time. Mr. Chamberlain afterwards laid stress upon the fact that a report had also been received from the General Staff. At that period the General Staff was still in process of hasty reconstitution, after having been broken up on the outbreak of war. So far as its views were entitled to carry weight, they were on the whole hostile to the Cabinet's wishes. The General Staff thought that General Nixon could take Baghdad, but that the Turks might menace him there very soon, and that 'if there 'were very strong objections to a withdrawal from Baghdad 'then its occupation should not be attempted.'

It remains to note the attitude of the Government of India towards the proposed advance. On October 6, 1915, the day after General Nixon had been ordered to go no farther, the Government of India telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain recognising the great advantages which would result from the capture of Baghdad, but stating that 'to do this at least an 'additional division would be required.' Lord Hardinge claimed in the House of Lords that the telegram of October 6 showed that the Government of India were 'absolutely 'opposed to an advance without the reinforcement of General 'Nixon by an additional division.' He further contended that 'had the later telegrams from the Secretary of State of the '8th October to General Nixon and myself not been despatched, 'the expeditionary force would have remained at Kut-el-'Amara.' We have here the clue to the change of view of the Government of India in the second week of October. What were the telegrams of the Secretary of State? On October 8

Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed to General Nixon: 'To both 'occupy and hold Baghdad what addition to your present 'force are you confident will be necessary?' On the same day he telegraphed to Lord Hardinge: 'The Cabinet are 'so impressed with great political and military advantages of 'occupation of Baghdad that every effort will be made by us 'to supply the force that is necessary. We do not wish to 'attempt it with insufficient forces. I shall be glad to know 'whether you are satisfied that one division will suffice.' The effect of these telegrams was to impress upon Lord Hardinge and General Duff that the Cabinet were above all things anxious to take Baghdad, and they seem to have become obediently eager to meet the Cabinet's wishes.

Yet before they could take any step, the situation was stampeded by General Nixon. Having received Mr. Chamberlain's inquiry, he instantly replied on the same day: 'No 'additions are necessary to my present force to beat Nur- 'ed-din and occupy Baghdad; of this I am confident.' General Nixon appears to have dispatched this rashly complacent message without consulting anybody. His Chief of Staff, General Kemball, was not sent to discuss the situation with General Townshend until October 19. General Townshend had sent a warning telegram to General Nixon's headquarters on October 3, in which he said that 'unless great risk is to 'be run' it was 'absolutely necessary' that the advance from Kut should be undertaken by two divisions, or 'by one division 'supported closely by another complete division.' Inexplicable though it may sound, General Nixon told the Commission that he did not remember seeing this telegram from General Townshend, the man who was best able to judge whether he could defeat the Turks and take Baghdad. The Government of India and the Cabinet were not informed of General Townshend's view, nor did they trouble to inquire. General Duff actually stated that if he had been aware of General Townshend's attitude he would not have altered his final opinion.

By October 9 the Government of India had fallen into line, and had abandoned their considered and cautious view of October 6 with astonishing alacrity. Lord Hardinge telegraphed on October 9 to Mr. Chamberlain that he was 'glad 'of the Cabinet's decision,' and he added that he and General Duff were 'of the opinion that Sir John Nixon is in the best

'position to judge as to the number of troops that will be 'required.' It is due to Lord Hardinge to mention that he added an important qualification. He emphasised the fact that General Nixon asked for another division, and he urged that 'the reinforcing troops should reach Baghdad not later 'than one month after the capture of that city.' Lord Hardinge may not have known, but both General Duff and the military advisers of the Cabinet should have known, that owing to transport and other difficulties it was impossible for another division to reach Baghdad within the period specified. Having changed his tone, Lord Hardinge ended by becoming unaccountably enthusiastic. On October 23 he telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain: 'I am confident right policy at the 'present time is to take the risk and occupy Baghdad with the 'least possible delay, relying upon you to send two divisions 'from France as quickly as possible to Mesopotamia.' Finally, Mr. Chamberlain, as the mouthpiece of the Cabinet, took the irrevocable step on October 23 by telegraphing to the Government of India: 'If Nixon is satisfied that the force he has 'available is sufficient for the operation, he may march on 'Baghdad.'

There was one man who ought to have known, and evidently did know, that it was unsafe to order General Townshend to attempt to take Baghdad with a single depleted Division and twenty-eight guns. That man was General Duff, at whose instance Lord Hardinge telegraphed to London a warning message on October 7. Part of the text of this message is in dispute, but General Duff's version of the salient passage, which apparently is not disputed, is as follows: 'As a military 'operation, therefore, he (General Duff) holds that to occupy 'Baghdad with our present forces would be most unwise.' Two days later he assented to this 'most unwise' military operation. Why did he change his mind? He appears to have been influenced, firstly, by General Nixon's confident statement to Mr. Chamberlain on October 8, and, secondly, by the evident anxiety of the Cabinet to take Baghdad. These reasons cannot be held to exonerate him. As Commander-in-Chief in India, he was in a military sense responsible for the conduct and control of the Mesopotamia Expedition; and as an executive member of the Government of India he also shared

the local political responsibility. He knew better than anyone else the temperament of General Nixon, his own subordinate. Had he firmly adhered to his conviction of October 7, and had he vigorously opposed an adventure so forlorn in its basis, the attempt might never have been made. It is curious that General Barrow at the India Office underwent a very similar change of mind. On October 4 he wrote a memorandum in which he said that 'to attempt to go to Baghdad with the 'present force was to incur unjustifiable risk.' By October 16 he had so far modified his view that he said that 'if he had 'a firm promise of two divisions, he was entirely in favour 'of going to Baghdad.' But the essential position was unchanged, because the two divisions could not arrive for a considerable time.

Both Lord Hardinge and the Cabinet received very bad counsel from their military advisers. The three officers chiefly concerned are General Nixon, General Duff, and General Barrow. General Nixon's fault was blind confidence; with the best of intentions, he misled everybody. General Duff erred through weakness and instability, and he was also to blame because he never took the obvious course of going to the Tigris to examine the situation for himself. General Barrow cannot be placed in the same category, for he was far away; he seems to have placed much reliance in General Nixon's view, and there is no published proof that he was aware of the inadequacy of the transport; but he greatly excelled the other two in his knowledge of strategy, and it is unfortunate that he had second thoughts after his wise conclusion on October 4. Possibly, like Lord Hardinge and General Duff, his judgment was affected by the strong predilection of the Cabinet in favour of an advance to Baghdad.

But though the soldiers gave the politicians and administrators bad advice, the question of ultimate responsibility is not altered by that fact. Lord Hardinge in his apologia in the House of Lords contended that the Government of India would have placed themselves in 'an invidious position if 'they had overridden the opinion of the General in command 'in the field and had vetoed the advance to Baghdad.' It would have been a case, he said, of 'civilian interference with 'military plans.' We may remark in passing that the 'civilian

'interference' began with the action of the Cabinet on October 4 in reopening the question of the advance to Baghdad. Mr. Asquith took much the same line in the House of Commons. He sheltered himself behind General Nixon, of whom he said, with scant justice to others, that in the autumn of 1915 he was 'easily the most successful general in all the theatres of war.' Mr. Chamberlain wanted to know what the House of Commons would have said if the Cabinet 'had set up our own opinions 'in opposition to those of the general officer on the spot.' All these contentions are unconstitutional and unsound, and their validity cannot be admitted for a single moment. They recall to memory Mr. Balfour's speech in the House of Commons on January 31, 1900, after General Buller's repulse at Spion Kop, when he virtuously declared that the British generals in the field had not been hampered by any orders or instructions whatever from the Cabinet. No Government can abdicate and yet remain in office, least of all in time of war. It was remarked in 1900, with reference to Mr. Balfour's speech, that 'no member of the Cabinet appears to have quite grasped the 'elementary truth that the conduct of a war is the business 'of a government, which cannot clear its responsibility by 'delegating its powers to an inferior authority.' As a matter of fact, successive British Governments have constantly interfered with military plans during the present war, and it is imperative that they should do so on occasion. None know this better than the various Ministers who, when their Mesopotamia schemes came to grief, pleaded that they had followed expert advice. The frequent cry in the popular press, 'Trust 'the soldiers and seamen,' is the negation of all government if literally adopted as our watchword in war. The function of the Government is to examine the proposals of the soldiers and seamen, to accept or reject them, to come to decisions in the light of common sense, and to shoulder the responsibility. Had the Cabinet continued to maintain the attitude of polite and unquestioning detachment which was the rule in the autumn of 1914, we should by now have been defeated. But responsibility carries penalties in the event of failure, and although Mr. Austen Chamberlain made the plea which has been quoted, he recognised the wholesome principle involved by tendering his resignation after the Commission had reported.

In spite of the fact that he was Secretary of State for India, his share of responsibility was in effect precisely the same as that of his colleagues, neither more nor less. He declined to admit that the policy adopted by the Cabinet was wrong, but he accepted the result and relinquished office. Lord Curzon afterwards said that his conduct was 'almost quixotic.' It was nothing of the sort. It was the acceptance of a sound constitutional principle, and though Mr. Chamberlain was alone in taking this courageous course, his decision raised him in the esteem of his countrymen, and will strengthen rather than prejudice his future opportunities of public service. It remains a matter for deep regret that at so critical a moment as the present India should have been deprived of the services of so capable a Secretary of State.

The Commission found quite correctly that the advance to Baghdad was 'an offensive movement based upon political 'and military miscalculations and attempted with tired and 'insufficient forces, and inadequate preparation.' It placed 'the weightiest share of responsibility' upon General Nixon, 'whose confident optimism was the main cause of the decision 'to advance.' It considered that the other persons responsible, 'in the order and sequence of responsibility,' were Lord Hardinge, General Duff, General Barrow, Mr. Chamberlain, and the War Committee of the Cabinet. The suggested sequence of responsibility is difficult to accept, even in the case of General Nixon. The Commission rightly observed that the political heads of departments 'have the option and 'power of accepting or rejecting the advice of their expert 'subordinates. The acceptance by a chief of wrong advice 'from expert subordinates may be an extenuation of, but 'cannot secure complete immunity from, the responsibility 'for the evils which may ensue.' The principles here defined might have been more strongly stated. Our analysis of the origin of the advance to Baghdad has been in vain if it has not shown that the first impulse came from the Cabinet, and that except in the special case of General Nixon, the judgment of the Government of India and of the military experts was swayed to an excessive degree by a desire to meet the supposed wishes of the Cabinet. It has been admitted that the Cabinet were grievously misled by military opinion, but the plea is an

extenuation and not an acquittal. Their statement that they were anxious about Persia is true, but it is not the whole truth, as is proved by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of October 21. Our conclusion is that they were eager for a success in some portion of the theatre of war, and that when a chance seemed to offer they clutched at it and pressed for it without sufficient scrutiny. The military advice they received entitles them to be relieved from unqualified condemnation, but the primary blame lies at their door. They made a grievous mistake, which cost many thousands of lives, and their worst fault was their subsequent collective impenitence. One other conclusion emerges from this examination. There is no sign that a single clear brain investigated the problem of Baghdad. The contradictions and the waverings, the masses of irrelevant detail, the endless meetings and consultations and telegrams, the confusion of the whole business, form a mortifying revelation of our methods of conducting war in 1915. Had one clear-minded man in authority stripped the whole subject of its wrappings, and taken his stand firmly upon the simple point that a solitary tired and reduced division without adequate backing should not have been sent to capture a great city in an inhospitable region at a distance by river of 570 miles from the sea, there might have been no disaster.

We have confined our analysis to the question of responsibility for the advance to Baghdad, because every other point raised in the controversy is subsidiary to that paramount issue. Both in the debates in Parliament, and in the discussions in the press, attention was directed to a whole series of matters of secondary importance, some of which were almost irrelevant. One example must suffice. A great deal was said about a warning sent on October 21 at the instance of the General Staff, stating that 60,000 Turks might be concentrated at Baghdad at the end of January. General Nixon did not receive the warning, but the point is not very material, because nearly two months before the date mentioned General Townshend was beleaguered in Kut. Another warning, explicitly stating that Marshal von der Goltz and 30,000 Turks were on their way to Baghdad, was received by General Nixon on November 17, four days before the battle of Ctesiphon, but he merely replied that 'at present I do not accept these reports as conclusive

'for various reasons.' Nothing short of a positive order would have made him hesitate.

Public indignation was almost exclusively concentrated upon the terrible revelations associated with the breakdown of the medical organisation, and also upon the painful disclosures of the inefficient control of equipment and supply, and above all of river transport, by the Army Department of the Government of India. The case of Major Carter, an officer of the Indian Medical Service who had incurred much unmerited obloquy by his persistent efforts to call attention to the plight of the wounded, was pressed with an excited eagerness which suggested a lack of perspective. While the bad management of the Indian military authorities was deservedly condemned, their plea that they were starved by the War Office, and that their requests for material were ignored, went entirely unheeded. Yet it is a fact that the War Office was so hostile and ungenerous to the Mesopotamia Expedition in 1915, that even the dispatches of the commanders were refused publication in the 'London Gazette.' Under the influence of the press and of certain Members of Parliament, the public anger was fanned into a wild demand for 'punishment.' The outcry at length concentrated upon Lord Hardinge, who had left India for ever more than a year earlier, and had returned to his old post as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, where his exceptional experience was invaluable. He had steered India safely through the troubled early period of the war, and had left the country amid general manifestations of regret; but an issue which really concerned principles of supreme importance with regard to the conduct of the war degenerated in the end into an insensate clamour for his expulsion from the Foreign Office. He had thrice offered to resign, and on each occasion his request had been refused. Mr. Balfour, who was himself one of the Ministers responsible for the advance to Baghdad, finally crushed the agitation in a speech which, in motive at any rate, is one of the most creditable incidents in his career. We have shown here that if punishment had to be administered, it was bound to begin with Ministers themselves. As this would have involved the elimination of several leading members of the Government, and the consequent paralysis of administration, the excitement suddenly collapsed.

The true object of the Mesopotamia Commission was to find out in what respect our methods of conducting war were at fault; to marshal evidence and to assess its meaning, and not to provide scapegoats. The Commission did its work well, and its report is a model of judicial impartiality. Incidentally it revealed grave shortcomings in the administrative system of India, both civil and military. To these we may again revert, but meanwhile it is necessary to say that the findings of the Commission have no relation whatever to the present scheme for the enlargement of Indian self-government. In its dispassionate disclosure of the methods by which the Government of 1915 went about the business of waging war the Commission rendered a great service to the nation, and to that issue public discussion should return in a calmer spirit.

LOVAT FRASER.

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